Ruth Castro, Appellant-Defendant v. Moed Properties c/o Highgates Property Management, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Ruth Castro (“Tenant”) appeals from the trial court's order evicting her from an apartment owned by Moed Properties c/o Highgates Property Management (“Landlord”). Although Tenant raises numerous issues in her appellate brief, we find the following issue to be dispositive: whether the trial court erred when it issued the order of eviction and order of possession in favor of Landlord. We affirm.¹

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On December 10, 2024, Landlord filed its Notice of Claim seeking eviction and alleging that Tenant's lease “expired on July 11, 2024,” that “Landlord provided a Notice of Non-Renewal to [T]enant on May 10, 2024[,] stating the lease would not be renewed and to vacate the apartment at the end of the lease, July 11, 2024,” and that “[T]enant has refused to vacate the property.” Appellee's App. Vol. 2 p. 11. The lease along with the notice of non-renewal were attached to and made part of the Landlord's complaint.

[3] On December 18, 2024, Tenant filed her response asserting that eviction proceedings were pursued as a “retaliatory practice” because she filed a “complaint of denial of a simple accommodation with HUD applying my civil and human rights under the fair housing ACT due to recognised [sic] disability under that fair housing rights ACT.” Id. at 38. On January 9, 2025, the eviction hearing was held, at which Tenant appeared, pro se. At the hearing, Landlord's property manager, Kristy Christensen (“Christensen”) testified that Landlord was seeking possession of the apartment at 1637 East Market Street, Apartment 315, New Albany, Indiana (“the Apartment”). Christensen also testified that she was familiar with Tenant's lease for the Apartment, that the term of the lease expired on July 11, 2024, and that Landlord gave Tenant a notice of non-renewal sixty days prior to the expiration of the lease. Christensen further testified that Tenant failed to vacate the Apartment by July 11, 2024, and had not vacated the Apartment as of the date of the hearing. Landlord was seeking possession of the Apartment as of January 31, 2025. Christensen informed the trial court that, pursuant to the lease, Landlord was requesting attorney fees and court costs.

[4] Tenant did not refute or rebut any of Christensen's testimony. On cross-examination, Tenant asked Christensen if she was aware that Tenant had contacted various agencies to obtain “a water test in the water in the [A]partment” “because of my disability” and “because I was getting extremely sick.” Tr. p. 2-8. Christensen testified that she was aware the Tenant had filed a civil rights complaint, and that the case was closed and “had no findings.” Id. On re-redirect examination, Christensen further testified the civil rights complaint was filed on June 3, 2024, in federal court, after Landlord delivered its notice of non-renewal of the Lease.

[5] Tenant did not challenge Landlord's right not to renew her Lease. When she made her statement to the trial court, she testified that the eviction was filed “[b]ecause this is a retaliation against me for calling HUD, for asking ․ the [water] filter to be connected at my expense.” Id. at 2-10. Tenant stated she was “claiming the clean hands doctrine,” asserting that Landlord had “dirty hands” and that the eviction was an act of retaliation because of Tenant's filing of her complaints to the various agencies. Id. at 2-10, 2-11. Additionally, Tenant did not testify as to what her disability was or offer any evidence in support of her claimed disability. She also did not offer any evidence as to when she contacted HUD, or what the accommodation was that she requested. Tenant did not present evidence that Landlord knew of her complaint to HUD when the non-renewal notice was served to Tenant.

[6] On January 13, 2025, the trial court issued its order evicting Tenant from the Apartment and ordering her to vacate the Apartment by January 31, 2025. The order also awarded Landlord attorney fees in the amount of $600, plus court costs and post-judgment interest. Tenant now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[7] Initially, we note that Tenant has chosen to proceed pro se. A litigant is not given special consideration by virtue of his or her pro se status. Kelley v. State, 166 N.E.3d 936, 937 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021). “It is well settled that pro se litigants are held to the same legal standards as licensed attorneys. This means that pro se litigants are bound to follow the established rules of procedure and must be prepared to accept the consequences of their failure to do so.” Basic v. Amouri, 58 N.E.3d 980, 983–84 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (internal citations omitted). These consequences include waiver for failure to present cogent arguments on appeal. Id. at 984. Although we prefer to decide issues on the merits, where the appellant's noncompliance with the rules of appellate procedure is so substantial that it impedes our appellate consideration of the errors, we may deem the alleged errors waived. Id.

[8] The purpose of our appellate rules, and Indiana Appellate Rule 46 in particular, is “ ‘to aid and expedite review and to relieve the appellate court of the burden of searching the record and briefing the case.’ ” Dridi v. Cole Kline LLC, 172 N.E.3d 361, 364 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (quoting Ramsey v. Rev. Bd. of Ind. Dep't of Workforce Dev., 789 N.E.2d 486, 487 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003)). We will not become an advocate for a party and will not address arguments that are either inappropriate, too poorly developed, or lacking sufficient clarity to be understood. Id.

