FRANKLIN v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] During a traffic stop, a law enforcement K9 alerted to the presence of drugs inside Toro Tiant Franklin Jr.’s vehicle. A search of the vehicle revealed fentanyl pills inside the trunk. Franklin was charged with and convicted of possession of a narcotic drug. Franklin now appeals that conviction and raises one issue for our review: Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support his conviction.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On April 20, 2023, South Bend Police Department Officer Alex Williams initiated a traffic stop on Franklin's vehicle because it had expired plates. Officer Williams pulled up behind Franklin's vehicle and activated the emergency lights. The officer's dash camera video showed the vehicle approach a stop sign and, without stopping at the stop sign, turn left onto another road. Officer Williams activated his siren, and Franklin, the driver and sole occupant, stopped the vehicle soon after. Law enforcement determined that the vehicle was registered to Franklin's girlfriend.

[4] South Bend Police Department Officer Paul Strabavy arrived at the scene with Gary, a law enforcement K9, and instructed Gary to perform an open-air sniff of the vehicle. Gary “alerted by [ ] sitting down” at the driver's side of the vehicle, indicating that he “recognize[d]” the presence of contraband. Tr. Vol. II at 46. Officers Williams and Strabavy searched the vehicle.

[5] In the passenger area of the vehicle, the officers found money in various denominations, a piece of paper listing Franklin's name and date of birth, a prescription pill bottle bearing Franklin's name, and a clear bottle containing an unidentified substance. The trunk contained “clothes and shoes and bags” and “just a ton of stuff.” Tr. Vol. II at 51. Officer Strabavy searched “through the bags of clothes” in the trunk and found a small, folded business card that contained five blue M30 pills. Id. at 50. One of the pills was later tested and determined to contain 0.11 grams of fentanyl. The other four pills were not tested but had a combined weight of 0.43 grams.

[6] Franklin was transported to the police station, where Officer Williams conducted an interview. During the interview, Franklin told Officer Williams that the vehicle belonged to his girlfriend; the vehicle had been in Franklin's possession for a “couple hours” that day; Franklin sometimes allowed his friends to use the vehicle, and his friends last used it one or two weeks before the traffic stop. Ex. Vol. IV, State's Ex. 11 at 01:27–01:45. Franklin asked the officer if there was “something” in the vehicle. Id. at 02:10. The officer asked Franklin, “What all in the car is yours?” Id. at 02:23. Franklin stated that the medicine, money, shoes, and clothing in the vehicle belonged to him and that the clothing was located in the trunk. Franklin told Officer Strabavy, who assisted with the interview, that he knew what an M30 pill was.

[7] The State charged Franklin with possession of a narcotic drug as a Level 6 felony ¹ . A jury found Franklin guilty as charged. The trial court sentenced Franklin to one year to be served as a direct commitment to Michiana Community Corrections. This appeal ensued.²

Discussion and Decision

The State Presented Sufficient Evidence to Support Franklin's Conviction

[8] Franklin claims that the State did not present sufficient evidence to support his conviction for possession of a narcotic drug. Our standard of review for such a claim is as follows:

Our standard for reviewing evidentiary sufficiency challenges is well established, as we have made clear that “[i]t is the fact-finder's role, not that of appellate courts, to assess witness credibility and weigh the evidence to determine whether it is sufficient to support a conviction.” Teising v. State, 226 N.E.3d 780, 783 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007)). “A conviction is supported by sufficient evidence if ‘there is substantial evidence of probative value supporting each element of the offense such that a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” Hancz-Barron v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1237, 1244 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Willis v. State, 27 N.E.3d 1065, 1066 (Ind. 2015)). This Court reviews only the evidence most favorable to the verdict and the reasonable inferences therefrom, and will reverse only where it is shown that “no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Teising, 226 N.E.3d at 783.

Konkle v. State, 253 N.E.3d 1068, 1090–91 (Ind. 2025).

[9] To convict Franklin of possession of a narcotic drug as a Level 6 felony as charged, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Franklin, without a valid prescription, knowingly possessed “a narcotic drug (pure or adulterated) classified in schedule I or II.” Ind. Code § 35-48-4-6(a); see Appellant's App. Vol. II at 15. The State alleged that Franklin knowingly possessed fentanyl, which is a narcotic opioid listed as a Schedule II controlled substance. Appellant's App. Vol. II at 15; I.C. § 35-48-2-6 (2020).

[10] Franklin contends that the State presented insufficient evidence to establish that he knowingly possessed the five fentanyl pills found in the trunk of the vehicle. There are two types of possession: (1) actual and (2) constructive. Sargent v. State, 27 N.E.3d 729, 732–33 (Ind. 2015). “Actual possession occurs when a person has direct physical control over the item.” Id. at 733 (citing Gee v. State, 810 N.E.2d 338, 340 (Ind. 2004)). “A person constructively possesses [an item] when the person has (1) the capability to maintain dominion and control over the item; and (2) the intent to maintain dominion and control over it.” Id. (alteration in original) (citing Gray v. State, 957 N.E.2d 171, 174 (Ind. 2011)).

