IN RE: the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of R.G. (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] R.G. (“Mother”) appeals the trial court's order terminating her parental rights to A.G. (“Child”). Mother raises the following restated issue for our review: whether the trial court's judgment was clearly erroneous. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Mother and J.G. (“Father”)¹ (together, “Parents”) are the biological parents of Child, who was born on June 17, 2022. Prior to the present case, Mother had involvement with the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) concerning several of her older children. This involvement with DCS included prior substantiated assessments and adjudicated child in need of services (“CHINS”) cases from 2002 to the present. As a result, several of Mother's older children were placed in the custody of their fathers.

[3] In September 2022, DCS received a report alleging that Child, who was a newborn infant, was the victim of abuse and neglect due to living in an unsafe environment, caregiver impairment, and being exposed to domestic violence. The report further alleged that Mother had anger management issues and “multiple personalities,” had not been taking her prescribed mental health medications, and had threatened to kill both Father and Child “while she was holding a knife.” Tr. Vol. II p. 70; Ex. Vol. IV p. 27. It was also alleged that Parents were homeless, living in their van with Child, and that they abused substances.

[4] DCS removed Child from the care of Parents on September 12, 2022. Two days later, DCS filed a petition alleging that Child was a CHINS, due to Parents’ substance abuse, untreated mental health issues, lack of stable housing, and domestic violence issues. On December 27, 2022, the trial court adjudicated Child to be a CHINS, and on January 31, 2023, the trial court issued a dispositional order, ordering Parents into reunification services. In the trial court's order, Mother was required, among other things, to maintain suitable, safe, and stable housing; secure and maintain a legal and stable source of income; complete a parenting assessment and complete all resulting recommendations; complete a substance abuse assessment and complete all treatment recommendations; submit to random drug screens; complete a psychological evaluation and successfully complete all recommendations; participate in mental health services; participate in home-based case management; participate in domestic violence services; and attend supervised visits with Child.

[5] Throughout the length of the CHINS case, Mother had four or five mental health assessments scheduled, but she failed to appear for any of them and failed to put forth any further effort in regard to a mental health assessment. Mother was very resistant to “any kind of mental health treatment or services” and denied that she suffered from any “mental health issues.” Tr. Vol. II p. 89. She also failed to complete a substance use disorder assessment, despite having multiple referrals. Parents had a history of domestic violence in the presence of the Child, including threats by Mother to kill Father. Mother also failed to participate in a domestic violence assessment despite multiple referrals by DCS, and she denied needing any services for domestic violence. However, Mother had a temper that she exhibited in child and family team meetings, and in one such meeting held in 2024, Mother became so angry that she yelled at everyone present and then slammed a door inside of the DCS office so hard that the building shook.

[6] Mother was ordered to submit to random drug screens through Cordant and was required to call daily, but she never participated in Cordant-administered drug screens. She screened a few times for family case manager Rachel Givens (“FCM Givens”), but, in early 2024, became so angry one day that she removed a swab from her mouth and threw it at FCM Givens. Thereafter, Mother refused to participate in FCM-administered screens. Mother did participate in one screen on June 24, 2024, with a different DCS worker, and that screen was negative.

[7] Mother never participated in the court-ordered home-based case management services even though DCS offered her the service many times. DCS repeatedly stressed to Mother how important such services were to her progress due to her lack of stability and housing, but she refused to participate. During the case, Mother was generally homeless and reported living at times in her van, in the basement of an apartment, and on the street. She reported living in a tent by the Wabash River with Father during the summer of 2024. Mother never gave DCS any proof of employment at any time during the pendency of the case.

[8] During the length of the case, Child was never returned to Mother's care and remained placed outside of Mother's care. Mother was inconsistent in visiting Child, and at times went months between visits. When Mother did participate, her visits remained fully supervised throughout the case, and Mother never progressed beyond four hours of visitation per week. After the CHINS petition was filed in September 2022, Mother visited Child in October and November 2022 but failed to visit in December 2022 and January 2023. She visited once in February 2023 but failed to visit in March. Mother again visited once in April but had no visits in May. In the summer and fall of 2023, Mother's visits became more consistent, but then she completely failed to visit between December 2023 and June 2024. She resumed regular visits with Child from July through October 2024. Mother claimed that the months she did not participate in visits were due to Child being placed in Brazil, Indiana. However, Mother was offered transportation to the visits by DCS and still refused to participate.

