IN RE: I.W. (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] H.W. (“Mother”) and D.C. (“Father”) share a child, I.W. (“Child”).¹ Following a fact-finding hearing, the juvenile court found Child to be a child in need of services (“CHINS”) pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-34-1-1. On appeal, Mother contends that the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) failed to present sufficient evidence to prove that (1) Mother's actions or inactions seriously endangered Child's physical or mental condition, (2) Mother needed financial assistance to meet Child's needs, and (3) Mother was unable or unwilling to meet Child's needs without State coercion. Because we disagree, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Child was born on July 23, 2024. Mother and Father had been in a relationship previously, but the relationship had ended at some point prior to Child being born. On July 3, 2024, Father obtained an order for protection against Mother (“the protective order”) because of “stalking or repeated harassment” that had occurred. Ex. Vol. p. 7. Due to the protective order, Father was unable to attend Child's birth and had no contact with Child until DCS became involved.

[3] In August of 2024, Mother brought Child to Reid Hospital in Richmond due to concerns regarding Child's eating habits and weight. The hospital discharged Child with instructions for Mother to follow up with a primary-care provider. Prior to the Reid visit, Mother had taken Child to Riley Children's Hospital in Indianapolis regarding similar concerns.

[4] In late September of 2024, Mother returned with Child to Reid Hospital. Child had had “multiple episodes of vomiting,” and was diagnosed with “failure to thrive.” Tr. Vol. II pp. 91, 92. While Child was in the hospital, hospital staff attempted to assess Child's home feeding schedule. Mother did not know what formula concentration was being used for Child and had not reported whether she had been feeding Child throughout the night. Child was prescribed medicine for the vomiting and placed on a feeding schedule with small amounts of formula every three hours, which reduced his vomiting and improved his weight. Mother would not wake up to feed Child according to the schedule and was re-educated on feeding Child “several times [․] each shift.” Tr. Vol. II pp. 128–29. Mother also refused to burp Child. Eventually, hospital staff took over feeding due to Mother's failure to follow the feeding plan. Child remained in the hospital for approximately ten days.

[5] During Child's stay, Mother was “observed taking photos of patient health information on her cell phone[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 111. Mother was confronted about this incident, agreed to delete the photos, and then “started screaming and cussing” at hospital staff, “demanding that she take the baby and leave right then.” Tr. Vol. II p. 112. At some point, Mother “threw her cell phone across the room” next to a nurse, who had been “probably a few inches from [Child]’s bassinet where he was sleeping[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 112. When hospital security informed Mother that she could not take Child until Child was discharged, Mother left alone. As a result of these events, Mother was “banned from Reid property.” Tr. Vol. II p. 111.

[6] On October 1, 2024, DCS petitioned to adjudicate Child a CHINS. DCS alleged that Mother was unable and/or unwilling to provide proper care for Child despite attempts by medical personnel to assist. DCS further alleged that Father could not be located or contacted. The juvenile court authorized DCS to immediately place Child into protective custody.

[7] An initial hearing was held on October 2, 2024. After the hearing, the juvenile court found that it was in Child's best interests to continue to be removed from Mother's home, and the juvenile court granted temporary wardship of Child to DCS. DCS was ordered responsible for Child's supervision, placement, and care. Mother was scheduled for supervised parenting time with Child. On October 23, 2024, the juvenile court received a DNA test report establishing Father as Child's biological father. Subsequent to the DNA test report, Father was also given parenting time with Child.

[8] Between October and December of 2024, licensed clinical social worker Marquetta Stokes met with Mother four times to conduct a parenting assessment for DCS. Stokes recommended that Mother complete an updated psychological evaluation, complete parenting education, and continue with her individual therapy and life skills services. Mother told Stokes that she had been in some abusive relationships in the past, including with Father. Stokes recommended Mother complete a domestic-violence assessment to determine Mother's knowledge of domestic abuse and her role in these relationships. During the visit, Mother required “prompting and reminders” on holding Child properly and Child's formula percentage. Tr. Vol. II p. 134. After the assessment, Mother spoke with Robin Cruz, a licensed clinical social worker and certified battered-intervention provider, and scheduled an appointment for a “Batterers Intervention” assessment, which appointment Mother later canceled because she was “not court ordered” to participate in the service. Tr. Vol. II p. 138.

