T.P. (Mother), Appellant-Respondent v. Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee-Petitioner (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] T.P. (Mother) consented to the adoption of her three children (collectively, Children) after they were removed from Mother's home due to her drug use and adjudicated as children in need of services (CHINS). Mother then stopped participating in all court-ordered services and failed to appear for subsequent hearings in Children's cases. When the prospective adoptive family later withdrew from the adoption, Mother was twice asked whether she wished to restart services aimed at reuniting her with Children but Mother declined both times. The Indiana Department of Child Services (DCS) thereafter petitioned to terminate Mother's parental rights as to Children, and the trial court granted the petitions. Mother appeals, arguing that her prior consent to Children's adoptions precluded involuntary termination proceedings and that insufficient evidence supported the termination of her parental rights. We affirm.¹

Facts

[2] In September 2021, Mother's youngest child, P.P., tested positive for methamphetamine at birth. DCS was notified of P.P.’s condition and began an assessment. Mother admitted that she had used methamphetamine and Adderall during the week leading up to P.P.’s birth. DCS also learned that hospital staff suspected Mother was under the influence when she visited P.P. at the hospital in the days following his birth.

[3] DCS soon filed petitions alleging all three of Mother's children—A.Y. (born in 2016), S.P. (born in 2020)  ² , and P.P.—were CHINS. The petitions included allegations that Children lacked a sober caregiver based on Mother's history of substance abuse and admitted use of methamphetamine and Adderall during her pregnancy. Mother ultimately admitted the CHINS allegations, acknowledging her substance abuse issues and that the family could benefit from services.

[4] The trial court approved reunification as a permanency plan for Children, and Mother had mixed success in reunification services for the next year and a half. Though she twice progressed to unsupervised visitation with her children, Mother relapsed both times and was required to return to supervised visits. In February 2023, the trial court suspended visitation and soon after approved adoption as a concurrent permanency plan. In June 2023, Mother signed consents to a specific family's adoption of Children. She then stopped participating in services and attending court hearings.

[5] The prospective adoptive family ultimately decided against adopting Children, and DCS moved Children to their current pre-adoptive placement around March 2024. The DCS Family Case Manager (FCM) assigned to Children's CHINS cases informed Mother of the change and asked her on at least two occasions whether she wished to restart reunification services. Mother declined both times.

[6] In October 2024, DCS filed petitions to terminate Mother's parental rights as to Children. Mother attended the initial hearing, where she was given the date for the subsequent fact-finding hearing and was warned that if she did not attend, the hearing could proceed without her. Mother failed to appear at the fact-finding hearing, though she was represented by counsel. The trial court terminated Mother's parental rights as to all three children. She appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[7] When reviewing the termination of parental rights, we apply a “highly deferential standard of review.” In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 642 (Ind. 2014). We do not reweigh evidence or judge witness credibility but consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that support the trial court's judgment. Id. We reverse only when the judgment is clearly erroneous. Id.

[8] On appeal, Mother specifically takes issue with DCS's involuntary termination of her rights after she signed adoption consents for Children. She also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the terminations. As both arguments fail, we affirm.

I. Mother's Prior Consents to Adoption

[9] Though her appellate brief lacks clarity, Mother appears to make multiple claims relating to her prior consents to Children's adoption. She presents an unusual position, seeking reversal of the termination order while simultaneously arguing that her parental rights should have been terminated through her prior consent. This inherent contradiction makes it difficult to discern the precise relief Mother seeks.

[10] We understand Mother to claim that the prior consents “negated the need” for DCS to pursue involuntary termination. Appellant's Br., p. 7. But Mother provides no citations to authority or further analysis of this assertion, and she fails to include the adoption consent documents in the appellate record. She has therefore waived her argument. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a) (requiring argument be supported by citations to authority and cogent reasoning); A.D.S. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1156 n.4 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (finding claim waived where it was not supported by cogent reasoning). Waiver notwithstanding, the FCM testified that Mother signed adoption consents for a specific family who ultimately withdrew from the adoption. This supports the trial court's finding that DCS no longer had valid consent and appropriately sought involuntary termination.

[11] Mother also questions the timing of her notification that Children's placement was changed. She claims there was “zero evidence presented that [M]other was made aware of the change of placement prior to the filing of the Involuntary Termination of Rights Petitions despite the requirement for DCS to do so.” Appellant's Br., p. 10. But Mother cites no authority for this claimed requirement and offers no further analysis.³ Moreover, Mother acknowledged that she was notified of the change in placement multiple times before the fact-finding hearing. The FCM testified that “the first update [Mother] got was actually from the placement that didn't want to pursue the adoption [ ] and then she did call me and we spoke about it.” Tr. p. 40. Mother does not explain why these notifications were inadequate or how she was prejudiced.

