Automotive Rehab, Inc. and Christopher McAbee, Appellants-Defendants v. Herman Black, Jr., Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] In 2010, Herman Black, Jr. took his 1966 Chevy Impala convertible (the Chevy) to Automotive Rehab, Inc. (the Auto Shop), a paint and body shop, for some specified restoration work. After the Chevy had remained at the Auto Shop for about five years, the Auto Shop's owner, Christopher McAbee, engaged in proceedings to place a mechanic's lien on it. Following a 2015 foreclosure sale, McAbee titled the Chevy in his name and had different and more extensive restoration work performed on the vehicle at the Auto Shop. In 2022, asserting he was unaware of any lien or foreclosure sale of the Chevy, Black filed a complaint against the Auto Shop and McAbee (collectively, Auto Defendants) for declaratory judgment, replevin, breach of contract, and fraud. Auto Defendants counter-claimed for frivolous litigation and unjust enrichment. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, which the trial court denied.

[2] Following a bench trial, the trial court entered a declaratory judgment that Black was the rightful owner of the Chevy and that the mechanic's lien and McAbee's title were invalid. The court found in favor of Black on his claims for replevin and breach of contract, but against Black on his fraud claim and against Auto Defendants on their counterclaims. The court ordered Auto Defendants to return the Chevy to Black and pay him $50,479.20 in damages.

[3] Auto Defendants appeal and raise the following five restated issues:

1. Did the trial court err in denying Auto Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Black's replevin and breach of contract claims?

2. Is the trial court's conclusion that Black's claims accrued in 2018 and were not time barred clearly erroneous?

3. Did the trial court clearly err in determining that Auto Defendants failed to comply with the requirements of the mechanic's lien statute?

4. Is the trial court's judgment that ordered both the Auto Shop and McAbee to pay Black's damages clearly erroneous?

5. Did the trial court err when it did not provide a set-off to McAbee and/or the Auto Shop for money spent on restoration work after McAbee claimed title to it?

[4] We affirm.

Facts & Procedural History

[5] In May 2000, Black purchased the Chevy, VIN 164676J232572, in exchange for $5,000 and his 1986 Cadillac. Black sometimes drove the Chevy on weekends but bought it primarily as a hobby and for car shows during his retirement, still years away. Black's certificate of title for the Chevy initially listed two Indiana Department of Revenue (DOR) liens but one was removed in 2006.

[6] At all relevant times, McAbee was the sole owner-operator of the Auto Shop. In the spring of 2010, Black stopped at the Auto Shop and inquired about having restoration work done on the Chevy. Tim McAbee (Tim), McAbee's father, who Black believed was the shop's owner, went to Black's home, located at 4409 Strathdon Drive in Fort Wayne, to assess the Chevy. Tim went underneath the Chevy to inspect the frame and told Black it needed to be repaired in one area.

[7] Thereafter, on April 9, 2010, Black drove the Chevy to the Auto Shop, where McAbee and Black agreed that the Auto Shop would repair the Chevy's frame as identified by Tim, do some touchup work on the body, detail and paint the engine and trunk, and install a new interior, namely, seat upholstery, carpet, and convertible roof. Black told McAbee that he was in no hurry, explaining that his plan was to use the Chevy when he retired in 2018. The parties agreed that Black would supply the materials for the interior work when the Auto Shop was ready for that portion of the job. McAbee provided Black with a written estimate (the Estimate), stating that the agreed work would cost $5000.¹ Black's phone number was correct on the Estimate but his address was not, stating 4409 Strathon rather than Strathdon. On September 17, 2010, Black hand delivered a $1000 downpayment to the Auto Shop.

[8] After receiving the downpayment, the Auto Shop began to work on the Chevy, removing the Chevy's body from the frame, which McAbee estimated was about $2000 in labor. According to McAbee, significant rust damage to the frame was discovered such that full frame replacement was necessary. He maintained that he contacted Black by phone a few times about the matter, with Black stating that he would come in and look at the frame and decide how to proceed but never did and the Chevy just remained sitting at the Auto Shop.²

[9] In contrast to McAbee's account, Black maintained that he never received a call from McAbee advising that the entire frame needed to be replaced and that, from 2010 through 2018, he would stop in or call the Auto Shop at least once a year to touch base, and each time employees told him that work had not begun. Black had no issue with that status since he was not planning to use it until retirement. According to Black, in 2012, he talked to McAbee on the phone and told him to put the restorations “on the back burner” due to some personal issues and McAbee agreed, indicating the Auto Shop was busy anyway. Transcript at 23.