[9] DCS family case manager (“FCM”) Katie Longo has been assigned to Child's case since October 1, 2024. On November 18, 2024, Mother contacted FCM Longo and reported that “she had concerns that [Father] was smoking weed around [Child] and that [Child] smelled.” Tr. Vol. II p. 198. FCM Longo immediately went to Mother's home to observe Child and did not detect any odors. On November 22, 2024, Child was placed into Father's care. The same day, Mother contacted FCM Longo's supervisor, Kristen McClain, to suggest that FCM Longo had been “lying under oath” and that FCM Longo had been having a “relationship” with Father. Tr. Vol. II p. 190. On November 27, 2024, Mother made a police report that Father had “kidnapped” Child, and she had “sent 13 emails to Eric Holcomb, Governor of Indiana” regarding Child. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 84.

[10] At the fact-finding hearing conducted on January 24, 2025, Mother's behavioral provider since January of 2022, Christopher Pyle, testified that Mother has a “diagnosis of an autism spectrum disorder and [․] attention deficit hyperactivity disorder,” and that she had been involved in services aimed at managing anxiety, depression, and anger. Tr. Vol. II p. 170.

[11] Father testified that Mother had been found guilty of contempt for violating the July 3rd protective order, and that since being found in contempt, Mother had sent Father sixty to seventy text messages and had been facing a second contempt hearing. Father also testified that Mother is “always trying to find things wrong with [Child] and she does what's called I guess it's like doctor shopping. If she doesn't get what she wants from one doctor, she'll go to another – she's been to three or four or five pediatricians. She's walked out of pediatrician's office.” Tr. Vol. II p. 214. Father testified that when Mother was pregnant with Child, “she walked out and got into an argument” with the staff at a doctor's visit that he had attended. Tr. Vol. II p. 214.

[12] Doctor Saira Tariq, a pediatric hospitalist at Reid Hospital, testified that she had personally treated Child at Reid hospital for “a couple of days” during Child's late-September stay. Tr. Vol. II p. 94. Doctor Tariq testified that Mother “did not know exactly how [Child's] formula was being prepared because her grandmother was preparing it for her.” Tr. Vol. II p. 93. Doctor Tariq testified that Child had “no signs and symptoms of other organic causes” for the failure to thrive diagnosis outside of Child's feeding schedule. Tr. Vol. II p. 94. Doctor Tariq also testified that Child had gained weight as a result of the hospital's feeding schedule. When asked whether Mother had implemented the advised feeding schedule, Dr. Tariq testified that the nursing report indicated that “days were fine, but at night Mom was not able to wake up to feed.” Tr. Vol. II p. 94.

[13] Sadie Murphy, a pediatric nurse at Reid, testified that at some point during Child's stay, she had been Child's nurse, and that in a twelve-hour period, Mother had not done a feeding with Child “on her own.” Tr. Vol. II p. 109. Murphy testified, “[s]he would hold the bottle and feed him, but I had to initiate them for the entirety of my 12 hour shift.” Tr. Vol. II p. 109. Murphy also testified that she had had to wake Mother up for Child's feedings every three hours, Mother had failed to set an alarm for feedings, and Mother had had to be educated not to lay Child flat on the bed for feedings. Another nurse, Kirsten Jutte, testified that she had instructed Mother on how to feed Child and that Mother had fed Child “[s]ometimes” but had other times asked nursing staff for help. Tr. Vol. II p. 123. Jutte testified that Mother had not been receptive to learning how to burp Child and that Mother had required reeducation on feeding Child “several times probably each shift.” Tr. Vol. II pp. 128–29.

[14] FCM Longo testified that Mother had been “personally [․] attacking [her] through complaints through any means necessary[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 198. FCM Longo testified she had been planning to do a walk-through of Mother's home on November 7, 2024, but Mother “did not let [her] past the kitchen area and [she] ha[d] not been allowed back in the home since.” Tr. Vol. II p. 198. FCM Longo also testified that Mother “has refused to engage in the domestic violence assessment and the psychological assessment.” Tr. Vol. II p. 201. FCM Longo also opined that Mother “needs additional services before being able to meet [Child]’s needs.” Tr. Vol. II p. 201. Court appointed special advocate (“CASA”) Karen Bowen testified that, based on her observations of Father with Child, Child should remain in Father's care.

