A.H., Appellant-Respondent v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Petitioner (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] A.H. appeals his delinquency adjudication for Class A misdemeanor dangerous possession of a firearm by a child. A.H. alleges the trial court erred by admitting evidence of a handgun obtained during an investigative stop that violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. Finding no constitutional violations, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On October 11, 2024, Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department (IMPD) Officers Sophia Gannon and Roy Thurman received a dispatch on a report of suspicious persons near the intersection of Raymond and Shelby Streets, a “high crime area” in Indianapolis. Tr. Vol. II p. 33. The dispatch notes indicated there were two males wearing dark clothes and ski masks near the dollar and liquor stores: “[o]ne had a gun[,]” and the caller “felt like the store was about to be robbed ․” Id. at 17. Officer Gannon later recalled that one call mentioned at least one of the males was a juvenile and they thought the males “matched the description of somebody that had robbed them a few months earlier.”  ¹ Id. at 31. While responding, Officers Gannon and Thurman received a second dispatch to a nearby Little Caesars regarding subjects who “matched the description” from the first dispatch indicating: “[b]lack males. Dark clothing․ one had a gun. Wearing ski masks.” Id. at 34. The record does not provide the identification information for any caller or reflect whether all calls were made by the same or multiple individuals.

[3] Due to their proximity in time and place, Officer Gannon believed the calls were related. The officers drove to the Little Caesars, which was “less than a half of a mile” from the dollar store.  ² Id. at 35. After exiting their patrol car, they walked into the Little Caesars’ lobby and observed “only two subjects inside that matched the description” who were later identified as A.H. and Jaylen Evans. Id. at 34. Officer Gannon observed that A.H. was wearing a black sweatshirt and had a “ski mask ․ covering his face[,]” and she “suspected he was under the age of eighteen” because he “looked young․” Id. at 29. The officers’ body camera footage shows A.H. and Evans wearing masks that covered all of their heads but left their faces exposed from their eyebrows to just below their lips.

[4] The officers approached A.H. and Evans, who were sitting on a bench in the lobby. Officer Thurman asked, “What's up guys? How's it going?” and Evans answered, “we're getting our pizza.” Ex. Vol. I, Resp. Ex. A-G 4:25-4:32.³ Upon Officer Thurman's request, Evans handed him a receipt for his and A.H.’s pizza purchase. The officer viewed then returned the receipt to Evans.

[5] Officer Thurman told the pair they matched a description of suspicious activity and asked where they had just come from. “[T]hey pointed in the direction of the original dispatch.” Tr. Vol. II pp. 35-36. Officer Thurman then said, “I mean, don't you think it kind of looks weird that it's eighty degrees out and you have a sweatshirt on, a ski mask on, aren't you hot?” Ex. Vol. I, Resp. Ex. A-G 4:55-5:03. The officers’ body cameras recorded either Evans or A.H. asking if the officers wanted them to take the masks off. Officer Gannon responded, “[y]ou're good dude,” and explained that they received several calls with concerns that the pair were robbing stores. Id. at 5:02-5:25.

[6] Then, Officer Gannon asked, “do you guys have your [identification] so we can just say we talked to you? Then we can be [sic] get out of here and quit bothering you.” Id. at 5:25-5:35. Evans handed his identification to Officer Gannon. A.H. took his mask off without being told to do so. After he removed his mask, Officer Gannon recognized A.H. as “the little [last name of A.H.] right there.” Id. at 5:35-5:40. A.H. told the officers he did not have an identification with him, so he verbally gave his name and date of birth. Officer Thurman returned to the patrol car with Evans’ identification and A.H.’s information.

[7] While Officer Thurman was in the patrol car, Officer Gannon asked the pair for their ages. Evans said he was twenty years old, and A.H. said he was fifteen years old. Officer Gannon asked if either of them had a gun. Evans said that he did, and he lifted his shirt to show the officer. She pointed to A.H. and asked if he had a gun, and A.H. indicated he did not. Officer Gannon then asked A.H. if he could “lift his shirt up real quick” and he did. Id. at 6:30-6:35. “[A]s soon as he lifted his shirt, [Officer Gannon] observed the handle of a firearm” in A.H.’s waistband. Tr. Vol. II p. 45. With the assistance of a third officer that had arrived on scene, Officer Gannon placed A.H. in handcuffs and removed the firearm from his waistband.⁴ Less than three minutes had passed from the time that Officers Gannon and Thurman entered the Little Caesars to the time that A.H. was placed in handcuffs.

