David H. Lane, Jr., Appellant-Respondent v. Karla J. Peterson, Appellee-Petitioner (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] In this domestic relations case between David Lane, Jr. (Father) and Karla Peterson (Mother), Father pro se appeals the trial court's order denying him parenting time with his and Mother's 14-year-old son (Child). Among other violations of the Indiana Rules of Appellate Procedure, Father's brief lacks the cogency necessary for appellate review. We therefore find his appellate claims waived and affirm.¹

Facts

[2] Mother and Father legally separated in 2016, when Child was five years old. At that time, the trial court granted Mother primary physical custody of Child while awarding Father parenting time according to the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines. Seven years later, Father was incarcerated for reasons not disclosed in the record. In July 2023, Father filed from prison a “Motion for Rule to Show Cause” regarding his parenting time. App. Vol. II, p. 27. And in June 2024, he filed a “Motion to Hold [Mother] in Contempt of Court for Intentionally Disobeying this Court's Order.” Id.

[3] After several hearings, the trial court issued a July 2024 order denying Father's motions. That order stated, in pertinent part:

1. The parties are the parents of one minor child, [B.L.], born on May 4, 2011.

2. The hearings were held on November 13, 2023, March 14, 2024[,] and June 10, 2024. An in-camera interview was held with [Child] on January 29, 2024. The Court appointed a Guardian Ad Litem (GAL) to this matter at the June 10, 2024 hearing. The purpose of the GAL was to address the question of parenting time being made available to [Father,] who is currently incarcerated at Wabash Valley Correctional Facility with an expected release date of 2054. The GAL tasked himself to address the question of sanctions against Mother, per Father's motions, as well.

3. “The parenting time statute governs the modification, denial, and restriction of parenting time, Meisberger v. Bishop, 15 N.E.3d 653, 659 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), and states: ‘A parent not granted custody of the child is entitled to reasonable parenting time rights unless the court finds, after a hearing, that parenting time by the noncustodial parent might endanger the child's physical health or significantly impair the child's emotional development.[’ ”] Ind. Code § 31-17-4-1(a) (emphasis added). “[E]ven though the statute uses the word ‘might,’ this Court has previously interpreted the language to mean that a court may not restrict parenting time unless that parenting time ‘would’ endanger the child's physical health or emotional development[, and] an order for supervision constitutes such a restriction.” Hatmaker, 998 N.E.2d at 761. Hazelett v. Hazelett, 119 N.E.3d 153, 161 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019).

4. In reviewing best interest of child factors under Ind. Code § 31-14-13-2, the Court balances each of those factors. As a result of the evidence submitted at the hearings, including the written report and testimony from the GAL, the Court finds that it is not in child's best interest to be subject to in-person parenting time with Father.

5. Father is asking that the minor child be brought to the prison by ․ the child's paternal grandparents. This is contrary to the wishes of the child and Mother. The GAL also concludes that parenting time with Father would not be in the child's best interest. As cited in McCurdy v. McCurdy[,] 173 Ind. App. 437, 363 N.E.2d 1298, 1301 (Ind. Ct. App. 1977), “a parent should not be denied visitation with his or her children for an extended period of time solely because of the parent's imprisonment.” (emphasis added). Id. Notwithstanding the distance and travel requirements it would take to drive the child to the prison to see Father, Mother and GAL do not base their opinion solely on the fact that father is in prison. They argue that enforcing in-person parenting time would worsen the emotional trauma already experienced and exhibited by the child due to witnessing the abuse at the hands of Father. This Court agrees.

6. The Court finds that Mother has established that in person, virtual or telephonic parenting time with Father would impair the child's emotional development. Based on the evidence provided at the hearings and taking into account information gathered in the in-camera interview, the Court finds that Mother and child are both victims of trauma and abuse from Father which has impacted the emotional well-being of the child. The Court concludes that given the traumatic history that forcing the child to see and speak to his father against the child's wishes would cause further impairment to the child. Parenting time with Father is DENIED until such time that there is a significant change in circumstances.

7. The Court will authorize, however, for Father to continue to write his son with the understanding that the child may choose not to write back. Those letters may be sent to Mother's address. Father shall not include in the letter any threats or disparaging remarks about Mother. Mother shall give the letters to the child and permit the child to write Father back should minor child choose to do so.

8. It is further ordered that Father's Motion to Hold [Mother] in Contempt of Court for Intentionally Disobeying this Court's Order is DENIED.

App. Vol. II, pp. 27-29 (third set of brackets in ¶ 3 in original).

[4] Father pro se appealed the trial court's July 2024 order but struggled to comply with basic requirements of appellate procedure. Among his multiple defective filings, Father failed to file an appendix with his brief. This Court twice ordered Father to file an appendix within 30 days, warning that his failure to do so may result in dismissal of his appeal. Each time, Father failed to comply. Therefore, in May 2025, this Court dismissed Father's appeal with prejudice.