[15] On February 5, 2025, the juvenile court adjudicated Child to be a CHINS. On February 12, 2025, the juvenile court held a dispositional hearing, and on February 13, 2025, the juvenile court entered an amended fact-finding order and a dispositional order, ordering Mother and Father to participate in services with the goals of “continuation” of custodial care with Father and “reunification with Mother.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 154. The court also ordered Mother, among other things, to complete a domestic-violence assessment.

Discussion and Decision

[16] Mother contends that the juvenile court erred in finding Child to be a CHINS. Specifically, Mother contends that DCS failed to present sufficient evidence to prove that (1) Mother's actions or inactions had “seriously endangered Child's physical or mental condition[,]” (2) Mother “needed financial assistance to meet Child's needs[,]” and (3) Mother “was unable or unwilling to meet Child's needs without State coercion.” Appellant's Br. pp. 20–21. The juvenile court found that DCS had “met its burden by a preponderance of the evidence that the child is a CHINS pursuant to [Indiana Code section] 31-34-1-1.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 152.

[17] “The purposes of a CHINS case are to help families in crisis and to protect children, not punish parents.” Matter of D.P., 72 N.E.3d 976, 980 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). “[A]s a general rule appellate courts grant latitude and deference to trial courts in family law matters.” Id. “This deference recognizes a trial court's unique ability to see the witnesses, observe their demeanor, and scrutinize their testimony, as opposed to this court's only being able to review a cold transcript of the record.” Id.

[18] When reviewing a trial court's CHINS determination, we do not reweigh evidence or judge witness credibility. Instead, we consider only the evidence that supports the trial court's decision and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. When a trial court supplements a CHINS judgment with findings of fact and conclusions law, we apply a two-tiered standard of review. We consider, first, whether the evidence supports the findings and, second, whether the findings support the judgment. We will reverse a CHINS determination only if it was clearly erroneous. A decision is clearly erroneous if the record facts do not support the findings or if it applies the wrong legal standard to properly found facts.

In re D.J. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 68 N.E.3d 574, 577–78 (Ind. 2017) (citations, quotations, and brackets omitted).

[19] Under Indiana Code section 31-34-1-1, a child is a CHINS if, before the child becomes eighteen years of age,

(1) the child's physical or mental condition is seriously impaired or seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or neglect of the child's parent, guardian, or custodian to supply the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education, or supervision:

(A) when the parent, guardian, or custodian is financially able to do so; or

(B) due to the failure, refusal, or inability of the parent, guardian, or custodian to seek financial or other reasonable means to do so; and

(2) the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that:

(A) the child is not receiving; and

(B) is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the court.

The final element “guards against unwarranted State interference in family life, reserving that intrusion for families where parents lack the ability to provide for their children, not merely where they encounter difficulty in meeting a child's needs.” In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d 1283, 1287 (Ind. 2014) (quotation and emphasis omitted).

A. Mother's Inability to Provide Care and Supervision

[20] In arguing that her actions or inactions “did not seriously endanger Child's physical or mental condition,” Mother contends that the evidence presented “did not support such a conclusion.” Appellant's Br. p. 22. Specifically, Mother argues that she had educated herself on Child's “various health issues” and that she had taken Child to the hospital when it was warranted.

[21] We disagree with Mother's assertion that DCS failed to carry its burden on the first element of Indiana Code section 31-34-1-1. The facts, as outlined above, indicate that Mother had not been feeding Child appropriately prior to Child's hospitalization and required re-education multiple times on how to appropriately feed Child. This necessary re-education included, among other things, being taught how to hold; how, when, and how much to feed; and how to burp Child. Doctor Tariq testified that Mother “did not know exactly how [Child's] formula was being prepared because her grandmother was preparing it for her.” Tr. Vol. II p. 93. Mother required assistance in feeding Child even after re-education on multiple occasions, and, while Murphy was Child's nurse, Mother had never done a feeding “on her own. She would hold the bottle and feed him, but [Murphy] had to initiate them for the entirety of [her] 12 hour shift.” Tr. Vol. II p. 109. While Mother appropriately sought medical assistance to address Child's low weight gain initially, ample evidence supports the conclusion that Mother was thereafter unwilling or unable to follow medically-recommended steps to promote weight gain and reduce Child's vomiting.

