John Michael Brawley, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] After John Brawley babysat one-year-old Z.G. (Child), Child was observed to have several severe injuries concentrated around his genitals. Child's penis and scrotum were bruised and swollen, his anus was red and inflamed, and his mouth was bleeding. A medical expert later testified that these injuries were consistent with blunt force trauma and would not have resulted from an ordinary childhood fall.

[2] A jury convicted Brawley of neglect of a dependent resulting in bodily injury, a Level 5 felony, and two counts of child molesting, both Level 4 felonies. Brawley now appeals, raising two issues: (1) whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support his child molesting convictions; and (2) whether the trial court abused its discretion by publishing for the jury only a redacted, rather than complete, version of Brawley's statement to police. Finding sufficient evidence supports his convictions and no abuse of discretion in the trial court's evidentiary ruling, we affirm.

Facts

[3] In April 2022, Brawley needed a temporary place to live. His childhood friend, Brandon Smock, allowed Brawley to stay in his home, where Smock lived with his girlfriend, Chelsea Marr (Mother), and Mother's three children, including one-year-old Child.

[4] One evening, after Brawley had been living in the house for a few weeks, he volunteered to babysit Child. Mother worked as an Instacart grocery shopper and had just gotten an order that she needed to fulfill. Though she normally took Child with her while she worked, Brawley offered to watch Child. Mother agreed, and before she left, she changed Child's diaper, dressed him in clean clothes, and fed him. She observed that Child had no diaper rash or injuries, other than a small bruise on his forehead. As Mother was leaving, Smock arrived home from work and joined Mother on her trip. Mother's other children were with their grandparents. Thus, Brawley was left home alone with Child.

[5] When Mother and Smock returned about two hours later, they found Child completely naked, with no diaper or clothing on. Child's genitals were “bloody black and red looking,” his scrotum was “swollen,” and he had “markings all over his butt.” Tr. Vol. II, pp. 162, 180. Child also had fresh blood in his mouth and his lip was swollen.

[6] When Mother and Smock asked Brawley what had happened to Child, Brawley became pale and sweaty. He initially claimed he thought Child had a diaper rash, then added that Child might have fallen off the couch. However, Mother and Smock quickly suspected abuse and became furious as they continued questioning Brawley. At some point, either Smock or Mother grabbed a knife and cornered Brawley. When repeatedly asked what he had done to Child, Brawley became shaky, began to cry, and responded: “[W]hatever you think I did, I did.” Id. at 162. Mother and Smock told Brawley to the leave the house and then took Child to the hospital.

[7] There, medical examinations revealed extensive injuries across Child's body, though they appeared concentrated on the mouth, genitals, anus, and buttocks. Child suffered extensive genital bruising, including deep bruising on the penile shaft, at the base of the penis, and throughout the scrotum. His pubic bone area showed pinpoint bruising, and his anus was red, swollen, and inflamed. Child's mouth showed trauma as well: his lip was swollen and bruised, and his mouth was actively bleeding because the frenulum—the tissue connecting his upper lip to the gum—was torn.

[8] The State charged Brawley with one count of Level 5 felony neglect of a dependent resulting in bodily injury. A year later, the State amended the information to include two counts of child molesting—one, a Level 1 felony and the other, a Level 4 felony. Eventually, two more amendments were made to the charging information, downgrading the Level 1 felony to a Level 4 felony and removing an incorrect statement of Child's age. The final charging language for both counts of child molesting stated that Brawley “did perform or submit to fondling or touching with [Child], a child under the age of fourteen years, with the intent to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of [Child].” App. Vol. II, p. 150.

[9] On the morning of trial, the State attempted one final amendment to correct a purported “clerical error.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 128. The State sought to modify both child molesting counts to read that Brawley acted with the intent to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of Child “and/or John Michael Brawley.” Id. The trial court denied this request, noting that the State had amended the charging information three times already and the language the State sought to add had never appeared in any previous version. As a result, the State was limited to proving specifically that Brawley acted with the intent to arouse or satisfy Child's sexual desires.

[10] At trial, medical experts explained that though Child had many injuries—including bruises on his head, face, ribs, back, and legs—the most severe and concentrated trauma was to his genitals, anus, buttocks, and mouth. A pediatric doctor specializing in child abuse testified that based on her review of Child's medical records, his injuries were consistent with “blunt force trauma.” Tr. Vol. III, p. 14. The doctor explained that she “would not expect extensive genital bruising, extensive buttock bruising from just a normal type childhood fall,” and that the linear bruising pattern on his buttocks was indicative of “child physical abuse.” Id. at 13. She also noted that Child's oral injury was consistent with “blunt force trauma from an object going into his mouth.” Id. at 18.

