Meleeka Clary-Ghosh, Appellant-Respondent v. Michael Ghosh, Appellee-Petitioner (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Meleeka Clary-Ghosh (“Meleeka”) and Michael Ghosh (“Michael”) have been involved in litigation since the dissolution of their marriage under various cause numbers and causes of action. In the instant matter, after Michael filed a motion for proceedings supplemental and to set aside fraudulent transfers, Meleeka filed an emergency petition for a preliminary and permanent injunction and temporary restraining order. The trial court denied Meleeka's petition. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] This is apparently the fifth appeal stemming from Michael's efforts to collect judgments against Meleeka in their dissolution proceedings. See Clary-Ghosh v. Ghosh, 2023 WL 6054214 *1 (Ind. Ct. App. Sept. 18, 2023), trans. denied. In the most-recent previous appeal, this Court recounted the following:

Meleeka and [Michael] were formerly married. Andrew is Meleeka's brother, and Tooley is the father of Meleeka's two adult children who were born before she married [Michael]. This is the fourth appeal stemming from [Michael]’s efforts to collect judgments he obtained against Meleeka in their divorce proceedings, which began on August 13, 2009, when [Michael] filed a petition for dissolution. The divorce proceedings were protracted and resulted in the entry of multiple judgments in [Michael]’s favor against Meleeka[.]

Id. at *1.

[3] In the previous appeal, the trial court had found that Michael had proven that certain transfers of vehicles by Meleeka “were fraudulent and were done with the purpose of frustrating [Michael]’s ability to collect the Judgments from” Meleeka. Id. at *5. The trial court further concluded that Michael had shown that Meleeka's business, MCM Fashions, LLC (“MCM”), “was the alter ego of Meleeka such that MCM's corporate veil would be pierced.” Id. The trial court ultimately

voided the transfers of the vehicles and ordered that the vehicles were to be turned over to the Hamilton County Sheriff's Department for sale, with the net proceeds to be applied to satisfy its judgment. The trial court ordered Meleeka and MCM to pay [Michael] $31,000 in punitive damages, jointly and severally. In addition, the trial court awarded [Michael] $31,000 in attorney's fees, to be paid by Meleeka and MCM jointly and severally.

Id. In relevant part, this Court ultimately affirmed the trial court's judgment and the punitive damages awards to Michael and reversed the trial court's order only as it related to attorney's fees, concluding that the Indiana Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (“UFTA”) “does not authorize the award of attorney's fees” to a creditor. Id. at *14, 11.

[4] On June 3, 2024, Michael filed a motion for proceedings supplemental to Defendants and to Garnishee Defendants and to set aside fraudulent transfers. In the motion, Michael indicated that he had obtained several judgments against Meleeka and that the named “Garnishee Defendants, The National Bank of Indianapolis, Corp. [(“Bank of Indianapolis”)], Huntington National Bank [(“Huntington”)], JPMorgan Chase Bank [(“Chase”)], Regions Bank [(“Regions”)] and Citizens Bank, have in its possession one or more deposit accounts as defined by [Indiana Code section] 28-9-2-1,” in which he alleged Meleeka and/or Tooley have an interest. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 77.

[5] Michael further alleged, among other things, that “[u]pon information and belief,” Meleeka and/or Tooley had “established accounts at these banks under the names of Meleeka, Tooley, HMWP, Garnishee Defendant Cradeaja Clary a/k/a Cradeaja A. Clary (“Cradeaja”), Garnishee Defendant Meleesha Q. Clary (“Meleesha”) or other aliases in order to avoid collection by Michael with the actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud [Michael].” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 77. Among other requests, Michael asked the trial court to “Order the Judgment and Garnishee Defendants to answer Interrogatories concerning nonexempt property, funds on deposit or earnings, due or to become due, to Meleeka and Tooley, and return the same to the Court and [Michael]’s attorney[.]” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 84.

[6] On June 7, 2024, the trial court issued an order to answer interrogatories to both Huntington and Regions. The order indicated that the institutions could “answer the Interrogatories in lieu of appearing” at the hearing scheduled on the matter. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 91. One interrogatory to be answered inquired whether the institutions had “any type of deposit accounts” to the credit, “either individually or jointly, of the following Judgment Defendant(s) or their known aliases[,]” including, as aliases, Cradeaja and Meleesha Clary. Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 89, 93.

