IN RE: the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of: K.E. (Minor Child) (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] K.E. (Mother) appeals the termination of parental rights as to her minor child, K.E., claiming that the trial court's termination order was clearly erroneous.¹ Mother argues that the Indiana Department of Child Services (DCS) failed to prove that DCS had a satisfactory plan for K.E.’s care and treatment, and that termination of the parent-child relationship was in K.E.’s best interest.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] K.E., born August 15, 2013, was living with Mother in Elkhart County on March 12, 2022, when the two went to a nearby residence so Mother could buy drugs. Mother was arrested and charged with visiting a common nuisance, possession of methamphetamine, and neglect of a dependent.² DCS removed K.E. from Mother's care and placed her in “kinship care” with her teacher. Transcript at 54. Prior to that incident, DCS family case manager Nicole McFarland (FCM McFarland) received a report in February 2022 that K.E. was not being fed and housed appropriately and was allowed to be habitually truant from school. When FCM McFarland went to Mother's house to investigate, Mother refused to allow her inside.

[4] On March 16, DCS filed a petition alleging that K.E. was a Child in Need of Services (CHINS) for missing school, not being provided with necessities, being taken to a residence where Mother purchased drugs, and not having a caretaker because Father was incarcerated. K.E. was subsequently adjudicated a CHINS, and Mother acknowledged that she had substance abuse, mental health, housing, and incarceration issues.

[5] On April 18, the trial court entered a dispositional decree and ordered Mother to participate in reunification services. The order required Mother, among other things, to remain in contact with DCS and allow DCS personnel to visit her residence, establish paternity for K.E., not consume or distribute illegal substances, complete substance abuse and parenting assessments, submit to random drug screens, complete a psychological evaluation and follow all recommendations, and attend all scheduled visits with K.E.

[6] DCS referred Mother to the Bowen Center for substance abuse assessment and treatment, counseling, and psychological testing. Mother completed a substance abuse evaluation, and although she was directed to attend group counseling sessions, she only attended two sessions and never returned because she was reincarcerated following the revocation of her community corrections placement with regard to the methamphetamine possession and neglect convictions. Mother also missed numerous calls requesting that she submit to drug testing. In fact, only three screens were conducted. Two of the tests were negative and one administered in November 2023 was positive for methamphetamine. Thereafter, Mother stopped responding to drug screen requests and she failed to complete any of the court-ordered services or programs. Additionally, while Mother agreed to participate in supervised visitation at the center where K.E. was living, she was late for her first visit and subsequently canceled future visits following her probation violation. Mother last saw K.E. in December 2023.

[7] On March 4, 2024, the trial court conducted a permanency hearing, at which Mother did not appear. There was an active arrest warrant for Mother, and her whereabouts were unknown. During the hearing, it was established that Mother had failed to comply with the court-ordered case plan.

[8] On April 12, 2024, DCS filed a petition to terminate Mother and Father's parental rights alleging, among other things, that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in K.E.’s removal from her parents will not be remedied, and that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to K.E.’s well-being, safety, physical health or life. While Mother continued to have supervised telephone contact with K.E., she last spoke to K.E. on her birthday in August, 2024.

[9] At some point thereafter, Mother was arrested and charged with possession of methamphetamine, a Level 6 felony, and possession of paraphernalia, a Class C misdemeanor, in Kosciusko County. Mother pled guilty to the methamphetamine charge in August 2024, and the trial court imposed a one-year sentence that was ordered to run consecutively to the sentence in the Elkhart County case.

[10] Between September 2023 and August 2024, K.E. participated in individual therapy because she had “endured a lot of trauma” and “had a lot of behaviors.” Transcript at 68. Those behaviors included being “a little overaggressive” with younger children and dogs. Id. On the other hand, FCM McFarland described K.E. as sweet, loving, affectionate, “high energy” and “very honest.” Id. at 66-67. During the therapy sessions, K.E. expressed a lot of anger towards Mother. Although K.E.’s therapist never observed K.E. personally interact with Mother, she witnessed a phone call between Mother and K.E., during which K.E. maintained a blank facial expression, and was not engaged in the conversation.