[11] The State also introduced a recording of Brawley's telephone interview with a detective. In the recording, Brawley both offered his account of the incident—that Child had rolled off the couch—and accused Smock of acting aggressively with both Child and Mother. The version of the statement presented to the jury, however, was redacted to remove Brawley's accusations of Smock's violence with Mother.

[12] The jury found Brawley guilty of all three counts, and the trial court sentenced him to concurrent terms of five years on each count. Brawley appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[13] Brawley raises two issues on appeal: (1) whether sufficient evidence supports his convictions for child molesting; and (2) whether the trial court erred in admitting only the redacted version of Brawley's recorded statement to police. Finding sufficient evidence supports his convictions and no error in the court's evidentiary decision, we affirm.

I. Sufficiency of Evidence

[14] When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction, we consider only the evidence most favorable to the judgment without reweighing it or reassessing witness credibility. Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007). We will affirm a conviction “unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. “The evidence is not required to overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.” Mehringer v. State, 152 N.E.3d 667, 672 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020).

[15] For Brawley's two Level 4 felony child molesting convictions to stand as charged, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that, while Child was under 14 years of age, Brawley fondled or touched Child with the intent to arouse or satisfy Child's sexual desires. See Ind. Code § 35-42-4-3(b) (2021). Brawley's argument focuses on the final element: intent. This presents an unusual challenge, as the State was constrained by its own charging language to prove not that Brawley intended to satisfy his own sexual desires (the more common scenario in child molesting cases) but that he specifically intended to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of Child. Despite this constraint, Brawley's challenge fails.

[16] As Brawley acknowledges, the “intent to arouse or satisfy sexual desires may be inferred from evidence that the defendant intentionally touched the child's genitals.” Holden v. State, 149 N.E.3d 612, 616 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (citation omitted). Yet Brawley argues that because cases applying this rule “focus almost exclusively on the sexual desires of the perpetrator,” the rule refers only to an inference regarding the perpetrator's sexual desires, not the victim's. Appellant's Br., p. 12. Though we recognize that the constraint imposed by the charging information is uncommon, we do not agree that the language of our caselaw limits us from inferring intent here.

[17] In Bowles v. State, our Supreme Court held that “[t]he intent element of child molesting may be established by circumstantial evidence and may be inferred from the actor's conduct and the natural and usual sequence to which such conduct usually points.” 737 N.E.2d 1150, 1152 (Ind. 2000). This language speaks generally to the “intent element of child molesting,” which encompasses the intent to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of the defendant and/or the victim. Id. Additionally, the Bowles Court found that, based on the evidence presented, the jury could “infer that the defendant intended sexual arousal”—again referring to the intent generally without specifying the subject of the arousal. Id. at 1153.

[18] Accordingly, we find that the intent to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of either the perpetrator or the victim can be inferred from the surrounding circumstances, as described in Bowles and Holden. See Kress v. State, 133 N.E.3d 742, 748 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (applying Bowles to determine whether defendant intended to arouse or satisfy the desires of “either” himself or the victim). This is consistent with the principle that criminal intent is generally determined through inferences drawn from conduct and the surrounding circumstances. See Laughlin v. State, 101 N.E.3d 827, 829 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (“[I]ntent is a mental function and without a confession, it must be determined from a consideration of the conduct, and the natural consequences of the conduct.” (citation omitted)).

[19] We reject Brawley's contention that Child's young age makes this inference inapplicable. The inquiry rests not on the capacity of the victim to experience arousal but on the perpetrator's intent to provoke such a response. In fact, the child molesting statute makes no distinction based on the child's age or capacity for arousal, applying to all children under fourteen years of age. See Ind. Code § 35-42-4-3(b) (2021). Thus, the statute requires only the defendant's intent, not the victim's response to that intent.

[20] Here, the evidence naturally points to sexual intent, as Child's injuries were concentrated on his genitals. Medical expert testimony established that Child's penile shaft, base of penis, and scrotum displayed extensive bruising consistent with blunt force trauma. The most severe trauma was concentrated in areas associated with sexual activity—the mouth, genitals, anus, and buttocks. Based on this evidence, the jury could reasonably infer that Brawley intended to stimulate Child sexually. See Kress v. State, 133 N.E.3d 742, 749 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (finding sufficient evidence of intent to arouse defendant's or victim's desires where defendant touched victim's “privates” and asked her to view his “privates”).

[21] We are unpersuaded by Brawley's claim that this evidence instead demonstrates the intent to inflict pain upon Child. Brawley emphasizes that Child sustained injuries to various parts of his body aside from his genitals, and he points to the medical expert's testimony that Child's injuries were consistent with “child physical abuse.” Tr. Vol. III, p. 13. But this argument presupposes, without support, that one cannot intend to both inflict pain and sexually arouse a victim. Regardless, Brawley's claim is merely an invitation to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. The jury here could reasonably infer that Brawley's actions—which concentrated on Child's genital area—were done with the intent to stimulate or arouse Child, regardless of whether the acts also caused pain or injury. We will not substitute our judgment for that of the jury.

