IN RE: the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of: X.S. (Minor Child) (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] On June 13, 2023, X.S. (“Child”) was found to be a child in need of services (“CHINS”) after the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) received reports that A.J. (“Mother”) had abandoned Child with strangers and had refused to retrieve him. After DNA testing showed D.S. (“Father”) to be Child's biological father, Father was ordered to participate in various services. Father failed to successfully complete the court-ordered services. On June 18, 2024, DCS filed a petition to terminate Father's parental rights to Child. Following an evidentiary hearing, the juvenile court issued an order terminating Father's parental rights to Child.¹ Father contends, for the first time on appeal, that his due-process rights were violated and that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the juvenile court's order terminating his parental rights. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Child was born on July 26, 2018. Child was removed from Mother's care on an emergency basis on February 19, 2023, after Mother had abandoned Child with strangers and had refused to retrieve him. DNA testing subsequently showed Father to be Child's biological father.

[3] DCS filed a verified petition on February 20, 2023, alleging that Child was a CHINS. The CHINS petition alleged that Mother had abandoned Child, leaving Child in the care of her landlord; “[t]here were allegations by [M]other to [her landlord] that [C]hild was physically abused by [Father;]” Child had “disclosed domestic violence between” Mother and Father; and Father had “not shown that he can provide a safe and stable home for [Child] or care for” Child while had been in Mother's care. Ex. Vol. p. 13. The juvenile court declared Child to be a CHINS on May 12, 2023. The juvenile court entered a dispositional order on June 8, 2023, in which it ordered Father to

a. Contact the Family Case Manager [(“FCM”)] every week to allow the [FCM] to monitor compliance with this [CHINS] matter. The contact may be in person, by letter, email or by telephone.

b. Notify the [FCM] of any changes in address, household composition, employment or telephone number within five (5) days of said change.

c. Allow the [FCM] or other service providers to make announced or unannounced visits to the home of the child, permitting entrance into the home to ensure the safety of the child and to make the child available to the [FCM] and/or GAL/CASA.

d. If a program or programs is/are recommended by the [FCM] or other service provider, enroll in that program [within] a reasonable time, not to exceed thirty (30) days and participate in the program as scheduled by that program without delay or missed appointments. If required to obtain an assessment, arrange to complete that assessment within thirty (30) days.

e. Keep all appointments with any service provider, DCS, or CASA/GAL or advance notice and good cause will be given to the service provider, CASA/GAL and the [FCM] for the missed appointment.

f. Sign any releases necessary for the [FCM] to monitor compliance with the terms of the court's order.

g. Ensure that the child is not removed from this County for a period of more than seventy-two (72) hours without the specific consent of the [FCM].

h. Maintain suitable, safe and stable housing with adequate bedding, functional utilities, adequate supplies of food and food preparation facilities. Keep the family residence in a manner that is structurally sound, sanitary, clean, free from clutter and safe for the child.

i. Secure and maintain a legal and stable source of income, which may include employment, public assistance, Social Security and/or child support payments that are adequate to support all the household members, including the child.

j. Not use, consume, manufacture, trade, distribute or sell any illegal controlled substances, and will only take prescription medications for which a valid and current prescription exists and then only in the doses and frequencies specified in the prescription. Not permit the possession, use or consumption of any illegal controlled substances in the home or in the presence of the child.

k. Obey the law.

l. Actively participate in, cooperate with, and successfully complete all recommendations as a result of any domestic violence assessment(s)/programs. Following the assessment, if there are no reccomendations [(sic)] for further domestic violence services, the assessment will suffice as having completed this service.

m. Attend all scheduled visitations with the child and comply with all visitation rules and procedures set forth by DCS or the service provider coordinating and/or supervising the visit(s).

n. Participate in Fatherhood Engagement services, which will be referred by the [FCM].

Ex. Vol. p. 25. During a periodic case review, Father requested “a new assessment for batterers intervention.” Ex. Vol. p. 32. DCS did not object, and the juvenile court granted Father's request. Ex. Vol. p. 32.