[8] The State filed a delinquency petition alleging A.H. committed Class A misdemeanor dangerous possession of a firearm.⁵ On November 15, 2024, the juvenile court held a fact-finding hearing. During the hearing, A.H. moved to suppress the evidence obtained from his search and seizure. He alleged the search and seizure was unlawful and unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. The trial court denied his motion to suppress. A.H. subsequently objected to the admission of the firearm on the same grounds. Over his objection, the trial court admitted the firearm into evidence.

[9] The trial court entered a true finding as to the dangerous possession of a firearm allegation and adjudged A.H. a delinquent. On November 18, the court issued a dispositional decree ordering A.H. to, among other things, participate in formal probation, home-based casework, and a gun violence prevention program. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[10] A.H. appeals from a completed delinquency proceeding and contends the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the firearm into evidence at the fact-finding hearing. He claims the evidence should not have been admitted because it was obtained in violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. We disagree.

[11] We review a trial court's ruling on the admission of evidence for an abuse of discretion, which we find only when the court's decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it. D.Y. v. State, 28 N.E.3d 249, 254 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). “[W]e cannot reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility, and we must consider conflicting evidence in the light most favorable to the juvenile court's ruling.” Id. We must also consider the uncontested evidence favorable to the defendant. A.M. v. State, 891 N.E.2d 146, 149 (Ind.Ct.App.2008), trans. denied. However, to the extent that claims relating to admitting or excluding evidence implicate constitutional issues, we review them de novo. Ramirez v. State, 174 N.E.3d 181, 189 (Ind. 2021); see also Carpenter v. State, 18 N.E.3d 998, 1001 (Ind. 2014) (“the ultimate determination of the constitutionality of a search or seizure is a question of law that we consider de novo”).

I. Fourth Amendment

[12] A.H. first contends the police violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures[.]” U.S. Const. amend. IV. “For a search to be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, a warrant is required unless an exception to the warrant requirement applies.” Taylor v. State, 842 N.E.2d 327, 330 (Ind. 2006). At trial, the State bears the burden of proving that a warrantless search falls within an exception to the warrant requirement. Id. One exception to the warrant requirement is the so-called Terry stop, which is “a brief investigatory stop falling short of traditional arrest.” Clark v. State, 994 N.E.2d 252, 263 (Ind. 2013). To conduct such an investigative stop, an officer must establish “reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity may be afoot[.]” Id. (citation and internal quotations omitted).

A. Seizure

[13] A.H. argues that the officers seized him when they first “surrounded him” in the Little Caesar's, “blocked him from leaving the establishment[,]” and “aggressively questioned” him. Appellant's Br. p. 14. The State counters that the police interaction with A.H. became an investigative stop only when Officer Gannon asked A.H. if he could lift his shirt. We must discern when the investigative stop began to determine whether the officers had reasonable suspicion prior to initiating the stop. See Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 271 (2000) (“The reasonableness of official suspicion must be measured by what the officers knew before they conducted their search.”).

[14] The Calmes court described the levels of police investigation related to the Fourth Amendment:

There are three levels of police investigation, two of which implicate the Fourth Amendment and one of which does not. First, the Fourth Amendment requires that an arrest or detention that lasts for more than a short period of time must be justified by probable cause. Second, pursuant to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the police may, without a warrant or probable cause, briefly detain an individual for investigatory purposes if, based upon specific and articulable facts, the officer has a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity has or is about to occur. The third level of investigation occurs when a police officer makes a casual and brief inquiry of a citizen, which involves neither an arrest nor a stop. This is a consensual encounter in which the Fourth Amendment is not implicated.

State v. Calmes, 894 N.E.2d 199, 202 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Whether the Fourth Amendment is implicated “turns on a determination of whether, considering all the circumstances, a reasonable person would feel free to disregard the police and go about his or her business.” Bell v. State, 144 N.E.3d 791, 797 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020). Circumstances under which a reasonable person would not feel free to leave include: “(1) the threatening presence of several officers, (2) the display of a weapon by an officer, (3) physical touching of the person, or (4) the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer's request might be compelled.” Id. (citation omitted).

