Paul Richard Allen Clark, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Paul Clark appeals his convictions for two counts of Level 1 felony child molesting and one count of Level 5 felony criminal confinement. Clark also appeals his resulting 106-year aggregate sentence. Clark raises two issues for our review, which we restate as follows:

1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in the admission of certain testimony.

2. Whether his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and his character.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Around 2014, Clark began dating K.C. and moved into her home in Hendricks County with her two minor children, a son and a daughter (“the Children”). During that time, Clark molested both of the Children. He and K.C. later separated, and Clark moved out of the home. In 2022, the daughter informed a school official of the molestations.

[4] After an investigation, the State charged Clark with two counts of Level 1 felony child molesting and one count of Level 5 felony criminal confinement, which related to the manner in which Clark had molested the son. At his ensuing jury trial, both of the Children testified and provided graphic details of Clark having molested them. In particular, the son testified that, on at least one occasion, Clark tied him up to a bedpost, anally penetrated him, and then ejaculated into his mouth. The daughter testified that, on multiple occasions, Clark attempted to anally penetrate her, that she would scream during his attempts, and that he would continue his attempts until “something ․ c[a]me out of his penis.” Tr. Vol. 2, p. 235.

[5] Clark testified in his own defense and accused the Children of fabricating the alleged molestations. On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked Clark, “why would they lie?” Tr. Vol. 3, p. 89. Clark's counsel objected on the ground that the question called for Clark to speculate. The trial court overruled the objection, and Clark answered, “I wouldn't know.” Id. The jury found Clark guilty as charged.

[6] After a sentencing hearing, the trial court found as follows:

I'm going to find the following aggravators and mitigators. Number one, I do see that the Defendant has a criminal history. It is an aggravating circumstance. I'm not giving it a lot of weight due to the age ․ of the criminal history․ Also[,] ․ none of these convictions are sex offenses. Number two, I'm going to find as an aggravator[ ] the Defendant has previously violated probation. I'm also going to find as an aggravator that the victims were under the age of 12․ The most significant aggravator that I find and the one that I give the most weight is ․ that the Defendant was in the position of care, custody, and control of these children․ [T]hey put trust in the man that was brought into the home and he violated that trust in the most horrific way. It was more than just neglect ․ [Y]ou were violent and you raped them․ As a mitigating circumstance, I will find that it is an undue hardship to the children of Mr. Clark through no fault of their own ․ I'm going to find the aggravators outweigh the mitigators. This is one of the most horrific child molesting cases I have ever seen and I have heard․ I will say that[,] unfortunately, I have seen worse. I have seen far worse[. B]ut this was particularly violent[,] so I think the maximum sentence is warranted․

Id. at 175-77. The court then ordered Clark to serve the maximum terms of fifty years for each Level 1 felony and six years for the Level 5 felony, which terms the court ordered to be served consecutively for an aggregate sentence of 106 years in the Department of Correction.

[7] This appeal ensued.

1. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it allowed the prosecutor to ask Clark if Clark knew why the Children might lie.

[8] On appeal, Clark first asserts that the trial court abused its discretion when it permitted the prosecutor to ask Clark why the Children might lie. A trial court has broad discretion regarding the admission of evidence, and we review its decisions only for abuse of discretion. Hall v. State, 177 N.E.3d 1183, 1193 (Ind. 2021). We will reverse only if the trial court's ruling was clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it and the errors affect a party's substantial rights. Id.

[9] Clark argues that the prosecutor's question violated Indiana Evidence Rule 602, which provides that a witness “may testify to a matter only if evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter.” According to Clark, he could have no personal knowledge of the motivations the Children might have had to lie. However, we disagree with Clark's assessment of the question he was asked. He was asked if, within his personal knowledge, he might know of any such reason, and he answered accordingly. The trial court therefore did not abuse its discretion when it overruled Clark's objection and permitted the question.

2. Clark's sentence is not inappropriate.

[10] Clark also argues on appeal that his 106-year aggregate sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and his character. Under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), we may modify a sentence that we find is “inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Making this determination “turns on our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given case.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1224 (Ind. 2008).

[11] However, sentence modification under Rule 7(B) is reserved for “a rare and exceptional case.” Livingston v. State, 113 N.E.3d 611, 612 (Ind. 2018) (per curiam). Thus, when conducting this review, we will defer to the sentence imposed by the trial court unless the defendant demonstrates compelling evidence that portrays the nature of the offenses and his character in a positive light, such as showing a lack of brutality in the offenses or showing substantial virtuous character traits. Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015).

[12] As noted above, Clark's 106-year aggregate sentence is the maximum sentence possible given his convictions. And that is the gravamen of Clark's argument on appeal. In particular, he notes that the trial court expressly found that it had “seen worse” child molesting cases, and he argues that that fact, coupled with the fact that Clark has no previous sex offenses, does not support his sentence. See Tr. Vol. 3, p. 177.

[13] Clark reads too much into the trial court's statement that it had “seen worse” cases. The trial court's assessment of Clark's case was that it was “horrific” and “particularly violent,” and Clark had “raped” the Children. Id. at 176-77. That the court had nonetheless seen worse cases does not reduce the depravity of Clark's crimes. And our review under Appellate Rule 7(B) is about the nature of Clark's offenses and his character.

[14] Clark has not presented compelling evidence that the trial court's assessment of the nature of the offenses or his character was incorrect. Indeed, we agree with the trial court's assessment that the nature of the offenses was “horrific,” and we also conclude that the nature of the offenses speaks volumes about Clark's character. We therefore affirm Clark's 106-year sentence.

Conclusion

[15] For all of these reasons, we affirm Clark's convictions and sentence.

[16] Affirmed.

Mathias, Judge.

Chief Judge Altice and Judge DeBoer concur. Altice, C.J., and DeBoer, J., concur.