[7] On June 14, 2024, Meleeka filed a motion which appeared to object to interrogatories that Michael had submitted to Huntington. The same day, the trial court issued an order in receipt of the motion, stating that “[w]hile not clearly set forth in the motion, it appears [Meleeka] may be objecting to [Michael]’s Interrogatories submitted to [Huntington] with the Order to Answer Interrogatories to a Financial Institution, which was issued by the Court on June 7, 2024[.]” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 121 (emphasis in original). The order indicated that the June 7, 2024, order had been issued pursuant to Indiana Code section 28-9-3-4(d), and that “[Michael] believes certain accounts may have been created at specific financial institutions for the purposes of avoiding collection[.]” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 122. The order further provided that Meleeka appeared to seek a hearing on the interrogatories issued and that the trial court would address the interrogatories at the hearing on the motion for proceedings supplemental on August 2, 2024.

[8] On June 26, 2024, Michael issued a notice of intent to serve non-party discovery requests, indicating “[Michael] will serve non-party discovery requests after fifteen (15) days from the date of service of this notice on” the following non-parties: Bank of Indianapolis; Huntington; Chase; Regions; Citizens Bank; HMWP Psychology Counseling, LLC; Cradeaja; Meleesha; and Joining Faith with LMMMC.  ¹ Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 113.

[9] On July 1, 2024, Meleeka filed an emergency petition for a preliminary and permanent injunction and temporary restraining order. In the petition, Meleeka requested the following:

47. Meleeka requests that Michael be enjoined from issuing non-party discovery request and from communicating with 3[rd] parties indicating that Meleeka owes Plaintiff over a $100,000.

48. Meleeka requests that Michael be enjoined from defaming Meleeka and misconstruing the facts in order to obtain money from Meleeka's family or people who Meleeka associates with.

49. Meleeka requests that Michael and this Court, Judge Brown, be ordered to cooperate with the police authorities in their investigation of bank fraud.

50. Meleeka requests that this case be held in abeyance until the criminal investigation of bank fraud is resolved.

51. Meleeka requests that this Court order that all subpoenas and all discovery be quashed at least until the bank fraud matter is resolved in order to prevent further bank fraud wherein [Michael] is using the authority of this Court to carry out the bank fraud.

52. Meleeka requests that Michael be ordered to not stalk or follow [Meleeka] as the employees at Huntington Bank stated that [Michael] had been keeping a watch of [Meleeka] in order to find out where she has bank accounts.

53. Meleeka requests that Michael be required to produce evidence that Meleeka uses an alias or strike any such statement from his petitions and discovery requests.

Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 110.

[10] On July 2, 2024, the trial court ordered the following:

1. Pursuant to Ind. T.R. 34(c)(2), “[n]either a request nor subpoena to produce or permit as permitted by this rule shall be served upon a non-party until at least fifteen (15) days after the date on which the party intending to serve such request or subpoena serves a copy of the proposed request and subpoena on all other parties.” Emphasis added;

2. [Meleeka] is seeking a remedy of sanctions and dismissal for which she has presented no evidence [Michael] has actually sent discovery to non-parties or violated the Indiana Rules of Trial Procedure;

3. [Meleeka] prays this Court sanction [Michael] by quashing any discovery request intended to be issued by [Michael] and issue an order dismissing this action. Such relief is premature and this Court cannot issue a prescriptive sanction for an act that has yet to occur;

4. Additionally, on July 1, 2024, [Meleeka] filed an Emergency Verified Petition for a Preliminary and Permanent Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order, which appears to re-allege part of what is set forth in her Objection to Non-Party Discovery Request Propounded June 26, 2024 and Request for Sanctions. The Court now sets this emergency verified petition for hearing on July 12, 2024 at 2:00 PM (30 minutes);

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED the Objection to Non-Party Discovery Request Propounded June 26, 2024 and Request for Sanctions is therefore OVERRULED AND DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED [Michael]’s Motion for Proceedings Supplemental, as well as [Meleeka]’s Motion to Quash Interrogatories, are CONFIRMED for hearing on August 2, 2024 at 1:30 PM, as previously ordered on June 24, 2024. Further, [Meleeka]’s Emergency Verified Petition for a Preliminary and Permanent Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order is scheduled for hearing on July 12, 2024 at 2:00 PM (30 minutes).

Appellee's App. Vol. II p. 2–3 (first set of brackets, emphasis, and italics in original).

[11] At the hearing on Meleeka's motion for preliminary injunction on July 12, the trial court specifically addressed each of her requests on the record as follows:

the first request is that Michael be enjoined from issuing non-party discovery requests and from communicating with third-parties indicating that you owe [Michael] over $100,000. The trial rules [․] have discovery rules in place that parties are able to utilize. Both [Michael] and yourself are both entitled to use the same discovery mechanisms. I'm not going to prohibit a party from being able to utilize the trial rules. I don't think I have the authority to do that, and I'm not going to issue an order that tells somebody, no, you don't have the authority to do -engage in discovery for purposes of litigation when you follow the trial rules. So with respect to what's set forth in Paragraph No. 47, that request is denied.

