ROLL v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Pursuant to a plea agreement, Devon Roll (“Roll”) pleaded guilty to Level 6 felony neglect of a dependent ¹ and was placed on probation. Roll now appeals the conditions of his probation, claiming they were invalidly imposed. The State responds that we must dismiss because, as part of the plea agreement, Roll waived this type of sentencing challenge.² Agreeing with the State, we dismiss.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In May 2023, the State charged Roll with Level 3 felony neglect of a dependent and Level 6 felony leaving the scene of an accident. On August 14, 2024, Roll and the State entered a plea agreement under which Roll would plead guilty to neglect of a dependent as a Level 6 felony rather than a Level 3 felony and the remaining charge would be dismissed. The plea agreement called for a sentence of 730 days executed where 724 days of the sentence would be suspended to supervised probation. The agreement addressed the terms of probation, stating: “Defendant waives formal reading of the terms of his probation on the record, and further understands that the Court or the Probation Department may place him/her under any other reasonable terms of probation not listed in this agreement provided that Defendant receives notice of said terms.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 170. The agreement further provided: “Defendant agrees that he/she: ․ hereby waives his/her right to appeal [their] sentence so long as the judge sentences him/her within the terms of this plea agreement.” Id. at 171. For the plea agreement, a form was used that contained a space for Roll to initial beside each applicable provision. For inapplicable provisions, an “X” was marked in the space beside each provision. There was an “X” beside a potential provision requiring a person to “successfully complete an approved Alcohol & Drug User's Program and ․ pay the associated fee.” Id. at 170.

[3] The trial court held a plea hearing on August 14, 2024. After establishing a factual basis, the court asked Roll if he had “met with probation already,” and Roll said he had. Supp. Tr. Vol. 2 p. 16. The trial court then asked: “Do you have any questions or concerns, issues about your probation terms?” Id. Roll said: “No, Your Honor.” Id. The court signed the plea agreement, specifying it accepted the plea and was sentencing Roll in accordance with the agreement.

[4] After pleading guilty at the hearing, Roll met with the probation department and signed a document setting forth the terms and conditions of his probation. One condition required Roll to refrain from consuming any alcohol or any unprescribed drug. Another condition was that Roll “submit to drug/alcohol screens upon demand and pay the fee[.]” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 173.

[5] On October 14, 2024, Roll filed an objection “to declare probation terms added by the probation officer to be unenforceable.” Id. at 174. Roll challenged the requirements that he abstain from using alcohol and submit to drug and alcohol screens, arguing that “[n]o drugs or alcohol were involved in the offense, and nothing in the record indicate[d] that [Roll] [was] a drug or alcohol abuser.” Id. Roll argued that, in pleading guilty, it was “specifically bargained for by the [d]efense” that the conditions of probation exclude provisions related to “substance abuse counseling, treatment, or drug and alcohol testing.” Id. at 175. Roll argued that the exclusion of those types of terms was a “material” part of the agreement. Id. Roll asserted that he became aware of the challenged terms only when the probation department gave him a form after pleading guilty and “[c]ounsel was not provided notice that the terms would be added.” Id. Roll ultimately argued “[t]he added terms of probation” were “invalid” because they were set by probation, “not the [c]ourt[.]” Id. Roll claimed “the additional terms were implemented in contravention of Indiana law”— specifically, Indiana Code section 35-38-2-1.8(b)—and therefore invalid. Id. at 177. Roll also claimed that the procedures used to impose additional terms violated his right to due process under the United States Constitution and due course of law under the Indiana Constitution, particularly in that “new terms were added without the participation of [c]ounsel.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 181.

[6] The trial court held a hearing and subsequently entered an order directing Roll to “comply with any and all probation terms and conditions imposed on the date of sentencing, along with any and all reasonable and lawful terms required by the Washington County Probation Department thereafter.” Id. at 197. The court pointed out that, under the plea agreement, Roll waived a formal reading of the terms of probation and agreed that the court or the probation department could place him under any reasonable terms not listed in the plea agreement so long as Roll had notice of those terms. See id. at 196. Roll now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[7] Roll challenges the terms of his probation, arguing that the alcohol-related terms are invalid because they were imposed by the probation department, not the trial court. The State asks us to dismiss Roll's appeal on the basis that, in pleading guilty, Roll waived the right to appeal this type of sentencing issue.

