Lorenzo N. Rodgers, Jr., Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Law enforcement was dispatched to an apartment complex in Mishawaka, Indiana on February 17, 2024 after receiving a 911 call reporting a domestic dispute between a woman and her boyfriend. Officers arrived on scene to find S.B. sitting in the first-floor hallway unable to walk, and she informed them that she had to jump off her third-story apartment balcony because her boyfriend, Lorenzo Rodgers, was beating her. Rodgers was subsequently arrested, and S.B. was taken to the hospital where she relayed Rodgers’ abuse to a forensic nurse as part of a medical examination.

[2] At Rodgers’ jury trial and over his objections, the judge admitted body camera footage from the officers’ initial encounter with S.B. and the narrative S.B. gave to the forensic nurse. Rodgers was found guilty and convicted of criminal confinement, domestic battery, strangulation, and intimidation. He appeals his convictions, arguing the trial court's admission of the body camera footage and the narrative taken by the forensic nurse violated his rights under the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Late on February 17, 2024, Rodgers and his girlfriend, S.B., got into an argument at their apartment. After consuming an entire bottle of Hennessey, Rodgers became aggressive and S.B. attempted to get him to leave. Rodgers then pushed S.B. and punched her in the face twice. He also hid her phone, leaving her unable to call the police.

[4] Rodgers eventually got S.B. onto the couch and began choking her, telling her she was going to die. Rodgers released her and she attempted to escape through the front door, but he prevented her from doing so. Believing he was about to strangle her again, S.B. grabbed an object and hit Rodgers on the head. He went to check on his injury in the bathroom and continued telling S.B. she was going to die. S.B. jumped off their third-floor balcony onto a second-floor balcony. From there, she then jumped to the rocky and snowy ground below. A short time later, S.B. said she heard Rodgers come downstairs to look for her, but he did not find her.

[5] After ten to twenty minutes of trying to get a neighbor's attention and banging on doors for help, Tiana Williams and her sister arrived at the complex and found S.B. Williams testified that S.B., looking disheveled, was sitting on the ground crying. S.B. told Williams that Rodgers “beat her up” and that she jumped off the balcony. Transcript at 26. Williams then called 911 and waited with S.B. until police arrived.

[6] Officer Elias Martinez and other officers were dispatched to the apartment complex for a “domestic in progress.” Tr. at 31. Dispatch advised the officers that the victim was on the main floor and Rodgers was on the third floor. Officer Martinez activated his body camera upon arriving. When the officers located S.B., she was crying and “pretty worked up.” Tr. at 32. One of the officers asked S.B. if she was okay and which leg was hurt, and she informed him that she could not walk. State's Exhibit 1 at 00:40. The officer assured her that the paramedics were on the way. Id. at 00:49. When he asked S.B. what happened, she told him that Rodgers was drinking, they got into an argument that turned physical, and Rodgers would not let her leave, so she jumped off the balcony. Id. at 00:53-01:12. The officer asked Williams if Rodgers had come downstairs to where they were, and Williams said he had not. Id. at 01:05-01:07.

[7] The officers went up to the couple's apartment on the third floor and arrested Rodgers. Both Rodgers and S.B. were taken to St. Joseph Regional Medical Center to address their injuries. At the hospital, S.B. was examined by forensic nurse Jennifer Lindgren, who is trained to conduct medical exams on victims of domestic violence. Nurse Lindgren obtained S.B.’s consent to do the exam and took a narrative of the domestic violence event that brought her to the hospital. Then she took photographs of S.B.’s injuries and, guided by the information S.B. gave her, she conducted medical exams, including a strangulation exam, a CT scan, and x-rays. See Tr. at 66, 69. S.B. told Nurse Lindgren that Rodgers had hit her, choked her, told her she was going to die, and blocked the door to the apartment, causing her to jump off the balcony. Tr. at 82-83. Nurse Lindgren found that S.B. had a broken left tibia; bruising on the left side of her face and her arms; scratches on her neck, face, and arms; popped eye vessels; and a swollen neck.

[8] Rodgers was charged with Count I: Criminal Confinement, a Level 3 felony;¹ Count II: Domestic Battery Resulting in Moderate Bodily Injury, a Level 6 felony;² Count III: Strangulation, a Level 6 felony;³ and Count IV: Intimidation, a Level 6 felony.⁴ During a jury trial, neither Rodgers nor S.B. testified.⁵ When Officer Martinez and Nurse Lindgren testified, Rodgers objected to the admission of Officer Martinez's body camera footage containing S.B.’s statements and the narrative taken by Nurse Lindgren during her examination of S.B. at the hospital, arguing their admission violated the Confrontation Clause. The trial court admitted both over Rodgers’ objections. Rodgers was found guilty and convicted on all counts. He was sentenced to an aggregate sentence of twelve years, with six years in the Indiana Department of Corrections, two years served in community corrections, and the remaining four years suspended with two years on probation. Rodgers appeals his convictions.

