G.I., Appellant-Respondent, v. INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SERVICES (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] G.I. (Father), the father of M.I. (Child), appeals the trial court's Child in Need of Services (CHINS) determination, claiming that the order was clearly erroneous. Father argues that the Indiana Department of Child Services (DCS) failed to present sufficient evidence that Child was a CHINS due to Father's refusal or inability to provide for Child's needs or that coercive intervention of the court was necessary.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Child, born on December 28, 2007, lived with her mother, B.S. (Mother), her two half-siblings, and her maternal grandfather in Richmond. Father, who has never had custody of Child and has not seen her for several years, resides in New Castle.

[4] In April 2024, DCS received a report that Child was a victim of neglect, in that Mother “was intoxicated all of the time” and that Grandfather, who typically cares for Child, was in the hospital. Appellant's Appendix Vol. II at 32. It was also alleged that Child was not attending school.

[5] On June 20, 2024, DCS filed an amended verified petition ¹ alleging that Child was a CHINS because of Mother's behavior that included suspected physical abuse of Child. DCS further alleged that both parents were “unwilling or unable” to provide Child with adequate care and supervision, and that DCS was previously involved with both parents and Child in other cases. Id. Mother subsequently admitted that M.I. was a CHINS at a pretrial conference on July 29, 2024. Child was removed from Mother's care on November 26, 2024.

[6] Father first appeared in court for an initial hearing on December 9, 2024,² denied the CHINS allegations, and declined a scheduled visit with Child. At a pretrial conference on January 3, 2025, at which Father failed to appear,³ the trial court summarized some of the reasons for Child's recent removal from Mother's care that included continued academic neglect, Child's pregnancy, Mother allowing Child's minor boyfriend to live with them, and Mother's refusal to permit DCS staff to enter her residence.

[7] At that pretrial conference, Father's counsel informed the trial court that Father told him that he would “do whatever is necessary” to have Child live with him. Transcript at 155. The trial court responded that Father was “going to have to start doing parenting time ․ for there to be any possibility” of Child living with Father. Id. Family Case Manager Karen Tomlin (FCM Tomlin) informed the trial court that Father had refused to engage in parenting services that DCS offered.

[8] At a case status conference on January 17, 2025, Father appeared with counsel, at which time Father reported that he had executed a consent for Child's adoption earlier that morning because he believed that adoption was in Child's best interest. Father, however, was not willing to admit that Child was a CHINS; therefore, the trial court set the matter for a fact-finding hearing. The trial court noted in its order that Father declined parenting time with Child. Father failed to appear for the February 19 fact-finding hearing, but the trial court allowed the hearing to proceed over counsel's objection.

[9] At that hearing, it was established that Child had been residing in foster care since her removal from Mother's care. FCM Tomlin testified that she met with Father three times and had “two to three calls” with him since October 2024. Id. at 203. The first interaction was Father's call to FCM Tomlin in October 2024, where he agreed to meet with her. During that meeting in November, Father indicated that he would participate in DCS services.

[10] FCM Tomlin testified that Father talked with her about his relationship with Child. Father stated that the relationship was “good in the beginning” but at some point, Child no longer wanted to be involved with Father because of remarks that family members had made about him. Id. at 204.

[11] FCM Tomlin referred Father for various services and supervised parenting time through Firefly.⁴ On November 6, 2024, Father met with a Firefly staff member and stated that he would not participate in its services or parenting time. A few weeks later, FCM Tomlin met with Father and explained the various services offered through Firefly. Although Father agreed to again meet with Firefly personnel, he failed to do so.

[12] FCM Tomlin consulted with Father in December 2024 about supervised visitation with Child. Father stated that he was not willing to participate and that he planned to “just go for full custody.” Transcript at 205. Father never filed a petition for custody, nor did he request parenting time with Child.

[13] FCM Tomlin further testified that when she went to Father's apartment in January 2025, he was sleeping on a mattress in the front room. There were two bedrooms in the apartment; one was occupied by Father's roommate, and the other was used by Father's service dog. FCM Tomlin believed that even if Child could use the dog's bedroom, Father's residence was not large enough to accommodate her. Father acknowledged that he would require other housing for Child, but he would need financial assistance to provide for Child's needs because he was on disability and could not pay his regular bills.

[14] FCM Tomlin also learned that Father's roommate had “some criminal history” and was on probation, and “[Father] felt uneasy about some things [that were] going on in his home.” Id. at 206-07. When FCM Tomlin asked Father for additional information about the roommate so she could conduct a background check, Father denied her request and stated that he would “not do anything with DCS.” Id. at 207. At no time did Father express an interest to FCM Tomlin that he wanted to care for Child.

