IN RE: the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of M.H. (Father) and B.H. (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] M.H. (“Father”) appeals the termination of his parental rights to three of his children. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Father has four children with H.Z. (“Mother”), who does not participate in this appeal. Father's and Mother's parental rights to their oldest child were terminated in 2014. Their other three children are B.H., born in March 2014, L.H., born in June 2015, and R.H., born in June 2016. In August 2017, the Department of Child Services (DCS) received a report of unsafe living conditions in the family's home. DCS visited the house and found that it was “filthy” and “smell[ed] awful,” there were cockroaches in and outside the house, and the children were “stained in dirt” and had full diapers. Ex. Vol. IV p. 17. DCS removed the children and placed them in foster care. The children were adjudicated children in need of services (CHINS) in October 2017. In July 2018, Mother and Father divorced, and Father was awarded full physical custody of the children. Subsequently, the CHINS case was closed, and the children were reunified with Father.

[3] In July and August 2020, DCS received reports of neglect and physical abuse of the children as well as illegal drug use and domestic violence between Father and his then-girlfriend. DCS filed another CHINS petition, and the children were adjudicated CHINS in September 2020 after Mother and Father admitted to the allegations in the petition. Father specifically admitted that he was struggling with substance abuse, mental-health issues, and maintaining his home. That CHINS case was closed in May 2021.

[4] After receiving another report of neglect in May 2023, DCS visited Father's home and found it in “deplorable condition[ ]”—it was covered in dog urine and feces, the floors were littered with trash, the kitchen was full of dirty dishes and ants, and there was a bed-bug infestation. Tr. Vol. II p. 193. Due to the conditions in the home, DCS filed another CHINS petition on May 31. Initially, the children remained in Father's care, and the plan was for Family Preservation Services to work with Father on improving the home environment. But Father developed serious medical issues and had to be hospitalized, so DCS removed the children in July and placed them in kinship care. Later that month, upon admissions by both parents, the trial court adjudicated the children to be CHINS. In its dispositional decree, the court ordered Father to, among other things, complete all recommended assessments and programs, secure stable income, and maintain safe and suitable housing.

[5] In August 2023, DCS placed the children in foster care—B.H. and L.H. with one foster family, and R.H. with another. Father began supervised visitation the following month. He was consistent in visitation with the children but “struggled with supervising all three at the same time” and needed help with proper discipline if one of them was acting out. Id. at 48. DCS also referred Father for a parenting assessment, home-based case management, a psychological evaluation, and individual therapy. Father participated in home-based case management and individual therapy, but his attendance was inconsistent due to his medical issues. In January 2024, Father underwent a psychological evaluation and was diagnosed with major depressive disorder and an intellectual disability. As a result, he was recommended for services through the Bureau of Disabilities Services and vocational rehabilitation. Karen Brooks, Father's visit supervisor and home-based caseworker until August 2024, helped him apply to the Bureau of Disabilities Services, but Father never actually signed up for services. He did an intake for vocational rehabilitation but never completed the programming.

[6] One of the goals of Father's home-based case management was appropriate housing. For example, Brooks helped Father create a schedule of tasks to keep his home clean. But in addition to the uncleanliness, DCS had concerns about the structure and safety of the home; the front steps were unstable, the floors were plywood, and some of the walls didn't have drywall. DCS told Father that if he didn't find alternative housing, the Health Department would have to inspect the home to ensure it was safe to live in. Father insisted on staying in the home but “was resistant [to] having the Health Department” inspect it. Id. at 73.

[7] In September 2024, DCS petitioned to terminate Father's parental rights. The following month, B.H. and L.H. were moved to a different foster home, where they have since remained. R.H. has been in the same foster placement since August 2023. That November, Father moved out of his home and rented a three-bedroom house with his mother.

[8] The fact-finding hearing began on November 25. Jerion Denny, the family case manager (FCM) from December 2023 to September 2024, described DCS's involvement with the family as “a vicious cycle” because “as soon as [DCS] close[s] a case successfully it opens right back up due to the same concerns.” Id. at 53, 54. She testified that the children are thriving in their current placements and “have evolved in a positive manner since being removed.” Id. at 54. DCS's plan for the children was adoption by their current placements. FCM Denny explained that although the children are separated, their foster families are related, so the children can see each other. Jennifer Steinsdoerfer, who'd taken over for Brooks as Father's visit supervisor and home-based caseworker, testified that although Father's new home was “appropriate and clean” at that time, he'd just moved in, and she didn't believe he'd be able to “maintain ․ the cleanliness.” Id. at 103, 107.

[9] The remainder of the hearing was held in February 2025. Penny Anderson, the children's Court Appointed Special Advocate (CASA), testified that she'd visited Father's new home three times, including that morning before the hearing, and “each time the conditions just seem like they're getting worse.” Id. at 218. When she went to the home that morning, there were trash bags in the living room, dirty dishes and clutter in the kitchen, and mattresses and furniture in the yard. CASA Anderson opined that the children shouldn't be reunified with Father because “he's proven that he can't sustain a home.” Id. at 221. Scott Lockwood, the current FCM, had been to Father's house a week before the hearing and saw there were parts of the house without flooring, dishes with food in them sitting out in the kitchen, and mouse feces in several rooms.

[10] After the hearing, the court terminated Father's parental rights to all three children.