[9] On December 6, 2023, DCS filed a petition to terminate the parent-child relationship between Mother and Child. The trial court held the termination fact-finding hearing over the span of several dates in 2024, including April 15, August 12, October 7, October 8, November 18, and December 2, 2024. At the termination hearing, Mother insisted on being addressed as “Reverend,” and she testified that she had been a reverend for seven years, she was starting a church, she worked for an online art gallery on commission, and she was sleeping “on the streets” of Terre Haute at the time of the hearing. Tr. Vol. II pp. 23, 25. Over the course of her testimony, Mother repeatedly gave responses that did not match the questions and gave inconsistent responses to questions. She testified that she had been diagnosed with “Post Traumatic Stress Disorder from dealing with [DCS] repeatedly.” Id. at 34. She also testified that she had intended to file paperwork to dissolve her marriage to Father and that she had a new boyfriend, whom she had met while they were both homeless and living by the river. Mother added that she wanted to have more children and testified at the December 2, 2024 hearing date that she was pregnant.

[10] Mother's boyfriend testified that he and Mother were living together at the time of the hearing but that Mother was not on the lease. He further testified that he was on probation at the time of the hearing and that he had a rap sheet “as long as [his] arm” from “the Federal Government” and that his convictions included “weapons, firearms, dealing, things like that.” Id. at 238–39. He characterized himself as “extremely violent” when he “was ordered to do something.” Id. at 241.

[11] Evidence was presented at the hearing that Child had been with her foster family since November 2023 and was thriving at her foster placement. The foster family was a kinship placement, as the foster mother was the half-sister of one of Mother's other children. Child attended daycare and interacted well with her peers. At the time of the hearing, Child was in occupational, development, and speech therapies and had made great progress with the delays in development she had been exhibiting due to these therapies. Child was also under evaluation to determine if she had cerebral palsy. The foster parents were willing to adopt Child and wanted to make Child “a permanent part of [their] family.” Id. at 140.

[12] FCM Givens testified that the CHINS case had gone on “for quite some time with very little progress towards reunification.” Id. at 95. FCM Givens stated that DCS believed that termination was in Child's best interests and that Child had been removed from Parents’ care for over two years and had never been returned to the care of either Mother or Father. FCM Givens also presented evidence that Mother had submitted to a drug screen at the end of the November 18, 2024 hearing, and she had tested positive for methamphetamine and amphetamine.

[13] Court appointed special advocate Diana Fagg (“CASA Fagg”) testified that she believed that termination was in Child's best interests and that Child should remain in her current placement and be adopted. CASA Fagg based her opinion on the fact that Parents were homeless, had no permanent residence, and were unable to meet Child's needs. CASA Fagg testified that DCS had become involved with the family due to Parents’ domestic violence, substance abuse, mental health issues, and lack of stable housing and that neither parent had addressed any of these concerns over the length of the case. CASA Fagg further stated that, even if Parents had the means to provide for Child, she would still be concerned with their stability as parents due to their “domestic violence” and “mental health issues.” Id. at 131. When asked if Mother should have additional time to attempt to achieve the reunification goals, CASA Fagg stated that a lot of time had gone by and “[Child] deserves permanency.” Id. at 136.

[14] At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court took the decision under advisement, and on December 6, 2024, the court issued written findings of fact and conclusions of law terminating Mother's parent-child relationship. The trial court concluded that there was a reasonable probability that Mother would not remedy the conditions that resulted in Child's removal and continued placement outside the home, that the continuation of the parent-child relationship posed a threat to Child's wellbeing, that termination was in Child's best interests, and that there was a satisfactory plan for Child's care and treatment, which was adoption. Mother now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[15] While the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the traditional right of a parent to establish a home and raise their children, the law allows for the termination of parental rights based on a parent's inability or unwillingness to meet parental responsibilities. Bester v. Lake Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 145 (Ind. 2005); In re D.P., 994 N.E.2d 1228, 1231 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). Thus, parental rights are subordinated to the child's interests in determining the appropriate disposition of a petition to terminate the parent-child relationship. In re. J.C., 994 N.E.2d 278, 283 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). The purpose of terminating parental rights is not to punish the parent but to protect the child. In re D.P., 994 N.E.2d at 1231. Termination of parental rights is proper where the child's emotional and physical development is threatened. Id. The trial court need not wait until the child is irreversibly harmed such that their physical, mental, and social development is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship. Id.

[16] As our Supreme Court has observed, “[d]ecisions to terminate parental rights are among the most difficult our trial courts are called upon to make. They are also among the most fact-sensitive—so we review them with great deference to the trial courts ․” E.M. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 4 N.E.3d 636, 640 (Ind. 2014). Indeed, we do not reweigh evidence; rather, we defer to the trial court's assessment of the credibility of witnesses. Ind. Trial Rule 52(A). In evaluating the trial court's findings and conclusions in an order terminating parental rights, we review only for clear error, and we apply a two-tiered standard of review. In re A.P., 981 N.E.2d 75, 81 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). First, we must determine whether the evidence supports the findings, and second, we determine whether the findings support the judgment. Id. “A judgment is clearly erroneous if the findings do not support the trial court's conclusions or the conclusions do not support the judgment.” Id. If the evidence and reasonable inferences support the trial court's decision, we must affirm. A.D.S. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1156 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied.