The next paragraph, it references that you request Michael be enjoined from defaming Meleeka and misconstruing the facts in order to obtain money from Meleeka's family or people who Meleeka associates with. Defamation is not in this case. If you wish to bring a defamation action against [Michael], you are free to file a complaint for defamation. There's -- all I have is I have a judgment that's been issued in this cause. That's the state of where this case is at. I can't tell somebody that they have a right to defame somebody else. I'm not issuing an order that says that somebody has a right to defame somebody else. I think that if you believe that you have been the subject of defamation, you have a right to file a cause of action. But that's not this cause of action. And so this requested relief goes beyond the scope of what's in this case, and so that request is denied.

In paragraph 49, you request that Michael and this Court, specifically myself, be ordered to cooperate with the police authorities in their investigation of bank fraud. I have no idea what this is or what this really means. I don't have any evidence before this Court, and so this request is denied.

With respect to Paragraph No. 50, you request the case be held in abeyance until the criminal investigation is resolved. I don't have any basis -- I haven't been given anything in terms of a legal basis to stay the judgment in this cause.[․]

Paragraph 51, you request the Court order all subpoenas and all discovery be quashed at least until the bank fraud matter is resolved in order to prevent further bank fraud wherein Plaintiff is using the authority of the Court to carry out the band [(sic)] fraud. If you believe you've been the victim of bank fraud, you can stop by the prosecutor's office down on the 1st floor, and you can talk to the prosecutor's office. That bank fraud or whatever this claim is, I'm not sure what this really means, it's also not part of this cause of action. This cause of action originated back in July of 2017.

Tr. Vol. II pp. 26–28.

[12] With regard to paragraph fifty-one, the trial court further explained that the funds in the bank accounts at issue “have not been transferred to anybody. I don't have any evidence [․] the funds have been transferred.” Tr. Vol. II p. 29. With regard to Meleeka's next request, the trial court determined, “[S]talking is not part of this case. Okay? So I can't grant you the relief that you're asking for anyways. But, if you believe that a protective order is appropriate, such as for stalking, you can file a request for a protective order.” Tr. Vol. II p. 30. Finally, with regard to Meleeka's final request, that Michael be required to produce evidence that she uses an alias or strike any such statement from his petitions, the trial court determined that any such requests or concerns would be addressed “at the proceedings supplemental hearing.[․] [Y]ou only have standing to represent yourself.[․] If somebody else believes that they have money that he somehow is wrongfully freezing, then they need to make an appearance in this case.” Tr. Vol. II p. 31.

[13] The trial court denied all of Meleeka's requests on the record. After the hearing, the trial court entered a written order explaining that, “being duly advised, and having reviewed the petition and having heard argument on the same, the Court denied the relief requested by [Meleeka] on the record at the conclusion of the hearing.” Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 73–74.

Discussion and Decision

[14] Meleeka contends that trial court abused its discretion “in not issuing specific findings on its order denying injunctive relief.” Appellant's Br. p. 12.

To obtain a preliminary injunction, the movant must show (1) a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits; (2) the remedies at law are inadequate and there will be irreparable harm during the pendency of the action; (3) the threatened injury to the movant from denying the motion outweighs the potential harm to the nonmovant from granting the motion; and (4) the public interest would not be disserved by granting the injunction.

Vickery v. Ardagh Glass Inc., 85 N.E.3d 852, 859–60 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. denied.

[15] “The grant or denial of a preliminary injunction rests within the sound discretion of the trial court, and our review is limited to whether there was a clear abuse of that discretion.” Ind. Fam. and Soc. Services Admin. v. Walgreen Co., 769 N.E.2d 158, 161 (Ind. 2002) (citing Harvest Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Inter-Ocean Ins. Co., 492 N.E.2d 686, 688 (Ind. 1986)). An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances or if the trial court misinterprets the law. Ind. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n., Inc. v. Durham, 748 N.E.2d 404, 412 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001).

When determining whether or not to grant a preliminary injunction, the trial court is required to make special findings of fact and state its conclusions thereon. Ind. Trial Rule 52(A). When findings and conclusions are made, the reviewing court must determine if the trial court's findings support the judgment. Norlund v. Faust, 675 N.E.2d 1142, 1149 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997), trans. denied. The trial court's judgment will be reversed only when clearly erroneous. Id. Findings of fact are clearly erroneous when the record lacks evidence or reasonable inferences from the evidence to support them. Id. We consider the evidence only in the light most favorable to the judgment and construe findings together liberally in favor of the judgment. Id.