[10] In 2015, McAbee contacted Indiana Lien, a lien processing company, to place a mechanic's lien on the Chevy. McAbee handwrote the form that was submitted to Indiana Lien and in so doing he misstated both Black's address and the Chevy's VIN: McAbee wrote Black's address as 4409 Strathon Dr., rather than Strathdon, and stated that the VIN was 1G4676J232572 (the 1G VIN), rather than 164676J232572. McAbee represented in the paperwork that $5000 in repair work had been completed – although in fact about $2000 in labor had been performed at that point – reduced by Black's $1000 deposit, for a $4000 lien. The ensuing Notice of Mechanic's Lien (the Notice) had Black's address typewritten as 4409 Strathin Dr. and had the 1G VIN number. The Notice reflected the $4000 for services performed and added a storage fee of $1500 ($10 per day starting May 1, 2011), along with a filing fee, for a lien in the amount of $5660. The Notice advised that if the charges were not satisfied by August 11, 2015, the vehicle would be sold at a public sale at the Auto Shop on that date.

[11] Indiana Lien sent the Notice by U.S. Postal Service (USPS) certified mail. USPS tracking information reflected the “status of item” as “Delivered” on July 16, 2015. Appendix Vol. 2 at 114. Pursuant to statute, Indiana Lien also placed a “Public Notice” advertisement in The Journal Gazette newspaper on July 24, 2015. The advertisement stated that the foreclosure sale was set for August 11, 2015 at 5214 Decatur Rd. in Fort Wayne (the Auto Shop's address but not identifying it by name) of a “1966 Che” with the 1G VIN number. Id. at 115.

[12] McAbee was the only person present for the foreclosure sale, and the Chevy was “awarded” to the Auto Shop as the highest bidder, although no money was paid to redeem it. Transcript at 101, 123. “[O]n the advice of counsel,” McAbee decided to put title to the Chevy in his own name rather than that of the Auto Shop. Appendix Vol. 2 at 100. Indiana Lien assisted McAbee with the titling process and, in doing so, sent McAbee a CarFax report stating that the 1G VIN “is invalid” and a BMV report stating “No vehicle information was found” for the 1G VIN. Id. at 250; Exhibits Vol. 1 at 13-14. On July 21, 2016, McAbee obtained a Certificate of Title from the BMV, using the 1G VIN; the title did not list any DOR liens. Thereafter, Auto Defendants performed restoration work on the Chevy, replacing the frame, body, floors, passenger compartments, fuel lines, brake lines, shocks, and brake components and refurbished the Chevy's engine, consisting of approximately $8500 in parts and $10,000 in labor.

[13] Black retired in the fall of 2018 and visited the Auto Shop in October 2018 to discuss proceeding with the restorations as provided in the Estimate. At that time, McAbee told him that he had acquired the Chevy via a mechanic's lien in 2015 and now owned it. According to Black, this is the first that he learned about any mechanic's lien and McAbee would not let him see the Chevy. Subsequent to this visit, McAbee continued to have work performed on the Chevy. In 2019, Black visited the Auto Shop again and an employee showed him the Chevy, which Black saw was “tore apart” and in pieces throughout the shop. Transcript at 28.

[14] Black contacted the Better Business Bureau and, thereafter, the Consumer Protection Division of the Indiana Attorney General's Office (the AG) in November 2021. Auto Defendants responded to the AG's inquiries and provided the 2015 lien documents, which were then forwarded to Black. Auto Defendants’ correspondence to the AG claimed that Black owed over $45,000, consisting of $8550 in parts, $10,000 in labor, and $21,900 in storage fees.

