GOMEZ v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Juan Gomez appeals his convictions for Class A misdemeanor operating a vehicle while intoxicated endangering a person;¹ and Class C misdemeanor operating a vehicle without ever receiving a license.² He alleges the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions. He also argues his sentence was inappropriate. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On April 15, 2024, a witness driving in Hendricks County around 11:40 P.M. noticed what looked like a “fireball in the sky.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 5. Approximately thirty seconds later, the witness came across debris and downed powerlines on the road. The witness then noticed a silver car on the side of the road and a man later identified as Gomez lying unresponsive in a ditch not more than ten feet away from the vehicle. The car appeared to have crashed into a utility pole; there were no other vehicles or people at the crash site. Other witnesses from nearby homes arrived and called 9-1-1. Hendricks County Sheriff's Deputy Fred Fislar responded to the call. Upon arrival, Deputy Fislar was attempting to reach the still unresponsive Gomez when he came in contact with downed powerlines and was electrocuted. Both Gomez and Deputy Fislar were taken to the hospital for treatment. Deputy Fislar later died of his injuries.

[3] While Gomez was at the hospital, law enforcement sought and received a warrant to draw his blood. The resulting toxicology report revealed the alcohol content in Gomez's blood was .229 grams per hundred milliliters. An examination of the crash site showed Gomez's car had extensive front-end damage from impact with the utility pole. Officers found keys to the car about ten feet away from the damaged vehicle. They also located Gomez's Mexican government-issued identification inside the car. Police determined Gomez had never been issued a driver's license in Indiana. Gomez's identification showed he was born on September 11, 2003, which means he was twenty years old at the time of the crash.

[4] The State charged Gomez with operating a vehicle while intoxicated endangering a person, operating a vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.15 or more, operating a motor vehicle without ever receiving a license, and consuming alcohol as a minor. At the conclusion of a bench trial, the court found Gomez guilty as charged. Because of double jeopardy concerns, the trial court granted the State's motion to vacate the conviction for operating a vehicle with a blood alcohol content of 0.15 or more.

[5] During sentencing, the trial court found no mitigating factors. As an aggravating factor, the trial court found Gomez was on bond for essentially the same charges ³ in another criminal prosecution when he committed the offenses in this case and “a lesser sentence would diminish the seriousness of the crime charged.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 56. A person convicted of a Class A misdemeanor “shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of not more than (1) year.” I.C. § 35-50-3-2 (1977). A Class C misdemeanor carries a maximum prison term of sixty days. I.C. § 35-50-3-4 (1978). The trial court sentenced Gomez to the maximum term on each conviction, to be served consecutively. As part of the judgment, the trial court also ordered Gomez to pay a $1 fine, court costs of $189.50, and restitution to the utility company for property damages in the amount of $41,425.98.

There was sufficient evidence Gomez was operating a vehicle at the time of the crash.

[6] A sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim warrants a “deferential standard of review in which we ‘neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility[.]’ ” Hancz-Barron v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1237, 1244 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Brantley v. State, 91 N.E.3d 566, 570 (Ind. 2018), cert. denied). Instead, we respect the fact-finder's exclusive province to weigh conflicting evidence, Phipps v. State, 90 N.E.3d 1190, 1195 (Ind. 2018), and consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences that support the judgment of the trier of fact, Hall v. State, 177 N.E.3d 1183, 1191 (Ind. 2021). We will affirm the conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Teising v. State, 226 N.E.3d 780, 783 (Ind. 2024). It is “not necessary that the evidence ‘overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.’ ” Sallee v. State, 51 N.E.3d 130, 133 (Ind. 2016) (quoting Moore v. State, 652 N.E.2d 53, 55 (Ind. 1995)).

[7] Gomez maintains the State failed to prove he was operating a vehicle, a necessary element to sustain the convictions he challenges on appeal. He relies on Floyd v. State to argue the State merely suggested but did not prove he operated a vehicle. 399 N.E.2d 449 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980). In Floyd, a panel of this Court reversed the defendant's convictions for leaving the scene of an accident, driving while intoxicated, and driving while license suspended, holding there was insufficient evidence to show the defendant operated a vehicle. Id. at 450. There, the State presented scant detail at trial regarding the vehicle involved in the collision, plus the length of time between when the accident happened and when police encountered the defendant was not established. Id. at 450–51. Moreover, none of the State's witnesses placed the defendant at the scene of the accident. Id.