Hydraulic Exch. & Repair, Inc. v. KM Specialty Pumps, Inc., 690 N.E.2d 782, 785 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998). In reviewing the trial court's decision, we neither reweigh the evidence nor assess witness credibility. Great Lakes Anesthesia, P.C. v. O'Bryan, 99 N.E.3d 260, 268 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018).

[16] Initially, we note that the findings required to grant or deny a preliminary injunction “need not be extensive.” Costello v. Zollman, 51 N.E.3d 361, 365 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied. While the trial court may not have issued written findings, it specifically and purposefully discussed each of Meleeka's requests in detail on the record and indicated so in its written order, providing that “being duly advised, and having reviewed the petition and having heard argument on the same, the Court denied the relief requested by [Meleeka] on the record at the conclusion of the hearing.” Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 73–74. We conclude that the trial court's manner of disposing of each of Meleeka's requests on the record, by explaining in detail why the trial court was denying each request, was sufficient to comply with Rule 52(A).

[17] Meleeka contends that the trial court erred “by failing to issue injunctive relief concerning Michael's discovery violations and defamatory statements[.]” Appellant's Br. p. 14. Specifically, Meleeka contends that Michael had failed to disclose documents pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 34(C)(3) and that she had “asked for the court to quash the interrogatories that contain false information and to prevent Michael from issuing more non-party discovery without following the trial rule[.]” Appellant's Br. p. 14. For his part, Michael contends that Trial Rule 69(E) applies to the interrogatories in this case, not Rule 34(C). We agree. For context, and with no mention of interrogatories, trial Rule 34(C) provides, in relevant part:

[n]either a request nor subpoena to produce or permit as permitted by this rule shall be served upon a non-party until at least fifteen (15) days after the date on which the party intending to serve such request or subpoena serves a copy of the proposed request and subpoena on all other parties.

[18] On the other hand, Trial Rule 69(E) applies specifically to proceedings supplemental to execution, providing that

Notwithstanding any other statute to the contrary, proceedings supplemental to execution may be enforced by verified motion or with affidavits in the court where the judgment is rendered alleging generally:

(1) that the plaintiff owns the described judgment against the defendant;

(2) that the plaintiff has no cause to believe that levy of execution against the defendant will satisfy the judgment;

(3) that the defendant be ordered to appear before the court to answer as to his non-exempt property subject to execution or proceedings supplemental to execution or to apply any such specified or unspecified property towards satisfaction of the judgment; and,

(4) if any person is named as garnishee, that garnishee has or will have specified or unspecified nonexempt property of, or an obligation owing to the judgment debtor subject to execution or proceedings supplemental to execution, and that the garnishee be ordered to appear and answer concerning the same or answer interrogatories submitted with the motion.

If the court determines that the motion meets the foregoing requirements it shall, ex parte and without notice, order the judgment debtor, other named parties defendant and the garnishee to appear for a hearing thereon or to answer the interrogatories attached to the motion, or both.

(Emphasis added). In denying Meleeka's request that Michael be enjoined from issuing non-party discovery requests and from communicating to third parties that she owes him $100,000.00, the trial court explained that the trial rules “have discovery rules in place that parties are able to utilize” and concluded that both Meleeka and Michael are “entitled to use the same discovery mechanisms.” Tr. Vol. II p. 26. The trial court further concluded that it would not “prohibit a party from being able to utilize the trial rules” and that it would not issue an order prohibiting Michael from engaging in discovery “for purposes of litigation when you follow the trial rules.” Tr. Vol. II pp. 26, 27.

[19] Although it appears that Michael's June 26, 2024 notice of intent to serve non-party discovery requests did not contain attachments, the record shows that Michael had sent Meleeka an amended notice with the discovery requests attached on July 15, 2024, via electronic mail. The record does not indicate that Michael had sent any discovery requests, other than the interrogatories, to the non-parties before the July 12, 2024 hearing. Furthermore, review of Michael's motion for proceedings supplemental confirms that Michael complied with the requirements of Trial Rule 69(E) when he requested that the trial court order the garnishee defendants to answer interrogatories concerning non-exempt property, funds on deposit, or earnings. Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the evidence supports the conclusion that Michael had followed the rules of discovery and therefore supports the trial court's decision to deny Meleeka's request that Michael be “enjoined from issuing non-party discovery request and from communicating with 3[rd] parties[.]” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 110.