[15] On August 26, 2022, Black filed a complaint against Auto Defendants, requesting a declaratory judgment that the Auto Shop failed to comply with the mechanic's lien statute and the associated lien and foreclosure sale were invalid; that Black possessed valid title to the Chevy; and that the Auto Shop was not entitled to storage fees as such was not included in the Estimate and, even if the shop were entitled to storage fees, those fees would be limited to $2000 pursuant to statute. Black also alleged claims for replevin, breach of contract, and fraud. Auto Defendants filed counterclaims for unjust enrichment and frivolous litigation. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.

[16] As is relevant to this appeal, Auto Defendants sought summary judgment on the basis that Black abandoned the Chevy and, alternatively, his 2022 claims for breach of contract, replevin, and fraud were barred by the six-year statutes of limitations ³ as Black knew of or should have discovered any claims he may have had on or before the 2015 lien and foreclosure sale.

[17] Both parties submitted designated evidence, which included affidavit and deposition testimony of McAbee and Black. McAbee testified that, over the course of a couple years, he called Black several times to inform him of the issues discovered with the Chevy's frame but Black never moved forward with the needed work. He further averred that the Chevy sat for a period of five years at the Auto Shop without any contact from Black, that the Auto Shop perfected and foreclosed on a mechanic's lien, and that 2018 or 2019 was the first time Black contacted the Auto Shop about the Chevy.

[18] Black averred that he regularly checked with the Auto Shop about the Chevy either in person or by phone, and each time employees told him that work had not yet begun, which he “had no problem with” because it was going to be his retirement car. Appendix Vol. 2 at 232. Black testified that he still had the same phone number as when he dropped off the Chevy and that he never received calls, voice mails, or texts from Auto Defendants and knew nothing about a mechanic's lien until October 2018 and did not see documentation thereof until he contacted the AG.

[19] Following further briefing and a hearing, the trial court denied all summary judgment motions. In denying Auto Defendants’ motion, the court found issues of material fact existed to preclude entry of summary judgment, including whether Black had abandoned the Chevy as asserted by Auto Defendants. As to Auto Defendants’ statute of limitations argument, the court determined, in part:

The crux of the Defendants’ argument is that the filing and foreclosure of the mechanic's lien put [Black] on notice, at the latest, in August 2015․ [Black] has submitted evidence establishing a genuine issue of material fact that precludes the entry of summary judgment.

Appendix Vol. 2 at 35.

[20] A bench trial was held on July 30, 2024. Black testified that he told McAbee and others at the Auto Shop in 2010, and again over the years, about his plan to use the Chevy when he retired in 2018 and that he never intended to abandon the vehicle. He further testified that storage fees were never mentioned to him, that he never received the Notice or knew about a lien, and that no one at the Auto Shop mentioned after 2015 that McAbee now owned the car.

[21] In his testimony, McAbee agreed that Black initially said he was not in a hurry to get the work done, that storage fees were not included in the Estimate, and that there was no discussion about how long the Auto Shop would hold the car. McAbee testified that he spoke “a few times” to Black about the Chevy, but after he had not heard from Black in years and needed the space at the Auto Shop, he contacted Indiana Lien to perfect a mechanic's lien on the Chevy. Transcript at 116. He acknowledged that the paperwork he filled out reflected the wrong spelling for Black's street and had the wrong VIN for the car, but claimed that he believed the information was correct and that Black had received the Notice. McAbee explained that the error in the VIN was because it had been painted over but conceded that the effort to remove such paint would have been “not a lot.” Id. at 151. He acknowledged that the newspaper advertisement had the wrong VIN and an incorrect dollar figure for work that had been performed.

[22] McAbee also acknowledged receiving the BMV and Carfax reports in 2015, which stated that the 1G VIN was invalid, but thereafter proceeding to obtain a certificate of title from the BMV with that VIN. McAbee noted that, as part of the lien titling process, a Fort Wayne police officer had signed off with approval on paperwork with the 1G VIN although he agreed that officer did not inspect any vehicle with a 1G VIN. As to whether Black was stopping in at the Auto Shop over the years, McAbee testified that “to his knowledge” Black was not, but McAbee acknowledged that he was at the Auto Shop only “intermittently” since 2012. Id. at 131, 132. He also acknowledged that he was not aware that Black's title to the Chevy with the correct VIN included a DOR lien.

