Anthony Lee Allen, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Anthony Allen (“Allen”) appeals his convictions, following a jury trial, for Level 6 felony resisting law enforcement,¹ Level 6 felony criminal recklessness,² Level 6 felony theft,³ and Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement.⁴ He also appeals his sentence.

[2] Allen specifically argues that: (1) his convictions for Level 6 felony resisting law enforcement and Level 6 felony criminal recklessness violate double jeopardy principles; (2) the trial court abused its discretion in admitting certain evidence; (3) there is insufficient evidence to support his convictions because the State failed to prove his identity beyond a reasonable doubt; and (4) his sentence is inappropriate. Concluding that: (1) Allen's convictions for Level 6 felony resisting law enforcement and Level 6 felony criminal recklessness do not violate double jeopardy principles; (2) any error in the admission of certain evidence was harmless; (3) there is sufficient evidence to support Allen's convictions; and (4) his sentence is not inappropriate, we affirm Allen's convictions and sentence.

[3] We affirm.

Issues

1. Whether Allen's convictions for Level 6 felony resisting law enforcement and Level 6 felony criminal recklessness violate double jeopardy principles.

2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting certain evidence.

3. Whether there is sufficient evidence to support Allen's convictions.

4. Whether Allen's sentence is inappropriate.

Facts

[4] The facts most favorable to the judgment reveal that at approximately 6:00 p.m. on September 28, 2023, an Edinburgh Police Department (“EPD”) officer (“the EPD officer”) responded to a dispatch for a welfare check on an intoxicated individual at 308 North Grant Street. When the EPD officer arrived at the scene, he noticed fifty-six-year-old Allen sitting on the front porch with two women who lived in the home. The EPD officer was “familiar enough with” Allen that he “knew [Allen] when [he] saw [Allen.]” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 90). In addition, the EPD officer noticed that Allen, who was not wearing a shirt, was wearing shorts and tennis shoes.

[5] At approximately 9:15 that same night, Antonio (“Antonio”) and Monica (“Monica”) Apolonio (collectively “the Apolonios”) were in their home at 504 North Grant Street. Antonio was watching television when he noticed movement on the screen that monitored the outdoor security cameras. Specifically, the outdoor security camera captured a dark and grainy video of a shirtless man wearing shorts who looked into the Apolonios’ two vehicles and attempted to open the door to one of them (“the Apolonios’ security video”). The face of the man in the video is not clearly shown.

[6] Fifteen minutes later, at approximately 9:30 p.m., Frank Bryant (“Bryant”), who lived approximately one to two blocks from the Apolonios’ house, had just gone to bed when he heard his 1995 Dodge Dakota (“the truck”) being started in the driveway. Bryant looked out the window and saw someone driving the truck, in which Bryant had left the key, away from his house. Bryant contacted law enforcement and reported that the truck had been stolen. In addition, Bryant reported that the truck had only one working headlight.

[7] EPD Deputy Chief Hector Mercado (“Deputy Chief Mercado”) heard the dispatch regarding the stolen truck and was on the lookout for it as he was driving southbound on U.S. Highway 31 (“U.S. 31”). When he noticed a truck that had only one working headlight being driven north on U.S. 31, Deputy Chief Mercado turned his vehicle around and followed the truck. After confirming that this truck was the truck that had been stolen from Bryant, Deputy Chief Mercado activated his emergency lights and siren to initiate a traffic stop. Although the driver of the truck initially appeared to be pulling over, as Deputy Chief Mercado drove closer to the truck, the driver “suddenly accelerated off[.]” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 149).

[8] Deputy Chief Mercado pursued the truck northbound on U.S. 31. During the pursuit, which included additional law enforcement officers who had responded to the dispatch of the stolen truck, the driver of the truck traveled at speeds ranging from fifty to eighty miles per hour in a fifty-five mile-per-hour zone. In addition, the truck's driver was “all over in both lanes of travel and during the pursuit, ․ [he was] slamming on [his] brakes, causing officers who were pursuing [him] to have to hit their brakes and ․ take evasive action.” (Tr. Vol. 2. at 98).