[4] On September 25, 2023, the juvenile court issued an order in which it noted that

[t]he following facts and circumstances have occurred since the Dispositional Decree was entered: [Father] has behaved erratically with [DCS] and service providers. [Father] spoke with a batterer's intervention provider on July 27, 2023. [Father] became verbally aggressive with the provider. The provider then determined that [Father] would be unable to receive batterer's intervention services from their institution, as she believed he required more individualized and intense services to address his behavior.

[Father] has displayed similar behavior toward the visitation supervisor and FCM [Kimberly] Rodemeyer,[2] as well as her supervisor. [DCS] believes that [Father's] behavior is indicative of drug use.

On September 13, 2023, [Father] told FCM Rodemeyer that he had moved to Colorado and that he would like to have his son moved there.

Ex. Vol. p. 34. The juvenile court modified the dispositional order to include the requirements that Father complete both a substance-abuse assessment and a psychological evaluation and successfully complete any recommendations. The juvenile court denied DCS's request to add a requirement for random drug screens, beyond those ordered in conjunction to the substance-abuse assessment. Father failed to successfully complete the court-ordered services and his supervised visitation with Child was suspended after “[f]requent no, no calls no shows, cancellations, and lack of engagement[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 42.

[5] On June 18, 2024, DCS filed its petition to terminate Father's parental rights to Child. The juvenile court held an evidentiary hearing on DCS's petition on August 12 and 26, 2024. During the evidentiary hearing, both FCM Rodemeyer and guardian ad litem (“GAL”) Kaydee Tipton testified that termination of Father's parental rights was in Child's best interests. The juvenile court additionally heard evidence indicating that Father had failed to successfully complete the court-ordered services, maintain safe and stable housing that was suitable for Child, and obtain and maintain stable employment. On December 18, 2024, the juvenile court issued its order terminating Father's parental rights to Child.

Discussion and Decision

[6] “The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children.” Bester v. Lake Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005). Although parental rights are of a constitutional dimension, the law allows for the termination of those rights when parents are unable or unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities. In re T.F., 743 N.E.2d 766, 773 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied. Parental rights, therefore, are not absolute and must be subordinated to the best interests of the child. Id. Termination of parental rights is proper where the child's emotional and physical development is threatened. Id. The juvenile court need not wait until the child is irreversibly harmed such that their physical, mental, and social development is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship. Id.

I. Due Process

[7] Father contends that he was denied due process, claiming that the dispositional order included inappropriate, boiler-plate terms that had no relation to any facts alleged against him ³ and that there were alleged procedural irregularities regarding the suspension of his supervised visitation with Child and DCS's and the juvenile court's failure to act to judicially establish his paternity of Child. Father, however, did not appeal the CHINS determination or disposition order and did not raise any of his due-process argument below. He raises it for the first time on appeal.

[8] “[A] party on appeal may waive a constitutional claim, including a claimed violation of due process rights, by raising it for the first time on appeal.” In re N.G., 51 N.E.3d 1167, 1173 (Ind. 2016).

At a minimum, a party must show that it gave the trial court a bona fide opportunity to pass upon the merits of the claim before seeking an opinion on appeal. The policy reasons behind this requirement—preservation of judicial resources, opportunity for full development of the record, utilization of trial court fact-finding expertise, and assurance of a claim being tested by the adversary process—apply with particular force where, as here, the claim is a constitutional one.

Endres v. Ind. State Police, 809 N.E.2d 320, 322 (Ind. 2004). Because Father did not give the juvenile court a bona fide opportunity to address his due process claims below, we conclude that he has waived appellate review of this contention.

II. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[9] In reviewing termination proceedings on appeal, we will not reweigh the evidence or assess the credibility of the witnesses. In re Involuntary Term. of Parental Rights of S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d 874, 879 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). We only consider the evidence that supports the juvenile court's decision and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. Id. Where, as here, the juvenile court includes findings of fact and conclusions thereon in its order terminating parental rights, our standard of review is two-tiered. Id. First, we must determine whether the evidence supports the findings and, second, whether the findings support the legal conclusions. Id.

[10] In deference to the juvenile court's unique position to assess the evidence, we set aside the juvenile court's findings and judgment terminating a parent-child relationship only if they are clearly erroneous. Id. “A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there are no facts or inferences drawn therefrom to support it.” Id. A judgment is clearly erroneous only if the legal conclusions made by the juvenile court are not supported by its findings of fact, or the conclusions do not support the judgment. Id.

[11] Father contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the termination of his parental rights to the Child. In order to terminate a parent's parental rights to a child, DCS must prove that there is a satisfactory plan for care and treatment of the child and that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c)(2)–(3). As is relevant to this case, Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(c)(1) further provides that DCS must also prove the existence of one or more of the following circumstances:

(2) That:

(A) the child has been removed from the parent and has been under the supervision of a local office or probation department for at least fifteen (15) months of the most recent twenty-two (22) months, beginning with the date the child is removed from the home as a result of the child being alleged to be a[CHINS] or a delinquent child; and

(B) despite [DCS's] reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify the child's family under IC 31-34-21-5.5, the parent has been unable to remedy the circumstances that resulted in the child being placed in care outside the parent's home.

(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(d). Father does not argue on appeal that DCS failed to prove that it has a satisfactory plan for care and treatment of Child, with that plan being adoption. In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support termination of his parental rights to Child, Father argues that DCS failed to prove Indiana Code sections 31-35-2-4(c)(1) and (c)(3).

A. Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(c)(1)

[12] In this case, DCS alleged that termination of Father's parental rights was warranted under subsections (d)(2) and (d)(3). Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(c)(1) explicitly provides that DCS must prove “one (1) or more of the circumstances described in subsection (d)[.]” (Emphasis added). Thus, DCS was only required to prove one of the circumstances listed in subsection (d) in support of its petition to terminate Father's parental rights to Child. See generally In re C.C., 788 N.E.2d 847, 854 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (addressing the prior version of the statute and explaining that because Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) had used the word “or” and had therefore been written in the disjunctive, the juvenile court had only been required to find that one prong of subsection (B) had been proven by clear and convincing evidence), trans. denied.

[13] Pursuant to subsection (d)(3), the juvenile court concluded that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in Child's continued placement outside of Father's home will not be remedied.

When determining whether a reasonable probability exists that the conditions justifying a child's removal and continued placement outside the home will not be remedied, the trial court must judge a parent's fitness to care for his or her children at the time of the termination hearing, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions. In so doing, the trial court may consider the parent's response to the services offered through [DCS]. A pattern of unwillingness to deal with parenting problems and to cooperate with those providing social services, in conjunction with unchanged conditions, support a finding that there exists no reasonable probability that the conditions will change. Additionally, [DCS] was not required to rule out all possibilities of change; rather, it needed to establish only that there is a reasonable probability that the parent's behavior will not change.

In re B.J., 879 N.E.2d 7, 18–19 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (internal citations and quotations omitted), trans. denied.

[14] With respect to the reasonable probability that the conditions for Child's continued placement outside Father's care would not be remedied, the juvenile court made numerous findings regarding Father's failure to make progress towards reunification or remedy the factors leading to Child's continued removal from his care. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support the juvenile court's order terminating Father's parental rights to Child, we address Father's numerous challenges to the juvenile court's factual findings.