[23] Black also called as a witness Terry Coleman, who had worked at the Auto Shop on and off from 2002 to 2014. Coleman testified that he observed Black visit the shop probably five or six times over a four-year period to check on the Chevy, including within the last two weeks of Coleman's employment. Black also presented the testimony of another auto restoration business owner, who estimated that based on the pictures Black showed him of the Chevy in pieces, the cost to reassemble the car and perform the work initially requested in the Estimate would be $51,479.

[24] On October 7, 2024, the trial court issued an Order and Judgment (the Final Order) with findings of fact and conclusions of law in favor of Black on his claims for declaratory judgment, replevin, and breach of contract but against him on his fraud claim and against Auto Defendants on their counterclaims. The Final Order included the following findings of fact:

14. Prior to filling out the lien form, Defendant McAbee did not attempt to call Mr. Black or send Tim McAbee or anyone else to visit Mr. Black at his address.

* * *

18. After retiring, in October 2018, Mr. Black visited [the Auto Shop] to check on the progress of the Vehicle. Defendant McAbee advised Mr. Black that [the Auto Shop] had perfected a mechanic's lien on the Vehicle in 2015 and that he bought the Vehicle. This was Mr. Black's first notice of the mechanic's lien and purchase of the Vehicle.

* * *

21. Mr. Black never received a copy of the Notice of Mechanic's Lien or any other paperwork from [the Auto Shop] or Defendant McAbee in the mail. He also did not see any notice in the newspaper regarding the sale of the Vehicle.

22. Mr. Black's cellphone number has remained the same since before his first contact with [the Auto Shop]. Mr. Black never received any phone calls, voice messages or text messages from [the Auto Shop] concerning the mechanic's lien or the auction of the Vehicle.

Appendix Vol. 2 at 18-20.

[25] Summarized, the court concluded: Black's claims did not accrue until October 2018 and thus his 2022 complaint was timely filed within six years of the discovery date; Black did not abandon the Chevy; Auto Defendants failed to comply with the notice requirements of the mechanic's lien statute; Black is the rightful owner of the Chevy and Auto Defendants were unlawfully detaining it; Auto Defendants did not perform the work that was agreed to in the Estimate and performed other restoration work beyond the scope of that requested by Black; and the Auto Shop breached the contract. The court ordered Auto Defendants to return the Chevy to Black and cover the costs of doing so. The court also ordered Auto Defendants to pay damages to Black in the amount of $50,479.20 (the cost to reassemble the Chevy less the $1,000 paid by Black). Auto Defendants now appeal. Additional information will be provided as necessary.

Discussion & Decision

Standards of Review

[26] Auto Defendants assert that the trial court should have granted their motion for summary judgment on Black's replevin and breach of contract claims.⁴ This court reviews summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard as the trial court. Hughley v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1000, 1003 (Ind. 2014).

Drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of ․ the non-moving parties, summary judgment is appropriate if the designated evidentiary matter shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A fact is “material” if its resolution would affect the outcome of the case, and an issue is “genuine” if a trier of fact is required to resolve the parties’ differing accounts of the truth, or if the undisputed material facts support conflicting reasonable inferences.

Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). Indiana's summary judgment standard sets a “relatively high bar” and “consciously errs on the side of letting marginal cases proceed to trial on the merits, rather than risk short-circuiting meritorious claims.” Id. at 1004. Even a self-serving affidavit can create a genuine issue of material fact to preclude summary judgment. Id.

[27] Auto Defendants also challenge the Final Order in several respects. Where, as here, the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law at a party's request, our standard of review is well-settled:

[W]e determine whether the evidence supports the trial court's findings, and whether the findings support the judgment. We will not disturb the trial court's findings or judgment unless they are clearly erroneous. Findings of fact are clearly erroneous when the record lacks any reasonable inference from the evidence to support them. A judgment is clearly erroneous when a review of the record leaves us with a firm conviction that a mistake has been made. We will neither reweigh evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses, but will consider only the evidence favorable to the judgment and all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom.