[9] As the pursuit continued, the driver of the truck abruptly turned into a soybean field. Several officers, including Deputy Chief Mercado and Johnson County Sheriff's Office Lieutenant John Cave (“Lieutenant Cave”), who was driving a Ram 1500 (“the Ram 1500”), pursued the truck into the field. While in the soybean field, the truck's driver was “mak[ing] ․ donut[ ] spin[s][.]” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 152). At some point, the truck ended up facing the Ram 1500. At the same time, Deputy Chief Mercado's vehicle, which was located approximately twenty feet from the truck, ended up facing the driver's side of the truck. As the truck's driver's door swung open “pretty wide[,]” the headlights from Deputy Chief Mercado's vehicle shined into the cab of the truck, and the driver “looked right at” Deputy Chief Mercado. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 152). The deputy chief recognized the driver as Allen, who was shirtless and wearing shorts.

[10] At the same time, Lieutenant Cave opened the driver's door of the Ram 1500 to take Allen into custody. However, Allen accelerated the truck and hit the front driver's corner of the Ram 1500. The collision “completely ripped off” the Ram 1500's front fender and damaged the grill, the hood, and the driver's door. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 126).

[11] After hitting the Ram 1500, Allen drove out of the soybean field and began driving southbound in the northbound lanes of U.S. 31. Allen, who subsequently crossed the median and continued southbound in the proper lanes of U.S. 31, traveled at speeds of forty to eighty miles per hour.

[12] In an attempt to stop Allen, deputies from the Bartholomew County Sheriff's Office set up stop sticks at the Johnson and Bartholomew County line. However, before reaching the stop sticks, Allen “drove off the road․ ramped a ditch[,] and [drove] into a cornfield[,]” where the corn stalks were taller than the truck. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 137). The officers who had been pursuing Allen were unable to follow Allen into the cornfield because they would have damaged their vehicles. Instead of pursuing Allen, those officers set up a perimeter around the cornfield while other officers sent up a drone to search for Allen and the truck. The drone eventually located the truck, but Allen was no longer in it.

[13] A Bartholomew County Sheriff's Office K-9 handler (“the K-9 handler”) was dispatched to the scene with his K-9 (“the K-9”). The K-9 tracked Allen to a nearby wooded area, where officers took Allen into custody. Thereafter, an officer sent Deputy Chief Mercado a photograph of Allen in custody, and Deputy Chief Mercado identified Allen as “the subject that [he had seen] in the [truck].” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 160).

[14] In January 2024, the State filed amended informations charging Allen with: (1) Level 6 felony resisting law enforcement for using a vehicle to flee from Deputy Chief Mercado after the deputy chief had identified himself by visible or audible means and had visibly or audibly ordered Allen to stop; (2) Level 6 felony criminal recklessness for performing an act, while armed with a deadly weapon (the truck), that created a substantial risk of injury to Lieutenant Cave; (3) Level 6 felony theft; and (4) Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement.⁵

[15] In January 2024, Allen filed a motion in limine, wherein he asked the trial court to hold a hearing and to issue preliminary rulings on the admissibility of certain evidence, including the Apolonios’ security video. Following a hearing, the trial court issued an order granting Allen's motion in part but allowing the State to introduce the Apolonio's security video. According to the trial court's order, that “video purportedly show[ed] [Allen],” on the same evening and shortly before his arrest, “attempting to enter into two vehicles, which [were] located approximately .1 mile from the location where [Allen] allegedly stole the vehicle he later used, allegedly, to flee from police.” (App. Vol. 2 at 47). In addition, the trial court further noted that the “video also purportedly show[ed] [Allen] in the same clothes he was wearing when arrested.” (App. Vol. 2 at 47). The trial court found that the State could “use the video for identification purposes and for the purposes of placing [Allen] in the general location of the crimes.” (App. Vol. 2 at 47).

[16] During Allen's opening statement at the February 2024 trial, Allen told the jury that he was “being accused of a crime he just didn't commit.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 86). Allen specifically told the jury that he “wasn't that guy” who stole the truck, fled from law enforcement, and hit the Ram 1500. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 87). Allen further told the jury that when the K-9 had found him in the wooded area, he had simply been “sleeping under the stars on a pleasant fall Indiana evening.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 86). According to Allen, he frequently slept in that spot.

