Z.H., Appellant-Respondent v. G.M., Appellee-Petitioner (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Z.H. appeals the trial court's entry of an order for protection in favor of G.M. and claims the evidence does not support the order. We reverse.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On December 18, 2024, G.M. filed a Petition for an Order for Protection and Request for a Hearing against Z.H. G.M. alleged that she was a victim of repeated acts of harassment. She alleged: “Male subject intentionally hit my parked car causing slight damage.” Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 8. That same day, the court issued an Ex Parte Order for Protection.

[3] On February 21, 2025, the court held a hearing. G.M. appeared without counsel and testified, “I asked for the protective order because I am afraid, your Honor. He backed into my vehicle intentionally. He reversed into it. He struck it.” Transcript Volume II at 7. She testified, “[h]e had sufficient space to, I guess, park his car, but he continued to reverse and he struck my vehicle.” Id. She stated, “And I am afraid, because if he did that to my vehicle, you know, what can he do to me.” Id. She indicated the incident occurred on October 17, 2024. The court asked, “[p]rior to the incident ․, did you have any problems with [Z.H.],” and G.M. replied, “[b]esides him continuously reversing far back into my vehicle, I have had no other incident with him, your Honor, that I can say.” Id. at 8. When asked, “[s]o before the date in question, you had no incidents with [Z.H.],” she answered “no.” Id.

[4] On cross-examination, G.M. testified that she had lived at her residence since 2019. She indicated that her vehicle, a van, was parked in her driveway at the time of the accident. The court admitted a map from the Lake County Surveyor's Office depicting the locations of G.M.’s and Z.H.’s residences, G.M.’s driveway, and the street. Z.H.’s counsel asked G.M. to refer to several photographs, and G.M. indicated that the photographs showed her van parked in her driveway. When asked “[i]s this where it was parked when you claim it was hit,” G.M. replied affirmatively.¹ Id. at 11. The court asked G.M., “[s]pecifically, what is the harassment,” she stated “[b]ecause he keeps doing it,” the court asked “[d]oing what,” and she replied “[r]eversing all the way to the point to my vehicle where he's not leaving sufficient space.” Id. at 20. G.M. presented a number of photographs taken on different dates to show that Z.H. “reverses as far as he possibly can to my vehicle.” Id. at 26. She testified, “[t]here's more than sufficient space and there's parking available in other areas on the block.” Id.

[5] Z.H. referred to the Surveyor's map and testified that he and his father lived in the residence on Lot 13, that his father owned Lots 13 and 12, and that G.M. lived in the residence on Lot 11.² When asked where he parked his vehicle, Z.H. answered, “[a]t the edge of the lot of my father's property line, I've always parked there.” Id. at 41. When asked, “why do you park at the edge of the line,” he replied “[i]t's just where I've always parked whether it was my car or my father's car. Whenever I drive, I always park there to leave space in front for my father, or when I was younger, my grandparents would park in front.” Id. The court, at the request of Z.H.’s counsel, took notice of “City Code of East Chicago regarding parking City Code 72.001, 72.047.”³ Id. at 44. When asked about the allegation that he “intentionally reversed [his] vehicle into [G.M.’s] vehicle causing damage,” Z.H. testified, “[n]ot to my knowledge did I bump her vehicle in any way, fashion, or form ․ I was unaware that I hit her vehicle.” Id. He testified that he returned home from work, parked his car, and went inside, and about ten minutes later his father told him the police were outside. When asked, “[h]ow do you determine ․ how close you've parked to the property line,” Z.H. testified, “I guess you can call it instinct. I've parked like that ․ since 16, so I always kind of know where the property line is. And every time I get out of the vehicle, I always look back and make sure I'm never crossing over ․ into their property, and if I do, I'll pull forward.” Id. at 46. He indicated that, to his knowledge, his vehicle has never struck the neighbor's vehicles. He indicated that he had no reason to bother, harass, or intimidate his neighbors and that no one talked to him about the location he parked in front of his father's lot.