Stanley v. Stanley, 237 N.E.3d 1133, 1138 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024), trans. denied (internal citations omitted).

1. Denial of Auto Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment

[28] Auto Defendants argue that the trial court should have granted their motion for summary judgment on Black's claims for replevin and breach of contract. Specifically, they argue that the claims were time barred as a matter of law.

[29] Statutes of limitation seek to provide security against stale claims, which promotes judicial efficiency and advances the peace and welfare of society. Cooper Indus., LLC v. City of S. Bend, 899 N.E.2d 1274, 1279 (Ind. 2009). The party pleading a statute of limitation bears the burden of proving the suit was commenced beyond the statutory time allowed. Id. When application of a statute of limitation rests on questions of fact, it is generally an issue for the trier of fact to decide. Id.; see also Gittings v. Deal, 109 N.E.3d 963, 972 (Ind. 2018) (when a cause of action accrues is generally a question of law “[b]ut it can involve questions of fact”).

[30] Pursuant to Indiana's discovery rule, a cause of action accrues, and the statute of limitation begins to run, “when a claimant knows or, in the exercise of ordinary diligence, should have known of the injury.” Rieth-Riley Const. Co. v. Gibson, 923 N.E.2d 472, 475 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). We have held that the exercise of ordinary diligence means that an injured party must act with some promptness where the acts and circumstances of an injury would put a person of common knowledge and experience on notice that some right of his has been invaded or that some claim against another party might exist. Perryman v. Motorist Mut. Ins. Co., 846 N.E.2d 683, 689 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006).

[31] Auto Defendants argue that the designated materials establish that Black knew or should have known through ordinary diligence about his claims for replevin and breach of contract “by 2015, at the latest,” when McAbee “openly asserted ownership of the Chevy and [the Auto Shop] published its sale.” Appellants’ Brief at 15. Therefore, Auto Defendants maintain that Black's 2022 claims were time barred having been filed more than six years after Black knew or should have known of his claims. We disagree.

[32] The designated evidence reflects that the Notice had a misspelled street name for Black's address and an incorrect VIN for the Chevy. The newspaper advertisement for the foreclosure sale likewise had an incorrect VIN. Black averred that he did not receive the Notice in the mail and never saw anything about a foreclosure sale of the Chevy in the newspaper. Black averred that he checked with the Auto Shop regularly between 2010 and 2018 and was advised by employees that work had not yet begun. He also stated that he was not aware of any lien or McAbee's claimed ownership of the Chevy until being told so by McAbee in October 2018.

[33] McAbee, in contrast, averred that he made several efforts to contact Black to inform him that the entire frame needed to be replaced, but Black never moved forward with the work or retrieved the car. Rather, the car “sat at [the Auto Shop] for a period of five years, without any contact from [ ] Black” until “sometime in 2018 or 2019.” Appendix Vol. 2 at 99-100. Among other things, Auto Defendants also designated the USPS tracking information indicating that the Notice addressed to Strathin Dr. was “Delivered” on July 16. Id. at 100, 114.

[34] The designated evidence clearly reflects the existence of genuine issues of material fact as to when Black knew or should have known through ordinary diligence about his claims against Auto Defendants. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying Auto Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

2. Determination That Black's Claims Accrued in 2018

[35] In its Final Order, the trial court concluded, in part:

7․ Mr. Black's claims for replevin, fraud, and breach of contract did not accrue until October 2018, when Defendant McAbee first informed him of the mechanic's lien and foreclosure.

8. Mr. Black filed his Complaint in August 2022 which was within six years of the discovery date. Consequently, Mr. Black's claims were timely. The statute of limitations does not bar any of Mr. Black's claims.

Appendix Vol. 2 at 21. Auto Defendants contend that the court's conclusion that Black's claims accrued in 2018 is clearly erroneous. More specifically, Auto Defendants argue that the trial court “misapplied the discovery rule” to toll the statute of limitations until 2018 because “[t]he evidence clearly illustrates that [ ] Black failed to exercise ordinary diligence.” Appellants’ Brief at 16, 28.