[17] Also, during the trial, the jury heard the facts as set forth above. In addition, the trial court admitted into evidence, over Allen's objection, the Apolonios’ security video.

[18] Further, Deputy Chief Mercado testified that he had been able to identify Allen when he had seen Allen in the truck in the soybean field because he was “familiar enough with [Allen] to recognize [Allen] when [he] saw him.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 142). Deputy Chief Mercado specifically explained that he had seen Allen around Edinburgh and, in the past year, had interacted with Allen about twenty-five times or more in passing and in general conversation. Deputy Chief Mercado also identified Allen in court.

[19] In addition, the K-9 handler testified that after he and his K-9 had arrived at the truck, the K-9 handler could immediately tell that the K-9 was picking up a scent that was “unique to the driver of the truck.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 211). The K-9 handler further testified that the K-9 had followed that scent to Allen. When Allen's counsel asked the K-9 handler if the K-9 could have apprehended the wrong person, the K-9 handler responded, “In this situation, no.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 224). The K-9 handler identified Allen in court as the individual that the K-9 had apprehended in the wooded area near the cornfield. The jury convicted Allen of the four charged offenses.

[20] At Allen's March 2024 sentencing hearing, the trial court reviewed Allen's presentence investigation report (“the PSI”), which revealed that Allen has one prior felony conviction for Level 6 felony operating a vehicle while intoxicated. Allen also has ten prior misdemeanor convictions, including one conviction for Class A misdemeanor possession of marijuana, one conviction for Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement, one conviction for Class B misdemeanor disorderly conduct, four convictions for Class B misdemeanor public intoxication, one conviction for Class A misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance, one conviction for Class B misdemeanor possession of marijuana, and one conviction for Class C misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia. In addition, Allen's probation had been revoked in one of these cases. The PSI further revealed that at the time it was completed, Allen had pending charges for Class A misdemeanor battery, Class B misdemeanor possession of marijuana, and Class B misdemeanor public intoxication for acts that Allen had committed one month before he had committed the acts that led to the convictions in this case.

[21] The trial court found Allen's criminal history and previous probation revocation to be aggravating factors and did not find any mitigating factors. Before sentencing Allen, the trial court stated as follows:

[T]he facts and circumstances of this crime are horrendous․ You are flying down 31, tearing up people's livelihoods by driving through fields, driving directly at an officer. You ․ are going to cost the tax payers or Johnson County an inordinate amount of money to fix that police truck․ You put the public in danger. You put several officers in danger. You put yourself in danger. And there is absolutely no excuse․ Resist[ing law enforcement] being a crime of violence, ․ there certainly is a basis for the court to run these [sentences] consecutively․ So what I'm gonna do, Sir, is I am gonna send you to the Department of Correction[ ] because your criminal history certainly justifies that at this point.

(Tr. Vol. 3 at 36-37).

[22] Thereafter, the trial court sentenced Allen to two (2) years for the Level 6 felony resisting law enforcement conviction, two (2) years for the Level 6 felony criminal recklessness conviction, one and one-half (11/212) years for the Level 6 felony theft conviction, and one (1) year for the Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement conviction. Further, the trial court ordered the sentences for the three Level 6 felony convictions to run consecutively to each other and concurrently with the sentence for the Class A misdemeanor conviction. In addition, the trial court suspended the one and one-half (11/212) year sentence for the Level 6 felony theft conviction, resulting in a sentence of four (4) years to be served in the Department of Correction (“the DOC”) and one and one-half years (11/212) suspended to probation.

[23] Allen now appeals his convictions and his sentence.

Decision

[24] Allen argues that: (1) his convictions for Level 6 felony resisting law enforcement and Level 6 felony criminal recklessness violate double jeopardy principles; (2) the trial court abused its discretion in admitting certain evidence; (3) there is insufficient evidence to support his convictions; and (4) his sentence is inappropriate. We address each of his contentions in turn.