[8] “Because a plea agreement is a contract, albeit one affecting important due process rights, the principles of contract law can provide guidance in the consideration of plea agreements.” Wright v. State, 700 N.E.2d 1153, 1155 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998). Indeed, when it comes to interpreting and applying the provisions in a plea agreement, “we are guided by contract interpretation principles, beginning with the agreement's plain language and determining the intent of the parties at the time the plea was entered.” State v. Smith, 71 N.E.3d 368, 370 (Ind. 2017). In general, the interpretation of a contract presents a question of law that we review de novo. Thomas v. Valpo Motors, Inc., 258 N.E.3d 236, 239 (Ind. 2025). Moreover, “[i]f the terms [of a plea agreement] are unambiguous, we will apply them accordingly.” Smith, 71 N.E.3d at 371. Notably “[t]erms do not become ambiguous merely because the parties disagree as to their proper interpretation.” Id. Rather, terms are ambiguous only if a reasonable person would find them subject to more than one interpretation. Id.

[9] In negotiating a plea agreement, a defendant may agree to “waive their right to appeal their sentence” so long as “their waiver is knowing and voluntary[.]” Davis v. State, 217 N.E.3d 1229, 1232 (Ind. 2023). Subject to this knowing and voluntary requirement, waiver provisions are broadly enforceable. Id. at 1234 (focusing on the knowing and voluntary requirement, noting that waivers “must stand or fall with the agreements of which they are a part” (quoting United States v. Wenger, 58 F.3d 280, 282 (7th Cir. 1995))); Lee v. State, 816 N.E.2d 35, 40 (Ind. 2004) (“A defendant ‘may not enter a plea agreement calling for an illegal sentence, benefit from that sentence, and then later complain that it was an illegal sentence.’ ” (quoting Collins v. State, 509 N.E.2d 827, 833 (Ind. 1987))).

[10] Here, the plea agreement reflected that Roll would plead guilty to the lead count as a lesser-included Level 6 felony in exchange for a fixed sentence and dismissal of the remaining count. Roll specifically agreed to a 730-day sentence that largely consisted of time on supervised probation. Moreover, in the plea agreement, Roll acknowledged he was “waiv[ing] [the] right to appeal [his] sentence so long as the judge sentence[d] [him] within the terms of th[e] plea agreement.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 171. The terms of the plea agreement specified that Roll was waiving a formal reading of the conditions of probation and that “the Court or the Probation Department may place [Roll] under any other reasonable terms of probation not listed in th[e] agreement provided that [Roll] receive[d] notice of said terms.” Id. at 170 (emphasis added). After sentencing, Roll met with the probation department and was notified that his probation terms included: (1) refraining from consuming alcohol and unprescribed drugs and (2) participating in random alcohol and drug screens. At the meeting, Roll signed a document acknowledging these and other terms of his probation.

[11] On appeal, Roll argues that the alcohol-related probation terms are invalid. First, Roll refers to a statute contemplating that the trial court, rather than the probation department, will specify in the record the terms of probation. Roll argues his probation terms are invalid because “the court did not order them at the time of sentencing and probation lacks authority to add probation terms.” Appellant's Br. p. 7. This argument is unavailing because Roll expressly agreed that “the Court or the Probation Department may place [Roll] under any other reasonable terms of probation not listed in th[e] [plea] agreement provided that [Roll] receive[d] notice of said terms.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 170 (emphasis added). Roll's agreement in this regard was binding. Cf. Lee, 816 N.E.2d at 40 (recognizing the binding nature of plea agreements). Given that Roll agreed to procedures regarding additional terms, the appropriate focus is not whether the probation procedures used in this case aligned with generally applicable statutory procedures; we must instead focus on whether the terms were imposed in a manner consistent with the terms of Roll's plea agreement.³