[15] Here, the officers’ initial encounter with A.H. was a consensual encounter, which did not implicate Fourth Amendment protections. The two officers exited their patrol car and entered the Little Caesars at a walking pace; they did not display their weapons, did not touch A.H., and spoke calmly without issuing any orders, commands, or instructions. See id. (encounter was initially consensual where two uniformed officers told the defendant to “stand still, stop[,]” did not draw or display their weapons, did not touch the defendant, did not yell, and spoke to defendant in calm and polite manner).

[16] However, Officer Gannon soon asked, “do you guys have your [identification] so we can just say we talked to you? Then we can be [sic] get out of here and quit bothering you.” Ex. Vol. I, Resp. Ex. A-G 5:25-5:35. Officer Gannon's words indicated that an end to her encounter with A.H. was dependent upon A.H.’s compliance with providing his identification. Her statement would lead a reasonable person to believe he needed and could be compelled to comply with her request to end the police interaction and, therefore, that he was not free to leave until he did so. See U.S. v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553 (1980) (a person is “seized” when by a show of authority his freedom of movement is restrained); see also Bell, 144 N.E.3d at 797 (the use of language indicating that compliance with the officer's request might be compelled is a circumstance that would lead a reasonable person to believe he is not free to leave). Thus, an investigative stop implicating A.H.’s Fourth Amendment rights began when Officer Gannon showed her authority by making A.H.’s provision of identification a condition precedent to ending their encounter.

[17] Officer Gannon's subsequent actions also indicated an ongoing seizure of A.H. After A.H. provided his identification information verbally, Officer Thurman exited the Little Caesars with A.H.’s information. While he was outside, Officer Gannon asked A.H. if he had any weapons. As we concluded in Calmes, a reasonable person would not feel free to leave when an officer asked him if he was armed while another officer was running the defendant's identification through an in-car computer. See Calmes, 894 N.E.2d at 204.

B. Reasonableness of the Seizure

[18] Having established when the investigative stop began, we turn to A.H.’s argument that the seizure was unreasonable because officers did not have reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot. In arguing that the officers had reasonable suspicion, the State relies on the following: the general information obtained from anonymous calls; that the dispatch was in a high-crime area; that A.H. was wearing clothing that “tended to conceal” his identity, Appellee's Br. p. 20; A.H.’s disclosure that he was fifteen years old; and Evans’ confirmation that he possessed a gun. However, neither Evans’ possession of a gun nor A.H.’s disclosed age was known to officers before the stop began. Still, considering the totality of the circumstances when the officers initiated the investigative stop, they had reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot.

[19] The State and A.H. agree that the alleged criminal activity that police could have sought to investigate was either an impending robbery or the presence of a firearm on either A.H. or Evans. In making reasonable suspicion determinations, our standard of review is well-settled:

In assessing whether a stop was justified by particularized reasonable suspicion, we consider the totality of the circumstances, including the defendant's conduct. We will conclude that reasonable suspicion existed if the facts known to the officer, together with any reasonable inferences, would cause a person of ordinary prudence to believe that criminal activity has or is about to occur. We also take into account the nature of the suspected offense when assessing reasonable suspicion and we have required less evidence when the stop is to intercept a man suspected of being armed with a gun. In addition, officers are not required to rule out all possibility of innocent behavior before initiating a stop.

Bell, 144 N.E.3d at 798 (internal citations and quotations omitted).

[20] In the case before us, the officers approached A.H. following a dispatch regarding several 9-1-1 calls. The record is devoid of caller identification, so we treat the 9-1-1 calls as anonymous tips. Although an anonymous tip alone rarely demonstrates a tipster's basis of knowledge, “there are situations in which an anonymous tip, suitably corroborated, exhibits sufficient indicia of reliability to provide reasonable suspicion to make the investigatory stop.” J.L., 529 U.S. at 270 (internal quotations and citation omitted). In considering the reasonableness of this investigatory stop,

we must strike a balance between the public interest and the individual's right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law [enforcement] officers. Protecting the public from gun violence is a legitimate and paramount concern of law enforcement, and the State is legitimately concerned with deterring gun violence and possession of firearms by unlicensed individuals.