[11] K.E. had been in various foster homes throughout the pendency of the CHINS case, and the home where she was living at the time of the termination hearing was not “pre-adoptive.” Id. at 69. DCS personnel continued to actively search for an adoptive home for K.E., and it was determined that there were some “options that have stepped forward as being interested in adopting [K.E.]” Id. K.E.’s therapists believed that K.E. required ongoing intensive therapy and a stable home life.

[12] When the termination hearing commenced on January 10, 2025, Mother was incarcerated at the DOC, with a projected release date of April 16, 2026. FCM McFarland testified that she had concerns about Mother's ability to adequately parent K.E. in light of the numerous periods of incarceration and Mother's inability to obtain and maintain sobriety. In light of those concerns, FCM McFarland recommended that K.E. not be returned to Mother's care. FCM McFarland further testified that while there was no adoptive family in place for K.E. at the time of the termination hearing, DCS was actively pursuing options for K.E.’s adoption.

[13] Court Appointed Special Advocate Sabrina Fritz (CASA Fritz) testified that she supported the termination of Mother's parental rights because even when Mother was not incarcerated, she made almost no effort to participate in the court-ordered parenting services and programs. K.E. told CASA Fritz that she did not want any further contact with Mother because she did not believe that Mother could care for her. K.E. desired to be with an adoptive family that loved her and would take care of her. CASA Fritz believed that termination was in K.E.’s best interests.

[14] Following the termination hearing, the trial court concluded that there was a reasonable probability that Mother would not remedy the conditions that resulted in K.E.’s removal, that there was a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship would pose a threat to K.E.’s wellbeing, that termination was in K.E.’s best interest, and that DCS had a satisfactory plan for K.E.’s care and treatment, which was adoption. The trial court based its findings on Mother's continued substance abuse that led to her repeated periods of incarceration, her failure to sufficiently engage in DCS services and programs to improve her ability to create a safe environment for K.E., and her refusal to take responsibility for her actions.

[15] Mother now appeals.

Standard of Review

[16] We recognize that “[a] parent's interest in the care, custody, and control of his or her children is ‘perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests.’ ” In re R.S., 56 N.E.3d 625, 628 (Ind. 2016) (quoting Bester v. Lake Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005)). “[A]lthough parental rights are of a constitutional dimension, the law provides for the termination of these rights when the parents are unable or unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities.” In re A.P., 882 N.E.2d 799, 805 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). Involuntary termination of parental rights is the most extreme sanction a court can impose, and therefore “termination is intended as a last resort, available only when all other reasonable efforts have failed.” Id.

[17] We have long adhered to a highly deferential standard of review in cases involving the termination of parental rights. In re S.K., 124 N.E.3d 1225, 1230-31 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied.

In considering whether the termination of parental rights is appropriate, we do not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility. We consider only the evidence and any reasonable inferences therefrom that support the judgment, and give due regard to the trial court's opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses firsthand. Where a trial court has entered findings of fact and conclusions of law, we will not set aside the trial court's findings or judgment unless clearly erroneous. [Ind. Trial Rule 52(A)]. In evaluating whether the trial court's decision to terminate parental rights is clearly erroneous, we review the trial court's judgment to determine whether the evidence clearly and convincingly supports the findings and the findings clearly and convincingly support the judgment.

In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1229-30 (Ind. 2013) (citations and quotation marks omitted).

[18] Reviewing whether the evidence “clearly and convincingly” supports the findings, or the findings “clearly and convincingly” support the judgment, is not a license to reweigh the evidence. Id. (observing that weighing the evidence under the clear and convincing evidence standard applicable to termination cases is the trial court's prerogative, not ours). Where, as here, a parent does not challenge the trial court's factual findings, we accept all of the trial court's relevant findings as true. See Matter of To.R., 177 N.E.3d 478, 485 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), trans. denied.

[19] A petition to terminate a parent-child relationship must allege and prove, in relevant part:

the existence of one or more of the following circumstances:

․

(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(4) That there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health, or life of the child.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(d)(3)-(4) (2024). In addition, DCS must allege and prove:

(2) that there is a satisfactory plan for care and treatment of the child; and

(3) that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests.

I.C. § 31-35-2-4(c)(2)-(3) (2024).