1. Double Jeopardy

[25] Allen first argues that his convictions for Level 6 felony resisting law enforcement and Level 6 felony criminal recklessness violate double jeopardy principles “because both charges were elevated from their base offenses as misdemeanors to Level 6 felonies based on the single act of driving a vehicle.” (Allen's Br. 8). We review such questions de novo. A.W. v. State, 229 N.E.3d 1060, 1064 (Ind. 2024).

[26] Indiana's protection against substantive double jeopardy prohibits “multiple convictions for the same offense in a single proceeding.” Id. at 1066. To determine if a substantive double jeopardy violation has occurred, we apply a “three-part test based on statutory sources[.]” Id. First, we look to the statutory language of the offenses at issue. Id. “[I]f the language of either statute clearly permits multiple punishment,” then “there is no violation of substantive double jeopardy[,]” and we end our analysis. Id. (cleaned up). Second, we assess whether the charges are inherently or factually included as charged. Id. at 1068. When “neither offense is an included offense of the other (either inherently or as charged), there is no violation of double jeopardy[,] and the analysis ends – full stop.” Id. at 1067 (cleaned up). Third, we “examine the facts underlying those offenses, as presented in the charging instrument and as adduced at trial ․ to determine whether a defendant's actions were so compressed in terms of time, place, singleness of purpose, and continuity of action as to constitute a single transaction.” Id. at 1071 (emphasis omitted) (cleaned up). “If the underlying facts reveal the two offenses are indeed separate, there is no [double jeopardy] violation.” Id. (cleaned up). If, however, the “facts show only a single continuous crime, and one statutory offense is included in the other,” the State may not obtain cumulative convictions. Id. (cleaned up).

[27] Here, neither INDIANA CODE § 35-44.1-3-1 (resisting law enforcement) nor INDIANA CODE § 35-42-2-2 (criminal recklessness) clearly permits multiple punishments. Therefore, we turn to the second step of the double jeopardy test, which we find to be dispositive. Specifically, this Court has previously explained that, “under Wadle [v. State, 151 N.E.3d 227 (Ind. 2020)], where ‘one of the material elements of both offenses is a victim, and a separate victim is alleged for each offense, it would seem by definition one offense cannot be either a factually or inherently included offense of the other.’ ” Stone v. State, -N.E.3d--, 2025 WL 1833146, *3 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (quoting Woodcock v. State, 163 N.E.3d 863, 875 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), trans. denied). Here, the victim of the Level 6 felony resisting law enforcement conviction was Deputy Chief Mercado, and the victim of the Level 6 felony criminal recklessness conviction was Lieutenant Cave. Therefore, the resisting law enforcement conviction was neither inherently nor factually included in the criminal recklessness conviction, or vice versa, so there is no double jeopardy violation. See Stone, --N.E.3d--, 2025 WL 1833146 at *3 (concluding that where the victim of the attempted aggravated battery was one person, and the victim of the criminal recklessness was another person, the attempted aggravated battery was not inherently or factually included in the criminal recklessness, or vice versa, so there was no double jeopardy violation).

2. Admission of Evidence

[28] Allen next argues that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the Apolonios’ security video. As stated above, the dark and grainy video depicts a shirtless man wearing shorts who looked into the Apolonio's two vehicles and attempted to open the door to one of them. The face of the man in the video is not clearly shown. Allen specifically contends that “[p]laying this video for the jury violate[d] Indiana Rule of Evidence 404(b).” (Allen's Br. 8).

[29] The admission or exclusion of evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and we will reverse only for an abuse of that discretion. Russell v. State, 234 N.E.3d 829, 858 (Ind. 2024), cert. denied. A trial court abuses its discretion if its decision is clearly against the logic and the effect of the facts and circumstances before the court. Id.

