IN RE: J.S. (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] J.S. (“Mother”) appeals the trial court's determination that her children, J.S., J'A.Y., and J'D.Y. (“Children”) are children in need of services (“CHINS”). On appeal, Mother contends that the evidence was insufficient to demonstrate that the Children are CHINS under either Indiana Code Section 31-34-1-1 or Indiana Code Section 31-34-1-2. The trial court's finding that the Children are CHINS pursuant to Indiana Code Section 31-34-1-1 is not clearly erroneous. Given this determination, we need not address the trial court's additional finding that the Children are also CHINS pursuant to Indiana Code Section 31-34-1-2 or DCS's argument that the Presumption Statute applies to J'D.Y. Accordingly, we affirm.

Issue

[2] Mother raises two issues, which we consolidate and restate as whether the trial court's determination that the Children are CHINS is clearly erroneous.

Facts

[3] The three Children at issue in this CHINS include J'A.Y., born in 2017; J'D.Y., born in 2021; and J.S., born in 2023.¹ Mother has three older children that are not subjects of this action. Mother has a prior substantiated assessment for neglect in 2009, a prior substantiated assessment for neglect and physical abuse in 2015, and a prior substantiated assessment for neglect in 2017 because J'A.Y. was born positive for THC—the active compound in marijuana.

[4] On September 5, 2024, Mother took two-year-old J'D.Y. to the hospital with a head injury. Testing revealed that J'D.Y. had a large epidural hematoma and an intracranial midline shift. J'D.Y.’s injury was life-threatening, and he had emergency surgery. According to Mother, as she was driving to pick up J'A.Y. from school, she had to stop the vehicle quickly and heard J'D.Y. cry out.² J'D.Y. was on the floor of the vehicle in the backseat area and had hit his head on the metal bar at the bottom of the front seat. Mother stated that J'D.Y. was in a high-back booster seat and that J'D.Y. had either unbuckled himself or slipped out of the seat belt when she stopped quickly. Dr. Tara Holloran, a physician specializing in child abuse and neglect, opined that J'D.Y.’s injury was the result of abuse or neglect. J'D.Y.’s age and weight required that he be placed in a rear-facing car seat, not a high-back booster seat.

[5] Mother refused to allow DCS to view Mother's vehicle and the booster seat, to allow DCS to interview the other children, to allow the other children to be examined by the hospital staff, to participate in a drug screen, and to allow DCS to inspect her residence. Eventually, DCS was able to view Mother's residence and discovered that the residence had no refrigerator, minimal furniture, and little food. DCS later assisted Mother in obtaining appropriate furniture and car seats for the Children.

[6] DCS filed a petition and alleged that the Children were CHINS pursuant to Indiana Code Section 31-34-1-1 (neglect). DCS also alleged that J'D.Y. was a CHINS pursuant to Indiana Code Section 31-34-1-2 (serious endangerment due to an injury)³ and that the rebuttable presumption of Indiana Code Section 31-34-12-4 (“Presumption Statute”)⁴ applied to J'D.Y. The Children were removed from Mother's care and placed with a maternal aunt.

[7] Mother has been diagnosed with bipolar disorder, anxiety, and depression, but Mother was not taking any medications to address her conditions or receiving therapy. DCS referred Mother for home-based casework and home-based therapy. Mother, however, repeatedly cancelled the therapy appointments. Eventually, Mother completed three therapy appointments; the therapist recommended that Mother continue therapy and that she obtain a medication evaluation. The therapist did not believe that Mother would continue therapy or obtain a medication evaluation on her own.

[8] Family Case Manager (“FCM”) Shana Ghooray noted that Mother eventually took four drug screens but also missed calls to take screens. Mother tested positive for cocaine and THC on September 19, 2024, and THC on October 17, 2024. The two additional screens were negative for illegal substances. Mother participated in a substance abuse assessment at Aspire, but she refused to comply with Aspire's recommendations.

[9] A fact-finding hearing was held in December 2024. The trial court granted DCS's petition and found the Children to be CHINS. The trial court did “not believe [J'D.Y.] was restrained at all” in Mother's vehicle and found that J'D.Y. “suffered life-threatening injuries due to the neglect of Mother.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 171, 175. The trial court concluded:

11. In conclusion, we have a child that suffered a near fatal injury that, at a minimum, was caused by Mother's uncontested neglect in failing to keep the child safe. We have evidence of substance abuse and a refusal by Mother to demonstrate sobriety, in combination with untreated mental health. All of these factors prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the children's mental and physical wellbeing are endangered and the coercive intervention of the Court is necessary.

* * * * *

13. Mother has poor decision making due to her drug use and untreated mental health condition. Mother's poor decision making caused life threatening injuries to her toddler and put all her children at risk of harm. Therefore, the coercive intervention of the court is necessary.

Id. at 177. The trial court then found the Children to be CHINS pursuant to both Indiana Code Section 31-34-1-1 and Indiana Code Section 31-34-1-2. The trial court made no findings regarding the Presumption Statute. Mother now appeals.

