Courtnay Annene Titus, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Courtnay Titus appeals her sentence for her conviction of dealing in a narcotic drug, a Level 4 felony. On appeal, Titus argues that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing her and that her sentence is inappropriate. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm.

Issues

[2] Titus raises two issues on appeal, which we restate as:

I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it sentenced Titus.

II. Whether Titus’ sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and Titus’ character.

Facts

[3] On September 29, 2022, officers from the Kokomo Police Department responded to a 911 call after a child found an unconscious male lying on his apartment patio. The man was deceased, and he was identified as Marshall Banter. It was later determined that Banter died of a fentanyl overdose. A cell phone recovered near Banter's body contained text messages between Banter and Douglas Dunlap that appeared consistent with drug activity. Officers contacted Dunlap, who confirmed that he purchased drugs from a woman known to him as “Nayy.” Tr. Vol. III p. 121. Officers identified Nayy's phone number as belonging to Titus.

[4] On September 30, 2022, officers conducted a controlled buy from Titus through Dunlap. Titus exited her motel room holding an object. Upon realizing she was interacting with law enforcement, Titus attempted to ingest the object, which was later recovered and tested positive for fentanyl. Titus was taken into custody and admitted to dealing heroin, cutting the heroin with fentanyl, and possessing narcotics and paraphernalia in her motel room. In Titus’ motel room, officers discovered fentanyl, syringes, cutting agents, marijuana, scales, ammunition, and other drug-related items. A man was also found in the motel room actively using narcotics.

[5] The State charged Titus with dealing in a controlled substance resulting in death, a Level 1 felony; dealing in a narcotic drug, a Level 4 felony; possession of a narcotic drug, a Level 6 felony; maintaining a common nuisance, a Level 6 felony; unlawful possession of a hypodermic syringe, a Level 6 felony; and resisting law enforcement, a Class A misdemeanor.

[6] A jury trial began on October 11, 2024. After the jury was selected, Titus pleaded guilty to dealing in a narcotic drug, a Level 4 felony, and the State dismissed the remaining charges except for the Level 1 felony charge, which proceeded to jury trial. On October 17, 2024, the jury found Titus not guilty of the Level 1 felony charge.

[7] At sentencing, Titus testified that she sold heroin and fentanyl to support her drug addiction. The trial court found that the nature of the offense was an aggravating circumstance and discussed several aspects of the nature of the offense. Regarding mitigating factors, the trial court considered Titus’ mental health, but did not assign it great weight, and Titus’ minimal criminal history. Although considered, the trial court rejected the fact that Titus has children and the argument that the offense is not likely to recur. The trial court then found that the aggravating factor outweighed the mitigating factors and sentenced Titus to ten years, with eight years executed in the Department of Correction (“DOC”) and two years suspended to supervised probation. Titus now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

I. Abuse of Sentencing Discretion

[8] Titus argues that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to consider certain mitigators and by considering certain aggravators. Sentencing decisions rest within the sound discretion of the trial court and are reviewed on appeal only for an abuse of discretion. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007) (citing Smallwood v. State, 773 N.E.2d 259, 263 (Ind. 2002)), clarified on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007); Phipps v. State, 90 N.E.3d 1190, 1197 (Ind. 2018). “An abuse occurs only if the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom.” Schuler v. State, 132 N.E.3d 903, 904 (Ind. 2019) (citing Rice v. State, 6 N.E.3d 940, 943 (Ind. 2014)).

[9] A trial court may abuse its discretion in a number of ways, including:

(1) “failing to enter a sentencing statement at all”; (2) entering a sentencing statement in which the aggravating and mitigating factors are not supported by the record; (3) entering a sentencing statement that does not include reasons that are clearly supported by the record and advanced for consideration; or (4) entering a sentencing statement in which the reasons provided in the statement are “improper as a matter of law.”

Ackerman v. State, 51 N.E.3d 171, 193 (Ind. 2016) (quoting Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 490-91).

[10] “This Court presumes that a court that conducts a sentencing hearing renders its decision solely on the basis of relevant and probative evidence.” Schuler, 132 N.E.3d at 905. Even when an abuse of discretion occurs, “[w]e will not remand for resentencing if we can say with confidence the trial court would have imposed the same sentence had it not considered the purportedly erroneous aggravators.” Owen v. State, 210 N.E.3d 256, 269 (Ind. 2023). “A single aggravating circumstance may be sufficient to support an enhanced sentence.” Hayko v. State, 211 N.E.3d 483, 487 n.1 (Ind. 2023), cert. denied.

