SCHNEID v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Cory Schneid appeals the trial court's order revoking his probation and imposing the suspended portion of his sentence. Finding that there was sufficient evidence and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a sanction, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In July 2024, Schneid pleaded guilty to Class A misdemeanor operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated and agreed to a 365-day sentence with 361 days suspended to probation. Schneid had already accrued four days of credit time and thus began serving his probation immediately.

[3] In January 2025, Schneid's probation officer filed a petition to revoke probation, alleging Schneid had violated his probation in four ways: (1) consuming alcohol; (2) failing to enroll in a substance abuse treatment program; (3) failing to report to and maintain contact with the probation department; and (4) failing to make payments toward probation fees and court costs. At the initial hearing on the petition, Schneid admitted to the first and third violations. One week later, the trial court held a fact-finding hearing and found that Schneid also committed the second and fourth violations. As a result, the trial court revoked his probation and ordered the 361-day suspended portion of his sentence executed in the Hancock County Jail. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[4] Schneid first argues that the State provided insufficient evidence to prove the second and fourth violations of failing to enroll in a substance abuse treatment program and failing to make payments toward his fees and costs. “Probation is a matter of grace left to a trial court's discretion, not a right to which a criminal defendant is entitled.” Terpstra v. State, 138 N.E.3d 278, 284 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied. “A probation violation hearing is a civil proceeding, and the State must prove the alleged probation violation by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id. On appeal, we consider only the evidence that supports the judgment and will affirm if the probative evidence supports the trial court's finding that a defendant violated the conditions of probation. Id.

[5] Here, Schneid admitted to the first and third violations of consuming alcohol and failing to report to and maintain contact with the probation department. And for decades, this Court has held that “revocation is appropriate if the State proves any violation.” Menifee v. State, 600 N.E.2d 967, 970 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (emphasis added). Thus, it is of no moment whether the State provided sufficient evidence to prove the second and fourth violations because Schneid had already admitted to two other distinct violations, which he does not challenge.

[6] Schneid next argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered him to serve the suspended portion of his sentence. If a probation violation is found, the trial court must render the appropriate sanction for the violation. Heaton v. State, 984 N.E.2d 614, 616 (Ind. 2013). Sanctions for violations incurred during the probationary period include: (1) continuing the period of probation; (2) extending the period of probation; and (3) ordering execution of part or all of the original suspended sentence. Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(h) (2015).

[7] “[A] trial court's sentencing decisions for probation violations are reviewable using the abuse of discretion standard.” Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007). “An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's judgment is ‘clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it or is contrary to law.’ ” Shields v. State, 248 N.E.3d 1246, 1263 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (quoting Howard v. State, 122 N.E.3d 1007, 1013 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied), trans. denied.

[8] During the initial hearing on the petition to revoke probation, Schneid admitted to the first and third violations and thus acknowledged that, while he was on probation, he consumed alcohol and failed to report to and maintain contact with the probation department. As a result, the trial court revoked Schneid's probation and ordered him to serve the suspended portion of his sentence executed.

[9] First, the trial court's sanction was not contrary to law. In his briefs, Schneid acknowledges that “the trial court had the option to sanction [him] by modifying the terms of his probation, extending the length of his probation, or ordering a partial execution of his sentence.” Appellant's Br. p. 12 (emphasis added). While this is true, the trial court is also authorized by the same statute to order a full execution of his sentence. See I.C. § 35-38-2-3(h)(3) (permitting the trial court to “[o]rder execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing”). Thus, the sanction was not contrary to law.

[10] Second, the trial court's sanction was not against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. We note that the underlying conviction in this case is alcohol-related and that Schneid was subsequently prohibited from consuming alcohol as a condition of his probation. Prior to filing the petition, Schneid's probation officer gave him a break and “subjected [him] to a first sanction agreement because of prior allegations of consuming alcohol while on probation.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 36. Under the agreement, Schneid promised to enroll in a substance abuse treatment program. Schneid neither refrained from consuming alcohol, nor availed himself of the program, which is evidence of his intent not to comply with the conditions of his probation. Schneid's continuing alcohol use was an unambiguous violation of his probation. Revocation of his probation, including the imposed sanction, was not against but entirely consistent with the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court.

Conclusion

[11] The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it revoked Schneid's probation and ordered him to serve the suspended portion of his sentence.

[12] Affirmed.

Najam, Senior Judge.

May, J., and Felix, J., concur.