Andrew Thompson, Appellant-Defendant v. Debbie Jennings, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Debbie Jennings brought a small claims action against Andrew Thompson, an attorney whom she had paid a $5000 retainer to potentially represent her incarcerated son, Quinton Jennings (Quinton). She sought return of the $5000 after Quinton spoke with Thompson and decided not to hire him, as they could not agree on the scope of representation. The trial court determined that no oral or written contract existed and that, in equity, Jennings was entitled to the return of all but $720, which represented the reasonable amount of attorney fees earned by Thompson.

[2] Thompson, pro se, appeals and asserts that an oral agreement was formed between himself and Jennings and that under that agreement he had already performed services worth more than $5000. Further, even in the absence of an oral agreement, Thompson argues that he is entitled to the full value of his services under the theory of quantum meruit. Finally, Thompson asserts that the trial court denied him due process.

[3] We affirm.

Facts 1 & Procedural History

[4] In early April 2023, Jennings contacted Thompson to inquire about his ability to represent Quinton, who had been convicted and imprisoned following a lengthy jury trial. Thompson, an attorney who represents individuals seeking various forms of post-conviction relief, informed Jennings that he required a $5000 retainer. On April 4, Jennings obtained a $2000 cashier's check made payable to Thompson and gave it to him later that month.

[5] Thereafter, on April 21, Thompson sent an email to Jennings with an engagement letter attached (the Proposed Contract), which detailed the terms of his legal representation of Quinton. He asked Jennings to review the Proposed Contract and “provided it meets your approval” sign and return it. Exhibits Vol. at 9. The Proposed Contract was directed to “Quinton Jennings c/o Debbie Jennings.” Id. at 14.

[6] Three days later, Jennings responded to Thompson's email and indicated that she was waiting to talk with Quinton about the Proposed Contract and that she would be signing it sometime in May, maybe around May 10, which is when she thought she could get the remaining funds for the retainer. She stated, “Soon as I get the rest of the retainer, me and [Q]uinton will be giving you a call in [M]ay.” Id. at 8.

[7] At some point, Thompson informed Jennings that he would not speak with Quinton until she had paid the entire $5000 retainer. On May 19, 2023, Jennings obtained a $3000 cashier's check made payable to Thompson and gave it to him. Shortly thereafter, they had a conference call with Quinton. This was the first and only conversation Thompson had with Quinton.

[8] According to Jennings, Quinton and Thompson argued during the call about the proposed scope of Thompson's legal representation, and Quinton told Thompson that he did not want his services. Thompson acknowledged that Quinton wanted services beyond what he was willing to provide and that they could not agree on the scope of representation, but Thompson testified that Quinton agreed to hire him. In any case, Thompson never obtained a written agreement of services signed by Quinton, nor did Jennings execute the Proposed Contract.² On or about June 11, Jennings requested the return of the $5000, but Thompson refused.

[9] On June 23, 2023, Jennings filed a small claims action against Thompson in Vanderburgh County. That action was dismissed, on Thompson's motion, based on the notice of claim not being filed in a preferred venue. Jennings then refiled her small claims action, on May 20, 2024, in Monroe County, a preferred venue.

[10] At the factfinding hearing on August 13, 2024, Thompson argued that, although Jennings did not seek legal services for herself, she entered into an oral agreement with Thompson to pay him $5000 in exchange for him reviewing Quinton's case and discussing legal options with Quinton. Jennings, on the other hand, claimed that she had no such agreement with Thompson and that he agreed not to do any work on the case until after he spoke with Quinton, as Quinton was to be his client, not Jennings. Because Quinton could not reach an agreement with Thompson and chose not to hire him, Jennings argued that she was entitled to the return of the $5000 she had paid for the retainer.

[11] Thompson argued, in the alternative, that even if there was not an enforceable oral agreement, he was equitably entitled to retain the $5000 because he had done work in excess of that amount. Thompson presented as evidence an invoice that was created after the call with Quinton and documented work done between May 9 and May 22, 2023.³ The invoiced amount was $3060 for 6.5 hours of document review and research and 2 hours of phone calls with Debbie and Quinton. Thompson also claimed to have done 8.25 hours of work in early June, after the call with Quinton.