[6] On cross-examination, G.M. asked what the police told him on October 17, 2024, and Z.H. testified, “[t]he officers told me that you stated that I hit your vehicle and that there was no damage to your vehicle and no police report or accident report would be filed.” Id. at 47. The court questioned Z.H. about the location of his vehicle as depicted in several photographs, and Z.H. stated that the photographs showed his vehicle “parked at the edge of our property line next to [G.M.’s] vehicle which is parked very close to our property line in her driveway.” Id. at 49. The court asked, “[w]ould it be your pattern when you got to the street and parked to back up,” Z.H. testified, “[y]es, your Honor, I always reverse into my parking spot,” the court asked, “[t]o get to the line,” and Z.H. responded affirmatively. Id. at 51. The court asked, “[e]ven if you had space in front of you,” Z.H. replied affirmatively, the court asked “[w]hy,” and he stated, “I've always parked there.” Id. The court asked, “[b]ecause you've always parked there even though there was more than enough space for you to maybe move two or three feet, four, five feet,” and Z.H. answered, “[y]es, your Honor. I always leave room just in case my father needs to back up or someone parks in front.” Id. The court asked why he continued to park close to G.M.’s vehicle after the allegation of harassment was made against him resulting in the ex parte order for protection, and Z.H. replied, “[a]fter the protective order, I didn't park as close to that property line.” Id. at 52. The court commented that the photographs do not appear to indicate that Z.H. parked further from the line after the protective order was issued.

[7] In closing, G.M. argued, “[t]o me, this continued pattern of behavior ․ is a form of harassment” and “I want to live in peace. I don't want to have to worry on my safety or feel threatened because I feel threatened. I feel afraid. That's how I feel.” Id. at 54. Z.H.’s counsel argued, “we do not have harassment. We have a pattern of parking behavior in front of his own property, a property owned by his father, where he resides.” Id. at 55. He argued, “[w]e have a neighbor who is in violation of City of East Chicago town code by parking her vehicle across the sidewalk and parking her vehicle in a manner that's not parallel with the edge of the roadway, but is actually directed into the roadway in violation of city code.” Id. He argued “it's alleged [Z.H.] backed his vehicle into [G.M.’s] vehicle. If it happened, it's an accident. It's not harassment. It's not intimidation. It's none of those things that would support a protective order.” Id.

[8] The court stated, “I have ․ multiple problems with this case: one, we've got city code that the Court has taken judicial notice of,” “[t]his van is on a public way, a walkway, not a street,” “you're in violation of a city code,” “I mean, it's on every picture,” “[t]hat van is on a public walkway,” and “it's not supposed to be there.” Id. at 56. It stated, “[w]as your vehicle smashed [ ] or struck by this other vehicle,” and “[t]here's no evidence that it was other than your testimony.” Id. The court further stated, “[n]ow, technically, he can park there. But when there's a protective order, I'm not going to do anything to demonstrate any kind of harassment. I'm going to move down, park on the other side of the street, move down, not because I've been doing this for 35, 40, 50 years, but stay out of that person's way until I get this matter resolved in court” and “[t]hat's why I got to extend this protective order.” Id. at 57. The court entered an order for protection.

Discussion

[9] Before addressing Z.H.’s arguments, we note that G.M. has not filed an appellee's brief. When an appellee fails to submit a brief, we do not undertake the burden of developing arguments, and we apply a less stringent standard of review, that is, we may reverse if the appellant establishes prima facie error. Bixler v. Delano, 185 N.E.3d 875, 877 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022). Prima facie is defined as “at first sight, on first appearance, or on the face of it.” Id. This rule was established so that we might be relieved of the burden of controverting the arguments advanced in favor of reversal where that burden properly rests with the appellee. Id. at 878.

[10] Z.H. argues that G.M. failed to demonstrate that he presents a credible threat to her safety or the safety of a member of her household. He argues, “[a] reasonable person would not or should not suffer emotional distress as a result of seeing a neighbor park a vehicle close to one's own vehicle, especially after having done so without issue time and time again.” Appellant's Brief at 11. He maintains there is no evidence that he threatened to harm G.M. or a member of her household. He also argues that he “has parked his vehicle parallel to the edge of the roadway in front of his Father's property, as permitted by City code for the City of East Chicago” and “G.M. parks her vehicle in a manner that partially obstructs the sidewalk in front of her property and partially enters the roadway perpendicular to the curb, rather than parallel to the curb, in violation of City Code.” Id. at 13.