1. Findings Numbers 6, 15–20, 25, 28, and 48

[15] Father challenges the juvenile court's factual findings numbers six, fifteen through twenty, twenty-five, twenty-eight, and forty-eight, which read as follows:

6. The CHINS court modified [Father's] dispositional decree to add additional services on September 26, 2023.

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15. Prior to leaving Indiana, on June 13, 2023, Father was issued a number of orders by the CHINS court, including to

a. Contact the [FCM] weekly;

b. Notify the FCM of changes of address, household composition, employment or telephone number;

c. Enroll in recommended programs within thirty (30) days;

d. Keep all appointments with service providers;

e. Maintain suitable, safe and stable housing for himself and his child;

f. Not use or consume any controlled substances;

g. Obey the law;

h. Engage in supervised visitation;

i. Participate in Fatherhood Engagement;

j. Participate in a domestic violence assessment and any recommended treatment[.]

16. Immediately before leaving Indiana, on September 26, 2023, Father was also ordered to participate in a Substance Abuse Assessment and a Psychological Assessment.

17. Father did not maintain weekly contact with [FCM] Rodemeyer.

18. Father did not keep DCS timely advised of the changes of his living situation, of which Father reports there have been several changes in the year during which he has lived in Colorado.

19. Father went to F.R.O.G. recovery house after he was released from jail for non-support of his children.

20. During Father's time in Colorado he lived at the following locations at one time or another (confusion about how much time he spent at each location or in what chronological order he resided at these locations results from Father's inconsistent testimony from the first evidentiary hearing to the second):

a. In an apartment with Emmett Kelley, the apartment's lessor, in Littleton, Colorado;

b. A homeless shelter in Denver, Colorado, beginning in December of 2023 for five months;

c. A sober-living house transition in Denver, Colorado;

d. Step-Denver, a work-based transitional housing program from which he was dismissed due to delays in receipt of his criminal history;

e. An unnamed shelter for two months;

f. Intown Suites in Inglewood, Colorado;

g. Quality Inn hotel room in Inglewood, Colorado;

h. Father's brother's apartment at Briargate Lane, Apt. 101, Parker, Colorado from which he was excluded at his brother's request;

i. An Extended-Stay America Hotel in Sheridan, Colorado since August 23, 2024.

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25. Father completed a substance abuse assessment and it was recommended that that he screen weekly. Fat[h]er has failed to follow the recommendation by not screening weekly or not providing the results of the screens he may have taken at a sober living house or other treatment provider to the [DCS].

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28. DCS has not been able to independently set up screens for Father for substance abuse since he moved to Colorado, as [DCS] does not have screening providers available in that state.

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48. Father places blame for his failure to engage in services and improve his ability to parent on others, including the FCM and multiple service providers, instead of taking accountability for what he needs to do to safely reunify with his son.

Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 21–22, 23.

[16] In challenging these findings, Father restates his argument that the CHINS disposition order was improper because many of the included requirements were, in Father's view, unnecessary. Father does not challenge the accuracy of the information included in factual findings number six or fifteen through twenty. As for factual findings numbers twenty-five and twenty-eight, Father asserts that the CHINS court had stated that he was not required to participate in drug screens. However, as the State points out, while the CHINS court's modification order, issued on September 26, 2023, denied DCS's request to “add random drug screens for Father[,]” the order also ordered Father to complete a substance-abuse assessment and follow all treatment recommendations, including random drug screens if recommended. Ex. Vol. p. 35. As for finding number forty-eight, Father does not argue that he has not blamed others for alleged failures in their encounters with Father, but argues that his act of placing the blame on others “is entirely understandable” because, in Father's view, the blame for the need for DCS intervention rests solely with Mother and, as such, there is no need for him to engage in services at all. Appellant's Br. p. 27. Father's arguments relating to these factual findings amount to nothing more than a request for this court to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See In re S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d at 879.

2. Findings Numbers 8–12

[17] Father challenges the juvenile court's factual findings numbers eight through twelve, which read as follows:

8. Father was not married to Mother at the time of the child's birth.

9. Father did not file a notice in the Indiana Putative Father Registry.

10. Father never filed a paternity nor went to court for a paternity action.

11. Father completed a DNA test during the CHINS case which established his biological paternity of [Child] in May of 2023.

12. Legal paternity for Father has not yet been established.

Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 21.

