IN RE: B.P. (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] T.P. (“Mother”) and J.P. (“Father”) (collectively, “Parents”) appeal the trial court's order adjudicating their five minor children, B.P., Ja.P., A.P., Jo.P., and D.P. (collectively, “the Children”), as Children in Need of Services (“CHINS”). Parents raise one issue for our review, namely, whether the juvenile court clearly erred when it adjudicated the Children to be CHINS. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Mother and Father are not married but have been in a long-term relationship for over twenty years. During that time, Mother gave birth to the Children.¹ From January 2017 through September 2024, Mother took the Children from the home on at least five occasions and stayed in a domestic-violence shelter for periods ranging from one night to a few weeks. Each time, Mother reported that she had been the victim of domestic violence. During that time, in December 2023, Mother also obtained a protective order against Father. Thereafter, Mother also called the police on Father at least five times. In September 2024, Mother again went to a domestic-violence shelter and reported “ongoing domestic violence in the household” and that Father had made “threats to kill” one of the Children. Tr. at 97.

[3] Also in September, the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) received a report that Mother had filed for an order of protection against Father, that the Children were missing school, and that there was a history of domestic violence between Mother and Father. DCS assessment workers Jessica Milliner and Brittney Sule investigated the reports. Sule spoke with Mother, who reported that Father had “threaten[ed] to kill” her and one of the Children and that he had become physically aggressive with one of their daughters. Id. at 103. Mother also acknowledged that the stays at the shelters had negatively impacted the Children's attendance and grades at school. DCS substantiated the allegation of domestic violence.

[4] On October 11, DCS filed a petition alleging that the Children were CHINS because their physical or mental conditions are seriously endangered “as a result of the neglect or refusal” of Parents “to provide necessary care and a safe living environment free of domestic violence.” Appellants’ App. Vol. 2 at 7. DCS removed the Children from the home the same day.

[5] The court held a fact-finding hearing on DCS's petition. During the hearing, Mother acknowledged her various stays in the shelters but said that she had gone to the shelters when she and Father did not “see[ ] eye to eye” and “couldn't work things out[.]” Tr. at 29. She denied any physical abuse by Father. She also acknowledged that she had previously called the police on Father and alleged that he had “punched” one of the Children, but she again testified that that “didn't happen.” Id. at 30. Mother also admitted that the stays at the shelters had “affected the kids’ performance” in school. Id. at 33. Mother then testified that she was “lying” when she told DCS and the shelter about the domestic violence. Id. at 67. When asked if Mother had lied to police in order to obtain the protective order against Father, Mother invoked her Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.

[6] Milliner testified that she had conducted three assessments of Parents over the past two years and that the family needs services but that she did not believe “the family would be willing to engage in services without a court order.” Id. at 93. Renee Fuller, the shelter case manager, testified that Mother had disclosed “ongoing” domestic violence and that Father had “physically abused” one of their daughters. Id. at 97. She further testified that, based on her training and experience, Mother was “telling the truth” when she made those disclosures. Id. at 99. And DCS Family Case Manager (“FCM”) Sarah Mejia testified that Parents would not “engage in [domestic violence] services without the coercive intervention of the Court.” Id. at 109.

[7] Following the hearing, the court entered findings of fact and conclusions thereon. In its order, the court took “a negative inference” from Mother's invocation of her Fifth Amendment rights and did not find her testimony that she had previously lied to be credible. Appellants’ App. Vol. 2 at 15. The court also found Fuller's and Sule's testimonies “to be credible.” Id. at 16. The court then found that, because Mother and Father “deny any domestic violence in the home,” they are “unwilling” to engage in services to address that concern. Id. at 18. The court then concluded that the Children were endangered because of their “continued exposure to domestic [violence].” Id. at 20. Accordingly, the court adjudicated the Children to be CHINS. Thereafter, the court entered a dispositional order and ordered Parents to participate in services. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[8] Parents contend that the trial court's order adjudicating the Children to be CHINS is clearly erroneous. Specifically, Parents challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the CHINS determination. When reviewing the sufficiency of evidence, we give due regard to the trial court's ability to assess the credibility of witnesses. E.B. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. (In re Des.B.), 2 N.E.3d 828, 836 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). We neither reweigh evidence nor judge witness credibility; rather, we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences most favorable to the trial court's decision. Id.

[9] Where the trial court issues findings of fact and conclusions thereon, we apply a two-tiered standard of review. N.P. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. (In re R.P.), 949 N.E.2d 395, 400 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). We consider first whether the evidence supports the findings and then whether the findings support the judgment. Id. We will set aside the trial court's findings and conclusions only if they are clearly erroneous and a review of the record leaves us firmly convinced that a mistake has been made. Id. “Findings are clearly erroneous only when the record contains no facts to support them either directly or by inference.” K.B. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 24 N.E.3d 997, 1001-02 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (citation omitted).

[10] In a CHINS proceeding, DCS bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that a child meets the statutory definition of a CHINS. N.L. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. (In re N.E.), 919 N.E.2d 102, 105 (Ind. 2010). In the instant case, to meet its burden of establishing that a child is a CHINS, DCS must prove that:

(1) the child's physical or mental condition is seriously impaired or seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or neglect of the child's parent, guardian, or custodian to supply the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education, or supervision:

(A) when the parent, guardian, or custodian is financially able to do so; or

(B) due to the failure, refusal, or inability of the parent, guardian, or custodian to seek financial or other reasonable means to do so; and

(2) the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that:

(A) the child is not receiving; and

(B) is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the court.