Grayson v. State, 52 N.E.3d 24, 28 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (internal quotations and citations omitted, brackets in original), trans. denied. Here, the officers’ concerns and “the danger of the allegations of the anonymous tipster warranted an immediate response by law enforcement officers for the safety of the general public.” Id.

[21] In this case, the call information relayed to officers was as follows: (1) “[b]lack males. Dark clothing․ one had a gun. Wearing ski masks[,]” Tr. Vol. II p. 34; (2) a mention that one male looked like a juvenile; (3) the males “matched the description of somebody that had robbed [caller] a few months earlier[,]” Id. at 31; and (4) the caller “felt like” the store was about to be robbed, Id. at 17. Officers Gannon and Thurman immediately responded to the second dispatch to the Little Caesars from about half a mile away. When they arrived on scene, the officers approached A.H. to ask a few questions based on the anonymous tips and immediately corroborated some information therefrom. A.H. and Evans were still in the location the caller reported, wearing the ski masks described by the caller, and were the only subjects in the area that matched that description. Officer Gannon immediately suspected A.H. was a juvenile because he “looked young․” Id. at 29. And the officers knew the location to be a high crime area.

[22] “This is reasonable, appropriate, and laudable community policing, the type of law enforcement activity that is consistent with the balance citizens want struck between personal independence and personal safety.” Grayson, 52 N.E.3d at 28. In addition, “the ultimate test to establish reasonable suspicion is the totality of the circumstances.” Washburn v. State, 868 N.E.2d 594, 599 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (internal quotations omitted). Here, the totality of the circumstances, taken together with all reasonable inferences, would cause a person of ordinary prudence to believe that criminal activity has or is about to occur. See Bell, 144 N.E.3d at 798. Moreover, because officers are not required to rule out all possibility of innocent behavior before initiating a stop, the fact that Evans provided a receipt showing that he and A.H. had purchased a pizza did not eliminate the officers’ reasonable suspicion. Therefore, the officers had reasonable suspicion to conduct the investigative stop.

B. Reasonableness of the Search

[23] A.H. and the State agree that a search occurred when A.H. complied with Officer Gannon's request to lift his own shirt. However, A.H. challenges the reasonableness of that search, alleging: 1) the officers searched him for the purpose of locating a weapon, which was not permissible; 2) the search was more intrusive than was permissible; and 3) Officer Gannon lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct a pat down search because she “had no reason to believe anybody was in danger when she conducted the search.” Appellant's Br. p. 26. We disagree.

[24] First, as our Supreme Court has stated:

After making a Terry stop, an officer may, if he has reasonable fear that a suspect is armed and dangerous, frisk the outer clothing of that suspect to try to find weapons. The purpose of this protective search is not to discover evidence of crime, but to allow the officer to pursue his investigation without fear of violence. The officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed; the issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger. To determine whether an officer acted reasonably, we consider the specific, reasonable inferences that the officer, in light of his experience, can draw from the facts.

Johnson v. State, 157 N.E.3d 1199, 1205 (Ind. 2020), cert. denied (citations and quotations omitted).

[25] The totality of the circumstances described in our seizure analysis above equally support Officer Gannon's search of A.H. All information available to Officer Gannon would lead a reasonably prudent person to believe that a crime—specifically, a robbery or juvenile possession of a firearm—was afoot and, therefore, that her safety was potentially in danger. Moreover, “the right to frisk is automatic whenever the suspect has been stopped upon the suspicion that he has committed, was committing, or was about to commit a type of crime for which the offender would likely be armed[.]” Id. (quoting N.W. v. State, 834 N.E.2d 159, 165-66 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005)). Therefore, the purpose of the search was to ensure the safety of officers and others, and the officers had reasonable suspicion to conduct the search.

[26] Second, the intrusiveness of the search was permitted. A.H. characterizes the search as an enhanced intrusion from a pat down because he was asked to expose the underside of his clothing. However, we agree with the State that the method of the search was less intrusive than a pat-down search: the search involved A.H. lifting his own shirt, which allowed officers to refrain from any non-consensual touching of A.H.’s outer clothing or person. See M. Stone v. State, 671 N.E.2d 499, 503 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (an officer's intrusion during a Terry stop was minimal where the officer asked defendant to remove his untied shoe during a search for weapons); see also U.S. v. Reyes, 349 F.3d 219, 225 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing U.S. v. Baker, 78 F.3d 135, 138 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied) (a request that a suspect lift his shirt is less intrusive than a Terry pat-down or non-consensual touching and is a permissible method of search under Terry). The search here was reasonable.