[18] In challenging these findings, Father does not challenge the accuracy of the information included in these factual findings. Instead, Father asserts that the juvenile “court ignores its own and DCS’[s] complicity in not following through on the promise to open a juvenile paternity case[.]” Appellant's Br. p. 27. Father's attempt to shift the blame for his failure to establish paternity effectively amounts to a request to reweigh the evidence, which, again, we will not do. See In re S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d at 879.

3. Findings Numbers 21, 24, 26, and 70

[19] Father challenges the juvenile court's factual findings numbers twenty-one, twenty-four, twenty-six, and seventy, which read as follows:

21. At this termination case's initial hearing, Father provided a mail-drop address from a church as the address at which he was living but did not disclose to the Court that it was other than where he resided.

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24. Father has provided no records or other evidence to demonstrate he is employed, and the court finds his self-serving testimony of his employment unreliable.

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26. Father admitted during his substance abuse evaluation a prior history of substance usage, including alcohol, THC, cocaine and hallucinogens.

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70. This Court finds Father's testimony to be lacking in consistency and his candor to the Court to be questionable.

Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 22, 24.

[20] Father argues that finding number twenty-one is “entirely against the captured statements” as he “was very clear that the address being provided for mail was a mailing address, and that his residential address was different.” Appellant's Br. p. 28. Father ignores the portion of the transcript in which he admitted that he had not told “the court that [he was] providing a mailing” address, claiming that he “wasn't aware that [he] had to.” Tr. Vol. II p. 102. Father also admitted that he had lied about his address under oath. Further, while Father argues that he had provided evidence regarding his employment and prior substance abuse, his challenge to factual findings numbers twenty-four and twenty-six amount to nothing more than an invitation for this court to reweigh the evidence, which, again, we will not do. See In re S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d at 879. Furthermore, the juvenile court's determination that Father lacked candor and that his testimony lacked consistency is supported by the record.

4. Finding Number 29

[21] Father challenges the juvenile court's factual finding number twenty-nine, which reads as follows:

Father explains his lack of stability in employment and housing by a report that he broke his leg and was unable to work. However, he uses the same rationale to explain why he has failed to maintain consistent contact with service providers, even though a broken leg would not prevent him from responding to telephone calls or email messages.

Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 22.

[22] In challenging this finding, Father argues that despite his injury, he had maintained “routine contact with all service providers and the DCS case worker.” Appellant's Br. p. 29. This argument, however, ignores Father's admission on the record that while it had been his “intention to be mostly consistent” with his contact with DCS and service providers, there had been times where he had failed to maintain weekly contact. Tr. Vol. II p. 174. FCM Rodemeyer testified that Father had failed to keep all scheduled appointments with service providers. FCM Rodemeyer further testified that Father had failed to maintain steady communication with her throughout the CHINS and termination proceedings. Father's challenge to factual finding number twenty-nine amounts to nothing more than an invitation for this court to reweigh the evidence, which, again, we will not do. See In re S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d at 879.

5. Findings Numbers 31–33 and 57

[23] Father challenges the juvenile court's factual findings numbers thirty-one through thirty-three and fifty-seven, which read as follows:

31. Once Father was involved in the CHINS case, he began visitation under an order that it be supervised by a third[-]party visit supervisor.

32. Father was non-compliant with supervised visitation with the child. Father missed visits and had several no-call/no-shows. As a result, he went through multiple visit supervisor providers.

33. The CHINS Court suspended Father's visitation on November 19, 2023, and it has not yet been reinstated.

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57. CASA observed [Child] is happy and healthy in his long-term placement and is working with a therapist to address attachment issues.

Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 22–23.