[9] Tenant's appellate brief contains several deficiencies and violates several provisions of Appellate Rule 46(A) in some manner. Specifically, although Tenant's brief contains references to a few trial rules, Code sections, and rules of professional conduct and judicial conduct, her brief contains no citation to legal authority or case law for any of her propositions, nor does Tenant cite to any portions of the record in support of her argument. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8) (requiring contentions of the appellant contained in the argument section to be supported by citation to legal authorities and the parts of the record on appeal relied upon). Additionally, the brief does not contain a statement of facts section and, therefore, does not contain a narrative statement of the relevant facts. See App. R. 46(A)(6) (requiring the statement of facts section to consist of a narrative statement of the facts presented in accordance with the standard of review appropriate to the judgment being appealed and supported by page references to the record). Further, the brief does not contain either a statement of issues or summary of the argument, containing a concise or succinct description of the issues presented or the arguments made in the brief. See App. R. 46(A)(4) (requiring the statement of issues to contain a concise and particular description of each issue presented); App. R. 46(A)(7) (requiring the summary of the argument section to contain a succinct, clear, and accurate statement of the arguments).

[10] “ ‘While we are often tolerant of minor infractions of the appellate rules so that we may decide appeals on their merits, those rules are nonetheless binding on all persons bringing appeals to this court.’ ” Ramsey, 789 N.E.2d at 490 (quoting Sartain v. Blunck, 453 N.E.2d 324, 325 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983)). Tenant's noncompliance with the appellate rules, lack of cogent argument, and failure to cite to legal authority or portions of the record to support her assertions impedes our ability to provide meaningful appellate review of her arguments. A party waives an issue where the party fails to develop a cogent argument or provide adequate citation to authority and portions of the record. Clary-Ghosh v. Ghosh, 26 N.E.3d 986, 989 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (citing Dickes v. Felger, 981 N.E.2d 559, 562 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012)), trans. denied.

[11] Waiver notwithstanding, to the extent that Tenant argues that the trial court erred in granting the eviction, we disagree. Tenant appeals from a negative judgment. We will reverse only if the evidence leads to but one conclusion, and the small claims court reached the opposite conclusion. Kim v. Vill. at Eagle Creek Homeowners Ass'n, Inc., 133 N.E.3d 250, 252 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). Judgments in small claims actions are “subject to review as prescribed by relevant Indiana rules and statutes.” Eagle Aircraft, Inc. v. Trojnar, 983 N.E.2d 648, 657 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (citing Ind. Small Claims Rule 11(A)). The reviewing court does not reweigh the evidence or determine the credibility of witnesses but considers only the evidence supporting the judgment and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from that evidence. Id. We presume the court correctly applied the law. Id. A judgment will be reversed only if the evidence leads to but one conclusion, and the trial court reached the opposite conclusion. Kim, 133 N.E.3d at 252.

[12] Here, the evidence presented at the eviction hearing established that Tenant had a year-long lease for the Apartment, which expired on July 11, 2024. Under the terms of the lease, the lease “shall be automatically renewed ․ on a month to month basis after its original expiration date unless otherwise notified by Landlord.” Appellee's App. Vol. 2 p. 15 (emphasis added). On May 10, 2024, Landlord sent a notice of non-renewal to Tenant, notifying her that Landlord would not be renewing the lease and that Tenant must vacate the Apartment by the “end of [the] lease term.” Id. at 36. Tenant failed to vacate the Apartment at the expiration of the lease on July 11, 2024. Pursuant to the lease, when a tenant fails to vacate at the termination of the lease, “Landlord may take all steps necessary to remove Tenant ․ and Tenant shall acquire no additional rights or extension of lease term[s] by reason of such holding over.” Id. at 15. Because Tenant failed to vacate the Apartment, Landlord filed an eviction claim against Tenant. Therefore, under the lease, Landlord was not obligated to renew her lease, and once the notice of non-renewal was sent, Tenant was required to vacate the Apartment at the end of the lease. When she did not vacate the Apartment, Landlord took the necessary step to file an eviction claim against Tenant.

[13] Tenant argues that the non-renewal of her lease and the subsequent eviction was done by Landlord in retaliation for Tenant filing claims under the Fair Housing Act with the federal courts. However, the evidence at the hearing revealed that Landlord sent the notice of non-renewal to Tenant on May 10, 2024, which alerted Tenant to Landlord's decision to not renew Tenant's lease, and which was the basis of the later eviction. Tenant's complaint was filed with the federal court on June 3, 2024, which was subsequent to the notice of non-renewal. Therefore, contrary to Tenant's contention, Landlord's decision to not renew Tenant's lease could not have been in response or retaliation to Tenant's filing of a complaint in the federal court. Further, to the extent that Tenant argues the substance of her claims pending in federal court, such claims were not before the trial court, and the outcome of such claims will be determined in due course through the federal court system.

[14] Based on our review of the record, we cannot say that the evidence from the eviction hearing leads to but one conclusion, and the trial court reached the opposite conclusion. We, therefore, affirm the trial court's grant of judgment in favor of Landlord.

[15] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   We note that Tenant filed a motion with this court, requesting an expeditious decision. As we have now issued an opinion in due course, along with this opinion, we issue an order denying Tenant's motion as there is no further relief to be granted to Tenant.

Foley, Judge.

Judges Kenworthy and Scheele concur. Kenworthy, J. and Scheele, J., concur.