[12] At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court took the matter under advisement. Then on August 29, 2024, the court issued its order, which included specific findings of fact and conclusions thereon.⁴ In addition to facts consistent with those set out above, the order provided:

31. A contract for legal services is governed by more strict rules than those applicable to a contract between parties on equal footing. Briggs v. Clinton Cnty. Bank & Tr. Co. of Frankfort, Ind., 452 N.E.2d 989, 1004 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983). An attorney who relies on an oral agreement for payment of legal services should not be surprised if the court refuses to enforce it. Id. Even under a contract, an award of attorney's fees must be reasonable. The determination of reasonableness of attorney's fees necessitates consideration of all relevant circumstances. Fackler v. Powell, 923 N.E.2d 973, 981 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).

32. This court disagrees with Thompson's assertion that Jennings was his client. Jennings did not need legal services, her son did, and Jennings made this clear to Thompson.

33. The record reveals that Jennings was clear that her goal was to secure representation for her son, and that she was not seeking to retain Thompson so that he could provide legal opinions to her. In Thompson's proposed fee agreement dated April 21, 2024, he explicitly stated, “It is attorney's belief, based on experience, that there is reasonable hope, but no certainty of obtaining some relief beyond the reduction in sentence ordered by the court of appeals, primarily with respect to sentencing and less likely with respect to obtaining a new trial and subsequent acquittal.” Jennings did not need to retain Thompson to offer an opinion about whether her son could benefit from his representation, as Thompson offered that opinion as part of his initial effort to entice Jennings to sign a written fee agreement.

34. Further, no evidence was presented to indicate that Jennings held herself out as having authority to act on Quinton's behalf. In her emails after receiving Thompson's proposed fee agreement, she wrote that she was waiting to discuss the matter with her son, Quinton. Even prior to Thompson's initial discussion with Quinton in which he declined Thompson's representation, Jennings had indicated that she did not have Quinton's authority to bind him to a service agreement with Thompson.

35. Jennings and Thompson never reached a meeting of the minds sufficient to form an express contract regarding what Jennings would receive in exchange for her payment of $5,000.00.

36. In the absence of evidence supporting the existence of an enforceable contract between the parties, this Court is left to analyze this case under equitable principles. Indiana courts recognize the appropriateness of an equitable award for “money had and received,” which is in the nature of unjust enrichment. It is available where the defendant has received money from the plaintiff under “circumstances that in equity and good conscience he ought not to retain” the funds (i.e., because the money belongs to the plaintiff) and the money was received without consideration. See T-3 Martinsville, LLC v. US Holding, LLC, 911 N.E.2d 100, 122 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (citing to Pufahl v. Nat'l Bank of Logansport, 154 N.E.2d 119, 120-21 (1958)).

37. The Court in Pufahl noted that “[m]oney belonging to the plaintiff may be recovered if the defendant received it ‘by mistake of facts, or without consideration, or upon a consideration that has failed.’ ” Pufahl, 154 N.E.2d l l9 at 120-21.

38. In this case, Thompson received $5,000.00 from Jennings because Jennings mistakenly believed that her son wished to hire Thompson. It would be unjust for Thompson to retain all of that money under the circumstances.

39. Furthermore, it would not be reasonable for Thompson to charge $5,000.00 of attorney fees just to determine whether he would provide legal services on Quinton's behalf.

40. Thompson informed Jennings that the hourly rate for his services was $360 per hour. Thompson sent Jennings an invoice indicating that he spent two hours on phone calls with Jennings and Quinton through May 22, 2023․. Equity dictates that Thompson ought to be paid for the time he spent in meeting with Quinton to determine whether an attorney-client relationship might be formed between Thompson and Quinton.

41. [T]his Court finds that Thompson is entitled to be paid a reasonable fee for the time he spent communicating with Quinton and Jennings regarding Quinton's interest in retaining him. To that end, this Court finds that Thompson is entitled to retain $720 of the $5,000.00 paid to him by Jennings.

42. It is inequitable, however, for Thompson to be paid for services he was never hired by Quinton to perform.

43. It is therefore, ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that a judgment is entered for Plaintiff, Debra Jennings, against Defendant, Andrew Thompson, in this cause in the sum of $4,280.00 ․.