[24] Father argues that these factual findings “entirely ignore the undisputed testimony that” he had raised Child “for an extended period prior to removal” and testimony that Father behaved appropriately in his in-person visits with Child. Appellant's Br. p. 30. Even assuming that Child had, at some point, resided with Father, this would have no bearing on Father's lack of compliance with his supervised visitation with Child. The record supports the juvenile court's finding that Father's supervised visitation was suspended due to “[f]requent no, no calls no shows, cancellations, and lack of engagement.” Tr. Vol. II p. 42. As for factual finding number fifty-seven, Father argues that the fact that Child has ongoing attachment issues “challeng[es the assertion] that anything Father has done is creating harm for the Child.” Appellant's Br. p. 30. Father's argument in this regard is nothing more than an invitation for this court to reweigh the evidence, which again we will not do. See In re S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d at 879.

6. Findings Numbers 34–39 and 49

[25] Father challenges the juvenile court's factual findings numbers thirty-four through thirty-nine and forty-nine, which read as follows:

34. While Father was involved in Fatherhood Engagement at the time of the evidentiary hearings, that involvement was the fourth attempt to get him [to] engage and complete the training.

35. Father became verbally aggressive with his assigned Batterer's Intervention provider who then refused to work further with him, recommending instead individualized and intensive services to address his behavior. Father has been similarly aggressive with the assigned FCM and visitation supervisors.

36. Healthy Family Advocates declined to work with Father for his substance use disorder assessment after Father exhibited escalated behaviors.

37. Father believes he does not have anger issues but instead has issues “when people don't listen to what I say.”

38. Father has been inconsistently engaged in individual therapy since June 11, 2024.

39. Therapist Chelly Gastineau reports Father has made limited to fair progress in his therapy.

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49. This Court had to reprimand Father (appearing by Zoom) repeatedly during the evidentiary hearing about his failure to comply with the Court's decorum expectations, including for interrupting witness testimony, vaping, turning off his microphone to talk with others in the remote location with him during the hearing, and then failing to acknowledge that which was clearly visible via the Zoom link, and refusing to remain seated during the hearing. The Court notes that even in the absence of these․, Father would have his hands on his face, slumped over, appearing disinterested. At the 2nd hearing the Court had to call Father to request that he connect to Zoom before the case [was] called.

Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 22–23.

[26] Father does not challenge the accuracy of these findings but states that his “attitude towards DCS and contrarian service providers is frankly understated.” Appellant's Br. p. 30. Father also claims that the reprimands from the juvenile court during the fact-finding hearing were irrelevant as whether he stays visible during the hearing has no bearing on his ability to parent Child. Father essentially argues that he has no need for services, and his disagreeable manner with some of the service providers he encountered during the CHINS and termination proceedings does not mean that he cannot be an acceptable parent to Child. Father's arguments in this regard are, once again, invitations for this court to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See In re S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d at 879.

7. Findings Numbers 40 and 47

[27] Father challenges the juvenile court's factual findings numbers forty and forty-seven, which read as follows:

40. During the evidentiary hearing Father repeatedly attempted to control which questions he would answer and used aggressive tone in response to questions in apparent attempt to shut down lines of questioning.

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47. Father attempted to evade questioning about his criminal history by claiming to “not know what you're talking about,” and subsequent evasive answers, calling into question his credibility.

Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 23.

[28] Despite Father's claim to the contrary, the evidence supports the juvenile court's determination that Father had attempted to control which questions he wanted to answer and would adopt an aggressive tone if he did not wish to pursue a line of questioning further. As for factual finding number forty-seven, Father admitted during the fact-finding hearing that he had “had maybe a couple [of] charges. Two or three charges 20 years ago.” Tr. Vol. II p. 187. When asked to “[t]ell the court about what your convictions were 20 years ago[,]” Father replied, “I don't know what you talking about, ma'am.” Tr. Vol. II p. 187. When asked about his prior convictions, Father replied “Sure” and “I plead the 5th.” Tr. Vol. II p. 190. Father also indicated that he would not answer any questions relating to his criminal history. We cannot say that the juvenile court erred in finding that Father's attempts to evade certain lines of questioning called into question his credibility. Father's claim to the contrary again amounts to nothing more than a request for this court to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See In re S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d at 879.