[11] Ind. Code § 34-26-5-2(b) provides: “A person who is or has been subjected to harassment may file a petition for an order for protection against a person who has committed repeated acts of harassment against the petitioner.” At the time of the order for protection, Ind. Code § 34-6-2-51.5 provided:

(a) “Harassment”, for purposes of IC 34-26-5, means conduct directed toward a victim that includes, but is not limited to, repeated or continuing impermissible contact:

(1) that would cause a reasonable person to suffer emotional distress; and

(2) that actually causes the victim to suffer emotional distress.

(b) “Harassment” does not include statutorily or constitutionally protected activity, such as lawful picketing pursuant to labor disputes or lawful employer-related activities pursuant to labor disputes.

(Subsequently repealed by Pub. Law No. 186-2025, § 175 (eff. July 1, 2025)).⁴

[12] Ind. Code § 34-26-5-9(h) provides:

A finding that ․ harassment has occurred sufficient to justify the issuance of an order under this section means that a respondent represents a credible threat to the safety of a petitioner or a member of a petitioner's household. Upon a showing of ․ harassment by a preponderance of the evidence, the court shall grant relief necessary to bring about a cessation of the violence or the threat of violence․

(Emphasis added). “The threat posed by the respondent is viewed objectively, and the threat must be credible, meaning plausible or believable.” L.R. b/n/f H.R. v. M.H. b/n/f N.H., 223 N.E.3d 675, 681 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (citation omitted). “Thus, the petitioner must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the respondent presently intends to harm the petitioner or the petitioner's family.” Id. (citation omitted). “If the petitioner meets their burden, the trial court must issue a protective order and grant relief necessary to end the violence or threat of violence.” Id. (citations and quotations omitted). Because these “court-ordered measures may impose significant restrictions on a respondent's freedom of movement and other rights,” a court “faced with a request for protective order must balance, on the one hand, the need to protect actual and threatened victims against, on the other, the onerous burden borne by those erroneously subject to such an order.” S.H. v. D.W., 139 N.E.3d 214, 219 (Ind. 2020) (citation and quotations omitted).

[13] The evidence does not support the conclusion that Z.H. had impermissible contact with G.M. or that he represents a present and credible threat to the safety of G.M. or her household. Z.H. parked his vehicle parallel to the street in front of his father's property where he lived and close to the boundary of the lot where G.M. lived and the driveway where she parked her vehicle. While G.M. alleged that Z.H.’s vehicle struck her vehicle once, she did not show there was any damage, and the police did not file a report. While Z.H. could have parked further from G.M.’s driveway,⁵ the evidence does not establish that Z.H. represented a credible threat to the safety of G.M. or a member of her household as required by statute. The evidence does not support the order for protection.

[14] For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the order for protection.

[15] Reversed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The photographs show a van parked partially in a driveway and extending partially into the street.

2.   The map shows Lots 11, 12, and 13 on the same side of the street, that there are houses on Lots 11 and 13, and that Lot 12 is vacant and located between Lots 13 and 11.

3.   Section 72.001 provided, “[n]o person shall ․ park a vehicle ․ in any of the following places: (1) On a sidewalk ․” Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 122. Section 72.047 provided, “[n]o person shall ․ park a vehicle in a roadway other than parallel with the edge of the roadway headed in the direction of lawful traffic movement and with the right-hand wheels of the vehicle within 12 inches of the curb or edge of the roadway ․” Id.

4.   This definition is now found at Ind. Code § 34-6-2.1-80 (added by Pub. Law No. 186-2025, § 176 (eff. July 1, 2025)).

5.   To the extent Z.H. parked his vehicle close to G.M.’s driveway, we note that Section 72.001 of the City Code of East Chicago provides that “[n]o person shall stop, stand, or park a vehicle ․ [i]n front of a public or private driveway.”

Brown, Judge.

Bailey, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.