[13] Thereafter, Thompson filed a motion to correct error, which the trial court denied on September 24, 2024.⁵ The trial court rejected Thompson's claim that he was denied due process based on the alleged imbalance of time the parties were given at the factfinding hearing. The court noted in its order that Jennings controlled the questioning for thirty-six minutes of the hearing, Thompson controlled the questioning for fifty minutes, and the other eighteen minutes involved the court's own questions and the final arguments of the parties.

[14] Thompson now appeals. Additional information will be provided below as needed.

Standard of Review

[15] Judgments in small claims actions are “subject to review as prescribed by relevant Indiana rules and statutes.” Ind. Small Claims Rule 11(A). Under Ind. Trial Rule 52(A), the clearly erroneous standard applies to appellate review of a trial court's specific findings of fact and conclusions, with due regard given to the opportunity of the trial court to assess witness credibility. Trinity Homes, LLC v. Fang, 848 N.E.2d 1065, 1067 (Ind. 2006); Hurst v. Smith, 192 N.E.3d 233, 242 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022). That is, the findings and conclusions will be set aside only if the record contains no facts or inferences supporting them. Hurst, 192 N.E.3d at 242 (“We neither reweigh the evidence nor assess the credibility of the witnesses but consider only the evidence most favorable to the judgment.”). “This deferential standard of review is particularly important in small claims actions, where trials are informal, with the sole objective of dispensing speedy justice between the parties according to the rules of substantive law.” Prater v. Harris & Sons Landscaping, LLC, 175 N.E.3d 855, 858 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (internal quotations omitted); see also Ind. Small Claims Rule 8 (addressing informality of the hearing).

[16] Further, whereas here an appellee does not file a brief, we need not undertake the burden of developing an argument for the appellee. Fang, 848 N.E.3d at 1068. We will reverse the trial court's judgment if the appellant's brief presents a case of prima facie error, which is error “at first sight, on first appearance, or on the face of it.” Id. Where an appellant is unable to meet this burden, however, we will affirm. Id.

Discussion & Decision

[17] We begin by observing that the argument section of Thompson's appellate brief is woefully lacking. App. R. 46(A)(8) provides several requirements for this section of an appellant's brief, including:

(a) The argument must contain the contentions of the appellant on the issues presented, supported by cogent reasoning. Each contention must be supported by citations to the authorities, statutes, and the Appendix or parts of the Record on Appeal relied on, in accordance with Rule 22.

(b) The argument must include for each issue a concise statement of the applicable standard of review; this statement may appear in the discussion of each issue or under a separate heading placed before the discussion of the issues. In addition, the argument must include a brief statement of the procedural and substantive facts necessary for consideration of the issues presented on appeal, including a statement of how the issues relevant to the appeal were raised and resolved by any ․ trial court.

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(d) If the admissibility of evidence is in dispute, citation shall be made to the pages of the Transcript where the evidence was identified, offered, and received or rejected, in conformity with Rule 22(C).

Thompson failed to set out a standard of review for any of his issues, and that lack of mooring is reflected in his arguments and presentation of the facts, which often rely on facts and inferences not favorable to the judgment. And as will be set out more fully below, Thompson does not support his arguments with cogent reasoning or citations to relevant authority. With these failings in mind, we proceed with a brief discussion of the issues presented.

[18] Thompson first argues that the trial court erred by refusing to find that an enforceable oral agreement existed between himself and Jennings (or Quinton). In support, he directs us to a case from 1902 for the proposition that “oral agreements can be enforceable when evidenced by actions such as payment and invoicing[.]”⁶ Appellant's Brief at 9 (citing McBride v. Ulmer, 65 N.E. 610 (Ind. Ct. App. 1902)). This general proposition is undeniable but just because a court can find an oral agreement under certain circumstances does not mean it must. Here, the trial court determined that there was no meeting of the minds sufficient to form an enforceable oral agreement, and this is supported by the facts and inferences most favorable to the judgment. Thompson argues that he invoiced Jennings for his services, and she subsequently paid him, thus acknowledging the oral agreement. But Jennings disputed that she ever received an invoice from Thompson, and more importantly, the only invoice presented into evidence by Thompson that documented actual hours worked was created after Jennings had already paid the full $5000 retainer and after Thompson had the fateful conference call with Quinton.