[20] Clear and convincing evidence need not establish that the continued custody of a parent is wholly inadequate for a child's very survival. Bester, 839 N.E.2d at 148. It is instead sufficient to show that the child's emotional and physical development is put at risk by the parent's custody. Id. If the allegations in the petition are found to be true, “the court shall terminate the parent-child relationship.” I.C. § 31-35-2-8(a).

Discussion and Decision

I. Best Interests

[21] Mother argues that DCS failed to establish that termination of her parental rights was in K.E.’s best interests. Mother claims that the trial court impermissibly relied on FCM McFarland and CASA Fritz's conclusions that her parental rights should be terminated and on the fact that Mother was “not going to be released [from incarceration] until April of 2026 when making the best interest determination.” Appellant's Brief at 13.

[22] In determining what is in a child's best interests, a court is required to look beyond the factors identified by DCS and consider the totality of the evidence. In re A.K., 924 N.E.2d 212, 223 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). This includes a child's need for permanency because “children cannot wait indefinitely for their parents to work toward preservation or reunification.” Matter of Ma.H, 134 N.E.3d 41, 49 (Ind. 2019). In other words, the trial court need not wait until a child is irreversibly harmed before terminating the parent-child relationship. A.D.S. v. Ind. Dept. of Child Servs., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1158 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. A parent's historical inability to provide “adequate housing, stability, and supervision,” in addition to the parent's current inability to do so, supports finding termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child. A.K. 924 N.E.2d at 223.

[23] Individuals who pursue criminal activity run the risk of being denied the opportunity to develop positive and meaningful relationships with their children. Castro v. State Office of Family and Children, 842 N.E.2d 367, 374 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). Also, a parent's failure to exercise the right to visit their child “demonstrates a lack of commitment to complete the actions necessary to preserve the parent-child relationship.” Lang v. Starke Cnty. Off. of Fam. and Ch., 861 N.E.2d 366, 372 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied. Similarly, a parent's issues with substance abuse that have not been addressed and remedied and pose a risk to their child's safety is “sufficient alone to support the trial court's conclusion that the best interests of the [child] are served by terminating parental rights.” A.D.S., 987 N.E.2d at 1159. Finally, a recommendation by both the FCM and CASA to terminate parental rights, coupled with the evidence that the conditions resulting in the placement outside the home will not be remedied, is sufficient to prove by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in a child's best interest. In re A.I., 825 N.E.2d 798, 811 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied.

[24] In this case, the evidence established that Mother has a substantial criminal history involving drug possession and sales that predated the CHINS case. More specifically, Mother was arrested and convicted of dealing in methamphetamine in 2012, and she subsequently violated probation for that offense in 2018.

[25] The CHINS case commenced on March 12, 2022, after Mother visited a residence to purchase drugs while K.E. waited in the car. As a result of that incident, Mother was convicted of neglect of a dependent and possession of methamphetamine and was sentenced to five years of incarceration with three years to community corrections and two years on reporting probation. Although Mother was on work release in September and October 2022, her placement there was revoked, and she was reincarcerated. Mother was released sometime in 2023, but she was reincarcerated following a probation violation and was ordered to serve the balance of her sentence at the DOC.

[26] Mother was charged with possession of methamphetamine, a Level 6 felony, and misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia, a Class C misdemeanor in another county in May 2024. Mother pled guilty to the methamphetamine charge in August 2024, and the trial court imposed a one-year sentence that she was ordered to serve consecutively to the sentence imposed in Elkhart County. As a result, Mother's projected release date was April 16, 2026.

[27] The evidence at the termination hearing further demonstrated that even when Mother was not incarcerated, she rarely participated in court-ordered reunification services, including visits with K.E. In March 2022, DCS referred Mother to the Bowen Center for substance abuse assessment and treatment, counseling, and visitation with K.E. While at Bowen, Mother completed a substance abuse evaluation and participated in only two substance use group sessions in September and October 2022.

[28] Mother also failed to comply with drug screening, in that she missed calls for random testing 118 times, and she had 46 “unforgiven” missed tests. Exhibit 145. After testing positive for methamphetamine in November 2023, Mother never drug screened again.

