Nicholas Edward Johnson, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Following a jury trial, Nicholas Johnson was convicted of Level 6 felony sexual battery. On appeal, Johnson presents four issues for our review:

1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it denied Johnson's request for a special prosecutor?

2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in allowing the State to present the expert testimony of Katherine Starr?

3. Did the State commit prosecutorial misconduct during its closing argument?

4. Is the evidence sufficient to support Johnson's conviction?

[2] We affirm.

Facts & Procedural History

[3] Johnson and his wife, Lauren, are both from Huntington. In high school Johnson and Lauren were standout athletes. Following high school, Lauren continued her athletic career at Huntington University. Lauren then pursued a professional running career, ultimately reaching the upper echelon of her sport by qualifying for the United States Olympic trials in 2012, 2016, and 2021. Johnson helped coach Lauren and became knowledgeable with various treatment techniques to help with her training.

[4] H.S. ran cross-country and track when she was in high school in Huntington. During that time, she met Johnson and Lauren. H.S. graduated from high school in 2016 and went to college at Indiana University in Bloomington, where she ran on the cross-country and track teams.

[5] In 2018, Johnson began working as the cross-country coach at Huntington University. H.S. decided to leave Indiana University after her junior year and enter the transfer portal to pursue other opportunities. During the transfer process, H.S. was contacted by approximately sixty different schools. H.S. ultimately chose to attend Huntington University and was excited to train with Johnson and Lauren given their success in the cross-country and track arenas.

[6] H.S. enrolled at Huntington University starting in the fall of 2019. In addition to coaching H.S., Johnson acted as an athletic trainer for H.S. and provided treatments to help H.S. recover from injuries faster and to improve her performance. Johnson was not certified or licensed to perform athletic treatments but nonetheless provided them like he had during Lauren's professional training. Treatment techniques employed by Johnson included soft-tissue massage, dry needling, and ice baths.

[7] Around March 2020, one of H.S.’s teammates at Huntington University decided to quit the team. Johnson responded by calling the athlete names and saying “really hurtful things about her character.” Id. at 140. H.S. sent a message to her teammates that Johnson's comments “w[ere] not okay.” Id. Johnson confronted H.S. and told her that she had “ruined his image” and “likely destroyed the team.” Id. H.S. was upset and asked what she could do to “fix it” and Johnson told her that she would “have to work to earn his trust back.” Id.

[8] In July 2020, Johnson arranged for H.S. and a teammate to temporarily live in an apartment on Huntington University's campus free of charge. Aside from H.S. and her teammate, no one else was living in the apartment building. Johnson, however, had access to the apartment. At that time, H.S. was twenty-one or twenty-two and Johnson was thirty-three.

[9] H.S. moved in a few days before her teammate and discovered a problem with the hot water. H.S. contacted Johnson, who came to the apartment to fix it. Johnson also arrived with a treatment table and provided H.S. with a treatment, during which Johnson told H.S. that she “needed more physical touch in [her] life” to help her learn to trust people again and that she needed to accept more treatments from him and allow him to give her hugs. Id. at 144. He suggested that she should let him start popping her toes or cracking her back. After H.S. told Johnson that she did not want him to touch her in that way, he tried to tickle her and started chasing her around the apartment. H.S. started crying because she feared Johnson, so he stopped chasing her and apologized. He then offered to give her a foot massage to help her relax, which H.S. initially refused. Johnson persisted, and H.S. finally put her foot on his lap for him to massage it. Johnson eventually left the apartment.

[10] A few days later, H.S. was not at the apartment when Johnson sent a text message telling her that there was a surprise for her in her bedroom. It was not unusual for H.S. to receive gifts, such as notes, letters of encouragement, or her favorite candy, from Johnson. However, when H.S. got back to the apartment, Johnson was sitting on her bed. After H.S. showered, Johnson motioned for her to sit next to him. H.S. sat on the bed away from Johnson. Johnson made a comment that made H.S. feel as though she offended him, so she moved a little closer. Johnson urged her to move even closer and rest her head on his shoulder. Johnson then told H.S. that he wanted to help her fall asleep. Despite H.S.’s initial protests, she eventually acquiesced and let Johnson stroke her hair as she lay on her bed. At some point, Johnson laid down alongside H.S. and started rubbing her hamstring and her back. H.S. did not want the touching by Johnson but did not confront him because she did not know how to tell him to stop. She felt like she “just had to accept whatever [Johnson] was doing and not suggest that he had other intentions.” Id. at 150.