Discussion and Decisions

[10] Mother challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court's determination that the Children are CHINS under Indiana Code Section 31-34-1-1 and Indiana Code Section 31-34-1-2. CHINS proceedings are civil actions; thus, “ ‘the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a child is a CHINS as defined by the juvenile code.’ ” In re N.E., 228 N.E.3d 457, 475 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (quoting In re N.E., 919 N.E.2d 102, 105 (Ind. 2010)); see Ind. Code § 31-34-12-3. On review, we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of the witnesses. Id. (citing In re D.J., 68 N.E.3d 574, 577-78 (Ind. 2017)).

[11] Here, the trial court entered, sua sponte, findings of fact and conclusions thereon in granting the CHINS petitions. “ ‘As to the issues covered by the findings, we apply the two-tiered standard of whether the evidence supports the findings, and whether the findings support the judgment.’ ” Id. (quoting In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d 1283, 1287 (Ind. 2014)). We review the remaining issues under the general judgment standard, which provides that a judgment “ ‘will be affirmed if it can be sustained on any legal theory supported by the evidence.’ ” Id. (quoting Yanoff v. Muncy, 688 N.E.2d 1259, 1262 (Ind. 1997)). We will reverse a CHINS determination only if it is clearly erroneous. D.J., 68 N.E.3d at 578.

[12] “[T]he purpose of a CHINS adjudication is to protect children, not [to] punish parents.” N.E., 919 N.E.2d at 106. A CHINS adjudication is not a determination of parental fault but rather is a determination that a child is in need of services and is unlikely to receive those services without the intervention of the court. Id. at 105. “A CHINS adjudication focuses on the condition of the child ․ [T]he acts or omissions of one parent can cause a condition that creates the need for court intervention.” Id. (citations omitted). “A CHINS finding should consider the family's condition not just when the case was filed, but also when it is heard.” S.D., 2 N.E.3d at 1290.

[13] DCS must prove three elements for a juvenile court to adjudicate a child a CHINS: (1) the child is under the age of eighteen; (2) that one of the different statutory circumstances exist that would make the child a CHINS; and (3) the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that he or she is not receiving and is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the court. N.E., 919 N.E.2d at 105.

[14] DCS's petition requested that the Children be found to be CHINS under Indiana Code Section 31-34-1-1 and that J'D.Y. also be found to be a CHINS under Indiana Code Section 31-34-1-2 and the Presumption Statute, Indiana Code Section 31-34-12-4. Although DCS's petition alleged that Indiana Code Section 31-34-1-2 and the Presumption Statute applied only to J'D.Y., the trial court found all of the Children to be CHINS under both Indiana Code Section 31-34-1-1 and Indiana Code Section 31-34-1-2 and did not make any findings regarding the Presumption Statute.

[15] We begin by addressing the trial court's finding that the Children are CHINS pursuant to Indiana Code Section 31-34-1-1, which has been “referred to as the ‘neglect statute.’ ” In re D.F., 83 N.E.3d 789, 795 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). This statute provides:

A child is a child in need of services if before the child becomes eighteen (18) years of age:

(1) the child's physical or mental condition is seriously impaired or seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or neglect of the child's parent, guardian, or custodian to supply the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education, or supervision:

(A) when the parent, guardian, or custodian is financially able to do so; or

(B) due to the failure, refusal, or inability of the parent, guardian, or custodian to seek financial or other reasonable means to do so; and

(2) the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that:

(A) the child is not receiving; and

(B) is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the court.

[16] On appeal, Mother first argues that DCS failed to prove the Children's physical or mental conditions are seriously impaired or endangered. Mother contends: (1) there is no evidence her mental health seriously endangered the Children; and (2) Mother demonstrated her sobriety, and her substance abuse did not impact the Children. According to Mother, J'D.Y.’s “injury was an isolated accident, albeit a serious one. But an isolated incident does not in itself justify a CHINS determination.” Appellant's Br. p. 24.

[17] Mother, who has had multiple prior substantiated DCS assessments, came to the attention of DCS again on September 5, 2024, because of two-year-old J'D.Y.’s life-threatening head injury. Even if we accept Mother's explanation for J'D.Y.’s injury, the injury was the result of Mother failing to adequately secure J'D.Y. in the proper car seat for his age and weight.⁵

[18] During the investigation, DCS discovered that Mother's residence had no refrigerator, minimal furniture, and little food. Moreover, Mother admitted that she has been diagnosed with bipolar disorder, anxiety, and depression and was not taking medications to address her conditions or receiving therapy. Mother tested positive for cocaine and THC on September 19, 2024, and THC on October 17, 2024, and missed calls to take screens.⁶ Although Mother participated in a substance abuse assessment, she refused to comply with the assessment's recommendations.