[11] Father now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[12] Father contends there is insufficient evidence to meet the statutory requirements for termination. When reviewing the termination of parental rights, we do not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility. In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1229 (Ind. 2013). Rather, we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences most favorable to the trial court's judgment. Id. When a trial court has entered findings of fact and conclusions of law, we will not set aside the court's findings or judgment unless clearly erroneous. Id. To determine whether a judgment terminating parental rights is clearly erroneous, we review whether the evidence supports the trial court's findings and whether the findings support the judgment. In re V.A., 51 N.E.3d 1140, 1143 (Ind. 2016). DCS must prove the allegations in a termination petition by clear and convincing evidence. See Ind. Code § 31-34-12-2.

[13] Here, DCS filed its termination petition under Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4. A petition under that section must allege:

(1) the existence of one (1) or more of the circumstances described in subsection (d);

(2) that there is a satisfactory plan for care and treatment of the child; and

(3) that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests.

I.C. § 31-35-2-4(c) (2024).¹ As to the first requirement, DCS alleged, and the trial court found, the existence of the following circumstances in subsection (d):

(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(4) That there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health, or life of the child.

(5) That the child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been adjudicated a child in need of services.

See Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 87-93; 104-107.

[14] Father argues that DCS failed to prove any of these circumstances in subsection (d). He also challenges the trial court's conclusions that there is a satisfactory plan for care and treatment of the children and that termination is in the children's best interests. We address each challenge in turn.

I. The trial court did not err in concluding that the children have been adjudicated CHINS on three occasions

[15] Although DCS alleged several subsection (d) circumstances, under Section 31-35-2-4(c)(1), it was required to prove only one. Father concedes that the children have been adjudicated CHINS multiple times, as contemplated by Section 31-35-2-4(d)(5), but he contends DCS “failed to prove this particular element as the same was not determined as a Conclusion of Law by the trial court.” Appellant's Br. p. 19. But the trial court found that the children were adjudicated CHINS in July 2023 and in the two previous CHINS cases. See Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 87-88. These findings clearly establish that the children were adjudicated CHINS on three separate occasions. Because DCS proved this allegation, we need not address the other circumstances alleged. See In re J.W., 259 N.E.3d 1039, 1045 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025).

II. The trial court did not err in concluding that there is a satisfactory plan for care and treatment of the children

[16] Father also contends DCS failed to establish a satisfactory plan for care and treatment of the children. Where, as here, DCS's plan is adoption, “there need not be a guarantee that a suitable adoption will take place, only that DCS will attempt to find a suitable adoptive parent.” In re A.S., 17 N.E.3d 994, 1007 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied. “Part of the reason for this is that it is within the authority of the adoption court, not the termination court, to determine whether an adoptive placement is appropriate.” Id.

[17] Father argues that adoption of the children by their current placements is not a satisfactory plan because the children would be separated from each other. But the suitability of a particular adoptive placement was not at issue before the court in the termination proceedings. See id. And in any event, we have held that a plan is satisfactory “even if the plan is for the children to have separate adoptive homes.” Id. The trial court did not err in determining that DCS's plan of adoption is satisfactory.

III. The trial court did not err in concluding that termination is in the children's best interests

[18] Finally, Father challenges the trial court's conclusion that termination is in the best interests of the children. In determining whether termination is in a child's best interests, the trial court must look at the totality of the evidence and subordinate the parent's interests to those of the child. In re Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 49 (Ind. 2019), reh'g denied. Termination of a parent-child relationship is proper where the child's emotional and physical development is threatened. K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1235. Additionally, a child's need for permanency is a “central consideration” in determining the best interests of a child. Id. “Indeed, children cannot wait indefinitely for their parents to work toward preservation or reunification.” Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 49 (quotation omitted).

[19] A parent's historical inability to provide adequate housing, stability, and supervision coupled with a current inability to provide the same supports a finding that termination is in the child's best interests. Castro v. State Off. of Fam. & Child., 842 N.E.2d 367, 374 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied. Since the first CHINS case in 2017, Father has been unable to maintain a safe, sanitary home for the children. As FCM Denny described, although Father improves the living environment while DCS is involved, once the case is closed, he falls back into old habits, and DCS ends up opening another case for the same reasons. When DCS first became involved in the underlying CHINS case here, Father's home was covered in dog urine and feces, trash, dirty dishes, ants, and bed bugs. Despite DCS's concerns about the structural integrity of the home, Father refused to move out until just before the fact-finding hearing. And in the few months between the November and February hearing dates, Father had already let his new house fall into poor condition. When CASA Anderson and FCM Lockwood each visited the house in February, there were trash bags in the living room, dirty dishes in the kitchen, mattresses and furniture in the yard, parts of the house without flooring, and mouse feces in several rooms. As CASA Anderson testified, Father has “proven that he can't sustain a home.”

[20] Additionally, Father hasn't shown an ability to adequately parent the children. His visitation has remained supervised throughout the CHINS and termination proceedings. During visits with the children, he “struggled with supervising all three at the same time” and needed help disciplining them. And Father could've obtained even more help with his parenting and housing struggles through the Bureau of Disabilities Services and vocational rehabilitation after his psychological evaluation, but he didn't follow through with those recommendations.

[21] While the evidence of Father's inability to provide a safe and stable environment supports termination, permanency is also a central consideration. The children, now 11, 10, and 9, have been involved in 3 CHINS cases and have been removed from Father's care for over 2 years in this case. They've shown improvements since being removed and are thriving with their respective foster families, who wish to adopt them. The totality of the evidence supports the trial court's conclusion that termination of Father's parental rights is in the children's best interests.

[22] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Section 31-35-2-4 was amended effective July 1, 2025, several months after the termination order was issued in this case. See Pub. L. No. 179-2025, § 25. Neither party argues that this amendment has any bearing on the proceedings.

Vaidik, Judge.

Tavitas, J., and Felix, J., concur.