[11] The next night, Johnson texted H.S. and told her he wanted to help her fall asleep again. H.S. told Johnson that she did not want his help. Despite her rejection of his offer, Johnson showed up and let himself into the apartment sometime after 10:00 p.m. H.S. again told Johnson that she did not want his help to fall asleep, but Johnson ignored her, got into her bed, and lay beside her. He started doing the same thing he had done the night before—alternating between rubbing her hamstrings and rubbing her back. H.S. testified and described what happened next:

Every time he would go back to my hamstrings, he got a little higher on my hamstrings, and I started to get a little scared about how high he was going to go, but every time he would go a little higher, he went back to my back. And I told myself that I was wrong, that my coach would never do something like that to me and that I was misjudging the situation. And then, at one point, he started to try to pull my legs apart, and I kept them closed, and then he would go back to my back, and I told myself that meant nothing. Nothing was happening. And then he tried to pull my legs apart again, and I kept them closed, and it happened again where he would go back to my back, and I relaxed, and then the third time, he pulled them completely apart.

Id. at 153. H.S. asserted that she was “physically resisting” Johnson as he pulled her legs apart. Id. Johnson then returned to rubbing H.S.’s hamstring and progressed up her hamstring, underneath her shorts, until he was “all the way on the external ․ sex organ.” Id. Johnson started rubbing her sex organ in a circular motion for what “felt like a very long time” to H.S. Id. at 154. H.S. did not say anything to Johnson. Johnson stopped and declared he had to leave.

[12] Johnson continued to pursue a sexual relationship with H.S. and every time “he would go a little bit further,” having no respect for the boundaries set by H.S. Id. at 155. H.S. eventually stopped resisting his advances, leading to a consensual sexual relationship between her and Johnson.

[13] During the fall semester at Huntington University, H.S., who was still on the cross-country and track teams, was confronted about her relationship with Johnson. Before the end of the semester, Johnson was fired from his coaching positions with Huntington University. In January 2021, H.S. transferred from Huntington University. That same month, H.S. was interviewed by Detective Shane Blair with the Huntington Police Department about her relationship with Johnson, but she did not reveal any information. A few weeks later, Detective Blair called H.S. and again asked her about her relationship with Johnson but she chose not to respond.

[14] In the summer of 2021, H.S. began documenting her experience at Huntington University, including details about her relationship with Johnson. Near the end of the summer, H.S. told her high school coach about her relationship with Johnson and gave him a copy of her notes. In October 2021, H.S. shared her notes with the wife of her former head coach at Indiana University, who H.S. knew to be a prosecutor. H.S. sought her assistance because she wanted a better understanding of what her next steps in the legal realm should be. By November 2021, H.S. had arranged to meet with Detective Blair to discuss her relationship with Johnson. H.S. testified that she had not come forward before because it was “overwhelming to talk about everything” and she was “afraid [she] wouldn't be believed.” Id. at 162.

[15] In January 2023, the State convened a grand jury under case number 35C01-2301-MC-32. On March 27, 2023, the grand jury indicted Johnson with Level 6 felony sexual battery and Class B misdemeanor battery.¹ Before the indictments were returned, Johnson filed a motion requesting appointment of a special prosecutor because Prosecutor Jeremy Nix had represented H.S.’s father in previous legal matters. The trial court held a hearing on Johnson's motion on May 23, 2023. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court denied Johnson's request.

[16] The day before the scheduled jury trial, Johnson moved to exclude the testimony of the State's proposed expert witness—Katherine Starr. The State asserted that Starr was an expert in athlete abuse and could provide the jury with expertise about the coach-athlete relationship that was outside the experience of a typical juror. Johnson challenged both Starr's qualification as an expert witness and the subject matter of her testimony. Specifically, Johnson argued that Starr was an advocate, not an expert, and that her testimony was not based on scientific principles. Following a hearing, the trial court denied Johnson's motion. The jury trial commenced on September 25, 2024. As part of its case-in-chief, the State called Starr as a witness. The trial court permitted Starr to testify over Johnson's renewed and continuing objections to her qualifications and the substance of her testimony.

