HILL v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Following a bench trial, Marsha Hill appeals her conviction for Class B misdemeanor battery. Hill contends that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction.

[2] We affirm.

Facts & Procedural History

[3] Hill, a resident of Clifton Square Apartments on West 30th Street in Indianapolis, wanted to do her laundry on September 13, 2024, but she could not access the laundry room. Around 8:00 a.m., she went to the office to inform the property manager, Alisha Jones, of the problem. Jones was not there, so Hill went back up to her apartment and called another resident, who said she would go down and check. That resident's key fob did not work either.

[4] At 8:14 a.m., a resident informed Jones that there was an issue with the fob access to the laundry room. Jones then put in a request with IT. A couple hours later, Hill again attempted to access the laundry room with no success. She spoke with a maintenance worker about the issue. When his key fob did not work, the worker told Hill to go to the office to have Jones call IT.

[5] Hill went directly to the office lobby and notified Jones of the issue. Jones responded, “Thank you for letting me know, another resident came down and let me know and I reached out to IT and they're working on the issue.” Transcript at 21. Hill made clear to Jones that she was “disturbed” about not being able to access the laundry room. Id. at 29. Hill also stated, “Well you know, when I got here, I told you guys that I came here for a washer and dryer.” Id. at 21. Jones described Hill's demeanor as “upset” during this brief discussion. Id. at 35.

[6] Thirty-seven seconds into the encounter, which was video recorded without audio by a surveillance camera in the office, Hill took several steps toward Jones and placed her hands on either side of Jones's neck. Jones immediately raised her right hand up to where Hill's right hand was on her neck and told Hill to take her hands off Jones's neck. At this same time, a maintenance worker opened the door that was directly behind Hill and came into the room. Hill then moved her hands down into “a hugging motion” around Jones and apologized. Id. at 25. Jones responded, “it's okay, just don't ever do it again,” and Hill left the office. Id. at 24.

[7] The State charged Hill with Class B misdemeanor battery, and a short bench trial took place on February 3, 2025. The State presented the testimony of Jones and the video recording of her interaction with Hill.¹ Hill then testified on her own behalf and claimed that she was simply trying to hug Jones. The trial court inquired of Hill while watching the video, “So why are your hands there?” Id. at 33. Hill responded, “Around her neck to hug her.” Id. While Hill tried to demonstrate, the court interrupted, “Hold on, hold on, hold on. Why would ․ you take that route to hug someone?” Id. Hill responded, “I don't know. I – I can't even say exactly why I did it. I'm just a friendly person.” Id.

[8] When the State recalled Jones on rebuttal, she testified that Hill “appeared to be upset” and that it was not Jones's perception that Hill was trying to “hug [Jones] up around the neck[.]” Id. at 35. Further, Jones noted that they had never hugged during any of their previous interactions.

[9] The trial court found Hill guilty as charged and sentenced her to time served. Hill now appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence.

Discussion & Decision

[10] When reviewing the sufficiency of evidence supporting a conviction, we neither reweigh the evidence nor assess the credibility of witnesses. Fix v. State, 186 N.E.3d 1134, 1138 (Ind. 2022). “When there are conflicts in the evidence, the [trier of fact] must resolve them.” Young v. State, 198 N.E.3d 1172, 1176 (Ind. 2022). Thus, on appeal, we consider only the probative evidence and the reasonable inferences supporting the conviction and will affirm “unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Fix, 186 N.E.3d at 1138 (quoting Jackson v. State, 50 N.E.3d 767, 770 (Ind. 2016)).

Sorgdrager v. State, 208 N.E.3d 646, 650 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), trans. denied. In sum, the evidence does not need to overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence; it is sufficient if an inference may be reasonably drawn from the evidence to support the conviction. Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 147 (Ind. 2007).

[11] To prove that Hill committed battery as charged, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she knowingly or intentionally touched Jones in a rude, insolent, or angry manner. Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(c)(1). “Any touching, however slight, may constitute battery[.]” Matter of Hill, 144 N.E.3d 184, 188 (Ind. 2020) (quoting Impson v. State, 721 N.E.2d 1275, 1285 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000)).

[12] Hill does not dispute that she intentionally placed her hands on Jones. Thus, the touch element is easily satisfied. Hill argues, however, as she did below, that her touching of Jones was not knowingly or intentionally done in a rude, insolent, or angry manner. That is, she describes the touching as “an unconsented to hug, intended as a friendly gesture.” Appellant's Brief at 5. But Hill acknowledges that Jones described the touching and the perceived intent behind it “much differently” than her at trial. Id. at 9.

[13] Indeed, Jones testified that she did not believe that Hill was trying to hug her when Hill initially touched her with both hands on the neck. Hugging had never been part of their interactions in the past, and Hill was expressing upset about the laundry room issue during this interaction, which, we observe, would make hugging in this instance rather odd. Further, the video evidence does not indisputably contradict Jones's testimony or indisputably support Hill's testimony that she was simply hugging Jones. See Love v. State, 73 N.E.3d 693, 699-700 (Ind. 2017) (holding that where video evidence “indisputably contradicts” the trial court's factual determinations, reversing based on that evidence does not constitute reweighing, but “where the video evidence is somehow not clear or complete or is subject to different interpretations, we defer to the trial court's interpretation”).

[14] Our Supreme Court has explained in the context of battery:

[P]urposeful physical contact can take a variety of forms, and the appropriateness of each form often will depend heavily on both nuance and context. It is precisely because of this variability that we vest responsibility in our factfinders to evaluate “the reasonable inferences based upon an examination of the surrounding circumstances to determine whether – from the person's conduct and the natural consequences therefrom – there is a showing or inference of the requisite criminal intent.” Diallo v. State, 928 N.E.2d 250, 253 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (internal quotation omitted). At the end of the day, whether Respondent possessed the requisite mens rea was a question of fact to be determined by the [factfinder].

Hill, 144 N.E.3d at 189.

[15] Here, the trial court considered the conflicting testimony of both witnesses along with the video evidence. In doing so, the court asked Hill pointed questions, while viewing the video, about the placement of her hands on Jones's neck and why she would “take that route to hug somebody[.]” Transcript at 33. The trial court also asked Jones about what was said just before she was touched by Hill. Ultimately, the trial court did not find Hill's testimony regarding the intended nature of the touching to be credible. This was the trial court's prerogative, and we will not reweigh the evidence.

[16] Considering only the evidence and reasonable inferences favorable to the conviction, we cannot say that no reasonable factfinder could find the elements of battery proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we affirm.

[17] Judgment affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Due to the angle of the camera, Hill is pictured in the video only from her shoulders down. More of Jones's body is pictured in the video, including her neck and, at times, her face.

Altice, Chief Judge.

Pyle, J. and DeBoer, J., concur.