[12] Turning to the plea agreement, Roll agreed to the prospect of future terms imposed by the court or the probation department, expressly acknowledging that he could be subject to terms “not listed in th[e] [plea] agreement provided that [Roll] receive[d] notice of said terms.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 170. We therefore reject Roll's contention that the additional conditions were invalid solely “because they were not included the plea agreement” itself. Appellant's Br. p. 11. Roll further argues the conditions were constitutionally improper due to a lack of “due process and due course of law” under the state and federal constitutions. Id. at 14. According to Roll, he should have been given an opportunity to object to a potential term of probation before being subject to that term. See id. at 15 (arguing that any remedy for a problematic term was “illusory” under the circumstances). Yet, in pleading guilty, Roll agreed to the prospect of probation-imposed terms. Further, Roll negotiated an agreement whereunder he had to comply with “reasonable terms of probation not listed in th[e] [plea] agreement[.]” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 170 (emphasis added).

[13] Regarding reasonableness, Roll points out that terms of probation generally must be “reasonably related to [the] defendant's treatment or the protection of society.” Appellant's Br. p. 13 (citing Knight v. State, 155 N.E.3d 1242, 1248 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020)). Roll claims the challenged terms proscribing alcohol use and requiring alcohol screening were unreasonable because: (1) “[T]his incident ar[ose] from a motor vehicle incident, one that Roll was not solely responsible for”; (2) “Roll was not under the influence of alcohol or drugs, nor [was] there any evidence in the record that he suffers from substance abuse issues”; and (3) “The offense was failing to properly restrain his minor child, and his rehabilitation is not related to or benefitted by the prohibition.” Id. at 14.

[14] Roll has not established that the challenged terms fell outside the bounds of reasonableness. The record reflects that Roll was partially responsible for a vehicle collision while his child was not properly restrained in a car seat. Regardless of whether Roll had a history of substance abuse or was under the influence of drugs or alcohol when he was involved in the vehicle collision, Roll's conviction related to poor decision-making in failing to keep his child safe. In Carswell v. State, this court rejected a challenge to an alcohol-related probation condition even when “there [was] nothing in the record [that] suggest[ed] any relationship between [the defendant's] behavior and the use of alcohol.” 721 N.E.2d 1255, 1265 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999). In that case, the defendant had been convicted of child molesting. See id. In rejecting the defendant's challenge to the condition, this court observed that “[t]he propensity of alcohol to impair judgment and reduce inhibition is known,” and therefore, “[t]he need to protect children and to assist the defendant in his rehabilitation ma[de] the condition a reasonable one.” Id.

[15] Consistent with Carswell, we “are not prepared to hold that it is an abuse of discretion to require abstention from the use of alcohol” as a condition of probation for conduct that involved a lapse of judgment with regard to vehicular safety. Id. The challenged probation terms help ensure that Roll remains able to make safe driving-related decisions for himself, his passengers, and others on the roadway. Thus, the challenged probation terms are consistent with the sentencing provisions Roll agreed to when pleading guilty.

[16] Having concluded that the challenged probation terms are consistent with the sentencing provisions of the plea agreement—and given that Roll waived his right to appeal aspects of his sentence that are consistent with that agreement—we agree with the State that Roll's sentencing appeal is subject to dismissal.

[17] Dismissed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-46-1-4(a)(1).

2.   On April 4, 2025, the State filed a motion to dismiss, which we held in abeyance on May 2, 2025. We resolve the State's motion to dismiss herein and contemporaneously grant the motion through a separate order.

3.   In any case, to the extent Roll claims the alcohol-related conditions of probation were imposed in a manner contrary to Indiana Code section 35-38-2-1.8—which contemplates “a new probation hearing at any time during a probationer's probationary period” where “the court may modify the probationer's conditions of probation”—at this point, the substantive requirements of this statute appear to be satisfied in that, after Roll objected to the probation department's alcohol-related terms, the trial court held a hearing and ratified them.

Foley, Judge.

Kenworthy, J. and Scheele, J., concur.