Ra Pee, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] A jury found Ra Pee guilty of attempted murder, a Level 1 felony, and criminal recklessness, as a Level 6 felony, and found that he knowingly or intentionally used a firearm in committing attempted murder. The trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of forty-two years. Pee challenges his attempted murder conviction and his sentence. We affirm.

Issues

[2] Pee presents the following issues for review:

1. Whether the trial court committed reversible error in admitting hearsay;

2. Whether sufficient evidence supports his attempted murder conviction; and

3. Whether his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and his character.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On the afternoon of July 31, 2024, Pee parked his Lexus sedan in front of his mosque in Fort Wayne. He walked around his vehicle, opened the front passenger door, pulled a 9-millimeter semiautomatic handgun from his waistband, and placed it in the glove box. He then closed the door and started walking toward the mosque entrance.

[4] Suddenly, Pee turned and looked toward the street, returned to the vehicle, and retrieved the handgun from the glove box. He pulled the slide back to load a round in the chamber and walked toward the street. Pee pointed the handgun at another man, Bar Se, who was walking across the street toward the mosque, and fired three shots in his direction. The bullets from the first and second shots struck the ground near the edge of the parking lot, and the third bullet struck the ground much closer to Se. Below is a still photo from the mosque's security camera footage showing the dust plumes kicked up by the bullets; Pee is in the blue striped pants, and Se is at the top of the photo walking toward the mosque:

Tabular or graphical material not displayable at this time.

Ex. Vol. at 85 (State's Ex. 73).

[5] At that time, Fort Wayne Police Department Officer Jeremy Hoover was responding to a report of a disabled vehicle, which is propped up on a jack near the dust plume at the top of the photo. As he was in his police cruiser talking to a man and a woman with two children who were walking toward the vehicle (out of the frame of the photo and to the right), Pee's gunshots rang out. The man and the woman and the children ran off, and the officer exited his cruiser. He fired multiple shots at Pee, who fell wounded. Officer Hoover handcuffed and arrested Pee. Another officer retrieved Pee's handgun, which had four rounds in the magazine and another round in the chamber.

[6] In the meantime, Se had wandered into a nearby apartment complex. Approximately forty minutes after the shooting, Detective Mark Bieker located Se. The detective handcuffed Se and patted him down for weapons. No weapons were found. Detective Bieker then questioned Se about the shooting.

[7] The State charged Pee with attempted murder, a Level 1 felony, and criminal recklessness, as a Level 6 felony. The State also sought a sentencing enhancement based on Pee's alleged knowing or intentional use of a firearm in committing the attempted murder. A jury trial was held in December 2024. The jury found Pee guilty as charged and found the evidence sufficient to support the firearm enhancement. The trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of forty-two years executed in the Department of Correction. Pee now appeals his attempted murder conviction and his sentence.

Discussion and Decision

Issue One: Admissibility of Hearsay

[8] Pee first contends that the trial court committed reversible error in admitting hearsay. Generally, “[w]e review trial court rulings on the admission of evidence for an abuse of discretion.” Corbally v. State, 5 N.E.3d 463, 468 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). “A trial court abuses its discretion only if its decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it, or if the court has misinterpreted the law.” Id. (quoting Williams v. State, 997 N.E.2d 1154, 1160 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013)). “Admission of hearsay is not grounds for reversal where it is merely cumulative of other evidence admitted.” Wilkes v. State, 7 N.E.3d 402, 405 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).

[9] At trial, the State called Se as a witness. He testified that he had seen Pee before the day of the shooting, but they had never talked. Se stated that on the day of the shooting, he heard Pee “cussing [his] mom and stuff, and so [he] went towards [Pee].” Tr. Vol. 2 at 198. He further testified, “[Pee] was trying to shoot at me, but I did not get hit.” Id. at 199. Se stated that Pee shot at him three times, and then “an officer pull[ed] up behind [Se], trying to shoot [Pee] back.” Id. at 203. He also stated that after Pee was handcuffed by the officer, he waited “two minutes, nobody talked to me. I just left.” Id. at 207. Se claimed that he did not have a weapon at the time of the shooting.

[10] The State then called Detective Bieker, who testified about his part of the investigation. The detective stated that Se was “very scared and nervous” and was “still under the stress of the incident” when they conversed after the shooting. Id. at 220. When the State asked the detective what Se had told him, Pee objected on hearsay grounds. The State argued that the testimony was admissible under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule. The trial court agreed and overruled the objection.

[11] Detective Bieker's account of Se's statements was largely cumulative of Se's own testimony and the security camera footage of the shooting.¹ For that reason, we need not address the merits of Pee's contention that the trial court erred in admitting the challenged testimony. Wilkes, 7 N.E.3d at 405.

Issue Two: Sufficiency of Evidence for Attempted Murder Conviction

[12] Pee also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his attempted murder conviction. Our standard of review is well settled:

For a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we look only at the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict. Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007). We do not assess the credibility of witnesses or reweigh the evidence. Id. We will affirm the conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

Love v. State, 73 N.E.3d 693, 696 (Ind. 2017).