[29] The evidence further established that Mother's visitations with K.E. were unsuccessful. In 2023, Mother was late for the first visit, and she subsequently canceled two visits after her probation was violated. FCM McFarland testified that she had concerns about Mother's ability to adequately parent K.E. in light of her incarceration, and the inability and/or refusal to obtain and maintain sobriety and stability for K.E. In light of these circumstances, FCM McFarland recommended not returning K.E. to Mother.

[30] CASA Fritz also supported the termination of Mother's parental rights because of Mother's drug abuse, her frequent and lengthy incarcerations, and her nonparticipation in court-ordered services and programs. Additionally, K.E. told CASA Fritz that she did not want any contact with Mother and she did not believe that Mother could adequately care for her. K.E. desired to be with an adoptive family that loved her.

[31] Although Mother contends that the trial court relied only on the recommendations of CASA Fritz and FCM McFarland and her history of incarceration as the bases for terminating her parental rights, the record demonstrates that the trial court also considered Mother's substance abuse issues, her lack of visits with K.E., and her failure to engage in court-ordered reunification services. To be sure, the evidence established that Mother has had multiple interactions with the criminal justice system before and after K.E.’s birth, that included multiple convictions for dealing in methamphetamine, possession of methamphetamine, and neglect of a dependent. Mother also violated her probation and conditions of her community corrections placement that resulted in lengthy incarcerations. Mother's participation in court-ordered services was sporadic even when she was not incarcerated, and she has not shown any interest in complying with any of the requirements that would have facilitated reunification with K.E. The totality of the evidence supports the trial court's conclusion that termination of Mother's parental rights was in K.E.’s best interests.

II. Satisfactory Plan for K.E.’s Care and Treatment

[32] Mother argues that the termination order must be set aside because the evidence failed to demonstrate that DCS had a satisfactory plan for K.E.’s adoption. Mother also contends that the testimony presented at the termination hearing established that “[K.E.] lacks adoptability.” Appellant's Brief at 11.

[33] This court has traditionally held that for a DCS plan to be “ ‘satisfactory’ ” for purposes of the termination statute, it “ ‘need not be detailed, so long as it offers a general sense of the direction in which the child will be going after the parent-child relationship is terminated.’ ” In re A.S., 17 N.E.3d 994, 1007 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (quoting Lang, 861 N.E.2d at 375). A DCS plan is satisfactory if the plan is to attempt to find suitable parents to adopt the child. Id. There need not be a guarantee that a suitable adoption will take place, only that DCS will attempt to find a suitable adoptive parent. Id. Thus, a plan will not be deemed unsatisfactory if DCS has not identified a specific family to adopt the child. Id. Moreover, it is the adoption court—not the termination court—that determines who adopts a child and whether an adoptive placement is appropriate. Id. (citing In re D.J., 755 N.E.2d 679, 685 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001)).

[34] Here, the evidence demonstrated that DCS's plan for K.E. is adoption. Prior to the termination hearing, K.E. had been in various foster homes, and the arrangement at the time of the termination hearing was, unfortunately, not pre-adoptive. DCS personnel established, however, that it was engaged in adoption recruiting for K.E. and that there were families interested in adopting her. This was sufficient evidence to show that DCS had a satisfactory plan for K.E.’s care and treatment under the termination statute, in that its plan was to attempt to find suitable parents to adopt K.E. See id.

[35] Mother, however, further claims that DCS's plan was not satisfactory because the evidence showed that K.E. was allegedly “unadoptable” in light of her “tantrums” and “aggressive behavior toward younger [children] and dogs.” Appellant's Brief at 11. Contrary to Mother's contention, FCM McFarland testified that K.E. is sweet, affectionate, “high energy” and “very honest.” Transcript at 66-67. In short, Mother's argument amounts to nothing more than a request for this court to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1229. The trial court's determination that DCS had a satisfactory plan for K.E.’s care, i.e., adoption, was not clearly erroneous.

[36] Judgment affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   While DCS filed a petition to terminate the parental rights as to both of K.E.’s parents, W.O.—K.E.’s father—admitted the allegations in the petition and is not a party to this appeal. We therefore primarily confine our discussion to those circumstances that relate to Mother.

2.   Mother subsequently pled guilty to the neglect and methamphetamine charges and was sentenced to five years of incarceration with three years to be served in community corrections and two years of reporting probation.

Altice, Chief Judge.

Pyle, J. and DeBoer, J., concur.