[8] In contrast to Floyd, the evidence here was stronger. Within a minute of noticing a “fireball in the sky,” the State's first witness came across debris and downed powerlines on the road. Tr. Vol. 2 at 5. The witness then saw a silver car on the side of the road, and Gomez lying unresponsive in a ditch nearby. The vehicle had extensive front-end damage. Law enforcement later recovered keys to the car at the scene, as well as Gomez's Mexican government-issued identification inside the car's console. There were no other vehicles or people at the crash site. Based on the evidence presented at trial, the trial court could reasonably infer Gomez operated the vehicle at the time of the crash. See Henderson v. State, 108 N.E.3d 407, 414 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (noting whether a defendant operates a vehicle may be shown by direct or circumstantial evidence).

Gomez's sentence is not inappropriate given the nature of his crimes and his character.

[9] Gomez asks us to revise his sentence. The Indiana Constitution authorizes this Court to review and revise a trial court's sentencing decision as provided by rule. Ind. Const. art. 7, § 6. Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) provides we may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, “after due consideration of the trial court's decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” The principal role of appellate review is to leaven the outliers, not to achieve a perceived correct sentence in each case. Conley v. State, 183 N.E.3d 276, 288 (Ind. 2022). Therefore, “we reserve our 7(B) authority for exceptional cases.” Faith v. State, 131 N.E.3d 158, 160 (Ind. 2019) (per curiam).

[10] “[S]entencing is principally a discretionary function in which the trial court's judgment should receive considerable deference.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1222 (Ind. 2008). “Such deference should prevail unless overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense (such as accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality) and the defendant's character (such as substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character).” Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015). The two prongs of 7(B) review are “separate inquiries to ultimately be balanced in determining whether a sentence is inappropriate.” Lane v. State, 232 N.E.3d 119, 126 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Conner v. State, 58 N.E.3d 215, 218 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016)). “[T]o the extent the evidence on one prong militates against relief, a claim based on the other prong must be all the stronger to justify relief.” Id. at 127.

[11] The question “is not whether another sentence is more appropriate; rather, the question is whether the sentence imposed is inappropriate.” Helsley v. State, 43 N.E.3d 225, 228 (Ind. 2015) (quoting King v. State, 894 N.E.2d 265, 268 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008)) (emphasis omitted). Whether we regard a sentence as inappropriate “turns on our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given case.” Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1224. The defendant bears the burden of persuading us a revised sentence is warranted. Cramer v. State, 240 N.E.3d 693, 698 (Ind. 2024).

[12] Gomez's sentence is not inappropriate given the nature of the crimes committed. “The nature of the offense compares the defendant's actions with the required showing to sustain a conviction under the charged offense.” McFarland v. State, 153 N.E.3d 369, 373 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (citing Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1224), trans. denied. Gomez unlawfully consumed alcohol as a minor and crashed his car into an electricity pole. The impact of the crash shattered the pole, bringing down powerlines and generating debris. Gomez's actions created hazardous road conditions, which led to Deputy Fislar's electrocution and death. His sentence is not inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses committed.

[13] Similarly, Gomez's sentence is not inappropriate in light of his character. “The character of the offender is found in what we learn of the offender's life and conduct.” Pedigo v. State, 146 N.E.3d 1002, 1016 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied. A defendant's criminal history is a relevant factor when considering his character. Id. At the time of the crash, Gomez was on bond for charges including driving while intoxicated, for which he was ultimately convicted. He had never been issued a driver's license in Indiana. He consumed alcohol as a minor and got behind the wheel on at least two separate occasions. His alcohol blood content in this case was .229 g/ml, significantly above the legal limit. Gomez's principal argument on appeal is that he “cannot be characterized as the worst type of offender.” Appellant's Br. at 13. Although maximum sentences are generally reserved for the worst offenders, that category “encompasses a considerable variety of offenses and offenders.” Wells v. State, 904 N.E.2d 265, 274 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied. There is no “guideline to determine whether a worse offender could be imagined.” Buchanan v. State, 767 N.E.2d 967, 973 (Ind. 2002). Given Gomez's poor character and history of bad decisions, we cannot say his sentence is inappropriate.

Conclusion

[14] Sufficient evidence supported Gomez's conviction, and his sentence is not inappropriate.

[15] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 9-30-5-2(b) (2001).

2.   I.C. § 9-24-18-1(a) (2022).

3.   Gomez was on bond for the following: operating a vehicle while intoxicated endangering a person, operating a vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration equivalent to 0.15 or more, operating a vehicle without ever receiving a license, and consuming alcohol as a minor in cause number 32C01-2403-CM-263. He was convicted of all counts before trial in this case.

Kenworthy, Judge.

Foley, J., and Scheele, J., concur.