[22] Given the foregoing, we find that the record contains “substantial evidence of probative value” to satisfy the intent element of Brawley's child molesting convictions. Bailey v. State, 907 N.E.2d 1003, 1005 (Ind. 2009).

II. Redaction of Brawley's Statement

[23] Brawley next challenges the trial court's decision to redact a portion of Brawley's recorded statement to police before publishing it to the jury. The State argues that Brawley waived this issue by failing to make a specific objection at trial. But the record shows that defense counsel objected to the redaction multiple times.

[24] Counsel first objected during pretrial discussions, explaining that the full statement provides context and allows Brawley to raise a defense of an alternate suspect. When the court considered the matter again mid-trial, counsel objected on these same grounds. The trial court then ruled that the redacted statement would be published, rejecting Brawley's argument. When the redacted statement was actually offered at trial, defense counsel once again objected, albeit more generally this time. But these prior discussions already made clear the basis for the objection, adequately preserving the issue for appeal. See D.R.C. v. State, 908 N.E.2d 215, 222 (Ind. 2009). Additionally, the court had already ruled on Brawley's objection, so it need not have been renewed. See Ind. Evidence Rule 103(b) (“Once the court rules definitively on the record at trial a party need not renew an objection or offer of proof to preserve a claim of error for appeal.”).

[25] As Brawley has adequately preserved the alleged error for appeal, we turn to the merits of his challenge. We review a trial court's evidentiary decisions for an abuse of discretion. Nicholson v. State, 963 N.E.2d 1096, 1099 (Ind. 2012). A trial court abuses its discretion if its decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it. Id.

[26] Here, the evidence at issue is a recording of a twenty-minute phone call during which Brawley gave a statement to a detective. In his statement, Brawley denied injuring Child and suggested that Child's bruises were caused by an accidental fall. Brawley also told the detective that Smock had a temper, was “rough” with Child, and would “throw [Child] on the couch” to sit him down. State's Exh. 27A at 10:08-15. At the end of the call, Brawley alleged that Smock was “rough” with Mother and claimed to have seen Smock hit and “throw[ ] her around.” State's Exh. 27B at 19:54-20:04.

[27] The trial court admitted the full statement into evidence but permitted only a redacted version to be published to the jury. The redacted version removed just the final portion of the conversation during which Brawley accused Smock of violence against Mother. Brawley claims that this redaction violates the doctrine of completeness and interferes with his ability to present his defense of Smock as an alternate suspect.

[28] The doctrine of completeness, as explained in Indiana Evidence Rule 106, provides: “If a party introduces all or part of a writing or recorded statement, an adverse party may require the introduction, at that time, of any other part—or any other writing or recorded statement—that in fairness ought to be considered at the same time.” The purpose of this rule is to avoid misleading the jury by presenting statements out of context. Evans v. State, 643 N.E.2d 877, 881 (Ind. 1994). But here, the excluded accusations of Smock's violence against Mother would not have corrected any misleading impressions, since the published version already portrayed Smock as aggressive.

[29] Even so, Rule 106 does not automatically make otherwise inadmissible evidence admissible. See id. Here, the allegations of Smock's domestic violence would require redaction under Evidence Rule 404(b)(1), which prohibits the use of a person's bad acts to show that they acted in conformity with that character on a particular occasion. See Garland v. State, 788 N.E.2d 425, 430 (Ind. 2003) (holding that Rule 404(b) applies to bad acts of both defendants and non-parties). Putting this evidence to Brawley's intended use—to show Smock as an alternate suspect—requires the inference that Smock's alleged violence against Mother proves he acted violently toward Child, which is exactly what Rule 404(b)(1) forbids. Brawley makes no claim that any of the exceptions to this rule apply here.

[30] Finally, the redacted statement presented the jury with evidence supporting Brawley's defense that Smock was the perpetrator. It contained Brawley's claims that Smock was rough with Child and would throw him on the couch—statements that are arguably more relevant to the charges against Brawley than the excluded allegations about Smock's treatment of Mother. Therefore, the trial court's decision to redact the limited portion of the statement did not interfere with Brawley's presentation of his defense. We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's publication of only the redacted statement.

Conclusion

[31] The State presented sufficient evidence to prove Brawley acted with the intent to arouse or satisfy Child's sexual desires, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in publishing for the jury a redacted version of Brawley's statement to police. We therefore affirm Brawley's convictions.

Weissmann, Judge.

Judges May and Scheele concur. May, J., and Scheele, J., concur.