[12] Finally, Mother argues that she was deprived of the opportunity to reunify with Children. She alleges that because she had previously signed adoption consents, she “believed that reunification was no longer the plan and [that] she was not required to participate in court ordered services.” Appellant's Br., p. 10. She briefly references her due process rights, presumably in reference to this alleged lack of opportunity.

[13] Because a parent's right to raise her child is protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the State must adhere to the requirements of due process when seeking to terminate parental rights. See In re C.G., 954 N.E.2d 910, 917 (Ind. 2011). “[T]he fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Id. (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976)). And though due process requires that “DCS must have made reasonable efforts to preserve and/or reunify the family unit” in the underlying CHINS case, those required efforts “vary by case.” In re T.W., 135 N.E.3d 607, 615 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019).

[14] Here, the record demonstrates that DCS gave Mother ample opportunity to work towards reunification, despite her inconsistency and ultimate abandonment of services. After Children were adjudicated as CHINS, Mother was given 18 months to work towards reunification before she signed the adoption consents. During that time, Mother's participation in services was “sporadic.” Tr. p. 29. She twice achieved unsupervised visitation but relapsed both times and returned to supervised visits. She never completed substance abuse treatment, did not obtain employment, and “did not cope well” with the stress of managing Children during visits. Id. at 37.

[15] Then, after she signed the adoption consents in June 2023, Mother stopped participating in all reunification services. When the planned adoption fell through, Mother was notified and asked “at least twice” whether she wanted to restart services like drug screening and therapy. Id. at 27. But Mother declined both times. Mother later attended the initial hearing on the termination petitions but failed to appear for the fact-finding hearing—further demonstrating that she was aware of the status of Children's cases but chose not to engage.

[16] Mother cannot now claim unfair surprise or lack of opportunity when she was repeatedly given the chance to reengage in Children's cases after the adoption fell through. Parents “may not sit idly by without asserting a need or desire for services and then successfully argue that [they were] denied services.” In re B.D.J., 728 N.E.2d 195, 201 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000).

II. Sufficiency of Evidence

[17] Mother also challenges the sufficiency of evidence supporting the termination of her parental rights under Indiana Code § 31-35-2-4 (2024).⁴ This statute required DCS to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, three elements: (1) there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of Children; (2) termination is in Children's best interest; and (3) one or more of the enumerated circumstances in subsection (d) exists. See Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c) (2024).

[18] When reviewing a termination of parental rights, we do not reweigh evidence or judge witness credibility. In re R.S., 56 N.E.3d 625, 628 (Ind. 2016). When, as here, the trial court has entered findings of fact and conclusions of law, we first “determine whether the evidence supports the findings, and second we determine whether the findings support the judgment.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). “The judgment will be set aside if found to be clearly erroneous.” Id.

[19] Here, Mother attempts to challenge some of the trial court's factual findings and also disputes three of the court's conclusions. We find no clear error in the trial court's judgment.

A. Mother Waived Her Challenge to the Factual Findings

[20] Mother attempts to challenge certain factual findings, but the entirety of her argument on this point reads as follows:

Mother specifically asserts that the following finding[s] of fact were not supported by the evidence, Finding #12, 14, 15, 32 & 40.

Appellant's Br., p. 8.⁵

[21] Mother provides no substantive argument or analysis as to why these findings are unsupported by the record and no citation to authority or contrary evidence. As a result, she has waived her challenge. See App. R. 46(A)(8)(a) (requiring argument be supported by cogent reasoning and citation to authorities and record); In re Involuntary Termination of Parent-Child Relationship of B.R., 875 N.E.2d 369, 373 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (finding parent's challenge to trial court's findings and conclusions waived for failure to present cogent argument).

B. The Trial Court's Conclusions Are Not Clearly Erroneous

[22] We understand Mother to challenge the trial court's conclusions regarding the third element required for terminating parental rights—that one or more of the enumerated circumstances under Indiana Code § 31-35-2-4(d) existed. DCS alleged, and the trial court found, that two such circumstances existed: that (1) Children had been removed for at least fifteen of the most recent twenty-two months, and despite reasonable reunification efforts, Mother had been unable to remedy the conditions that prompted the removal; and (2) there was a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in Children's removal would not be remedied. Because the statute requires a termination petition allege “one or more” of these circumstances, proof of one is sufficient to meet this element. See In re S.K., 124 N.E.3d 1225, 1233 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (finding similar language in prior version of statute—“one (1) of the following is true”—required DCS to prove only one of the listed circumstances to satisfy the element).