8. Findings Numbers 41–46

[29] Father challenges the juvenile court's factual findings numbers forty-one through forty-six, which read as follows:

41. Father has provided nothing to [Child] for his care and support since DCS became involved with [Child].

42. Father has a history of significant arrearage in his support obligation of another child, [J.H.], having been over $2500 in arrears in 2022 for that child.

43. Father is currently ordered to pay $126 bi-weekly for support of [J.H.], his child with [K.H.]; he has an arrearage of between one and two thousand dollars in [J.H.’s] support.

44. Father is currently ordered to pay $106 bi-weekly for support of [P.G.], his child with [N.G.]. He knows that he has an arrearage for [P.G.], but he does not know its amount.

45. Father's driver's license is suspended due to his failure to pay his ordered support.

46. Father reports his only current expense is housing; and is not currently paying the child support ordered for [J.H.] and [P.G.].

Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 23. Again, Father does not challenge the accuracy of these findings. As it relates to Child, he merely argues that he “would not need to provide support outside of the home if his Child were simply returned to him[.]” Appellant's Br. p. 32. These findings are supported by the record.

9. Finding Number 68

[30] Father challenges the juvenile court's factual finding number sixty-eight, which reads as follows: “There is no point during the underlying CHINS cases that Father made significant progress toward reunification.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 24. While Father points to evidence suggesting that he had made some progress with the court-ordered services prior to the fact-finding hearing, the challenged factual finding indicated that Father had not made significant progress toward reunification. Father's challenge to this finding is nothing more than a request for this court to reweigh the evidence, which, again, we will not do. See In re S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d at 879.

10. Finding Number 69

[31] Father challenges the juvenile court's factual finding number sixty-nine, which reads as follows: “Instead, he left his child and the State of Indiana to move to Colorado where he has since had sporadic and highly unstable housing and inconsistent employment.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 24. Father does not challenge the accuracy of this factual finding and states that he “has had a challenging time, to be sure, but he has remedied the situation.” Appellant's Br. pp. 33–34. To the extent that Father claims that he has obtained stable employment and housing, these claims amount to nothing more than a request for this court to reweigh the evidence, which, again, we will not do. See In re S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d at 879.

11. Finding Number 71

[32] Father last challenges the juvenile court's factual finding number seventy-one, which reads as follows: “Further, Father takes little personal accountability for regaining custody and placement of his son, instead repeatedly complaining that a plethora of individual seeking to help him instead have failed him in one way or another.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 24. The factual finding is supported by the record. Even on appeal, Father fails to take responsibility for any of his actions as it relates to Child and instead continues to blame Child's continued placement outside of his care on others.

[33] Considering the evidence presented during the fact-finding hearing and its other findings relating to Father's actions and lack of significant progress towards reunification, the juvenile court found, by clear and convincing evidence, as follows:

a. That the child has been removed from the parent and has been under the supervision of the local office for at least fifteen (15) months of the most recent twenty-two (22) months and, despite [DCS's] reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify the child's family under IC 31-34-21-5.5, [Father] has been unable to remedy the circumstances that resulted in [Child] being placed in care outside [Father's] home; and

b. there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in [Child's] removal or the continued placement outside the home will not be remedied by [Father].

Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 24. The evidence supports this finding. As of the date of the evidentiary hearing, Father had failed to successfully complete the court-ordered services, to establish a safe and stable home that was suitable for Child, to maintain stable employment, and to visit with Child. Instead, Father continued to blame others for these failures. Father's historical pattern of instability, coupled with his refusal to complete the court-ordered services aimed at reunification sufficiently proves that the conditions that have resulted in Child's continued placement outside of Father's care will not be remedied.

B. Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(c)(3)

[34] We are mindful that in considering whether termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child, the juvenile court is required to look beyond the factors identified by DCS and look to the totality of the evidence. McBride v. Monroe Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 798 N.E.2d 185, 203 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). In doing so, the juvenile court must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the children involved. Id. “A parent's historical inability to provide a suitable environment along with the parent's current inability to do the same supports a finding that termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the [child].” Lang v. Starke Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 861 N.E.2d 366, 373 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied.

The [juvenile] court need not wait until the child is irreversibly harmed such that her physical, mental, and social development is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship. Additionally, a child's need for permanency is an important consideration in determining the best interests of a child, and the testimony of the service providers may support a finding that termination is in the child's best interests.

In re A.K., 924 N.E.2d 212, 224 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (internal citations omitted).

[35] With respect to Child's best interests, Father challenges the juvenile court's factual findings numbers fifty-six, fifty-nine through sixty, and sixty-five, which read as follows:

56. DCS's staffed recommendation is that TPR be granted as to Father so that the child can achieve permanency via adoption, noting that the reason for the child's removal has not been remedied.

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59. CASA believes further contact with either biological father or biological mother would be detrimental to [Child] at this time.

60. CASA's staffed recommendation also supports termination of Father's parental rights so [Child] can achieve permanency via adoption.

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65. [Child's foster mother] also believes it would be in [Child's] best interest that she be able to adopt him so that [Child] can have closure to this phase of his life instead of being stuck in limbo waiting in the child welfare system.

Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 23–24. In challenging these findings, Father notes that “the best interest finding is primarily due to a desire for permanency for Child” and “finding closure for” Child. Appellant's Br. p. 33. Father claims that “[t]hese are impermissible bases to terminate,” arguing that “[a] better home is not a basis to terminate.” Appellant's Br. p. 33.

[36] The juvenile court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination of Father's parental rights was in Child's best interests. Despite Father's claim to the contrary, a child's need for permanency is an important consideration in determining the best interests of a child. See In re A.K., 924 N.E.2d at 224 (“[A] child's need for permanency is an important consideration in determining the best interests of a child[.]”). FCM Rodemeyer testified that DCS staff were of the opinion that termination of Father's parental rights was in Child's best interests because “the reason for removal [had not] been remedied throughout the case.” Tr. Vol. II p. 50. In addition, GAL Tipton testified that termination of Father's parental rights was in Child's best interests. GAL Tipton noted Child's “long term out of home placement” and his “adjustment in his community and with his foster family” as factors supporting her opinion that termination of Father's parental rights was in Child's best interests. Tr. Vol. II pp. 64–65. GAL Tipton further opined that

any type of moving [Child] or further contact with [Father] or [M]other for that matter, would be detrimental to his well-being just for the simple fact of how long it has been since he's uhm since that relationship has been maintained. In his school, he's in his community and any type of removal from that community and where he's currently at [GAL Tipton believed] it would be detrimental to him.

Tr. Vol. II p. 67.

[37] FCM Rodemeyer's and GAL Tipton's testimony supports the juvenile court's finding that termination of Father's parental rights is in Child's best interests. See Lang, 861 N.E.2d at 374 (providing that the testimony of the case worker, guardian ad litem, or a CASA regarding the children's best interests supports a finding that termination is in the children's best interests). This is especially true given Child's need for permanency and Father's historical pattern of instability. Father's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support this conclusion again effectively amounts to an invitation to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See In re S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d at 879.

[38] The judgment of the juvenile court is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Mother consented to Child's adoption and does not participate in this appeal.

2.   We note that at some places in the record FCM Rodemeyer's name is spelled as “Rodemeyer” and at others it is spelled as “Rodemyer.”

3.   Father repeatedly maintains that there is no suggestion that he had ever abused Child or engaged in domestic violence. Father's claim, however, ignores the allegations of abuse and domestic violence that are set forth in the CHINS petition. Father also requested the assessment for batterer's intervention and cannot now claim that its inclusion in the court-ordered services somehow violated his rights.

Bradford, Judge.

Judges May and Mathias concur. May, J., and Mathias, J., concur