[15] At some point, Child told FCM Tomlin that she did not want to see Father. Although the two had spoken on the phone, Father reported to FCM Tomlin that Child did “not want to move forward” and Father “did not want to put her in any position where she felt ․ stress ․ so he ․ did not want to proceed either.” Id. at 207-08. Father and Child stopped communicating after two calls because Father did not “have [any] kind of a bond with [Child].” Id. at 216.

[16] Child was five months pregnant at the time of the fact-finding hearing and was due to give birth in late June. It was established that Child was “doing very well” with her education and she had earned 25 credits towards graduation. Id. at 208. Child was thriving in foster care and was participating in individual therapy, parenting education, and skills training. FCM Tomlin believed that Child required ongoing services through DCS and that she should not be returned to either parent.

[17] Finally, the evidence demonstrated that Father did not cooperate with FCM Tomlin's referral for him to undergo a drug assessment and screenings. Although FCM Tomlin did not suspect that Father was presently using drugs, she made the referrals in light of Father's conviction for dealing in a controlled substance in 2008 and his admission that he used narcotics “throughout his life.” Id. at 213. FCM Tomlin desired assurance that Father was only taking “prescribed medication and nothing more.” Id. at 216.

[18] On February 21, the trial court issued an order adjudicating Child a CHINS. Although Father failed to appear at a subsequent dispositional hearing, counsel appeared on his behalf. The trial court ordered Child to remain in foster care and directed Father to participate in DCS reunification services.

[19] Father now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

I. Standard of Review

[20] A CHINS adjudication focuses on the needs and condition of the child, rather than the parent's culpability. In re N.E., 228 N.E.3d 457, 476 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024). Put another way, a CHINS adjudication is not a determination of parental fault but rather is a determination that a child is a CHINS and is unlikely to receive necessary services without court intervention. Id. The acts or omissions of a parent can cause a condition that creates the need for court intervention. Id.

[21] As our Supreme Court observed in In re D.J. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 68 N.E.3d 574 (Ind. 2017):

When reviewing a trial court's CHINS determination, we do not reweigh evidence or judge witness credibility. Instead, we consider only the evidence that supports the trial court's decision and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. When a trial court supplements a CHINS judgment with findings of fact and conclusions law, we apply a two-tiered standard of review. We consider, first, whether the evidence supports the findings and, second, whether the findings support the judgment. We will reverse a CHINS determination only if it was clearly erroneous. A decision is clearly erroneous if the record facts do not support the findings or if it applies the wrong legal standard to properly found facts.

Id. at 577-78.

[22] In this case, the trial court adjudicated Child a CHINS pursuant to Ind. Code § 31-34-1-1, which provides that a child is a CHINS if, before the child becomes eighteen years of age,

(1) the child's physical or mental condition is seriously impaired or seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or neglect of the child's parent ․ to supply the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education, or supervision:

(A) when the parent ․ is financially able to do so; or

(B) due to the failure, refusal, or inability of the parent ․ to seek financial or other reasonable means to do so; and

(2) the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that:

(A) the child is not receiving; and

(B) is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the court.

[23] This statute has been interpreted to require “three basic elements: that the parent's actions or inactions have seriously endangered the child, that the child's needs are unmet, and (perhaps most critically) that those needs are unlikely to be met without State coercion.” In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d 1283, 1287 (Ind. 2014). When determining whether a child is a CHINS under I.C. § 31-34-1-1, the juvenile court “should consider the family's condition not just when the case was filed, but also when it is heard.” In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d at 1290. DCS must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a child is a CHINS as defined in the juvenile code. In re N.E., 919 N.E.2d 102, 105 (Ind. 2010). Here, because Father has not challenged any of the trial court's factual findings, we need only determine whether the unchallenged findings are sufficient to support the judgment. In re A.M., 121 N.E.3d 556, 562 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), trans. denied.

II. Father's Claims

A. Father's Refusal or Inability to Provide For Child's Needs.

[24] Father claims that DCS failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Child's condition was endangered because of his alleged refusal or neglect to provide for her needs. Thus, Father maintains that the CHINS order must be set aside.

[25] At the fact-finding hearing, it was established that Father had not seen Child “for several years” before the CHINS petition was filed. Transcript at 204-05. And the evidence showed that Father failed to provide Child with food, clothing, shelter, education, and other necessaries. Although Father initially expressed an interest in caring for Child—with a promise that he would “do whatever is necessary”—he took no steps toward reunification. Id. at 155.