[30] Here, we need not determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the Apolonios’ security video because any error in the admission of this evidence was harmless. The basic premise of the harmless error rule is “that a conviction may stand when the error had no bearing on the outcome of the case.” Durden v. State, 99 N.E.3d 645, 652 (Ind. 2018). Under Indiana Appellate Rule 66(A), an error is harmless “where its probable impact, in light of all the evidence in the case, is sufficiently minor so as not to affect the substantial rights of the parties.” Under this probable impact test, Allen bears the burden of demonstrating how “the error's probable impact undermines confidence in the outcome of the proceeding below.” Hayko v. State, 211 N.E.3d 483, 492 (Ind. 2023), reh'g denied, cert. denied. In determining whether Allen has met his burden, we consider the likely impact of improperly admitted evidence on a reasonable, average jury considering all evidence in the case. See id. If substantial independent evidence of guilt exists and our confidence in the outcome is not undermined, the error is harmless. Id.

[31] Here, Allen cannot meet his burden on this record. Specifically, our review of the evidence reveals that Allen does not provide any reason to believe that this single piece of evidence – the video of a shirtless man wearing shorts, looking into the Apolonios’ two cars, and attempting to open the door of one of them – “would have moved the needle.” Russell, 234 N.E.3d at 859 (concluding that appellant had provided no reason to believe that a single additional piece of evidence “would have moved the needle”). The probable impact of any possible error in admitting the challenged evidence, in light of all the evidence in this case, is sufficiently minor so as not to undermine our confidence in the outcome of this case. See Hayko, 211 N.E.3d at 492. Thus, even if the trial court had erred in admitting the Apolonios’ security video, the error would be harmless. See id.

3. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[32] Allen next argues that there is insufficient evidence to support his convictions. “Our standard for reviewing evidentiary sufficiency challenges is well established, as we have made clear that it is the fact-finder's role, not that of appellate courts, to assess witness credibility and weigh the evidence to determine whether it is sufficient to support a conviction.” Konkle v. State, 253 N.E.3d 1068, 1090 (Ind. 2025) (cleaned up). “A conviction is supported by sufficient evidence if there is substantial evidence of probative value supporting each element of the offense such that a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (cleaned up). We review only the evidence most favorable to the verdict and the reasonable inferences therefrom and will reverse “only where it is shown that no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 1090-91 (cleaned up).

[33] Allen argues that there is insufficient evidence to support his convictions because the State failed to prove his identity beyond a reasonable doubt. He specifically contends that the State failed to prove that he was the person who stole the truck, failed to stop when Deputy Chief Mercado activated his lights and siren, crashed the truck into the Ram 1500, led law enforcement officers on a chase up and down U.S. 31, and drove the truck into the cornfield. Rather, according to Allen, “when the K-9 unit found him[,] he was just in the wrong place at the wrong time.” (Allen's Br. 14).

[34] However, our review of the evidence reveals that Deputy Chief Mercado testified that while he was in the soybean field, his vehicle had ended up facing the driver's side of the truck. As the truck's driver's door had swung open, the headlights from Deputy Chief Mercado's vehicle had shined into the truck, and the truck's driver had looked right at Deputy Chief Mercado. The deputy chief had recognized the driver to be Allen, who was shirtless and was wearing shorts. Deputy Chief Mercado specifically testified that he had been able to identify Allen because he had seen Allen around Edinburgh and, in the past year, had interacted with Allen about twenty-five times or more in passing and in general conversation. Further, after the K-9 had apprehended Allen, an officer sent Deputy Chief Mercado a photograph of Allen in custody. Deputy Chief Mercado identified Allen as the person who he had seen in the truck. In addition, Deputy Chief Mercado identified Allen in court. This evidence is sufficient to establish Allen's identity beyond a reasonable doubt. See Goolsby v. State, 517 N.E.2d 54, 58 (Ind. 1987) (concluding that evidence of identity was sufficient where victim clearly saw defendant during the attack, quickly identified defendant in a photo array, and positively identified defendant at trial), disapproved of on other grounds.

[35] We further note that, in addition to Deputy Chief Mercado's identification of Allen, the K-9 handler testified that the K-9 had immediately picked up a scent unique to the truck's driver and had tracked that scent to Allen. According to the K-9 handler, in that situation, the K-9 could not have apprehended the wrong person. Further, the K-9 handler also identified Allen in court.