[23] We find dispositive the conclusion that there was a reasonable probability the conditions that resulted in removal would not be remedied. In reviewing this conclusion, we first ascertain the conditions that lead to Children's removal and then “determine whether there is a reasonable probability that those conditions will not be remedied.” In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 643. A trial court “must judge a parent's fitness as of the time of the termination proceeding, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions.” Id. (internal quotations omitted).

[24] Children were removed based on Mother's admitted substance abuse. The record shows that, after Children's removal, Mother's participation in services was “sporadic” and her substance abuse persisted. Tr. p. 29. Though she twice achieved unsupervised visitation, Mother relapsed both times. By the time of the termination hearing, Mother had stopped substance abuse treatment without completing the program. After the proposed adoption fell through, Mother twice declined reengagement with reunification services like drug screening, demonstrating her unwillingness to address the condition that resulted in Children's removal. Moreover, Mother's unexplained failure to appear at the termination hearing further suggests her inability to consistently participate in Children's cases. We find no error in the trial court's conclusion.

[25] Mother also challenges the trial court's conclusion that termination was in Children's best interests. She claims the only evidence presented on this element was the FCM's testimony that long-term involvement in the child welfare system is harmful to children. But Mother ignores the totality of the evidence supporting the court's best interests conclusion. See Matter of Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 49 (Ind. 2019) (noting that to determine best interests, courts look to the “totality of the evidence and, in doing so, subordinate the parents’ interests to those of the child[ ]”).

[26] Both the FCM and the court appointed special advocate (CASA) recommended termination and testified that termination was in Children's best interests. The CASA specifically testified that Children are “thriving” in their current placement and S.P. particularly was exhibiting improved behaviors. Tr. p. 35. The CASA also noted that P.P., who had been removed from Mother's care as an infant, “barely has any bond with [M]other.” Id. at 37. The FCM explained Mother had last seen Children around January 2023—nearly two years before the termination hearing. Such testimony, coupled with the determination that the conditions that resulted in Children's removal were unlikely to be remedied, is sufficient to support a best interests conclusion. See In re P.B., 199 N.E.3d 790, 799 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (“[Courts] have previously held that the recommendation by both the case manager and child advocate to terminate parental rights, in addition to evidence the conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, is sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child's best interests.”).

[27] Children have “an interest in terminating parental rights that prevent adoption and inhibit establishing secure, stable, long-term, continuous relationships.” In re C.G., 954 N.E.2d at 917. Here, Children had not seen Mother in years and were thriving in their placement with a family that expressed their intent to adopt all three children. The evidence amply supported the trial court's conclusion that termination served Children's best interests.

Conclusion

[28] During the roughly three years that Children were in DCS custody, Mother demonstrated a pattern of inconsistent engagement with services and an ultimate abandonment of reunification efforts. When offered two opportunities to reengage after Children's proposed adoption fell through, Mother declined. She then failed to appear for the termination hearing. We find no error in the trial court's determination that DCS met its burden in terminating Mother's parental rights as to her three children.

[29] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Father's parental rights as to Children were separately terminated.

2.   The record contains some inconsistency regarding the middle child's initials. Mother's brief refers to this child as “S.Y.” (the initials used in the original CHINS petitions), but DCS uses “S.P.” (the initials the trial court used in its termination order). As the termination order is the subject of this appeal, we use “S.P.”

3.   Instead, Mother cites only to Indiana Code § 31-34-23-6(a), which outlines the situations in which DCS is required to file a motion requesting a change of placement. This statute only applies when a child has been in a foster family home or relative care and “in the same out-of-home placement for at least one (1) year,” and it excepts situations of emergency change in placement. Id. But even here, Mother's assertion lacks analysis: she merely restates the statute without explaining how it applies to her situation or pointing to evidence that would support its application, such as the length of Children's placement before being moved.

4.   This statute was significantly amended effective March 2024—months before the termination petitions were filed in July 2024. The termination petitions correctly reference the 2024 version in effect at the time of filing. This statute was amended again, effective July 2025, but those changes did not affect the subsections at issue in this case.

5.   The first three findings pertain to the trial court's determinations that Mother executed restricted—not general—consents to adoption, then stopped attending hearings and declined reengagement in services. Finding 32 states that Mother never made “consistent, lasting progress towards reunification” during the case, and Finding 40 is not a finding of fact, but a conclusion of law. App. Vol. II, p. 20.

Weissmann, Judge.

Judges Bailey and Brown concur. Bailey, J., and Brown, J., concur.