II. Article 1, Section 11

[27] A.H. also contends the search and seizure was unreasonable under Article 1, Section 11 of Indiana's Constitution. In relevant part, Section 11 states: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable search or seizure, shall not be violated[.]” Ind. Const. art. 1, § 11. Although the language of Section 11 is nearly identical to the Fourth Amendment, our courts interpret the state provision “independently and ask whether the State has shown that a particular search or seizure was reasonable based on the totality of the circumstances.” Ramirez, 174 N.E.3d at 191. In doing so, we balance the following three factors in conducting a reasonableness analysis: “1) the degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge that a violation has occurred, 2) the degree of intrusion the method of the search or seizure imposes on the citizen's ordinary activities, and 3) the extent of law enforcement needs.” Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356, 361 (Ind. 2005). “And ultimately it is the State's burden to demonstrate the reasonableness of the intrusion.” Jacobs v. State, 76 N.E.3d 846, 852 (Ind. 2017).

[28] In analyzing the officer's degree of suspicion, concern, or knowledge that a violation has occurred, we consider all the information available to the officers at the time of the search or seizure. Hardin v. State, 148 N.E.3d 932, 943 (Ind. 2020), cert. denied. Here, the degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge was high. The 9-1-1 caller informed the dispatcher that two subjects, one who was a juvenile and one who had a gun, were wearing dark clothing and ski masks and matched the description of the suspects who robbed them a month prior. A.H. was located shortly after officers received the dispatch, wearing the same clothing and mask the call described, and in the same location reported. And the location was a high-crime area.

[29] Next, we turn to the degree of intrusion and method of search from the defendant's point of view, considering the “intrusion into both the citizen's physical movements and the citizen's privacy.” Id. at 944. Here, the officers asked A.H. questions in a public place. See Moore v. State, 49 N.E.3d 1095, 1103 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (intrusion was minimal where officer asked defendant questions in a public place). And the duration of the intrusion—from the consensual encounter, through the investigative stop—was minimal, lasting less than three minutes. Regarding the method of the search, Officer Gannon asked A.H. to lift his own shirt to reveal his waistband. As discussed above, a request that a subject lift his own shirt is less intrusive than a pat-down involving warrantless touching of a person's outer clothing. See supra ¶26. Overall, the degree of intrusion was minimal.

[30] Finally, we review the extent of law enforcement needs. As explained under our Fourth Amendment analysis, law enforcement have a “legitimate and paramount” concern with deterring gun violence and possession of firearms by unlicensed individuals. Grayson, 52 N.E.3d at 28.

[31] In balancing the Litchfield factors, the minor intrusion here does not outweigh the high degree of law enforcement needs and concerns. The search and seizure did not violate Article 1, Section 11 of Indiana's Constitution.

III. Conclusion

[32] The search and seizure of A.H. was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. Therefore, the admission of the firearm at A.H.’s factfinding was not an abuse of discretion. We affirm.

[33] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The record indicates there were two initial calls; it is unclear which call reported that the males matched the description of prior robbery suspects and which call reported that one male looked like a juvenile.

2.   Officers Gannon and Thurman were riding in the same police car. Ex. Vol. I, Resp. Ex. A.

3.   Respondent's Exhibit A contains two video files on one flash drive. The videos are footage from body cameras worn by Officers Thurman and Gannon and are labeled with each officer's name. In their brief, the State labeled citations to Officer Gannon's video as “Ex. A-G” and citations to Officer Thurman's video as “Ex. A-T”: we do the same. Additionally, upon playing the video file, it appears that the audio and video tracks are misaligned. Therefore, all citations to statements from either video within Exhibit A are cited to the time in the video when the statements are audible.

4.   The record does not indicate when the third officer arrived on the scene.

5.   The petition also alleged A.H. committed Class B misdemeanor possession of marijuana, which was dismissed at fact-finding.

Scheele, Judge.

Judges Foley and Kenworthy concur. Foley, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.