[11] Franklin concedes that “he had the capability to reduce the [fentanyl] pills to his personal possession (by removing them from the trunk).” Appellant's Br. at 12. He claims only that the State presented insufficient evidence to show that he “intended to control the Fentanyl” when, according to Franklin, “the Fentanyl was hidden in a business card, in a bag, underneath [a] large amount of other items” in the trunk. Id. at 12, 13 (internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis added). When a defendant does not have exclusive possession of the location where the contraband was found, the State must support the inference of intent “with additional circumstances pointing to the defendant's knowledge of the presence and the nature of the item.” Gray, 957 N.E.2d at 175 (citing Gee, 810 N.E.2d at 341). Intent to maintain dominion and control can be proved through a variety of means:

(1) A defendant's incriminating statements; (2) a defendant's attempting to leave or making furtive gestures; (3) the location of contraband like drugs in settings suggesting manufacturing; (4) the item's proximity to the defendant; (5) the location of contraband within the defendant's plain view; and (6) the mingling of contraband with other items the defendant owns.

Id. (citing Gee, 810 N.E.2d at 341).

[12] We have also recognized the nature of the place where the contraband is found is an additional circumstance that demonstrates the defendant's knowledge of the contraband. See Johnson v. State, 59 N.E.3d 1071, 1074 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (noting presence of heroin under driver's seat was a circumstance that demonstrated Johnson knew of contraband). Ultimately, our question is whether a reasonable factfinder could conclude from the evidence that the defendant knew of the nature and presence of the contraband. Id. (citing Gray, 957 N.E.2d at 174–75).

[13] Franklin claims that he possessed the vehicle for “only a short period of time,” and thus, additional evidence was required to establish his intent to control the fentanyl. Appellant's Br. at 13. However, he was the sole occupant of the vehicle when Officer Williams stopped him. As our Supreme Court held in Goliday v. State, exclusive possession of a vehicle is sufficient to raise a reasonable inference of intent. 708 N.E.2d 4, 6 (Ind. 1999). Thus, the jury could have reasonably inferred that Franklin intended to control the fentanyl. Even without this inference, there are “additional circumstances pointing to the defendant's knowledge of the presence and the nature” of the fentanyl pills, which we address below. Gray, 957 N.E.2d at 175 (citing Gee, 810 N.E.2d at 341).

[14] Here, the evidence establishes that Franklin made incriminating statements. See Gray, 957 N.E.2d at 175 (citing Gee, 810 N.E.2d at 341). During his interview at the police station, Franklin told Officer Williams that the shoes and clothing in the vehicle belonged to him and that the clothing was located in the trunk. Officer Strabavy found the M30 pills among the “bags of clothes” in the trunk. Tr. Vol. II at 50. Additionally, Franklin told Officer Strabavy that he knew what an M30 pill was.

[15] As for the location of the fentanyl pills, the law enforcement officers found the contraband in a vehicle driven by Franklin; the vehicle contained a piece of paper listing Franklin's name and date of birth and a prescription pill bottle bearing Franklin's name. The fentanyl pills were found in the trunk of the vehicle—in a folded business card located in a bag—mingled with clothing and shoes that Franklin admitted were his. The mingling of contraband with other items a defendant owns is an additional circumstance indicator of knowledge and intent for constructive possession. Gray, 957 N.E.2d at 175; see, e.g., Shorter v. State, 144 N.E.3d 829, 840 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (holding evidence sufficient to find defendant constructively possessed firearm in part because it was found in same bag as other items belonging to him), trans. denied.

[16] The evidence admitted at Franklin's trial shows that a reasonable factfinder could conclude Franklin knew of the nature and presence of the fentanyl pills, see Johnson, 59 N.E.3d at 1073 (citing Gray, 957 N.E.3d at 174–75), and, therefore, had both the capability and the intent to maintain dominion and control over that contraband, see Gray, 957 N.E.2d at 174. We therefore conclude that the evidence is sufficient to show that Franklin constructively possessed the fentanyl found in the trunk of the vehicle Franklin drove. We affirm Franklin's conviction.

[17] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-48-4-6(a).

2.   Franklin also includes in his case caption Cause No. 71D08-1908-F5-000183 (“the Probation Cause”). Franklin had nearly completed serving a term of probation in the Probation Cause when he committed the instant offense, possession of a narcotic drug, in Cause No. 71D08-2304-F6-000422. The trial court determined that by committing the instant offense, Franklin violated the terms and conditions of his probation in the Probation Cause. At sentencing for the instant offense, the trial court addressed the probation violation but imposed no sanction. In this appeal, Franklin raises no issues related to the Probation Cause.

Felix, Judge.

Vaidik, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.