THATCHER v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Teagon W. Thatcher appeals following his conviction of Level 1 felony dealing in a controlled substance resulting in death.¹ Thatcher presents two issues for our review, which we reorder and restate as:

1. Whether the trial court committed fundamental error by admitting toxicology reports analyzing the deceased's blood; and

2. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to sustain Thatcher's conviction.

We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Thatcher and Neva Petty were friends, and they texted each other frequently using Facebook Messenger. On February 24, 2024, Petty texted Thatcher that she was experiencing symptoms of narcotics withdrawal and asked Thatcher for money. Thatcher explained that he could not give her money at that time, and she responded by telling him not to worry about it. He then texted: “U sure I can get u something to help I trap a lot so I can get something if u need it[.]” (Ex. Vol. 1 at 66.) The term “trap a lot” is slang for “dealing a lot.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 175.) In a later text conversation with Petty, Thatcher discussed trying to “run this bag up,” (Ex. Vol. 1 at 68), referring to “a bag of dope that he's trying to get rid of.” (Id. at 176.)

[3] On February 26, 2024, Thatcher texted Petty, “Do you like [ice cube emoticon]? Because I'm not gonna lie or hide it I trap hard and use [ice cube emoticon].” (Ex. Vol. 1 at 72.) The ice cube emoticon symbolizes methamphetamine. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 175-76.) He also texted, “I ain't never done slo and I don't plan on it but I don't judge anyone who uses it cuz I flip it sometimes too[.]” (Ex. Vol. 1 at 73) (errors in original). “Slo” is a slang term for heroin or fentanyl, and “flip it” means “selling it for pure profit.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 176.) Thatcher asked Petty if she wanted him to get some “Slo” for her, and she responded that she did. (Ex. Vol. 1 at 74.) Thatcher later texted Petty, “I got a half ball of slo for u,” (id. at 76) (errors in original), referring to approximately 1.75 grams. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 179.) Petty asked if the drugs were weak, and Thatcher responded: “Ain't nothing I get bad I promise u that[.]” (Ex. Vol. 1 at 78) (errors in original). Petty asked Thatcher if she could have the drugs that evening and pay for them later. Thatcher responded: “I'm just saying this because I tell everyone this lol imma trust u with the 1.5 but if u run off with it that's on you and I won't ever help you out again,” (id. at 82) (errors in original), meaning Petty was “being fronted one point five grams and if she doesn't pay for it then she's not getting any more.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 182.)

[4] That evening, Shianna Hodge, Petty's half-sister, picked Petty up from the house where Perry lived in Bluffton, Indiana. Hodge drove Petty to Muncie to visit their aunt and uncle. Before they left their relatives’ house, Petty asked Hodge if they could stop by a house in Muncie. Petty told Hodge the house was where she used to live, and she needed to retrieve some items from it. Hodge gave Petty her phone, and Petty put the address into a GPS application. The address was Thatcher's sister's house, where Thatcher was living at the time. When Hodge and Petty arrived at the house, Hodge stayed in the car while Petty went up to the front porch. Petty met someone on the porch, and Hodge believed the person was a male “because of the posture, the stance, and how the hair was.” (Id. at 30.) Hodge then drove Petty back to Bluffton. On the way to Bluffton, Hodge and Petty stopped at a McDonald's restaurant. Petty did not have cash on her to pay for her meal, but she electronically sent money to Hodge to reimburse her.

[5] Anthony Wells, Amanda Gatto, and Amanda Gatto's teenage daughter also lived in the house in Bluffton with Petty. Wells worked the late shift at a restaurant, and when he arrived home after 11:00 p.m. on February 26, 2024, he observed that Petty “appeared to be under the influence of something.” (Id. at 44.) Gatto observed Petty asleep on the couch when Gatto left for work at approximately 9:00 a.m. the next morning. Around 2:00 p.m., Petty asked Wells if he needed to use the shower, and Wells told Petty that he did not. Wells heard the shower turn on, and Petty was still in the bathroom when he left for work a little before 4:00 p.m. Gatto returned to the house at approximately 4:30 p.m. She heard the shower running and knocked loudly on the bathroom door, but Petty did not respond. Gatto then kicked in the bathroom door and saw Petty unconscious and sitting on the toilet. Gatto and her daughter called 911, administered Narcan, and performed CPR, but they could not revive Petty.

[6] Sergeant Joshua Smith of the Bluffton Police Department and paramedics responded to the 911 call. Petty was not breathing and did not have a pulse when the paramedics arrived. The paramedics performed CPR and administered four doses of epinephrine. Petty's condition did not improve, and she was declared deceased. Sergeant Smith searched the scene and found a cut drinking straw and three cigarette packs in the bathroom. Plastic baggies were inside two of the cigarette packs. One of the baggies was open and had a “blue purply powder in it.” (Id. at 78.) The baggie weighed .98 grams and the substance tested positive for fentanyl. Officers also collected Petty's cellphone and extracted the data from it, revealing her text and social media history.