[17] During the State's closing argument, the prosecutor argued to the jury that it “should be firmly convinced” of Johnson's guilt “because you haven't heard any contradictory evidence” as to the events giving rise to the charge of sexual battery. Transcript Vol. 3 at 71. Johnson immediately objected, moved to strike, and requested a mistrial. Following a sidebar, the trial court denied the motion for mistrial but ordered the prosecutor's statement stricken and instructed the jury to not consider it in any way. The jury ultimately returned a guilty verdict. On October 17, 2024, Johnson was sentenced to two years, with one year executed and one year suspended to probation. Johnson now appeals. Additional evidence will be provided as necessary.

Discussion & Decision

1. Special Prosecutor

[18] We review a trial court's denial of an appointment of a special prosecutor for an abuse of discretion. State v. Herrmann, 151 N.E.3d 1256, 1258 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied. “An abuse of discretion is an erroneous conclusion and judgment, one clearly against the logic and facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom.” D.R.C. v. State, 957 N.E.2d 205, 209 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied.

[19] A trial court may appoint a special prosecutor if:

(A) a person files a verified petition requesting the appointment of a special prosecutor; and

(B) the court, after:

(i) notice is given to the prosecuting attorney; and

(ii) an evidentiary hearing is conducted at which the prosecuting attorney is given an opportunity to be heard; finds by clear and convincing evidence that the appointment is necessary to avoid an actual conflict of interest or there is probable cause to believe that the prosecuting attorney has committed a crime[.]

Ind. Code § 33-39-10-2(b)(2).

[20] “The purpose of the special-prosecutor statute is to protect the State's interest in preserving the public confidence in the criminal-justice system and ensuring that the prosecutor serves the ends of justice.” Herrmann, 151 N.E.3d at 1258. The statute “incorporates a recognition of the grave nature of disqualification and the goal of comprehensively restraining disqualifications to situations of real need.” State ex rel. Long v. Warrick Cir. Ct., 591 N.E.2d 559, 560 (Ind. 1992) (discussing a predecessor of the current statute).

[21] It is the petitioner's burden to establish an actual conflict of interest. Hermann, 151 N.E.3d at 1258. “An actual conflict of interest arises where a prosecutor places himself in a situation inherently conducive to dividing his loyalties between his duties to the State and his personal interests.” Swallow v. State, 19 N.E.3d 396, 399 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied. The test is that a prosecutor must be disqualified if the controversy involved in the pending case is “substantially related to a matter in which the lawyer previously represented another client.” Id. (citing State ex rel. Meyers v. Tippecanoe Cnty. Ct., 432 N.E.2d 1377, 1378 (Ind. 1982)). The Indiana Supreme Court has also “disapproved of lawyers prosecuting a criminal case if, by reason of prior representation, the lawyer may have ‘acquired a knowledge of facts upon which the prosecution is predicated or which are closely interwoven therewith.’ ” Johnson v. State, 675 N.E.2d 678, 682 (Ind. 1996) (quoting Meyers, 432 N.E.2d at 1378).

[22] Before joining the prosecutor's office in 2018 and being elected as the Huntington County Prosecutor in 2021, Prosecutor Nix had been in private practice for fourteen years. During that time, Prosecutor Nix was retained by H.S.’s father to represent him in divorce proceedings and then in a criminal matter where H.S. was the alleged victim of sexual abuse. Johnson argued that Nix's previous representation of H.S.’s father in a matter where H.S. was the alleged victim and his current prosecution of a sex crime in which H.S. is the alleged victim created an “appearance of impropriety.” Supplemental Tr. Vol. 2 at 31. He explained that Prosecutor Nix presumably challenged H.S.’s credibility in the criminal action against H.S.’s father and now, as prosecutor, he is essentially, “vouching for her credibility.” Id. at 5, 30. Johnson also suggested that Prosecutor Nix had a conflict between his duty of confidentiality and privilege owed to H.S.’s father and the duty to Johnson to disclose exculpatory material.