[36] In support of a lack of diligence, Auto Defendants point out that Black never asked to inspect the Chevy during all the years it was at the Auto Shop. Black testified, however, that, when he would stop by the Auto Shop, he could see the Chevy under a tarp, which he had provided to the Auto Shop, and that he last saw it there in 2017 or 2018. Auto Defendants also suggest that Black could have checked BMV records. However, given that McAbee obtained a title to the Chevy in 2016 with the 1G VIN, any search by Black using the proper VIN would not have alerted him to potential claims against Auto Defendants.

[37] The trial court also heard and weighed the conflicting accounts of Black and McAbee about whether McAbee had spoken to Black by phone about the extent of damage to the frame and whether and how often Black had stopped at the Auto Shop over the years. Further, the undisputed documentary evidence pertaining to the mechanic's lien showed that McAbee provided inaccurate information to Indiana Lien of (1) Black's street name, (2) the VIN for the Chevy, and (3) the dollar amount of work that had been performed, all of which was in the Notice mailed to Strathin Drive, a nonexistent street.

[38] Auto Defendants suggest that Black's agreement at trial that the USPS would not deliver mail to a non-existent address coupled with his acknowledgment that other family members were living at his residence in 2015 “creates an inescapable inference” that Black received the Notice and, thus, knew or should have known of his claims in 2015. Appellants’ Brief at 35. We are unpersuaded by this argument. Black did not know if or where the USPS delivered any mail addressed to Strathin Drive, and he expressly testified that the Notice was not received at his residence on Strathdon.

[39] In determining when Black knew or should have known of his claims, the trial court considered the circumstances and the credibility of the witnesses. We agree with Black that “[t]he trial court had plenty of evidence on which to base its finding that [ ] Black diligently kept track of his Chevy but was unable to discover the Mechanic's Lien.” Appellee's Brief at 18. On the record before us, we cannot say that the trial court's conclusion that the claims did not accrue until 2018 was clearly erroneous.⁵

3. Non-Compliance with Mechanic's Lien Statute

[40] In response to Black's request for a declaratory judgment that he was the rightful owner of the Chevy, Auto Defendants maintained McAbee had acquired title through the mechanic's lien process. In rejecting Auto Defendants’ argument, the court concluded, in part:

5. [T]he Defendants failed to comply with the notice requirements of the Mechanic's Lien Statute. The attempted “notice” was inexcusably deficient. It consistently referenced the wrong vehicle identification number and was sent to the wrong address. At the time the application for a mechanic's lien was prepared, the Defendants had possession of the Vehicle and access to the correct vehicle identification number. They had also been given the correct address for Mr. Black and had even visited Mr. Black at that address.

* * *

7. The Court concludes that the lien initiated by Defendant McAbee, the subsequent sale of the Vehicle, and the title issued to Defendant McAbee for Vehicle Identification Number 1G4676J232572 are void.

Appendix Vol. 2 at 23, 24 (emphasis added).

[41] On appeal, Auto Defendants assert that the court's conclusion that Auto Defendants failed to comply with the mechanic's lien statute, Ind. Code § 9-22-6-2, is clearly erroneous as the court “misapplied” the requirements of that statute. Appellants’ Brief at 36. I.C. § 9-22-6-2 provides, in relevant part, that a person who performs labor “at the request of the owner” has a mechanics lien, and:

(d) Before a vehicle may be sold ․ an advertisement must be placed in a newspaper ․ The advertisement must contain at least the following information:

(1) A description of the vehicle, including make, year, and manufacturer's identification number.

(2) The amount of the unpaid charges.

(3) The time, place, and date of the sale.

(e) In addition to the advertisement ․, the person that holds the mechanic's lien under this section ․ must notify the owner of the vehicle ․ as indicated on the certificate of title of the vehicle ․ by certified mail, return receipt requested, at the last known address of the owner or person, as applicable, that the vehicle will be sold at public auction on a specified date to satisfy the mechanic's lien imposed by this section. If the person who holds the mechanic's lien has proof that the notice was mailed to the owner of the vehicle ․ actual receipt of the notice is not required.

(Emphases added).