[36] Based on this evidence, a reasonable jury could have found that the State proved Allen's identity beyond a reasonable doubt. Allen's argument that he was in the wrong place at the wrong time is simply a request that we reweigh the evidence and judge the credibility of witnesses, which we cannot do. See Konkle, 253 N.E.3d at 1090. There is sufficient evidence to support Allen's convictions.

4. Inappropriate Sentence

[37] Allen also argues that his sentence is inappropriate. Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) provides that we may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court's decision, we find that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender. The defendant bears the burden of persuading this Court that his sentence is inappropriate. Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1080 (Ind. 2006). Whether we regard a sentence as inappropriate turns on the “culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given case.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1224 (Ind. 2008).

[38] When determining whether a sentence is inappropriate, we acknowledge that the advisory sentence is the starting point the Legislature has selected as an appropriate sentence for the crime committed. Childress, 848 N.E.2d at 1081. Here, the jury convicted Allen of three Level 6 felonies and one Class A misdemeanor. The sentencing range for a Level 6 felony is between six (6) months and two and one-half (21/212) years, and the advisory sentence is one (1) year. I.C. § 35-50-2-7(b). The maximum sentence for a Class A misdemeanor is one (1) year. I.C. § 35-50-3-2.

[39] The trial court sentenced Allen to two years for the Level 6 felony resisting law enforcement conviction, two years for the Level 6 felony criminal recklessness conviction, one and one-half years for the Level 6 felony theft conviction, and one year for the Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement conviction. Further, the trial court ordered the sentences for the three Level 6 felony convictions to run consecutively to each other and concurrently with the sentence for the Class A misdemeanor conviction. In addition, the trial court suspended the one and one-half year sentence for the Level 6 felony theft conviction, resulting in an aggregate sentence of four years to be served in the DOC and one and one-half years suspended to probation. This sentence is less than the maximum sentence that the trial court could have imposed.

[40] With regard to the nature of the offenses, we note that Allen stole the truck, refused to stop for Deputy Chief Mercado, and took law enforcement officers on a chase up U.S. 31, during which he reached speeds of eighty miles per hour in a fifty-mile-per-hour speed zone. During the pursuit, Allen drove in both lanes of travel and slammed on his brakes, necessitating the officers to take evasive action. As the pursuit continued, Allen turned abruptly into a soybean field, where he purposely crashed into and damaged the Ram 1500. Allen then took the officers on a chase back down U.S. 31, where he drove south in the northbound lanes and again drove at excessive speeds. When officers attempted to stop Allen with stop sticks, Allen drove into a cornfield where the corn stalks were taller than the truck. Law enforcement officers had to use a drone and a K-9 to locate both the truck and Allen. We agree with the trial court that Allen placed multiple law enforcement officers as well as the public in danger. He also damaged the property of others, including the truck, the Ram 1500, the soybean field, and the corn field.

[41] With regard to Allen's character, we note that he has an extensive criminal history that includes one felony conviction and ten misdemeanor convictions. He has also violated probation, and, at the time that the PSI was completed, he had three pending misdemeanor charges for acts that he had committed before committing the offenses in this case. Allen's former contacts with the law have not caused him to reform his behavior. See Jenkins v. State, 909 N.E.2d 1080, 1086 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied.

[42] Allen has failed to persuade this Court that his sentence is inappropriate. We, therefore, affirm his sentence.⁶

[43] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   IND. CODE § 35-44.1-3-1.

2.   I.C. § 35-42-2-2.

3.   I.C. § 35-43-4-2.

4.   I.C. § 35-44.1-3-1.

5.   The State also charged Allen with two counts of Class A misdemeanor institutional criminal mischief for damaging the soybean and corn fields. However, the State later dismissed these charges.

6.   Allen also argues that “if [his] Double Jeopardy argument is successful and the Resisting Law Enforcement felony conviction is vacated, there would be no conviction for a crime of violence. Under this scenario[,] Allen's sentence would have to be reduced to no more than four years.” (Allen's Br. 15). See IND. CODE § 35-50-1-2(d)(1) (2020). Because Allen's double jeopardy argument was not successful, we need not address this argument.

Pyle, Judge.

Judges Weissmann and Felix concur. Weissmann, J., and Felix, J., concur.