[23] We have reviewed the record and it is clear that Prosecutor Nix's prior representation of H.S.’s father was unrelated to the prosecution of Johnson. Johnson presented no evidence that Prosecutor Nix was in a situation that would have required him to divide his loyalties between his former client, H.S.’s father, and his duty to the State of Indiana. Further, Johnson only speculates that Prosecutor Nix might have acquired knowledge about H.S.’s credibility from his representation of H.S.’s father. In any event, Prosecutor Nix testified that in the criminal action against H.S.’s father, his defense was not to challenge H.S.’s credibility, but rather, his defense was to challenge his client's mens rea. Johnson's evidence falls far short of establishing an actual conflict of interest. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying his request for a special prosecutor.

2. Admission of Expert Testimony

[24] Johnson argues that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing Starr to testify as an expert. Relying exclusively on Ind. Evidence Rule 702(b) (Rule 702), he argues that the State did not establish that Starr was qualified to testify as an expert witness, nor did it establish that the subject of her testimony was scientifically reliable.

[25] The trial court is considered the gatekeeper for the admissibility of expert opinion evidence under Rule 702. Doe v. Shults-Lewis Child & Family Servs., Inc., 718 N.E.2d 738, 750 (Ind. 1999). Thus, a trial court's determination regarding the admissibility of expert testimony under Rule 702 is a matter within its broad discretion and will be reversed only for abuse of that discretion. TRW Vehicle Safety Sys., Inc. v. Moore, 936 N.E.2d 201, 216 (Ind. 2010) (citations omitted). We presume that the trial court's decision is correct, and the burden is on the party challenging the decision to persuade us that the trial court has abused its discretion. Id.

[26] Johnson does not address the applicability of Rule 702(a), which allows a witness who is “qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education” to give opinions based on such knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education if such “will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” Only one of those characteristics is necessary to qualify an individual as an expert. Otte v. State, 967 N.E.2d 540, 547 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. Whether a witness has “specialized knowledge” that is beyond that knowledge generally held by lay persons and that would be helpful to the jury is a matter entrusted to the trial court's discretion. Farrell v. State, 884 N.E.2d 383, 398 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied.

[27] We first note that the State did not offer Starr's testimony as scientific evidence. Rather, it offered Starr's testimony to explain to the trier of fact the behavior of coaches and athletes, the complex social dynamics of that relationship, how that relationship might become abusive, and reasons why an athlete might delay reporting abuse. Non-scientific expert evidence like Starr's is governed by Rule 702(a) and need not be proven reliable by means of “scientific principles” under Rule 702(b). Taylor v. State, 101 N.E.3d 865, 871 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (noting that specialized knowledge under Rule 702(a) includes more than scientific knowledge).

[28] As to Starr's specialized knowledge, her Curriculum Vitae was admitted as an exhibit at trial. It shows that she has a bachelor's degree in sociology and began focusing on the field of athlete abuse in 2011. She has published a book and numerous articles about coach-athlete dynamics and abuse and has consulted as an expert for the Department of Justice, European Union, Government Office of Accountability, and the International Olympic Committee. In 2011, Starr created her own non-profit organization, Safe4Athletes, Inc., through which she advocates for athlete welfare in cases of sexual abuse, bullying, and harassment in coach-athlete relationships. She has also assisted in the development of protocols to prevent athlete abuse by coaches for both national and international organizations, participated in dozens of speaking engagements, television and radio interviews, and currently serves on several boards for organizations such as the US Center for Safe Sport. In addition to her work in the area, Starr was also an elite athlete who personally experienced abuse by a coach.

[29] Clearly, Starr has extensive expertise in the field of coach-athlete abuse and her own personal experience with the subject matter enhances her credibility as an expert. Starr did not testify about the specific facts of the case or offer an opinion as to H.S.’s credibility or Johnson's guilt. Rather, her testimony focused on and helped the jury to understand the complexities and dynamics of a coach-athlete relationship in a competitive university setting such as in this case. That dynamic, which is likely not understood by the average juror, was relevant to help explain why H.S. delayed disclosure to the police and why she continued in a relationship with Johnson. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Starr qualified as an expert based on her specialized knowledge in the area of coach-athlete abuse and that her testimony would assist the trier of fact. See Lyons v. State, 976 N.E.2d 137, 142 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (holding that a clinical psychologist's expert testimony about her experience counseling sex-abuse victims was admissible under Rule 702(a) to explain that “things [the defendant] was using to attack [the victim's] credibility were, in fact, not atypical of child sex abuse victims”).

