Daniel Mac Chumbley, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Daniel Chumbley and Logan Crague became engaged in a physical altercation in Chumbley's driveway after Chumbley refused to leave Crague's vehicle and engaged in threatening behaviors. During the scuffle, Chumbley slid into the driver's seat of the vehicle and drove it in reverse, causing Crague to fall to the ground. Chumbley drove the car over Crague's body, breaking Crague's leg. After a jury trial, Chumbley was convicted of Level 5 felony battery by means of a deadly weapon and Level 6 felony auto theft. Chumbley appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting each conviction. We affirm.

Facts

[2] In late October 2024, Chumbley dropped off a PlayStation 5 gaming console at Crague's apartment so that Crague could set it up for him. About a week later, Crague and his girlfriend, Gracie Goerres, drove to Chumbley's home to return the console.

[3] The three initially conversed amicably in Crague's vehicle, which was parked in Chumbley's driveway. At Chumbley's request, Crague drove him to a nearby liquor store where Chumbley purchased vodka. Upon returning, each took a shot of vodka and continued talking in the car, with Crague in the driver's seat, Goerres in the front passenger seat, and Chumbley in the back seat behind Crague. Chumbley then convinced Crague to drive him to a drug store about five minutes away, but they discovered upon arrival there that the store was closed. Crague drove back to Chumbley's home and parked again in the driveway.

[4] When Crague and Goerres indicated they needed to leave to go to Walmart before it closed, Chumbley asked if they could stay longer or if he could accompany them. Crague and Goerres denied both requests. Chumbley said he was not going to leave the vehicle unless he accompanied them to Walmart. Chumbley then refused Goerres's directive to exit the vehicle and called her a “stupid f***ing c**t.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 120. Chumbley also began making threatening gestures—“fake punching” over Goerres's head—while stating that he did not care “if you're a woman, I'll still beat you up.” Id. at 211.

[5] In response, Crague ordered Chumbley to leave the vehicle immediately. Chumbley complied but then began making the same “fake punching” gestures toward Crague as Crague sat in the driver's seat. After Crague handed his gun to Goerres, he and Chumbley then began scuffling outside the vehicle. During the altercation, Crague pinned Chumbley against the vehicle near the open driver's door. Chumbley slid into the driver's seat, from which Crague attempted to remove him. While Crague was standing in the driveway with his hands on Chumbley's chest, Chumbley shifted the vehicle into reverse and hit the gas.

[6] The vehicle's movement threw Crague to the ground, effectively pulling him under the vehicle. Chumbley drove the vehicle over him. Goerres testified she “felt the car physically lift up and drop” as it moved over Crague's body. Id. at 213. Chumbley continued backing the vehicle into the roadway and stopped.

[7] Despite his injuries, Crague managed to rise and stumble to the passenger door. Meanwhile, Goerres struggled with Chumbley for control of the steering wheel and Crague's gun, which Goerres held in her hand. After Goerres got the better of Chumbley and moved partially into the driver's seat, Crague moved into the front passenger seat. At this point, Chumbley was still in the car but partially hanging out the driver's door.

[8] In an attempt to force Chumbley out of the vehicle, Goerres slammed the accelerator pedal, sending the vehicle forward at about 35 to 40 miles per hour for about a block. When the vehicle stopped at the intersection at the end of the street, Goerres and Chumbley were still fighting over control of the vehicle and the gun. Crague grabbed the gun from Goerres before leaving the vehicle. Crague pointed the gun at Chumbley, telling him he would use it if Chumbley did not leave them alone. Chumbley then left the car and fled on foot to his residence.

[9] Crague's broken left leg required weeks in an immobilizer, brace, and cast. He also suffered a head injury above his right eye; road rash on both arms; and bruised bones and muscles in his wrist. Medical personnel confirmed these injuries resulted from being struck and run over by the vehicle.

[10] The officer who responded to the scene later went to Chumbley's home, where he found Chumbley “very excitable” and “hyper.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 97. When questioned, Chumbley claimed he had been assaulted, had a gun pointed at him, and had his phone stolen. He told the officer he was unaware that Crague had been run over. The officer later found Chumbley's phone near where the vehicle had stopped at the end of the street.

[11] The State ultimately charged Chumbley with eight crimes: aggravated battery, a Level 3 felony; battery resulting in serious bodily injury, battery by means of a deadly weapon, kidnapping, and conversion, all Level 5 felonies; and auto theft, criminal confinement, and criminal recklessness, all Level 6 felonies. The State also alleged that Chumbley was a habitual offender.

[12] Following a two-day trial, the jury returned verdicts of guilty as to three of the charges—battery by means of a deadly weapon, auto theft, and criminal recklessness—and verdicts of not guilty as to the remainder. Chumbley then admitted he was a habitual offender. Although the trial court initially entered judgment of conviction on the three guilty verdicts, the court vacated the criminal recklessness conviction on double jeopardy grounds. The court sentenced Chumbley to an aggregate nine years imprisonment: four years total for battery by means of a deadly weapon and auto theft, plus an enhancement of five years for the habitual offender finding. Chumbley appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[13] Chumbley argues the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt his commission of battery by means of a deadly weapon and auto theft. When reviewing the sufficiency of evidence to support a conviction, we neither reweigh evidence nor judge witness credibility. Scott v. State, 139 N.E.3d 1148, 1155 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020). We consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict. Id. We will affirm unless no reasonable factfinder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007).