[42] Auto Defendants’ primary argument is that the trial court misapplied the statute by utilizing an actual notice standard when the lien statute “only requires proof that the notice was mailed to the owner of the vehicle, not actual receipt.” Appellants’ Brief at 37. Auto Defendants’ argument overlooks that, although the court found that Black did not receive the Notice, the court also determined that Auto Defendants failed to provide accurate and statutorily-required information for the lien. That is, I.C. § 9-22-6-2 required that the advertisement include the VIN of the vehicle; the advertisement here did not. The statute required the holder of the lien to notify the owner “at the last known address of the owner”; Black's address was not on the Notice. The advertisement also indicated a balance of $5660 in charges, which McAbee conceded was not accurate, as in fact only about $2000 in labor had been performed as of that date. The trial court did not misapply the mechanic's lien statute, and its conclusion that Auto Defendants failed to comply with the requirements of the lien statute was not clearly erroneous.

4. Ordering “Defendants” to Pay Damages

[43] In the conclusions of law portion of the trial court's Final Order, the court separately addressed each of Black's claims, that is, one section for each claim: declaratory judgment, replevin, fraud, and breach of contract. The trial court likewise had separate sections for each of Auto Defendants’ two counterclaims. The Final Order contained a separate section entitled “Damages” that stated:

1. As a result of the Defendants’ conduct, Mr. Black incurred damages to his Vehicle.

2. The evidence before the Court shows it will cost $51,479.20 to put Mr. Black in the same position he was in when the contract was made.

3. The evidence before the Court shows the value of the labor needed to separate the body and frame was $2,000.00. Mr. Black paid Auto Rehab $1,000.00. Therefore, the Court credits the Defendants $1,000.00 toward the final judgment.

4. The Plaintiff's total recoverable damages are $50,479.20.

Appendix Vol. 2 at 28 (emphasis added). In the subsequent “Judgment” portion of the Order, the court ordered “the Defendants to pay the Plaintiff's damages in the total amount of $50,479.20.” Id. at 29 (emphasis added).

[44] On appeal, Auto Defendants assert that “the trial court's conclusion that [ ] McAbee is personally responsible under the alleged contract between [the Auto Shop] and Mr. Black is clearly erroneous.” Appellants’ Brief at 26 (emphasis added). They argue that, to the extent that the Estimate is considered a contract – which they dispute – McAbee was not party to it and no allegations to pierce the corporate veil were made but the court nonetheless “ordered [ ] McAbee to pay [ ] Black damages totaling $50,479.20 stemming from [the] alleged breach.” Id. at 27.

[45] We find that this misrepresents the Order as the court did not state that Auto Defendants owed $50,479.20 for breach of contract. In the breach of contract section, the trial court determined that a contract existed, the Auto Shop breached the contract by failing to complete the work reflected in the Estimate, and Black was entitled to compensatory damages for the Auto Shop's breach; no amount of damages was specified. Separately, in the replevin section, the court concluded, in part, that Black was the rightful owner of the Chevy, the vehicle was being unlawfully detained by Auto Defendants, and Auto Defendants – i.e., both McAbee and the Auto Shop – chose to perform work exceeding the scope of the work requested by Black and thereby placed the vehicle in a condition that will make its return to Black difficult. The court also found that the Chevy was “completely disassembled” and would cost $51,479.20 to reassemble. Appendix Vol. 2 at 20.

[46] After concluding that the vehicle was wrongfully detained and the contract had been breached, the court determined in the “Damages” portion of the Order that “[a]s a result of Defendants’ conduct,” Black suffered damages in the amount of $50,479.20. In sum, the Order does not state, nor does the context indicate, that the court was ordering damages strictly for breach of contract.

[47] Moreover, we observe that evidence was presented that McAbee, who was the sole owner of the Auto Shop, personally filled out the incorrect paperwork that was given to Indiana Lien, and chose to title the Chevy in his own name after it was awarded to the Auto Shop, though he paid no money for it. McAbee then obtained a title in his name with the 1G VIN despite having received the Carfax and BMV reports informing him that the 1G VIN was invalid.

[48] On this record, we find that the court's judgment entering a damages award requiring “Defendants,” including McAbee, to pay Black's total damages was not clearly erroneous.