[22] We further disagree with Mother's contention that, because there was “no evidence presented that Child continued to be diagnosed with failure-to-thrive, or that Mother missed feedings or otherwise seriously endangered Child[,]” Appellant's Br. p. 23, DCS “failed to carry its burden[.]” Appellant's Br. p. 24. Once in DCS's care, either in foster care or in Father's care, Child's caregivers followed medical recommendations and Child gained weight. Furthermore, with regard to Mother's parenting assessment, the juvenile court found, in part, that “[d]uring the parenting assessment, Ms. Stokes observed Mother with the child, during which Mother had to be prompted and reminded how to hold the child properly.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 150.

[23] The supervisor of Mother's visits with Child, Amy Brawner, testified that she watches Mother with Child two times a week, for three hours each visit. Brawner testified that she has had to refresh Mother's memory on certain skills during these visits, including “feeding, how to make the bottle, how to change the baby, how to bathe the baby, put him in the car seat, [and] dressing[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 178. Brawner testified that the last time she assisted Mother with making a bottle was the day before the hearing. Thus, while Mother did well and was appropriate during her supervised parenting time, she was unable to display progress towards being able to feed Child without assistance.

[24] Mother does not challenge the juvenile court's findings that she exhibited a lack of understanding and improper care habits when caring for Child during parenting assessments or supervised visitation. We conclude that Mother's inability or unwillingness to properly care for Child without continuous reeducation or prompting supports the juvenile court's conclusion that Child's “mental and physical conditions are seriously endangered by Mother's inability to provide the child with care and supervision.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 152.

B. Mother's Need for Financial Assistance

[25] Mother contends that she “did not need financial assistance to access needed services for Child.” Appellant's Br. p. 24. With regard to Mother's financial position, the juvenile court found the following:

7. Since 2017, after the child's maternal grandmother died, Mother has lived with the child's maternal great-grandmother, Gloria Lambert, in Wayne County.

8. Ms. Lambert is ninety-one (91) years old and assists Mother with Mother's finances.

9. Mother receives $800.00 per month in Social Security Insurance (SSI) and received food stamps and services from WIC for the child.

[․.]

14. Since March 2024, Mother has participated in Bureau of Developmental Disability Services (BDDS) to learn how to care for and feed the child, including weekly nurse visits.

[․.]

19. Mother is supposed to receive transportation services through BDDS, but that service is not reliable.

20. Mother's transportation issue is a barrier without the DCS's involvement.

Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 146–47. The juvenile court concluded that “Mother and Father need financial assistance to access needed services[,]” pursuant to section 31-34-1-1. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 152. Mother only challenges this conclusion as it relates to her.

[26] Mother does not challenge the juvenile court's findings, which we therefore accept as true. See Madlem v. Arko, 592 N.E.2d 686, 687 (Ind. 1992). Furthermore, at the fact-finding hearing, Mother's home-visit nurse, Elizabeth McCann, testified that Mother's transportation through BDDS “isn't super reliable.” Tr. Vol. II p. 158. Father testified at the fact-finding hearing that Mother is “not financially independent. Her [․] grandmother actually takes care of finances for her. She doesn't even have a bank account.” Tr. Vol. II p. 215. Moreover, Mother still required supervision, re-education, and prompting during visits on feeding, changing, and caring for Child. The findings and record support a reasonable conclusion that the services which Mother had already been receiving had been inadequate to ensure Child's safety in Mother's care and that Mother required further assistance to access needed services for Child. Mother's argument that her income was “sufficient” to properly engage in required services is nothing more than a request to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. In re D.J., 68 N.E.3d at 577–78.

