Osama A. Shibli, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] After Osama Shibli moved back to Indiana, the State charged him with two counts of Level 6 felony failure to register as a sex or violent offender based on a prior conviction for child molesting in Indiana. Shibli moved to dismiss the charges, which motion the trial court denied. Shibli moved for interlocutory appeal, which motion the trial court granted and over which we accepted jurisdiction. Pursuant to the Indiana Supreme Court's recent decision in Peters v. Quakenbush, 260 N.E.3d 919 (Ind. 2025), we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Shibli's motion to dismiss. We therefore reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand with instructions to grant Shibli's motion to dismiss.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] The facts, as set forth in our prior opinion, are as follows:

In 1998, Shibli was convicted of two counts of Class C felony child molesting in Indiana, for which the trial court sentenced him to eight years of incarceration. Shibli was released to parole and advised of his obligation to register as a sex offender under the Indiana Sex Offender Registration Act (the “SORA”). At the time of his conviction, Shibli was required by Indiana law to register as a sex offender for ten years.

In January of 2003, Shibli transferred his parole to Florida. Florida law required that Shibli register as a sex offender for life. In 2007, Shibli moved to Syria; however, prior to moving, he had signed a “Florida Department of Law Enforcement Predator/Offender Registration” form, in which he acknowledged that if he gained employment in another state, or became a resident of another state, he would also be required to register as a sex offender in that state. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 12.

In 2021, Shibli and his wife purchased a home in Fishers and Shibli obtained employment in Indianapolis. At this time, Shibli did not register as a sex offender. In November of 2022, the State charged Shibli with two counts of Level 6 felony failure to register as a sex or violent offender. On January 9, 2023, Shibli moved to dismiss the charges. On March 16, 2023, the trial court conducted a hearing, after which it denied Shibli's motion to dismiss.

Shibli v. State, 231 N.E.3d 280, 282 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024), trans. granted and opinion vacated. We affirmed, concluding that Shibli was required to register in Indiana “[b]ecause Florida law had already required Shibli to register for life, and he had signed an agreement with the State of Florida agreeing to register in any other state if he became a resident of another state[.]” Id. at 284. On June 19, 2025, the Indiana Supreme Court vacated our prior opinion and remanded the case with instructions for us to reconsider it in light of the Indiana Supreme Court's opinion in Peters.

Discussion and Decision

[3] When challenging the denial of a motion to dismiss, an appellant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, all of the facts necessary to support his motion to dismiss. Ackerman v. State, 51 N.E.3d 171, 177 (Ind. 2016). “We review a trial court's ruling on a motion to dismiss a charging information for an abuse of discretion, which occurs only if a trial court's decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances.” Pavlovich v. State, 6 N.E.3d 969, 974 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied.

[4] Indiana Code section 11-8-8-19(f) (“the Jurisdiction Statute”) provides that “[a] person who is required to register as a sex or violent offender in any jurisdiction shall register for the period required by the other jurisdiction or the period described in [Indiana statutes], whichever is longer.” Recently, the Indiana Supreme Court applied the Jurisdiction Statute to a case involving facts similar to those at issue in this case. See Peters, 260 N.E.3d at 923–28. In considering whether the requirement that an individual register in Florida, while present in Florida, subjects an individual to the Jurisdiction Statute after he no longer resides in or is present in Florida, the Indiana Supreme Court outlined Florida law, stating the following:

Florida requires a sexual offender to report in person for “initial registration” at a local sheriff's office within forty-eight hours after establishing permanent or temporary residence in that state. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 943.0435(2)(a). At that “initial registration,” the offender must report, among other things, his “address of permanent or legal residence or address of any current temporary residence, within this state or out of state.” Id. § 943.0435(2)(b). Beyond this “initial registration” obligation, Florida requires a sexual offender to “report in person each year” at specified times “to the sheriff's office in the county in which he or she resides or is otherwise located to reregister.” Id. § 943.0435(14)(a) (emphasis added). Whether this “reregistration” mandate applies to Peters is a decisive question. We conclude that it does not.