A. Mitigators

[11] Titus argues that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to consider as mitigating that she accepted responsibility for her actions, pleaded guilty without the benefit of a plea agreement, had a supportive family, and participated in Moral Reconation Therapy ¹ while incarcerated.² The trial court “ ‘is not obligated to accept the defendant's contentions as to what constitutes a mitigating circumstance or to give the proffered mitigating circumstances the same weight the defendant does.’ ” Weisheit v. State, 26 N.E.3d 3, 9 (Ind. 2015) (quoting Wilkes v. State, 917 N.E.2d 675, 690 (Ind. 2009)). “An allegation that the trial court failed to identify or find a mitigating factor requires the defendant to establish that the mitigating evidence is both significant and clearly supported by the record.” Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 493 (citing Carter v. State, 711 N.E.2d 835, 838 (Ind. 1999)).

[12] We first note Titus testified at sentencing that she participated in MRT, which is presumably the Moral Reconation Therapy that she now argues should have been a mitigating factor. Titus, however, presented no evidence regarding the therapy and has failed to demonstrate that the therapy is significant.

[13] Next, Titus argues that her family support should have been a mitigating circumstance. Titus testified that her parents were her support system and that she would live with them when released. The State contends that Titus’ “family's support is more of a reflection of her family's character than of hers ․” Appellee's Br. p. 22. We agree. Our review of the record does not convince us that the trial court abused its discretion in declining to find that this proposed mitigating circumstance was significant.

[14] Finally, Titus argues that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to consider that she accepted responsibility for her actions and that she pleaded guilty without the benefit of a plea agreement. “A guilty plea is not necessarily a mitigating factor where the defendant receives substantial benefit from the plea or where evidence against the defendant is so strong that the decision to plead guilty is merely pragmatic.” Amalfitano v. State, 956 N.E.2d 208, 212 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied. Here, Titus did not plead guilty to the Level 4 felony charge until the jury had already been selected, and Titus obtained a significant benefit from her plea of guilty to the Level 4 felony. The State dismissed three Level 6 felonies and one Class A misdemeanor. Further, Titus had admitted to the officers that she had been dealing narcotic drugs. Given the substantial benefit that Titus received and the overwhelming evidence against her, Titus has failed to demonstrate that this proposed mitigator was significant.

B. Aggravator

[15] Next, Titus argues that the trial court abused its discretion by relying on evidence heard during the trial for the Level 1 felony charge and relying on material elements of the offense in determining aggravators. The trial court here found the nature of the offense to be an aggravating circumstance. In doing so, the trial court noted: (1) the evidence related to the Level 4 felony conviction was presented at the jury trial for the Level 1 felony charge; (2) Titus had above average intelligence, a college education, and the ability to seek help; (3) Titus had an “extreme lack of concern” regarding the users to whom she was selling drugs; (4) the offense of dealing in a narcotic drug includes dealing drugs that do not generally result in deaths, but Titus was dealing fentanyl, which is deadly; and (5) the extreme dangers of fentanyl are well known. Tr. Vol. IV p. 124.

[16] This case was unusual in that Titus pleaded guilty to dealing in narcotics, a Level 4 felony, directly after the jury was selected. The remaining charge of dealing in narcotics resulting in death, a Level 1 felony, was considered by the jury, and Titus was acquitted of that charge. There is no indication that the trial court relied upon evidence related to the charge for which Titus was acquitted. In fact, the trial court specifically noted that Titus was acquitted of the Level 1 felony. The evidence during the jury trial, however, was directly relevant to Titus’ Level 4 felony conviction. Titus cites no authority for the proposition that the trial court could not consider that evidence. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion.

[17] As for Titus’ argument that the trial court relied upon material elements of the offense as an aggravator, we note that, while a trial court cannot enhance a sentence based on the material elements of the offense alone, “ ‘the trial court may properly consider the particularized circumstances of the material elements of the crime’ to be an aggravating factor.” Hudson v. State, 135 N.E.3d 973, 979 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (quoting Kien v. State, 782 N.E.2d 398, 414 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied). The State charged Titus with knowingly or intentionally possessing a narcotic drug having a weight of at least one gram but less than five grams. See Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1(c)(1). When Titus was arrested, she had .04 gram of fentanyl in her hand, and she had an additional 2.82 grams of fentanyl in her motel room. The trial court here considered particularized circumstances of Titus’ offense, including the types of narcotics Titus was dealing and that fentanyl is deadly and extremely dangerous. Accordingly, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in determining the aggravator here.

II. Inappropriate Sentence

[18] Next, Titus challenges her sentence as inappropriate under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B). The Indiana Constitution authorizes independent appellate review and revision of sentences imposed by a trial court. Lane v. State, 232 N.E.3d 119, 122 (Ind. 2024) (citing Ind. Const. art. 7, §§ 4, 6). This authority, as implemented through Appellate Rule 7(B), enables this Court to “revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court's decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Deference to the trial court's sentence should prevail unless “overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense and the defendant's character.” Oberhansley v. State, 208 N.E.3d 1261, 1267 (Ind. 2023) (internal quotations omitted). A defendant, however, need not show that both the nature of the offense and his or her character warrant revision; however, “to the extent the evidence on one prong militates against relief, a claim based on the other prong must be all the stronger to justify relief.” Lane, 232 N.E.3d at 127 (citing Connor v. State, 58 N.E.3d 215, 220 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016)).