[7] Dr. Scott Wagner, a forensic pathologist, performed an autopsy on Petty, and he collected blood and vitreous fluid from Petty's body as part of the autopsy. The fluids were sent to Axis Forensic Toxicology (“Axis”) for testing. The toxicology results were positive for fentanyl and methamphetamine, and Dr. Wagner listed fentanyl and methamphetamine toxicity as Petty's cause of death.

[8] Thatcher deleted the Facebook account he used to communicate with Petty shortly after her death. He was later detained for questioning and agreed to waive his Miranda ² rights. During the interview, Thatcher acknowledged meeting Petty the evening of February 26, 2024, on the front porch of his sister's house, but he claimed he gave her cash and not drugs.

[9] On April 23, 2024, the State charged Thatcher with Level 1 felony dealing in a controlled substance resulting in death and Level 5 felony dealing in a narcotic drug.³ The trial court held a bench trial on August 12, 13, and 14, 2024. Kevin Shanks, a forensic toxicologist at Axis, testified that Petty had an “extremely elevated level” of fentanyl in her system at the time of her death. (Id. at 115.) He explained the concentration of methamphetamine in Petty's system was “on the low side of illicit use.” (Id.) The trial court found Thatcher guilty of both counts, but to avoid double jeopardy, the trial court entered a judgment of conviction on only the count of Level 1 felony dealing in a controlled substance resulting in death. The trial court sentenced Thatcher to thirty-five years in the Indiana Department of Correction.

Discussion and Decision

1. Toxicology Report

[10] Thatcher asserts the trial court erred by admitting Petty's toxicology report because the State failed to demonstrate an adequate chain of custody for the blood sample Axis tested. We afford trial courts broad discretion regarding the admission of evidence, and we usually review such decisions for an abuse of that discretion. Wanke v. State, 231 N.E.3d 878, 882 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024). “A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it, or if the court has misinterpreted the law.” Scanland v. State, 139 N.E.3d 237, 242 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019).

[11] However, Thatcher did not object to the admission of Petty's toxicology report at trial. “[I]f a party fails to object to admission of the challenged evidence before the trial court, the issue is waived for appeal unless the admission constitutes fundamental error.” Richey v. State, 210 N.E.3d 329, 342 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023). “The fundamental error exception to the contemporaneous-objection requirement applies only ‘when the error constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendant fundamental due process.’ ” Fouts v. State, 207 N.E.3d 1257, 1266 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (quoting Brown v. State, 929 N.E.2d 204, 207 (Ind. 2010)), aff'd on reh'g, 210 N.E.3d 902 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), trans. denied. “The fundamental error exception is extremely narrow and reaches only those errors that are so blatant the trial judge should have taken action sua sponte.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original).

[12] Thatcher argues the admission of the toxicology report constituted fundamental error because the State did not demonstrate the required chain of custody for the blood sample at issue. “An exhibit is admissible ‘if the evidence regarding its chain of custody strongly suggests the exact whereabouts of the evidence at all times.’ ” Jones v. State, 218 N.E.3d 3, 9 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (quoting Culver v. State, 727 N.E.2d 1062, 1067 (Ind. 2000)), trans. denied. The exhibit's proponent must provide the court with a reasonable assurance that the exhibit passed through the various parties handling the exhibit undisturbed. Id. With fungible evidence, like blood and hair samples, the proponent's burden is higher because such evidence is indistinguishable to the naked eye. Id. However, the proponent “need not establish a perfect chain of custody, and any gaps in the chain go to the weight of the evidence and not to its admissibility.” Id. The mere possibility of tampering is not enough to disqualify evidence on chain of custody grounds. Id.

[13] Dr. Wagner explained that it was his standard procedure in performing an autopsy to collect blood, vitreous fluid, and urine samples from the body. He stated that in accordance with that procedure, he collected blood and vitreous fluid from Petty. There was no urine present in Petty's body for him to collect. Dr. Wagner then sent the samples to Axis for toxicology testing.

[14] Shanks described the lab's procedure for receiving samples. He explained a “client, who is typically a coroner or medical examiner, will draw the samples at autopsy. They will send the samples in tubes that we provide to them. We provide them specific tubes and a kit. They will send that to us via FedEx overnight.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 111.) Axis assigns a unique case number to each case and gives each specimen an identification number and bar code. The samples are then placed in “temporary secure refrigerated storage until testing is started.” (Id. at 112.) Shanks testified that, to the best of his knowledge, Petty's samples were submitted to Axis in accordance with the proper procedure and the toxicology report admitted as evidence was a true and accurate copy of the report that was issued after the testing of those samples. Thatcher points to no evidence indicating the samples were handled in any matter other than in accordance with standard procedure. Thus, the State presented sufficient evidence of the blood's whereabouts to provide the trial court with reasonable assurance that the tested blood sample was Petty's blood and that it had not been tampered with. Consequently, the trial court did not commit fundamental error in admitting the toxicology report. See, e.g., Mateo v. State, 981 N.E.2d 59, 67 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (holding State established a proper chain of custody when it presented evidence regarding the whereabouts of knives containing DNA evidence from the time when police collected the knives until trial), trans. denied.