[19] Thompson next asserts that Jennings had “very unclean hands.” Id. at 11. This is, we presume, in response to the trial court's conclusion that Jennings was entitled to the return of money from Thompson based on the equitable principle of unjust enrichment. Thompson provides no authority or cogent reasoning to support his passing argument in this regard, and thus we do not address it further. See Dickes v. Felger, 981 N.E.2d 559, 562 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (“A party waives an issue where the party fails to develop a cogent argument or provide adequate citation to authority and portions of the record.”).

[20] Thompson also argues, briefly, that the trial court “failed to properly account for and calculate Thompson's entitlement to recovery under the doctrine of Quantum Meruit.” Appellant's Brief at 11. That is, Thompson claims that the trial court failed to adequately compensate him for the reasonable value of the services that he rendered to Jennings and Quinton. Thompson points to his evidence – his billing rate and the hours he tracked working on the case – and asserts that the trial court “abused its discretion by denying the great weight of unrefuted evidence of the time he actually spent and billed working on the case.” Id. at 12.

[21] “Quantum meruit ․ is a claim or right of action for the reasonable value of services rendered,” and is an equitable principle that applies when no enforceable contract exists between the parties. Lash v. Kreigh, 202 N.E.3d 1098, 1103 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023). Here, the trial court determined that $5000 in attorney fees was an unreasonable amount for Thompson to charge just to determine whether he would provide legal services for Quinton. Further, under the circumstances, the court determined that equity dictated Thompson should be paid for the two hours of phone calls he had with Jennings and Quinton in May but that it would be inequitable for Thompson to be paid for services he was never hired by Quinton to perform. Thompson has failed to establish that the trial court erred in its balancing of the equities and determination of reasonable attorney fees.

[22] Thompson's final argument is perplexing. He claims that he was denied due process because the trial court “fail[ed] to reasonably balance the time the parties had to present their mutual cases” and “refus[ed] to permit certain offers of proof.” Appellant's Brief at 12. As explained in the trial court's order denying Thompson's motion to correct error, there was not a “gross imbalance of time” allocated to the parties at the hearing. Id. Regardless, Thompson provides us with no relevant authority, and we are aware of none, establishing that a due process violation occurs when a small claims defendant is not given a similar amount of time as the plaintiff to present his case.⁷ Further, Thompson has not directed us to anywhere in the record where the trial court excluded evidence proffered by him or refused to allow him to make an offer of proof regarding the excluded evidence.

[23] In sum, Thompson's arguments on appeal are without merit, and he has failed to establish prima facie error.

[24] Judgment affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

2.   Jennings did sign a version of the Proposed Contract, with various notations and edits made by her, but Thompson refused to accept the changes and told her they made the contract void. We note that this document was not presented to the trial court at the hearing and is not in the record before us.

3.   Jennings testified that she never received any invoices from Thompson.

4.   Thompson did not include the appealed order in his appendix, which is a violation of Ind. Appellate Rule 50(2)(b).

5.   Thompson did not include this motion or order in his appendix.

6.   He also cites Andrew Nemeth Props., LLC v. Panzica, 234 N.E.3d 183 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024), but our Supreme Court granted transfer in that case in October 2024. See 244 N.E.3d 904 (Ind. 2024). “When transfer is granted, the decision of the Court of Appeals is held for naught and has no precedential value.” Szamocki v. Anonymous Dr. & Anonymous Grp., 70 N.E.3d 419, 428 n.4 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. denied.

7.   Thompson provides a partial quote from the criminal case of Hirsch v. State, 697 N.E.2d 37 (Ind. 1998). The full quote makes clear the case's lack of relevance here: “Although placing the burden of production on the accused as to affirmative defenses usually encounters no constitutional shoal, fundamental fairness dictates that any party shouldering the burden of coming forward with evidence—particularly the accused in a criminal case—be given a relatively untrammeled opportunity to do so. Id. at 43 (internal citation omitted).

Altice, Chief Judge.

Judges Pyle and DeBoer concur. Pyle, J. and DeBoer, J., concur.