Ind. Code § 31-34-1-1.

[11] Our Supreme Court has interpreted the statute to require “three basic elements: that the parent's actions or inactions have seriously endangered the child, that the child's needs are unmet, and (perhaps most critically) that those needs are unlikely to be met without State coercion.” J.B. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. (In re S.D.), 2 N.E.3d 1283, 1287 (Ind. 2014). The statute does not require a court to wait until a tragedy occurs to intervene. In re A.H., 913 N.E.2d 303, 306 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). Rather, a child is a CHINS when he or she is endangered by parental action or inaction. Id. The purpose of a CHINS adjudication is not to punish the parents, but to protect children. Id.

Endangerment

[12] Parents first contend that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to show that the Children's physical or mental condition was seriously impaired or endangered. Specifically, they contend that the court's findings and conclusions related to the Children's endangerment “rest on evidence that was either recanted, uncorroborated, or vague.” Appellants’ Br. at 19-20. They further contend that “no third-party witness corroborated any physical abuse” and that neither Sule nor Fuller “provided details” or “observed injuries.” Id. at 20. Thus, they maintain that DCS “presented no evidence” to support a finding that the Children were endangered by exposure to domestic violence. Id. at 22.

[13] However, the evidence most favorable to the court's findings demonstrates that Parents have a long history of domestic violence. Indeed, beginning in 2017, Mother has taken the Children to stay at a domestic-violence shelter on at least five occasions for periods of time lasting up to several weeks. Further, Mother has called the police on Father five times since December 2023, and she obtained a protective order against Father. When Mother went to the shelter in September 2024, she reported to Fuller that there was “ongoing domestic violence in the household,” that Father had made “threats to kill” Mother and one child, and that Father had “physically abused” one of their daughters. Tr. at 97. And Fuller testified that Mother “was telling the truth” when she made those disclosures. Id. at 99. Similarly, when Sule investigated the initial DCS report, Mother told her that Father had “threaten[ed] to kill” her or the children. Id. at 103.

[14] We acknowledge that Mother testified that Father had never physically abused her. However, the court was free to determine that her testimony was not credible.² Instead, the court chose to credit the testimonies of the other witnesses who testified that Mother had reported a history of domestic violence between her and Father. Thus, the evidence supports the court's finding that there is history of domestic violence in the family. And it is well settled that exposure to domestic violence can serve as a basis for a CHINS determination. See In re N.E., 919 N.E.2d at 106.

[15] Still, Parents contend that Mother's “multiple shelter stays and police calls” cannot serve as a basis for a CHINS determination because it is an “irrelevant” history and does not show any “evidence of current harm to the children.” Appellants’ Br. at 25. However, it is clear from the record that the incidents of domestic violence were not limited to the distant past. Rather, Mother took the Children to the domestic violence shelter as recently as September 2024, which is the same month that DCS received the initial allegation of neglect and began its investigation. Indeed, Mother was still at the shelter when DCS conducted its initial assessment.

[16] DCS presented evidence that Parents have an ongoing history of domestic violence and that the Children's physical or mental condition was seriously impaired or endangered as a result. Parents’ arguments on appeal are merely requests for this Court to reweigh the evidence and judge the credibility of the witnesses, which we cannot do.

Coercive Intervention of the Court

[17] Parents next contend that DCS failed to present evidence to demonstrate that the Children have needs that are unlikely to be met without the coercive intervention of the court. Parents contend that Mother testified that she “had independently initiated family counseling” and “was coordinating with school counselors and pursuing mental health services” for one of the Children, which demonstrate that they would seek services without court involvement. Appellants’ Br. at 14.

[18] However, again, the court was not required to credit Mother's testimony that she had taken any steps to participate in services. And the evidence most favorable to the court's findings shows that coercive intervention was necessary. Indeed, despite the long history of domestic abuse that Mother has reported to others, she now denies that any abuse has ever occurred. Similarly, Father denies that any abuse has ever occurred between him and Mother. Because they both deny the existence of any problem, FCM Mejia testified that Parents would not engage in services, such as domestic violence services, without the coercive intervention of the court. Similarly, Milliner testified that the family needs services but that Parents would not “be willing to engage in services without a court order.” Tr. at 93. In other words, the evidence demonstrates that Parents deny the existence of a problem and will therefore not seek services to address it. Thus, DCS presented evidence that the coercive intervention of the court is necessary. Parents’ arguments are again an improper request for us to reweigh evidence and judge witness credibility.

Conclusion

[19] DCS presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate that Parents have an ongoing problem with domestic violence, which endangers the Children, and that the coercive intervention of the court is necessary for the Parents to address the problem. We therefore affirm the court's order adjudicating the Children to be CHINS.

[20] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Father is the biological father of B.P. and Ja.P. and is the alleged father of the remaining children.

2.   Parents contend that the court “misapplied” the law “by treating [Mother's] invocation of her Fifth Amendment rights as affirmative proof that she previously made truthful allegations of abuse.” Appellants’ Br. at 17. However, the court did not rely on Mother's invocation of her Fifth Amendment rights as proof that she had been truthful in her statements to Fuller and Sule. Rather, the court found that Mother's invocation of those rights “further support[ed] Rene Fuller and Brittney Sule's account of events and firmly establishes that the domestic violence is on-going in the home.” Appellants’ App. Vol. 2 at 20-21. In other words, the court did not rely on Mother's invocation but simply found that it supported other evidence that Mother had not lied in her initial reports of domestic violence.

Bailey, Judge.

Brown, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.