[19] Additionally, in determining whether a sentence is inappropriate, we are not limited to the aggravating and mitigating circumstances found by the trial court. Oberhansley, 208 N.E.3d at 1271. “Our role is primarily to leaven the outliers and identify guiding principles for sentencers, rather than to achieve the perceived correct result in each case.” Lane, 232 N.E.3d at 122 (internal quotations omitted). “Ultimately, we rely on our collective judgment as to the balance of all the relevant considerations involved, which include the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given case.” Id. (internal quotations omitted).

[20] When determining whether a sentence is inappropriate, the advisory sentence is the starting point the legislature has selected as an appropriate sentence for the crime committed. Fuller v. State, 9 N.E.3d 653, 657 (Ind. 2014). Here, Titus was convicted of a Level 4 felony. Indiana Code Section 35-50-2-5.5 provides: “A person who commits a Level 4 felony shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of between two (2) and twelve (12) years, with the advisory sentence being six (6) years.” The trial court sentenced Titus to ten years, with eight years executed in the DOC and two years suspended to supervised probation.

Nature of the Offense

[21] Our analysis of the “nature of the offense” requires us to look at the extent, brutality, and heinousness of the offense. See Wilson v. State, 157 N.E.3d 1163, 1182 (Ind. 2020). Titus argues that her offense is not the “most heinous of drug crimes” and that the record does not indicate she harmed anyone or intended to harm anyone. Appellant's Br. p. 11. We acknowledge that Titus was acquitted of the charge related to Banter's death, and accordingly, we do not consider Banter's death in our analysis. Titus, however, admitted to officers that she was dealing heroin and cutting the heroin with fentanyl, which is an extremely dangerous combination. And Titus’ motel room contained fentanyl, syringes, cutting agents, marijuana, scales, ammunition, and other drug-related items, which evidences the magnitude of Titus’ dealing activities.

Character of the Offender

[22] Our analysis of the character of the offender involves a broad consideration of a defendant's qualities, including the defendant's age, criminal history, background, past rehabilitative efforts, and remorse. See Harris v. State, 165 N.E.3d 91, 100 (Ind. 2021); McCain v. State, 148 N.E.3d 977, 985 (Ind. 2020). The significance of a criminal history in assessing a defendant's character and an appropriate sentence vary based on the “gravity, nature and number of prior offenses as they relate to the current offense.” McElfresh v. State, 51 N.E.3d 103, 112 (Ind. 2016). “Even a minor criminal history is a poor reflection of a defendant's character.” Prince v. State, 148 N.E.3d 1171, 1174 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020).

[23] Titus was thirty-nine years old at the time of sentencing and had a minimal criminal history prior to this case. In 2007, she was convicted of operating a vehicle with an alcohol concentration equivalent of .08 or more. In 2022, Titus entered into a pretrial diversion agreement for a charge of possession of paraphernalia, a Class C misdemeanor. Titus, however, admitted that heroin has been her drug of choice since she was twenty-nine years old. Accordingly, despite Titus’ minimal criminal history, it is clear that her criminal activity has persisted for more than a decade.

[24] Titus argues that she has been sober while incarcerated, she has a plan for her future, and she has a supportive relationship with her parents and children. Titus has completed all but four classes to earn her bachelor's degree in biology with a minor in chemistry, and she has a stable family with supportive parents. As the trial court noted, Titus has above average intelligence, a college education, and had the ability to seek help for her addiction. Titus has two children with her ex-husband, but she does not have custody of the children.

[25] We applaud Titus’ sobriety and plans for the future, but we cannot ignore her past conduct. Given Titus’ long-term drug use and the fact that she was dealing heroin cut with fentanyl, we cannot find any basis to conclude that the trial court's imposition of its sentence was inappropriate. Accordingly, we affirm Titus’ sentence.

Conclusion

[26] The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it sentenced Titus, and her sentence is not inappropriate. Accordingly, we affirm.

[27] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Moral Reconation Therapy is “a systematic treatment approach that seeks to decrease recidivism, or the tendency of a convicted criminal to re-offend, among juvenile and adult Incarcerated Individuals by increasing moral reasoning.” See https://www.in.gov/idoc/divisions/reentry/programs/#Moral_Reconation_Therapy__MRT____Course [https://perma.cc/DHV4-EZ42] (last visited July 29, 2025).

2.   Titus also argues that the trial court “failed to balance the identified mitigating and aggravating circumstances.” Appellant's Br. p. 9. It is well settled that we do not review the weight given to an aggravator or mitigator on appeal. See Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 491 (“Because the trial court no longer has any obligation to ‘weigh’ aggravating and mitigating factors against each other when imposing a sentence[,] a trial court cannot now be said to have abused its discretion in failing to ‘properly weigh’ such factors.”).

Tavitas, Judge.

Judges Vaidik and Foley concur. Vaidik, J., and Felix, J., concur.