5. Auto Defendants’ Request for Set-Off

[49] Auto Defendants assert that they were entitled to a set-off for money that they expended on parts and labor for restorations to the Chevy but that the trial court “failed to address” those costs when it ordered Auto Defendants to pay Black $50,479.20. Appellants’ Brief at 39. More specifically, Auto Defendants argue that the court clearly erred when it “disregarded uncontroverted evidence” that McAbee incurred $7593 in parts and $10,000 in labor of Auto Shop employees, and the Auto Shop incurred $15,630 in storage fees. Id.

[50] As Black notes, Auto Defendants did not make a request for set-off to the trial court, and, thus, this argument is waived. See Five Star Roofing Sys. v. Armored Guard Window & Door Grp., 191 N.E.3d 224, 239 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022). Waiver aside, we view Auto Defendants’ set-off argument as a repackaging of their counterclaim for unjust enrichment, where Auto Defendants alleged that, if the trial court were to award the Chevy to Black, it would result in him receiving the vehicle “in a substantially more valuable condition” than Black had left it and asking that Black be ordered to pay Auto Defendants “an amount sufficient to fairly compensate [them] for their time, labor, and materials, which have completely changed the nature of the Chevy.” Appendix Vol. 2 at 61-62. The trial court denied the counterclaim, and thus Auto Defendants are appealing from a negative judgment. On appeal, we will not reverse a negative judgment unless it is contrary to law. Smith v. Dermatology Assoc. of Fort Wayne, P.C., 977 N.E.2d 1, 4 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). A party appealing from a negative judgment must show that the evidence points unerringly to a conclusion different than that reached by the trial court. Id.

[51] In denying the counterclaim, the trial court determined that Black never requested the work, as is required for a claim of unjust enrichment,⁶ and that McAbee chose to perform the work for what he believed to be his own benefit. The court further determined, in part:

Furthermore, ․ the [Chevy] is in numerous pieces on the floor of the [Auto] Defendants’ garage. It is difficult to imagine how a disassembled vehicle could be a “benefit” to Mr. Black.

Id. at 28.

[52] The trial court did not “fail to address” the materials and labor costs that Auto Defendants had expended; rather, it made the determination that Auto Defendants were not entitled to recovery of those costs, which were made after McAbee claimed title to the Chevy and for work that Black did not request. Auto Defendants have not established that the court's decision not to provide a set-off to Auto Defendants was contrary to law.

[53] Judgment affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The Estimate did not include storage fees.

2.   In 2012, McAbee took a full-time position with a company, where he worked 7:30 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. and was not thereafter present in the Auto Shop during those hours.

3.   See Ind. Code § 34-11-2-7(1), (3), and (4) (actions on contracts not in writing, for damages for detention of personal property, and actions for fraud must be commenced in six years); see also DelVecchio v. Conseco, Inc., 788 N.E.2d 446, 450 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (recognizing six-year statute of limitations for breach of oral contract and ten-year statute of limitation for written contract), trans. denied; Est. of Verdak v. Butler Univ., 856 N.E.2d 126, 133 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (applying six-year statute of limitations for a replevin claim).

4.   We may review a trial court's summary judgment ruling following a trial on the merits. Roche Diagnostics Operations, Inc. v. Marsh Supermarkets, LLC, 987 N.E.2d 72, 78 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied.

5.   Black suggests that, even if the trial court's determination that the claims accrued in 2018 was clearly erroneous and the claims accrued in 2015 as Auto Defendants argue, his claims were nonetheless timely under the ten-year statute of limitations for written contracts, maintaining that the Estimate constituted a written contract. Auto Defendants contend that the Estimate lacked many terms and should not be considered a written contract between the parties. Because we find that the claims were timely filed under the six-year statute of limitations, we need not reach this alternative argument.

6.   To recover for unjust enrichment, a party must show that (1) he rendered a measurable benefit to the other party at that other party's express or implied request; (2) he expected payment from the other party; and (3) allowing the other party to retain the benefit without restitution would be unjust. Neibert v. Perdomo, 54 N.E.3d 1046, 1051 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (emphasis added).

Altice, Chief Judge.

Judges Brown and Tavitas concur. Brown, J. and Tavitas, J., concur.