[13] At trial, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Pee, acting with the intent to kill another human being, engaged in conduct constituting a substantial step toward the commission of the crime of murder, i.e., by discharging a firearm at or in the direction of Se. See Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 18 (charging information); Ind. Code §§ 35-42-1-1(1) (murder statute), 35-41-5-1 (attempt statute). The upshot of Pee's argument is that the State failed to prove that he intended to kill Se because the shots that he fired “went into the ground.” Appellant's Br. at 21.

[14] Our Supreme Court has stated that “[f]iring a gun in the direction of another person is ‘substantial evidence’ from which a jury may infer intent to kill.” Shelton v. State, 602 N.E.2d 1017, 1022 (Ind. 1992). The security camera footage shows Pee pointing his handgun in Se's direction and firing three shots, the third of which struck much closer to Se than the first two. State's Ex. 5. And Se himself testified that Pee “was trying to shoot at me[.]” Tr. Vol. 2 at 199. It was for the jury to determine from all the probative evidence whether Pee intended to kill Se, and we must reject Pee's invitation to reweigh the evidence in his favor. We therefore affirm his attempted murder conviction.

Issue Three: Appropriateness of Sentence

[15] Finally, Pee asks us to reduce his sentence pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), which provides that we “may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court's decision, [we find] that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Our “role under Rule 7(B) is to ‘leaven the outliers,’ and we reserve our 7(B) authority for exceptional cases.” Livingston v. State, 113 N.E.3d 611, 613 (Ind. 2018) (per curiam) (quoting Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind. 2008)). Indiana's flexible sentencing scheme allows trial courts to tailor a sentence appropriate to the circumstances presented, and “the trial court's judgment should receive considerable deference.” Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1222.

[16] Whether we regard a sentence as inappropriate at the end of the day turns on “our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other facts that come to light in a given case.” Id. at 1224. The question is not whether another sentence is more appropriate, but rather whether the sentence imposed is inappropriate. King v. State, 894 N.E.2d 265, 268 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). Deference to the trial court “prevail[s] unless overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense (such as accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality) and the defendant's character (such as substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character).” Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015). “Ultimately the length of the aggregate sentence and how it is to be served are the issues that matter.” Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1224. Pee bears the burden of persuading us that the trial court's sentence is inappropriate. King, 894 N.E.2d at 268.

[17] In determining whether a sentence is inappropriate, the advisory sentence “is the starting point the Legislature has selected as an appropriate sentence for the crime committed.” Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1081 (Ind. 2006). The sentencing range for a Level 1 felony is between twenty and forty years, with an advisory sentence of thirty years. I.C. § 35-50-2-4(b). The sentencing range for a Level 6 felony is between six months and two and a half years, with an advisory sentence of one year. I.C. § 35-50-2-7(b). And if a jury finds that the defendant knowingly or intentionally used a firearm in committing an offense, the court may sentence him “to an additional fixed term of imprisonment of between five (5) years and twenty (20) years.” I.C. § 35-50-2-11(g). Here, the trial court imposed consecutive sentences of thirty years for attempted murder, enhanced by ten years for Pee's use of a firearm for a total of forty years, and two years for criminal recklessness.

[18] “The nature of the offense is found in the details and circumstances of the commission of the offense and the defendant's participation.” Perry v. State, 78 N.E.3d 1, 13 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). Pee claims that “we know very little about the details and circumstances of the commission of these offenses.” Appellant's Br. at 24. Pee's motive for attempting to kill Se is indeed inscrutable, but the other particulars of his offenses are not. In the middle of a residential neighborhood with midday vehicular and pedestrian traffic, and mere yards from a house of worship, Pee grabbed a 9-millimeter semiautomatic handgun out of his glove box and fired three shots in Se's direction for no discernible reason. The brazenness and senselessness of Pee's actions do not merit a sentence reduction.

[19] An offender's character is shown by his “life and conduct.” Adams v. State, 120 N.E.3d 1058, 1065 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). Pee's presentence investigation report indicates that he was born in 1979 and has been in the United States “on a green card, from Thailand, since 2007.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 151. Pee reported that “his childhood was poor due to his father being a soldier and going with his father to the jungle from age 6 to age 19.” Id. at 153. “He denied ever suffering from any forms of abuse as a child.” Id. Pee emphasizes that he raised a family in America and prayed at his mosque five times a day, yet he fails to acknowledge that he tried to shoot and kill an unarmed man from the mosque's parking lot. Pee further maintains that he “has no juvenile record and has no prior adult misdemeanor or felony convictions[,]” Appellant's Br. at 24, but he neglects to mention that he has a pending charge for possession of a controlled substance in Harris County, Texas,² and, “as of September 23, 2024, ․ is being held for U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 151. After due consideration, we conclude that Pee has failed to establish that his sentence, which is essentially two decades less than the statutory maximum, is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and his character. Therefore, we affirm it.

[20] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The only discrepancy is the detective's statement that Se told him that Pee had fired five shots at him. Se's testimony and the security camera footage indicate that Pee fired only three shots, and only three shell casings from Pee's handgun were recovered at the scene. Accordingly, we find this discrepancy inconsequential.

2.   At the sentencing hearing, Pee claimed that the substance was not his and suggested that his friend had left it in his car. Tr. Vol. 3 at 127.

Bailey, Judge.

Judges Brown and Weissmann concur. Brown, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.