[19] Mother's contention that the CHINS finding was based upon a single isolated incident is incorrect. We note that “a single incident” of abuse or neglect “may support a CHINS finding, and it need not necessarily be repetitive.” K.A.H. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 119 N.E.3d 1115, 1121 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). Moreover, the CHINS determination was based upon Mother's persistent patterns of “poor decision making” that seriously endangered not just J'D.Y., but all of the Children. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 177. J'D.Y. fortunately recovered from his injury. “The CHINS statutes do not require that the trial court wait until [another] tragedy occurs to intervene.” In re R.P., 949 N.E.2d 395, 401 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). Given Mother's history of DCS substantiations, Mother's neglect that resulted in life-threatening injuries to J'D.Y., Mother's untreated mental illness, and Mother's positive drug screens, the trial court's finding that the Children are seriously endangered is not clearly erroneous.

[20] Next, Mother argues that DCS failed to present evidence that the coercive intervention of the court was necessary. This CHINS element “guards against unwarranted State interference in family life, reserving that intrusion for families ‘where parents lack the ability to provide for their children,’ not merely where they ‘encounter difficulty in meeting a child's needs.’ ” D.J., 68 N.E.3d at 580 (quoting S.D., 2 N.E.3d at 1287) (italics in original). “[C]ourts ‘should consider the family's condition not just when the case was filed, but also when it is heard.’ ” Id. (quoting S.D., 2 N.E.3d at 1290). “Doing so avoids punishing parents for past mistakes when they have already corrected them.” Id. at 581.

[21] Here, DCS presented evidence that, after J'D.Y.’s life-threatening injury, Mother refused to: (1) allow DCS to view Mother's vehicle and the car seat; (2) allow DCS to interview the other children; (3) allow the other children to be examined by the hospital staff; (4) participate in a drug screen; and (5) allow DCS to view her residence. DCS was eventually allowed to see the booster seat and Mother's residence and assisted Mother in obtaining appropriate furniture and car seats for the Children.

[22] Although Mother eventually participated in drug screening and a substance abuse assessment, Mother refused to comply with Aspire's recommendations. Mother was uncooperative with scheduling her mental health appointments, but Mother eventually attended three therapy appointments. Although the therapist recommended that Mother continue therapy and obtain a medication evaluation, the therapist did not believe that Mother would do either on her own. Given Mother's uncooperative behavior, we conclude that the trial court's finding regarding the need for coercive intervention is not clearly erroneous.

Conclusion

[23] We conclude the trial court's finding that the Children are CHINS pursuant to Indiana Code Section 31-34-1-1 is not clearly erroneous. Given this determination, we need not address the trial court's further finding that the Children are also CHINS pursuant to Indiana Code Section 31-34-1-2 or DCS's argument that the Presumption Statute applies to J'D.Y. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's CHINS determination.

[24] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Father's location is unknown, and he does not participate in this appeal.

2.   Mother does not have a valid driver's license.

3.   Indiana Code Section 31-34-1-2(a) provides:A child is a child in need of services if before the child becomes eighteen (18) years of age:(1) the child's physical or mental health is seriously endangered due to injury by the act or omission of the child's parent, guardian, or custodian, including failure of the child's parent, guardian, or custodian to protect the child from exposure to the use, possession, sale, or manufacture of illegal drugs; and(2) the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that:(A) the child is not receiving; and(B) is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the court.

4.   Indiana Code Section 31-34-12-4 provides:A rebuttable presumption is raised that the child is a child in need of services because of an act or omission of the child's parent, guardian, or custodian if the state introduces competent evidence of probative value that:(1) the child has been injured;(2) at the time the child was injured, the parent, guardian, or custodian:(A) had the care, custody, or control of the child; or(B) had legal responsibility for the care, custody, or control of the child;(3) the injury would not ordinarily be sustained except for the act or omission of a parent, guardian, or custodian; and(4) there is a reasonable probability that the injury was not accidental.

5.   Mother alleges that the trial court's finding that it “does not believe [J'D.Y.] was restrained at all” is clearly erroneous. Appellant's Br. p. 12 n.5. Mother testified that J'D.Y. was restrained in a booster seat, but the trial court was not required to find Mother's testimony credible. We cannot say the finding is clearly erroneous.

6.   The trial court found that “Mother missed over 30 calls to Cordant for drug screens.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 173. FCM Ghooray testified that Mother missed calls to take screens. It is unclear from the record presented to this Court, however, whether Mother actually missed thirty calls. Accordingly, we agree with Mother that the trial court's finding that Mother missed thirty calls is clearly erroneous. The evidence does, however, demonstrate that Mother missed some calls for drug screens. We, thus, conclude that the error is harmless. See M.K. Plastic Corp. v. Rossi, 838 N.E.2d 1068, 1074 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (“[E]ven an erroneous finding is not fatal to a trial court's judgment if the remaining valid findings and conclusions support the judgment, rendering the erroneous finding superfluous and harmless as a matter of law.”).Mother also argues that she demonstrated her sobriety by having two negative drug screens. Mother is merely asking this Court to reweigh the evidence and judge her two negative drug screens more favorably than her positive drug screens. The trial court's finding is not clearly erroneous.

Tavitas, Judge.

Vaidik, J., and Felix, J., concur.