Timothy Emmett Breed, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Timothy Emmett Breed appeals his twenty-year aggregate sentence for Level 2 felony dealing in methamphetamine and Level 5 felony possession of a narcotic drug, arguing his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of his offenses and his character. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In January 2023, Indiana Metropolitan Police Department (IMPD) officers executed a search warrant at Breed's residence and found 2,076.64 grams of methamphetamine and 6.53 grams of fentanyl. Officers also found indicia of drug dealing, including a blender and digital scale (both containing white residue), a cutting agent, four cell phones, a stack of cash, and different types of baggies. See Transcript Vol. 3 at 131, 154, 155, 179. Breed was arrested and charged with Count I: Dealing in Methamphetamine, a Level 2 felony;¹ and Count II: Dealing in a Narcotic Drug, a Level 3 felony.²

[3] Nearly two years later, Breed failed to appear for his jury trial and was tried in absentia while represented by counsel.³ The jury found Breed guilty of dealing in methamphetamine as a Level 2 felony, and for Count II, the lesser included offense of possession of a narcotic drug as a Level 5 felony. Appellant's Appendix Vol. 2 at 235-36. The trial court sentenced Breed to concurrent sentences of twenty years for the Level 2 felony and six years for the Level 5 felony, with seventeen years to be executed in the Department of Correction (DOC) and three years to be served in community corrections on home detention. Tr. Vol. 4 at 26; Appellant's App. Vol. 3 at 30. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[4] Breed requests revision of his twenty-year aggregate sentence under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), which “permits an appellate court to revise a sentence if, after due consideration of the trial court's decision, the sentence is found to be inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Faith v. State, 131 N.E.3d 158, 159 (Ind. 2019). Specifically, Breed asks us to “revise [his] aggravated sentence to an advisory term of 17.5 years, with ten (10) years in prison and seven and one-half (7.5) years on community corrections.” Appellant's Brief at 6.

[5] Our review under Rule 7(B) “should be [an] attempt to leaven the outliers” and is guided by “our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given case.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1224, 1225 (Ind. 2008). “[A] trial court's sentencing decision will generally prevail ‘unless overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense (such as accompanied by restraint, regard and lack of brutality) and the defendant's character (such as substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character).’ ” Konkle v. State, 253 N.E.3d 1068, 1093 (Ind. 2025) (quoting Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015)). It is the defendant's burden to prove that his sentence is inappropriate. Id. at 1092.

[6] When assessing the nature of the offense, we begin with the advisory sentence. Norton v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1285, 1291 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024). Breed was convicted of Level 2 felony dealing in methamphetamine and Level 5 felony possession of a narcotic drug. As his Level 2 felony conviction controls his aggregate sentence, we focus our attention there. A Level 2 felony conviction carries a sentence between ten and thirty years, with the advisory sentence being seventeen and one-half years. I.C. § 35-50-2-4.5. Here, the trial court sentenced Breed to twenty years—two and one-half years more than the advisory sentence.

[7] When the trial court deviates from the advisory sentence, we consider “whether there is anything more or less egregious about the offense committed by the defendant that makes it different from the ‘typical’ offense accounted for by the legislature when it set the advisory sentence.” Norton, 235 N.E.3d at 1291 (quoting T.A.D.W. v. State, 51 N.E.3d 1205, 1211 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016)). Breed contends that “aside from the amount of drugs found in his home, there are no other surrounding circumstances rendering the offense particularly egregious.” Appellant's Br. at 8. We disagree. The extraordinarily large amount of methamphetamine found in Breed's home makes his offense more egregious than that to which the advisory sentence would “typically” apply. Under Indiana Code section 35-48-4-1.1(e)(1), dealing in methamphetamine is a Level 2 felony if “the amount of the drug involved is at least ten (10) grams[.]” IMPD officers found over two thousand grams of methamphetamine in Breed's home—more than two hundred times the minimum set by the legislature for this particular offense.

[8] While Breed maintains his conviction was based solely on the amount of drugs found in his home, he fails to acknowledge the evidence recovered from his home that demonstrated his intent to distribute copious amounts of drugs, including a stack of cash, multiple cell phones, a digital scale, and baggies. See Tr. Vol. 3 at 198. In sum, Breed has failed to persuade us that his enhanced sentence is inappropriate based on the nature of his offense.

[9] Next, Breed contends that his twenty-year sentence qualifies for Rule 7(B) revision in light of his character because he held a job, suffers from depression and substance use disorder, and he expressed remorse at sentencing. In considering Breed's character, “we engage in a broad consideration of [his] qualities[.]” Burkhart v. State, 259 N.E.3d 347, 355 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (quoting T.A.D.W., 51 N.E.3d at 1211), trans. denied. “Even a minor criminal record reflects poorly on [his] character[.]” Morris v. State, 114 N.E.3d 531, 539 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (quoting Reis v. State, 88 N.E.3d 1099, 1105 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017)), trans. denied. Breed's criminal history spans about thirty years and includes thirteen misdemeanor convictions and five felony convictions. Tr. Vol. 4 at 19-20. He has received multiple significant sentences for drug-related offenses. See Appellant's App. Vol. 3 at 10-13.

[10] Breed's substantial criminal history notwithstanding, his job history, mental health, and expression of remorse at sentencing are also insufficient to warrant Rule 7(B) revision. First, the fact that Breed has been employed is unavailing because “most people are employed such that this consideration does not warrant a lesser sentence.” Jones v. State, 218 N.E.3d 3, 16 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), trans. denied. Second, Breed contends his substance use disorder and mental illness can be effectively treated “in less time than [his] lengthy 17-year prison sentence” and he is unlikely to reoffend if successfully rehabilitated. Appellant's Br. at 10. But these contentions fall outside the goal of Rule 7(B) review, which “is to determine whether the defendant's sentence is inappropriate, not whether some other sentence would be more appropriate.” King v. State, 991 N.E.2d 612, 618 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). Moreover, at the sentencing hearing, the trial court observed that Breed had already failed to take advantage of previous opportunities to seek help:

[Y]ou mentioned earlier about giving chances. I remember, Mr. Breed, when I reduced your bond so you could post your bond and get out. It's not good that I remember that because what came from that are more violations that ultimately ended up in your probation being revoked. There were multiple chances to seek treatment, get help, things of that nature. And I understand substance use disorder is a disease and it's not necessarily an easy one to beat. But there have been multiple chances leading up to, unfortunately, where we are today. So I do find that as a statutory aggravator.

Transcript Vol. 4 at 24-25.

[11] Despite this comment by the judge, the trial court acknowledged Breed's substance use disorder as a mitigating factor at sentencing. Finally, while Breed claims his apology to the trial court at sentencing constituted an expression of remorse and good character, “[w]e defer to the sentencing court's assessment of a defendant's sincerity” when evaluating expressions of remorse at sentencing. Thomas v. State, 249 N.E.3d 1118, 1122 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025).

[12] We conclude that Breed has failed to provide compelling evidence that his character warrants a revision of his twenty-year aggregate sentence or that his sentence is inappropriate.

Conclusion

[13] Because Breed failed to show that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and his character, we affirm.

[14] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1.1(a)(2), (e)(1).

2.   I.C. § 35-48-4-1(a)(2), (d)(1).

3.   We note that before this failure to appear, Breed had moved for and received continuances for five prior trial dates between March 2023 and November 2024. Appellant's Appendix Vol. 2 at 22. One week before the January 2025 trial, Breed again moved to continue his jury trial, and his request was denied. Id. at 23.

DeBoer, Judge.

Chief Judge Altice and Judge Pyle concur. Altice, C.J., and Pyle, J., concur.