[30] Johnson also challenges portions of Starr's testimony as “problematic.” Appellant's Brief at 29. First, Johnson claims that Starr inappropriately testified that an athlete can never consent to a sexual relationship with a coach. To the extent this statement could be considered error, we find that it was invited error. See Miller v. State, 188 N.E.3d 871, 875 (Ind. 2022) (stating that a party invites error if it was “part of a deliberate, ‘well-informed’ trial strategy”). During direct examination, Starr testified generally about the dynamics of the coach-athlete relationship and reasons why an athlete might consent to a sexual relationship. It was on cross-examination that Johnson elicited the specific testimony from Starr that an athlete “cannot consent at all” to a sexual relationship with a coach, which was an obvious attempt to discredit Starr by making her opinion seem extreme in the eyes of a jury. Id. at 49.

[31] Second, Johnson argues that Starr misstated the law regarding Title IX of the Higher Education Act, 20 U.S.C. 1681, when she testified that an investigation into a sexual relationship between an athlete and coach under Title IX would be a criminal investigation.² First, we note that Johnson did not object to Starr's testimony in this regard. We also note that Johnson had the opportunity to cross-examine Starr, during which he could have pointed out her misstatement of the law. Regardless of whether Starr misstated the law about Title IX, the jury was asked to decide if Johnson committed sexual battery as defined in the Indiana Code, not whether Title IX was violated.

3. Prosecutorial Misconduct

[32] To establish prosecutorial misconduct, we must “determine (1) whether the prosecutor engaged in misconduct, and if so, (2) whether the misconduct, under all of the circumstances, placed the defendant in a position of grave peril to which he or she would not have been subjected.” Booher v. State, 773 N.E.2d 814, 817 (Ind. 2002) (quoting Coleman v. State, 750 N.E.2d 370, 374 (Ind. 2001)). The gravity of peril is measured by the probable persuasive effect of the misconduct on the jury's decision rather than the degree of impropriety of the conduct. Id.

[33] Johnson argues that the State made an impermissible remark during closing argument when the prosecutor stated to the jury: “you should be firmly convinced because you haven't heard any contradictory evidence about what happened in [H.S.’s] apartment.” Transcript Vol. III at 71. Johnson maintains that this statement invited the jury to draw an adverse inference from Johnson's decision not to testify in violation of his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.³

[34] Here, Johnson immediately objected to this statement and moved to strike. Johnson also requested a mistrial. The trial court granted the motion to strike and admonished the jury to not consider the prosecutor's statement “in any way.” Transcript Vol. 3 at 72. The jury was also instructed during final instructions that the matter ordered stricken from the record was “to be treated as though you had never heard of it,” that the statements of counsel were not evidence, and that Johnson had no obligation to testify at trial. Id. at 87.

[35] We find that the prosecutor's statement was indirect and isolated, the trial court acted swiftly in admonishing the jury to disregard the comment, and the State's case came down to the jury's assessment of H.S.’s credibility based on her testimony, which was clear and consistent and parts of which were corroborated by other witnesses. Thus, even if we assume that the prosecutor's statement was improper, any error likely had no persuasive effect on the jury's decision and was therefore harmless. See Thomas v. State, 9 N.E.3d 737, 743 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (after finding State improperly referenced defendant's decision not to testify when it stated “there's not another story that's going on here. You've not heard the testimony of another story. You heard what [the defendant] told [the officer] but he wasn't raising his right hand swearing to tell the truth. He's not a witness in this case,” court concluded that the error was harmless as the State established beyond a reasonable doubt that the statement did not contribute to jury's verdict given the strength of the State's case, the trial court's admonishment, and the final instructions stating that a defendant is under no duty to testify).