C. Necessity of State Coercion

[27] Mother contends that DCS failed to prove that Child needs ongoing care and treatment that would not be provided without the coercive intervention of the Court.² “A pattern of unwillingness to deal with parenting problems and to cooperate with those providing social services, in conjunction with unchanged conditions, will support a finding that there exists no reasonable probability that the conditions will change.” In re Involuntary Termination of Parent Child Relationship of A.H., 832 N.E.2d 563, 570 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).

[28] While Mother contends that she had already been voluntarily engaged in services to address her mental health and/or to help her care for Child, the record reflects that those services had not resolved Mother's difficulties with parenting. The juvenile court found that Mother had canceled her scheduled domestic-violence assessment because “the assessment was not court ordered.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 151. The juvenile court further found that Mother had refused to complete a psychological evaluation and refused to allow FCM Longo to complete an assessment of her home. Additionally,

60. On November 7, 2024, Mother walked out of a Child and Family Team Meeting after FCM Longo brought up the possibility of placing the child with Father.

61. Since November 7, 2024, Mother has sent FCM Longo hundreds of text messages from many different telephone numbers and made many telephone calls.

62. A few weeks after November 7, 2024, on an unspecified date, Mother requested that FCM Longo only communicate with Mother through Mother's attorney, and FCM Longo has complied.

63. Since November 7, 2024, FCM Longo has not requested to assess Mother's home because of Mother's volatility.

64. Between November 22, 2024, and January 14, 2025, Mother spoke with Family Case Manager Supervisor (FCMS) Kristen McClain by telephone, and those calls lasted at least twenty (20) minutes each during which Mother appeared to be erratic and nonsensical.

Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 151.

[29] Mother does not challenge the juvenile court's findings, which we accept as true. See Madlem, 592 N.E.2d at 687. Nonetheless, the record supports these findings and further indicates that Mother demonstrated considerable resistance to learning new skills or cooperating with her DCS services. Mother continued to struggle with holding, feeding, and even changing Child. Jutte testified that Mother was not receptive to learning how to burp Child and that Mother had to be re-educated on feeding Child “several times probably each shift.” Tr. Vol. II pp. 128–29. FCM Longo opined that Mother “needs additional services before being able to meet [Child]’s needs.” Tr. Vol. II p. 201.

[30] Furthermore, Mother testified at the fact-finding hearing that she did not believe that she needed any assistance in caring for Child and denied that Child was ever “in failure to thrive.” Tr. Vol. II p. 237. Mother refused to complete a domestic-violence assessment or a psychological evaluation, and a therapist with which Mother had been referred to meet had only met with Mother once because further appointments had “either been rescheduled or no showed.” Tr. Vol. II p. 149. Mother had also, on multiple occasions, accused FCM Longo of “lying under oath.” Tr. Vol. II p. 190.

[31] Based on the record, the evidence and findings support the juvenile court's conclusion that Child “needs ongoing care and treatment that would not be provided without the coercive intervention of the Court.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 152. Mother's arguments again amount to nothing more than an invitation to reweigh the evidence. See In re D.J., 68 N.E.3d at 577–78. The juvenile court's CHINS adjudication was not in error.

[32] We affirm the judgment of the juvenile court.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Father does not participate in this appeal.

2.   Mother also contends that it was “nonsensical” for the trial court to require her to undergo a domestic-violence assessment “when Father was not required to do so.” Appellant's Br. p. 27. Services ordered at disposition are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. K.S. v. State, 849 N.E.2d 538, 544 (Ind. 2006). The requirements of a dispositional decree “must relate to some behavior or circumstances that was revealed by the evidence.” In re K.D., 962 N.E.2d 1249, 1258 (Ind. 2012) (quotation and citation omitted). Mother had told Stokes that she had been in some abusive relationships in the past, including with Father. Stokes recommended Mother complete a domestic-violence assessment to determine Mother's knowledge of domestic abuse and her role in these relationships. To the extent that Mother testified that she was a victim in her relationship with Father, the juvenile court was not required to credit her testimony. Because the order relates to circumstances revealed by the evidence, we conclude that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in ordering Mother to complete the assessment. Mother's argument to the contrary simply amounts to a request to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. In re D.J., 68 N.E.3d at 577–78.

Bradford, Judge.

Judges May and Mathias concur. May, J., and Mathias, J., concur.