[26] Father also failed to appear at the fact-finding and dispositional hearings, which demonstrated his ambivalence to playing any role in Child's life. See A.F. v. Marion Cnty. Off. of Fam. and Child., 762 N.E.2d 1244, 1252 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (observing that a parent's failure to appear for “court hearings reflects ambivalence”), trans. denied. Moreover, Father consented to Child's adoption, further displaying his attitude about parenthood and being a part of Child's life.

[27] The trial court specifically stated at the January 3, 2025, pretrial conference that Father had to start “doing parenting time” for there to be any possibility of Child living with him. Transcript at 155. The trial court further remarked that “if [Father] doesn't do parenting time, there's zero chance I'm putting [Child with him].” Id. Notwithstanding this directive, Father refused to participate in any DCS services, including having parenting time with Child. Father reneged on his promise to further meet with Firefly personnel to discuss the various services that were offered, and he told FCM Tomlin that “he wanted nothing to do with DCS.” Id. at 207.

[28] As for Father's living situation, the evidence showed that he lived with a roommate and his service dog in a small two-bedroom apartment. Father slept in the front room on a mattress, while his roommate used one bedroom and his dog occupied the other. When it was determined that Father's roommate had a criminal history and was on probation, FCM Tomlin requested Father to supply her with additional information about the roommate so she could complete a background check. Father refused to provide such information. Father recognized that there were issues with his housing situation, and he told FCM Tomlin that he was considering alternative arrangements because there were things going on at his residence “that [he] felt uneasy about.” Id. It was also established that Father required additional financial assistance to provide for Child's needs because he was unable to pay his monthly bills.

[29] The evidence further demonstrated that Child needed services, including individual therapy, parenting education, and skills training, and there was no evidence that Father was willing or able to provide Child with such services. Father had limited communication with Child through a couple of phone calls, and he refused to participate in supervised parenting time. Moreover, Father's consent to Child's adoption demonstrates that he had all but relinquished his parental rights in Child and desired DCS to provide for Child.

[30] When considering this evidence, we conclude that DCS proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Child's mental or physical condition was seriously endangered or impaired due to Father's ambivalence, inability, or refusal to provide for Child's needs.

B. The Court's Coercive Intervention.

[31] Father argues that DCS failed to demonstrate that coercive intervention of the court was necessary in these circumstances. DCS may intervene in a family's life when the family cannot meet the child's needs without the court's intervention. In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d at 286. This element guards against unwarranted State interference in family life because “not every endangered child is a [CHINS] permitting the State's parens patriae intrusion into the ordinarily private sphere of the family.” Id. at 1287.

[32] In determining whether coercive intervention is necessary, “the question is whether the parents must be coerced into providing or accepting necessary treatment for their child.” Matter of E.K., 83 N.E.3d 1256, 1262 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. denied. A parent's lack of cooperation with DCS establishes that they are unlikely to provide the care and supervision the child needs without the court's intervention. Matter of D.P., 213 N.E.3d 552, 562 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), trans. denied.

[33] Here, the evidence established that Father showed an unwillingness to work with DCS and Firefly throughout the CHINS proceedings. And for most of Child's life, Father has been absent and uninvolved. Although Father initially seemed to show an interest in taking care of Child after DCS filed the CHINS petition, he made no progress in communicating with Child and made no effort toward possible reunification. That Father continually refused to engage with DCS and address his issues is sufficient to show that Child's needs were unlikely to be met without the court's coercive intervention. See Matter of D.P., 213 N.E.3d at 562-63.

[34] Also, as discussed above, Father failed to appear at court hearings, and his consent to adoption further supported the trial court's conclusion that coercive intervention by the court was necessary. In short, Father's action in agreeing to place Child for adoption demonstrated his unwillingness to do anything to provide for Child's care.

[35] For these reasons, the trial court did not err in determining that, without court intervention, Child would not receive necessary care and supervision. The trial court's CHINS determination is not clearly erroneous.

[36] Judgment affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   DCS filed its initial CHINS petition on May 22, 2024.

2.   Father failed to appear at prior scheduled initial hearing dates due to lack of notice.

3.   The record reflects that Father was given actual notice of this pretrial conference date at his initial hearing.

4.   Firefly Children & Family Alliance provides services to children, families, and individuals that focuses on child abuse prevention, family preservation, and recovery issues.

Altice, Chief Judge.

Pyle, J. and DeBoer, J., concur.