I. Battery by Means of a Deadly Weapon

[14] To convict Chumbley of Level 5 felony battery by means of a deadly weapon, the State was required to prove he knowingly or intentionally touched Crague with a deadly weapon in a rude, insolent, or angry manner. Ind. Code §§ 35-42-2-1(c)(1), (g)(2). Although Chumbley does not dispute that the vehicle is a deadly weapon, he contends the State failed to prove he acted knowingly or intentionally when he struck Crague with the vehicle and ran over his body.

[15] A person acts “knowingly” if “when he engages in the conduct, he is aware of a high probability that he is doing so.” Ind. Code § 35-41-2-2(b). A person engages in conduct “intentionally” if “when he engages in the conduct, it is his conscious objective to do so.” Ind. Code § 35-41-2-2(a). Because intent is a mental state, the fact-finder must often resort to reasonable inferences based on the surrounding circumstances and the natural consequences of the defendant's conduct. Diallo v. State, 928 N.E.2d 250, 253 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).

[16] Here, the evidence showed that during a physical confrontation with Crague, Chumbley deliberately entered the driver's seat of Crague's vehicle. As Crague was standing inside the open driver's door with his hands on Chumbley's chest, Chumbley shifted the vehicle into reverse and hit the gas. As a result, Crague was struck by the door and pulled under the vehicle as it drove over his body.

[17] This evidence supports a reasonable inference that Chumbley was aware of a high probability the vehicle would strike Crague. Chumbley knew Crague's exact position—standing in the open doorway as he made physical contact with Chumbley. The natural and probable consequence of rapidly reversing the vehicle under these circumstances was that the door would strike Crague and cause him to fall into the path of the moving vehicle.

[18] Chumbley's reliance on his own testimony—that he entered the vehicle to escape Crague after Crague drew a gun and that he was unaware Crague had been struck—invites us to reweigh evidence, which we will not do. Scott, 139 N.E.3d at 1155. The jury was free to disregard Chumbley's self-serving testimony. Fultz v. State, 849 N.E.2d 616, 623 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). Moreover, multiple witnesses contradicted Chumbley's version of events, testifying that Crague did not display his firearm until after the vehicle later stopped on the roadway. The evidence was sufficient to support Chumbley's conviction for Level 5 felony battery.

II. Auto Theft

[19] To convict Chumbley of Level 6 felony auto theft, the State was required to prove he knowingly or intentionally exerted unauthorized control over Crague's motor vehicle with intent to deprive Crague of its value or use. Ind. Code § 35- 43-4-2(a)(1)(B)(i). Chumbley contends only that the State did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he intended to deprive Crague of the vehicle's use.

[20] For Chumbley's conviction to stand, the State need not have proven intent to permanently deprive Crague of the vehicle's value or use. See Bennett v. State, 871 N.E.2d 316, 322 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. granted and opinion adopted by 878 N.E.2d 836 (Ind. 2008). Intent to deprive is a mental state that the factfinder may infer from the defendant's conduct and its natural consequences. Bennett, 871 N.E.2d at 322.

[21] The evidence showed that during the altercation, Chumbley entered Crague's vehicle without permission, shifted into reverse, and accelerated, causing the vehicle to travel from the driveway into the roadway. At the time Chumbley operated the vehicle, Crague was outside it and thus was deprived of its use.¹ Even after the vehicle was in the street, Chumbley attempted to retain control of the vehicle by fighting Goerres.

[22] This evidence parallels Gibson v. State, 622 N.E.2d 1050, 1053 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993), trans. granted and opinion adopted in pertinent part by 643 N.E.2d 885, 888 (Ind. 1994). In Gibson, both Indiana appellate courts found sufficient evidence of auto theft when the defendant entered a vehicle without permission, revved the engine, and attempted to shift into gear, although a brake lock prevented him from driving away. Here, Chumbley's actions went further. After taking control of the vehicle, he drove it out of the driveway and away from its owner. The jury could reasonably infer from this conduct that Chumbley intended to deprive Crague of the use of the vehicle. The evidence was therefore sufficient to support the auto theft conviction.

[23] For these reasons, we affirm Chumbley's convictions.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Chumbley mischaracterizes Crague's testimony as stating that Goerres—rather than Chumbley himself--hit the gas pedal in the driveway. Crague instead testified that Goerres “stomped on the gas” and then “slammed on the brakes really hard” while trying to extricate Chumbley from the driver's seat after Chumbley backed the car from the driveway into the street. Tr. Vol. II, p. 130.

Weissmann, Judge.

Judges Bailey and Brown concur. Bailey, J., and Brown, J., concur.