4. Sufficiency

[36] Johnson argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for Level 6 felony sexual battery. Our standard of review with regard to sufficiency claims is well-settled. We will not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. Clemons v. State, 987 N.E.2d 92, 95 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). We consider only the evidence most favorable to the verdict and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom and will affirm if the evidence and those inferences constitute substantial evidence of probative value to support the verdict. Id. If there is conflicting evidence, it is the jury's role to resolve such conflicts. Lott v. State, 690 N.E.2d 204, 208 (Ind. 1997). Reversal is appropriate only when reasonable persons would not be able to form inferences as to each material element of the offense. Clemons, 987 N.E.2d at 95.

[37] To convict Johnson of sexual battery, the State was required to establish that Johnson, with the intent to arouse or satisfy his own sexual desires or the sexual desires of H.S., touched H.S. when H.S. was compelled to submit to the touching by force or the imminent threat of force. See Ind. Code § 35-42-4-8(a). Johnson argues that the State did not present evidence to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that H.S. was compelled to submit to the touching by force or the imminent threat of force.

[38] “[I]t is the victim's perspective, not the assailant's, from which the presence or absence of forceful compulsion is to be determined. This is a subjective test that looks to the victim's perception of the circumstances surrounding the incident in question.” Tobias v. State, 666 N.E.2d 68, 72 (Ind. 1996), trans. denied. And force need not “be physical or violent but may be implied from the circumstances.” Bailey v. State, 764 N.E.2d 728, 730 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied. However, evidence that a victim did not voluntarily consent to a touching does not support the conclusion that the defendant compelled the victim to submit to the touching by force or threat of force. Smith v. State, 678 N.E.2d 1152, 1155 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (citing Scott-Gordon v. State, 579 N.E.2d 602, 604 (Ind.1991)), trans. denied.

[39] H.S. testified that on the day the sexual abuse occurred, she had told Johnson that she did not want him to come to her apartment to help her fall asleep. After she was already in bed for the night, Johnson showed up at the apartment unannounced and went into H.S.’s room. H.S. again told Johnson that she did not want him to be there, but she believed he would not leave until he helped her fall asleep as he had done the night before. Johnson got into H.S.’s bed and lay beside her. He began rubbing her with his hands, alternating between her hamstrings and her back. H.S. testified that “[e]very time he would go back to [her] hamstrings, he got a little higher” and she “started to get a little scared about how high he was going to go.” Transcript Vol. 2 at 153. As she was trying to convince herself that she was “misjudging the situation,” Johnson tried to pull her legs apart, but H.S. kept them closed. Id. After more rubbing of her legs and back, Johnson tried to pull H.S.’s legs apart a second time but was again unsuccessful as H.S. was able to keep them closed. On his third attempt, Johnson managed to pull H.S.’s legs apart despite the fact that she was physically resisting him. After he got her legs apart, he started rubbing her hamstrings and continued up her leg and underneath her shorts until he reached her external sex organ. Johnson then rubbed her sex organ in a circular manner for what felt like “a very long time” to H.S. Id. at 154. Johnson's rubbing of H.S.’s sex organ ended when he stood up and said he had to go.

[40] H.S. told Johnson more than once that she did not want him to touch her and she testified that she was fearful of where his touching was going. Most importantly, however, H.S.’s testimony that she managed to keep her legs closed for Johnson's first two attempts to separate her legs and that she physically resisted Johnson's efforts to separate her legs the third time, albeit unsuccessful, is sufficient evidence from which the jury could have found that H.S. believed she was compelled by force to submit to Johnson's subsequent touching of her sex organ. See Bailey v. State, 764 N.E.2d 728 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (finding sufficient evidence of force to compel the touching when the victim refused the defendant's lewd advances, then over a week later, the defendant grabbed the victim's buttocks). Johnson's arguments to the contrary are simply requests to reweigh the evidence and assess the credibility of the witnesses, tasks we will not engage in on appeal. The evidence is sufficient to support Johnson's conviction for Level 6 felony sexual battery.

[41] Judgment affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Prior to trial, the State moved to dismiss the misdemeanor battery charge, which motion the trial court granted.

2.   Title IX is a civil statute that imposes civil penalties.

3.   The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no person “shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” The privilege extends to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 689 (1993).

Altice, Chief Judge.

Judges Pyle and DeBoer concur. Pyle, J. and DeBoer, J., concur.