Florida defines a “sexual offender” (as relevant to the circumstances here) as a person who “establishes or maintains a residence” in that state, who has been designated as “any” type of sexual offender “in another state or jurisdiction,” and who was or would be (if still living there) “subjected to” the registration and reporting requirements in that other state or jurisdiction. Id. § 943.0435(1)(h)1.b. When he returned to his home in Illinois (and ultimately settled in Indiana), Peters no longer established or maintained a residence in the State of Florida. And because he was no longer a “sexual offender” in Florida, as that state defines the term, the reregistration requirement no longer applied to him.

Our reading of this definition harmonizes with Florida's statutory procedure for a “sexual offender who intends to establish a permanent ․ residence in another state or jurisdiction.” Id. § 943.0435(7). In those circumstances, the soon-to-be-out-of-state offender must “report in person” to the local sheriff's office to provide an address of “intended residence” so that the sheriff can properly notify the other state of the “offender's intended residence.” Id. There is no requirement that the soon-to-be-out-of-state offender “reregister.” Nor is there any requirement that the offender, once he's established an out-of-state permanent residence, update the local sheriff's department in Florida with any subsequent out-of-state address changes—or any life changes for that matter (e.g., name, hair color, tattoos, or other identifying marks).

In short, while establishing an out-of-state permanent residence does not “de-register” the offender in Florida, [․] the former Florida resident's registration obligations effectively lapse, with no requirement to “reregister.” The offender need only “reregister” in Florida if he later returns there to take up residence—whether permanent or temporary—for three or more days. See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 943.0435(14); id. § 775.21(2)(k), (n).

Id. at 924–25 (footnote omitted).

[5] Florida does not impose “an in-person registration requirement on its permanent out-of-state offenders.” Id. at 927. Based on this fact, the Indiana Supreme Court concluded that the Jurisdiction Statute was inapplicable to Peters on the basis that the Jurisdiction Statute only applies to a person with a current out-of-state registration obligation. Id. at 928. As the State concedes, the same is true for Shibli.

[6] In April of 2007, Shibli filed paperwork in Florida indicating that he was planning to vacate his Florida residence and move to Syria. In denying Shibli's motion to dismiss, the trial court found that he had “resided outside of the United States for a majority of the time between 2007 and 2021.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 53. The trial court further found that, at some point, Shibli had returned to the United States and, on August 20, 2021, had purchased a residence in Fishers, Indiana. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 53. Applying the Indiana Supreme Court's decision in Peters to this case, Shibli's obligation to maintain his registration in Florida ended when he vacated the state in 2007. Furthermore, nothing in the record indicates that Shibli had been required to register as a sex offender in Syria prior to returning to the United States and establishing residence in Fishers. Thus, applying the Indiana Supreme Court's opinion in Peters to this case, we likewise conclude that the Jurisdiction Statute was inapplicable to Shibli. See Peters, 260 N.E.3d at 928.

[7] “[W]hen an information is facially deficient in stating an alleged crime[, ․] dismissal for failure to state an offense is warranted.” Pavlovich, 6 N.E.3d at 974. The information for the two charges at issue alleged that Shibli had “knowingly or intentionally fail[ed] to register” as required by Indiana Code chapter 11-8-8. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 8. The affidavit for probable cause filed in support of the charging information referred to the fact that Shibli had been subject to a lifetime registration requirement while living in Florida as support for the allegation that Shibli had a current obligation to register in Indiana. The charging information and supporting probable cause affidavit indicate that the charges were based on Shibli's alleged Florida registration requirement, not some other fact that would likewise require Shibli to register in Indiana. However, because the Jurisdiction Statute is inapplicable to Shibli, it cannot form the basis of the charged offenses. The trial court therefore abused its discretion in denying Shibli's motion to dismiss.

[8] The judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the matter is remanded to the trial court with instructions to grant Shibli's motion to dismiss the pending charges.

Bradford, Judge.

Chief Judge Altice and Judge Felix concur. Altice, C.J., and Felix, J., concur.