[20] To the extent that Meleeka contends that the trial court erred in denying her request concerning “defamatory statements,” Appellant's Br. p. 14, we disagree. Meleeka presented no evidence to the trial court regarding the alleged defamation, and as the trial court noted, “Defamation is not in this case.” Tr. Vol. II p. 27. The trial court further explained to Meleeka, “[i]f you wish to bring a defamation action against [Michael], you are free to file a complaint for defamation. There's -- all I have is I have a judgment that's been issued in this cause. That's the state of where this case is at.” Tr. Vol. II p. 27.

[21] It appears from the trial court's conclusions on the record that it could not find any evidence of defamation before it, and that it did not find that injunctive relief outweighed the remedies at law which Meleeka could seek through a separate action for defamation. See Bonewitz v. Parker, 912 N.E.2d 378, 384 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (providing that “[b]efore granting injunctive relief, a court is required to consider alternate remedies available to the plaintiff” and “[a]n injunction will not issue where the law can provide a full, adequate and complete form of redress”), trans. denied. We cannot say that the trial court's decision to deny injunctive relief on these grounds was clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the trial court. See Durham, 748 N.E.2d at 412.

[22] Meleeka next contends that the trial court erred “by failing to insure that Michael was following the law as delineated in Indiana Code [section] 28-9-3-4(d)[.]” Appellant's Br. p. 19. Specifically, she argues that the trial court should have “issued an injunction enjoining Michael from using the trial court's order in a manner inconsistent with the law.” Appellant's Br. p. 19. Meleeka indicates that the bank accounts of her daughters, Cradeaja and Meleesha, had been inappropriately frozen as a result of Michael's interrogatories. Meleeka contends that “[a]lthough the trial court knew that Cradeaja and Meleesha's bank accounts were frozen because the banks were wrongly instructed through Michael to freeze their accounts, the trial court took no action to correct the error.” Appellant's Br. p. 19.

[23] At the hearing, however, the trial court had already stated on the record that no one had appeared as a non-party to the hearing, and that Meleeka did not have standing “to make an argument for someone else who may have been aggrieved by some act by [Michael]. You can deal with your claims that you have with respect to [Michael], but you don't -- you don't have the ability to act for somebody else.” Tr. Vol. II pp. 22–23. After the parties presented argument, the trial court again addressed Meleeka's requests, stating, “you only have standing to represent yourself. [․] If somebody else believes that they have money that he somehow is wrongfully freezing, then they need to make an appearance in this case.” Tr. Vol. II p. 31.

[24] “Standing is a fundamental, threshold, constitutional issue that must be addressed by this, or any, court to determine if it should exercise jurisdiction in the particular case before it.” Doe v. Adams, 53 N.E.3d 483, 495 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (quoting Alexander v. PSB Lending Corp., 800 N.E.2d 984, 989 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003)). “The main purpose of standing is to insure that the party before the court has a substantive right to enforce the claim that is being made in the litigation.” Schulz v. State, 731 N.E.2d 1041, 1044 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). Standing is an issue of law that we review de novo. City of Gary v. Nicholson, 190 N.E.3d 349, 351 (Ind. 2022).

To establish standing, a plaintiff must demonstrate “a personal stake in the outcome of the litigation and ․ show that they have suffered or were in immediate danger of suffering a direct injury as a result of the complained-of-conduct.” Solarize Ind., Inc. v. S. Ind. Gas & Elec. Co., 182 N.E.3d 212, 217 (Ind. 2022) (quoting Bd. of Comm'rs of Union Cnty. v. McGuinness, 80 N.E.3d 164, 168 (Ind. 2017)).

Franciscan All., Inc. v. City of Hammond, 212 N.E.3d 1270, 1273 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023).

[25] At the hearing, Meleeka indicated only that her daughter had received a notice indicating that funds in her bank account were frozen. Meleeka failed to show that she had personally suffered or was in immediate danger of suffering a direct injury as a result of the frozen bank accounts, which she alleged had been frozen inappropriately. We conclude that the evidence supports the trial court's finding that Meleeka did not have standing to request an injunction related to the bank accounts that she alleged were not hers, which further supports the trial court's decision to deny Meleeka's request for a preliminary injunction.²

[26] We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Michael filed an amended notice of intent to serve non-party discovery requests on July 15, 2025, excluding Citizens Bank from the list and including T-Mobile.

2.   To the extent that Meleeka contends that her daughters did not receive notice of the proceedings, she does not point to anything in the record suggesting that she raised these assertions below, therefore waiving this argument. See, e.g., State v. Allen, 187 N.E.3d 221, 228 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (“Arguments raised for the first time on appeal, even ones based upon constitutional claims, are waived for appeal.”), trans. denied.

Bradford, Judge.

Judges Pyle and Kenworthy concur. Pyle, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.