Discussion and Decision

I. Standard of Review

[9] Rodgers argues the admission of the police officer's body camera footage and the narrative from Nurse Lindgren's examination violated the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. While we generally review admission of evidence for an abuse of discretion, because Rodgers asserts that the admission of evidence violated the constitution, we apply a de novo standard of review. Speers v. State, 999 N.E.2d 850, 852 (Ind. 2013), cert. denied; Cardosi v. State, 128 N.E.3d 1277, 1286 (Ind. 2019).

[10] The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, states in relevant part: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ․ to be confronted with the witnesses against him[.]” U.S. Const. amend. VI. It “prohibits introduction of testimonial statements made by a non-testifying witness” unless that witness is both unavailable to testify and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross examine them. Ward v. State, 50 N.E.3d 752, 757 (Ind. 2016). Admission of statements that are nontestimonial does not offend the Confrontation Clause. Id.

[11] To determine whether a statement is testimonial or nontestimonial, we must look at the statement's “primary purpose.” Id. Testimonial statements are “solemn declaration[s] or affirmation[s] made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact.” Everroad v. State, 998 N.E.2d 739, 742 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004)), trans denied. Nontestimonial statements are those “made in the course of police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.” Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006) (emphasis added).

[12] We apply the primary purpose test to determine whether a statement is testimonial, assessing the statement and the actions of the parties involved. Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 360 (2011); see Cruz v. State, 218 N.E.3d 632, 637 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), trans. denied. Our goal is not to determine “the subjective or actual purpose of the individuals involved[,]” but rather to determine “the purpose that reasonable participants would have had, as ascertained from the individuals’ statements and actions and the circumstances in which the encounter occurred.” Bryant, 562 U.S. at 360.

II. Body Camera Footage

[13] Rodgers asserts that admission of the police officer's body camera footage portraying S.B.’s statements to the officers violated the Confrontation Clause because there was no ongoing emergency and S.B.’s statements were testimonial. We disagree.

[14] Whether there was an ongoing emergency is a “highly context-dependent inquiry.” Young, 980 N.E.2d at 419 (quoting Bryant, 562 U.S. at 363). To determine whether there was an ongoing emergency, we consider four factors:

(1) whether the declarant was describing events “as they were actually happening” or past events; (2) whether the declarant was facing an ongoing emergency; (3) whether the nature of what was asked and answered was such that the elicited statements were necessary to be able to resolve the present emergency rather than simply to learn about past events; and (4) the level of formality of the interview.

[15] State v. Martin, 885 N.E.2d 18, 20 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (citing Davis, 547 U.S. at 827). “Police investigation of domestic violence involves a unique set of circumstances[.]” King v. State, 985 N.E.2d 755, 758 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) trans. denied. This Court has recognized that in domestic dispute situations, a victim's answers to “ ‘police officers’ initial inquiries may often be, but are not always, non-testimonial, because the officers may need to investigate and identify the people involved in order to assess the situation, the threat to their safety, and the potential danger to the victim.’ ” Young v. State, 980 N.E.2d 412, 419 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (citing Davis, 547 U.S. at 832).

[16] In this case, looking at the primary purpose of the statements and circumstances surrounding the officer's questions posed to S.B. and her responses, we find they were elicited to enable officers to resolve an ongoing emergency and thus, nontestimonial. First, the officers were dispatched to address a “domestic in progress.” Tr. at 31 (emphasis added). S.B. was visibly upset and suffered from a significant injury that still needed medical attention and which left her unable to walk. Upon arriving, the officers located S.B and immediately asked her what happened. S.B. responded quickly and emotionally, explaining how her condition came about.

[17] The officer then inquired about Rodgers’ location—whether he was in the apartment and whether he had attempted to come downstairs to where S.B. was. See State's Ex. 1 at 01:05. Lastly, the conversation was informal, taking place at the crime scene and lasting less than a minute. See McQuay v. State, 10 N.E.3d 593, 598 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (finding a victim's statements to law enforcement were nontestimonial, reasoning in part that they were made “at the crime scene rather than at the police station”). The officer asked only what was necessary to locate the threat and ensure S.B.’s and the officers’ safety. We conclude that the objective purpose in asking these few questions was to resolve the ongoing emergency of the domestic dispute, not to obtain statements to create an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony. Bryant, 562 U.S. at 360.

[18] Thus, because S.B.’s statements were made to the officers as they resolved an ongoing emergency, they were nontestimonial. As her statements were nontestimonial in nature, the admission of the body camera footage portraying them was not a violation of Rodgers’ confrontation right under the Sixth Amendment.