2. Sufficiency of Evidence

[15] Thatcher also contends the State failed to present sufficient evidence to sustain his conviction. “When faced with challenges to the sufficiency of evidence, we apply a ‘well settled’ standard of review that leaves determination of the weight of the evidence and credibility of the witnesses to the fact-finder.” Young v. State, 244 N.E.3d 950, 963 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (quoting Teising v. State, 226 N.E.3d 780, 783 (Ind. 2024)), trans. denied. “We consider only the evidence most favorable to the trial court's ruling and will affirm a defendant's conviction unless ‘no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” Teising, 226 N.E.3d at 783 (quoting Jenkins v. State, 726 N.E.2d 268, 270 (Ind. 2000)).

[16] Fentanyl is a schedule I controlled substance, Ind. Code § 35-48-2-4(b), and Indiana Code section 35-42-1-1.5 states:

(a) A person who knowingly or intentionally manufactures or delivers a controlled substance or controlled substance analog, in violation of:

(1) IC 35-48-4-1 (dealing in cocaine or a narcotic drug);

(2) IC 35-48-4-1.1 (dealing in methamphetamine);

(3) IC 35-48-4-1.2 (manufacturing methamphetamine);

(4) IC 35-48-4-2 (dealing in a schedule I, II, or III controlled substance);

that, when the controlled substance is used, injected, inhaled, absorbed, or ingested, results in the death of a human being who used the controlled substance, commits dealing in a controlled substance resulting in death, a Level 1 felony.

To convict a defendant under this statute, the State must “prove a causal connection between the controlled substance delivered by the defendant and the victim's death.” Yeary v. State, 186 N.E.3d 662, 673 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022).

[17] Thatcher does not contest Petty's cause of death. Dr. Wagner concluded that Petty died as the result of fentanyl and methamphetamine intoxication. He testified the level of fentanyl in Petty's blood stream was “about ten times more than we would normally see. It's a very high level.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 97.) Dr. Wagner stated the concentration of fentanyl in Petty's system could be fatal to even the most seasoned user.

[18] Thatcher instead argues the State failed to present sufficient evidence that he was the one who supplied the fentanyl that resulted in Petty's death. Thatcher notes he presented at trial “numerous texts and snapchats containing messages from and to [Petty] from individuals that were not Teagon Thatcher.” (Appellee's Br. at 9.) He asserts “[t]he messages indicate that, at least, she had other sources for money and narcotics.” (Id. at 13.) Thatcher “submits that these other sources at least create reasonable doubt that Teagon Thatcher provided the Fentanyl that took [Petty's] life.” (Id.)

[19] Petty sent a text message to Justin Foss on February 26, 2024, asking: “can u help me find sum like jus a lil bit I wld prefer blues ik u said u was slowing down pls u gotta kno someone or sum but I only got 20 thas y I wld prefer blues[.]” (Exhibit Vol. 2 at 159-60) (errors in original). A “blue” refers to a pill containing fentanyl. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 184.) However, there is no indication Foss ever responded to this message. In contrast, Thatcher sent text messages to Petty offering to sell her fentanyl and telling her he would give her 1.5 grams on credit. He also met with Petty on the front porch of his sister's house the night before she died. While Thatcher asserted that he gave Petty cash during that meeting, Petty did not have any cash on her when she and Hodge stopped for a meal on the way home from the meeting with Thatcher. Thus, a reasonable trier of fact could conclude from this evidence that Petty obtained the fentanyl that caused her death from Thatcher. Thatcher's argument that someone other than Thatcher could have supplied the fentanyl that killed Petty because she utilized multiple dealers to support her habit is a request for us to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See, e.g., Veach v. State, 204 N.E.3d 331, 338 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (holding State presented sufficient evidence to sustain defendant's conviction for dealing in a controlled substance resulting in death and noting defendant's argument about the identity of the substance he delivered to the victim was an impermissible request to reweigh the evidence), trans. denied.

Conclusion

[20] The trial court did not commit fundamental error by admitting the toxicology report, and the State presented sufficient evidence to sustain Thatcher's conviction. We accordingly affirm the trial court's judgment.

[21] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1.5.

2.   Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), reh'g denied.

3.   Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1(a).

May, Judge.

Weissmann, J., and Scheele, J., concur.