[5] Father, however, successfully moved to have his appeal reinstated. He has since filed a conforming appendix, and his appeal is now properly before this Court. But Father's brief fails to comply with the Indiana Rules of Appellate Procedure in ways that prevent appellate review of his claims. Finding Father's claims are waived, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

Discussion and Decision

[6] “It is well settled that pro se litigants are held to the same legal standards as licensed attorneys.” Basic v. Amouri, 58 N.E.3d 980, 983 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). This means they are “bound to follow” the Indiana Rules of Appellate Procedure and “must be prepared to accept the consequences of their failure to do so.” Id. at 983-84. “[W]e prefer to decide issues on the merits,” but where a litigant's noncompliance with our Appellate Rules is “so substantial as to impede our consideration of the issues, we may deem the alleged errors waived.” Id. at 984.

[7] Father has failed to comply with our Appellate Rules in several respects. First, his brief violates Rule 46(A)(5). That rule requires the appellant's brief to include a “Statement of Case” section that “briefly describe[s] the nature of the case, the course of the proceedings relevant to the issues presented for review, and the disposition of these issues by the trial court.” Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(5). Father's Statement of Case notes that, since November 2016, he has filed “50+ Motion to Show Causes” (sic) related to his parenting time with Child. Appellant's Br., p. 5. But this section does not mention—let alone describe—the July 2023 “Motion for Rule to Show Cause” or the June 2024 “Motion to Hold [Mother] in Contempt of Court for Intentionally Disobeying this Court's Order,” which were the subject of the appealed order. App. Vol. II, p. 27. What's more, Father did not include these motions in his appendix.

[8] Second, Father's brief violates Appellate Rule 46(A)(6). That rule requires the appellant's brief to include a “Statement of Facts” section that “describe[s] the facts relevant to the issues presented for review.” App. R. 46(A)(6). Father does little in his Statement of Facts to illuminate the dispute underlying his motions. He begins by summarizing the case law cited in the trial court's order. He then complains that the GAL failed to investigate “allegations of prior abuse by [Mother].” Appellant's Br., p. 9. Without citation to the record or any indication of relevancy, Father proclaims:

[The GAL] did not look at any past filings by [Father], or he would [have] seen the various police reports, videos, and pictures, of bruises that [Mother] put on [Child] by bites, pinches, and allowing the child to be bitten by dogs, and when she even dated a convicted child molester who had raped a 7 year old boy.

Id. at 9-10.

[9] Father also complains in his Statement of Facts that Mother lied under oath during the hearings on Father's motions. But Father does not set forth or describe Mother's allegedly false testimony. And even if he had, this Court could not review it because Father did not provide us with transcripts of the hearings or a verified statement of the evidence under Appellate Rule 31. See Fields v. Conforti, 868 N.E.2d 507, 511 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (finding appellant waived claims by not providing transcript on which claims depended).

[10] Third, Father's brief violates Appellate Rule 46(A)(8). That rule requires the appellant's brief to include an “Argument” section that “contain[s] the appellant's contentions [as to] why the trial court ․ committed reversible error.” App. R. 46(A)(8). The rule also provides that “the contentions of the appellant on the issues presented” must be “supported by cogent reasoning.” App. R. 46(A)(8)(a). Father's brief does not include an “Argument” section; it includes only a “Summary of Argument.” See generally App. R. 46(A)(7) (requiring “Summary of Argument” section that “contain[s] a succinct, clear, and accurate statement of the arguments made in the body of the brief”).

[11] Father's brief as a whole also lacks cogent reasoning. Father challenges the trial court's order denying him parenting time. But nowhere in his brief does Father explain how the court allegedly erred. In fact, his only discernible claim appears in the following passage of his Summary of Argument:

It is so oblivious (sic) that the court in this case cited case law that ruled in favor of the fathers in being able to see their children while in prison. They were wrong for doing so, just like [Mother] was wrong for refusing to allow me to see and talk to my son. My son is my mini-me. I love him with all my heart and soul. I want him to do good in school and at home. To blame me for his actions isn't my fault. It is the lack of my presence in the child's life is (sic) why he is rebelling.

Appellant's Br., p 10. Even assuming the “cited case law” referenced in this passage is that which Father summarizes in his brief's Statement of Facts, Father fails to analogize this authority to the facts of his case or otherwise explain why it warrants reversal of the trial court's July 2024 order. And the lack of transcripts compounds these deficiencies.

[12] “We demand cogent argument ․ because it promotes impartiality in the appellate tribunal.” Young v. Butts, 685 N.E.2d 147, 151 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997). “A court which must search the record and make up its own arguments because a party has not adequately presented them runs the risk of becoming an advocate rather than an adjudicator.” Id. Therefore, “[w]e will not ․ address arguments that are inappropriate or too poorly developed or expressed to be understood.” Basic, 58 N.E.3d at 984. Such arguments are waived. Id.; accord K.S. v. D.S., 64 N.E.3d 1209, 1212 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (“A party waives any issue for which it fails to develop a cogent argument or support with adequate citation to authority.”).

[13] Given Father's noncompliance with our Appellate Rules—most notably his brief's lack of cogency—we find Father has waived his claims for appellate review. We therefore affirm the trial court's July 2024 order.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Mother did not respond to Father's appeal.

Weissmann, Judge.

Judges Bailey and Brown concur. Bailey, J., and Brown, J., concur.