III. Forensic Nurse's Report

[19] Rodgers also argues that the admission of the narrative included in Nurse Lindgren's examination at the hospital violated his confrontation rights. Again, we disagree.

[20] The primary purpose test has been expanded beyond statements made to law enforcement to include statements made to medical personnel, such as forensic nurses. In Perry v. State, this Court concluded that a sexual assault victim's statements to a forensic nurse were admissible when the victim was unavailable to testify. 956 N.E.2d 41, 56-57 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), reh'g denied. We found the victim's statements to the nurse, describing the attack and identifying her attacker, were nontestimonial because “the totality of the circumstances, viewed objectively, indicate[d] that the primary purpose of [the forensic nurse's] examination and the primary purpose of [the victim's] statements in the course thereof were to furnish and receive emergency medical and psychological care.” Id. at 56.

[21] We find the Indiana Supreme Court's analysis in Ward particularly pertinent here. In that case, the Court recognized the role of a forensic nurse in assessing victims’ mental and physical injuries and creating a safety plan for them, stating

patient safety is a “critical” part of the comprehensive standard of care for treating victims of domestic violence. Providers must issue a safety plan. And that plan is not just the final instruction a patient receives; it is a process of “assessment” that begins “[b]efore the patient leaves the office,” with questions like “what happened?” and “who did this?” Answering these questions determines what resources patients need from their doctors and nurses—“for instance, are they safe to go home or do they need to access a domestic violence shelter?” ․ Likewise, proper documentation works in tandem with safety assessments and planning because it “helps coordinate care between multidisciplinary providers.” Doctors and nurses are instructed to record the assailant's name and relationship to the victim if the victim divulges that information.

Ward, 50 N.E.3d at 763 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis in original). Ultimately, the Court found that a “forensic nurse's primary function is providing medical treatment, not gathering evidence[,]” and held that the victim's statements to the forensic nurse were nontestimonial. Id. at 761, 763-64.

[22] We find the reasoning in Ward applicable to the narrative taken by Nurse Lindgren here. Nurse Lindgren testified that the purpose of a forensic nurse's examination is to diagnose and treat the victim's injuries. Tr. at 66. She asks every victim who their abuser was because

[i]t's important first to establish a relationship. Was it an unknown patient? Was it someone who broke into their home? Did they have a relationship? Also, the safety of them when they leave. Are they going to see this person again? Are they in a relationship[?] That kind of thing.

Id. at 81. Nurse Lindgren further stated that it was necessary to find out what happened to S.B., when and how it happened, and how she was injured because that information guides her examination and allows her to check for the most likely injuries, ask the right questions, and run the proper tests. See id. at 66.

[23] Rodgers argues S.B.’s statements in the narrative were testimonial because there was “no emergency at all” and the statement “was clearly about past events and being given to investigate a possible crime.” Appellant's Brief at 11. He asserts that a forensic nurse's only purpose is to preserve evidence for trial. Id. However, Rodgers fails to reconcile these contentions with Ward or Perry or Nurse Lindgren's own testimony that the primary purpose of a forensic nurse's examination is to properly diagnose, treat, and create a safety plan for the victim. Nurse Lindgren needed to know what happened to S.B. and by whom in order to treat her injuries and safely release her from the hospital. Rodgers produces no evidence to the contrary.

[24] We conclude that S.B.’s statements to Nurse Lindgren were nontestimonial and their admission did not violate Rodgers’ rights under the Confrontation Clause.

Conclusion

[25] Because S.B.’s statements made to law enforcement and to Nurse Lindgren were nontestimonial, admission of those statements did not violate Rodgers’ rights under the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause, and we affirm.

[26] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-42-3-3(a), (b)(3)(B).

2.   I.C. § 35-42-2-1.3(a)(1), (b)(3).

3.   I.C. § 35-42-2-9(c).

4.   I.C. § 35-45-2-1(a)(4), (b)(1)(A).

5.   A handwritten letter from S.B. filed with the trial court on December 16, 2024, suggests that S.B. signed an affidavit in February 2024 stating she did not wish to be involved in the case; however, that affidavit is not included in the appellate record. See Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 156; see also Tr. at 96. Nonetheless, neither the State nor the defense subpoenaed S.B. to testify. The State said it did not subpoena S.B. because she indicated at the beginning of the case that she was not going to cooperate with the State and continuously refused contact with their office. See Tr. at 96. Rodgers’ counsel suggested to the trial court that the defense did not issue a subpoena on the assumption that the State would subpoena her. Id. The defense did attempt to have her testify on behalf of the defense without being subpoenaed to do so, but S.B. did not voluntarily appear. Id. at 96, 106.

DeBoer, Judge.

Chief Judge Altice and Judge Pyle concur. Altice, C.J., and Pyle, J., concur.