[17] Mother challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court's decision terminating her parental rights to the Children. Before an involuntary termination of parental rights may occur, the State must allege and prove:

(1) the existence of one (1) or more of the circumstances described in subsection (d);

(2) that there is a satisfactory plan for care and treatment of the child; and

(3) that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c). The State's burden of proof for establishing these allegations is one of clear and convincing evidence. In re H.L., 915 N.E.2d 145, 149 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). Moreover, “if the court finds that the allegations in a petition described in section 4 of this chapter are true, the court shall terminate the parent-child relationship.” I.C. § 31-35-2-8(a) (emphasis added).

[18] Mother argues that the trial court's findings did not clearly and convincingly support its judgment, specifically the determination that termination of the parent-child relationship was in Child's best interests. In determining what is in the best interests of the child, a trial court is required to look at the totality of the evidence. In re A.K., 924 N.E.2d 212, 224 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (citing In re D.D., 804 N.E.2d 258, 267 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied), trans. dismissed. In doing so, the trial court must subordinate the interests of a parent to those of the child. Id. Termination of a parent-child relationship is proper where the child's emotional and physical development is threatened. Id. (citing In re R.S., 774 N.E.2d 927, 930 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied). A parent's historical inability to provide a suitable, stable home environment along with the parent's current inability to do so supports a finding that termination is in the best interests of the child. In re A.P., 981 N.E.2d at 82. Thus, although parental rights have a constitutional dimension, the law allows for their termination when parties are unable or unwilling to meet their responsibility as parents. In re A.K., 924 N.E.2d at 221.

[19] Testimony of the service providers, in addition to evidence that the conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, are sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child's best interests. In re A.S., 17 N.E.3d 994, 1005 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied. Before terminating the parent-child relationship, the trial court need not wait until a child is irreversibly harmed such that his or her physical, mental, and social development is permanently impaired. In re A.K., 924 N.E.2d at 224. Additionally, a child's need for permanency is an important consideration in determining the best interests of a child. Id. (citing McBride v. Monroe Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 798 N.E.2d 185, 203 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003)).

[20] Our review of the totality of the evidence reveals that, at the time of the termination hearing, Child had been removed from Mother's care for over two years and had never been returned to Mother's care at any time while the case was pending. The reasons for removal included Parents’ substance abuse, untreated mental health issues, lack of stable housing, and domestic violence issues. After Child was found to be a CHINS, Mother was ordered to participate in many services to try to rectify these issues, but the evidence presented at the termination hearing established that she was not consistent with these services and did not make significant progress toward reunification goals. The trial court's findings set out that Mother did not engage in mental health assessments despite numerous assessments being scheduled and that she never submitted to a domestic violence assessment, although DCS placed multiple referrals. Likewise, Mother never completed a substance use disorder assessment despite multiple referrals, and she refused to do her court-ordered drug screens through Cordant, instead screening a few times for FCM Givens until she got angry and refused to submit to further screens. Additionally, Mother never participated in home-based case management services to assist her in obtaining stability in housing and employment even though DCS stressed to her how important it was to make progress in these areas. Further, Mother was not consistent in visiting Child and never progressed beyond four hours per week fully supervised visits. For the duration of the over two-year case, Mother remained generally homeless, and she did not demonstrate stable housing at the time of the termination hearing. Both FCM Givens and CASA Fagg testified that termination was in the best interests of Child. The evidence presented at the termination hearing and the corresponding findings by the trial court supported the court's judgment that termination was in the best interests of Child.

[21] Mother argues that, because the trial court's “best interests determination ․ makes no mention of permanency,” the trial court's “factual findings do not support its legal conclusion that termination is in [Child's] best interests.” Appellant's Br. p. 12. In addition to the above findings, the trial court found that the foster parents had cared for Child for over a year and ensured that Child attended her appointments for the numerous necessary therapies that Child required due to her developmental delays. The trial court also found that this time with foster parents was “four times” longer than Child lived with Parents who “engag[ed] in rather extreme domestic violence” and had not “begun to address that critical issue.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 131. Despite not mentioning the actual word permanency, the trial court's findings support the reasonable inference that the foster family offered Child the permanency that Mother was not willing or unable to provide. If the evidence and reasonable inferences support the trial court's decision, we must affirm. A.D.S., 987 N.E.2d at 1156.

[22] Although a child's need for permanency is an important consideration in determining the best interests of a child, a trial court is required to look at the totality of the evidence in determining what is in the best interests of the child. In re A.K., 924 N.E.2d at 224. Looking at the totality of the evidence, the evidence presented supported the trial court's findings, and the findings support the trial court's judgment. We, therefore, conclude that the trial court did not err in its judgment terminating Mother's parental rights to Child.

[23] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Father's parental rights were terminated in the same proceedings as Mother's. However, Father does not participate in the instant appeal.

Foley, Judge.

Kenworthy, J. and Scheele, J., concur.