J.C., Appellant-Respondent v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] J.C. was adjudicated a delinquent child and the juvenile court awarded wardship of her to the Indiana Department of Correction (DOC). J.C. now appeals, raising the following issues for our review: (1) whether the juvenile court violated due process in proceeding to disposition without a modification report or dual status inquiry; and (2) whether the juvenile court erred in ordering restitution. Concluding there was no due process violation and that J.C. waived her right to appeal the restitution, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In February 2023, J.C.’s mother (Mother) contacted law enforcement after J.C., then twelve, grabbed her younger sister by the hair and pulled her to the ground. J.C. had previously been charged with the status offense of leaving home without permission, and had bounced between placement with her grandparents, Mother, and a group home.

[3] The State filed a petition alleging J.C. was a delinquent child for committing an act that, if committed by an adult, would constitute Class B misdemeanor battery. At that time, probation officer Julie Johnson (PO Johnson) completed a Preliminary Inquiry report indicating J.C. “ha[d] NOT been identified as a dual status child” and should “NOT be referred for an assessment by a Dual Status Assessment Team.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 26.

[4] J.C. was removed from her home and placed in emergency shelter care at Open Arms. Soon after, she was moved to Lutherwood Residential Facility. In June, the court held a hearing, and J.C. admitted to committing an act that would be Class B misdemeanor battery if committed by an adult. The parties agreed to proceed to disposition that day, and the court issued a dispositional order for J.C. to remain at Lutherwood.

[5] Thereafter, the court modified disposition several times. In December 2023, Lutherwood requested J.C. be removed from their facility due to noncompliance. J.C. was then placed in Neuro Diagnostic Institute, a state psychiatric hospital. She was released to Mother's care on September 13, 2024. Upon release, her behavioral issues continued. Within a month, she received “several discipline reports at school,” repeatedly refused to attend class or do work, threatened to hit a staff member, and twice ran away from home. Id. at 81. On October 18, Mother called law enforcement because J.C. was “out of control” and hit a window with a metal object causing the window to break. Id. at 83.

[6] The State filed a petition to modify disposition based on J.C.’s issues at school, attempts to run away, and general instability in the home. A hearing was held on October 22, 2024. At the hearing, after speaking with her attorney, J.C. admitted to the allegations in the petition. The following exchange then occurred:

BY THE COURT: ․ do you wish to proceed with disposition today?

[PO] JOHNSON: Yes, Your Honor.

Id. at 86. Neither party objected, so the court then proceeded to disposition. PO Johnson recommended placement in DOC, noting due to J.C.’s “past history of placements and non-compliance, ․ we are very limited in the options of what we can do ․” Id. Specifically, PO Johnson stated prior placements with grandparents and Mother had not worked out, J.C. had been asked to leave Lutherwood, her stay at the state hospital did not result in sufficient progress, and other facilities were “not willing to take her[.]” Id. at 88. Mother also testified and agreed with PO Johnson's recommendation of placement in the DOC, stating she “has tried” but did not believe “a less restrictive option [was] available[.]” Id. at 94.

[7] Also at the hearing, PO Johnson requested $241.00 in restitution for the window J.C. broke. The following exchange then occurred:

BY THE COURT: So you're asking for restitution of $241.00.

[PROBATION]: Yes, for the window on Friday night, yes.

BY THE COURT: Alright.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: J.C., you heard that request.

J.C.: Yes.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Are you okay with being ordered and you wouldn't have to pay it like right this second because you

don't have means of being employed but, at some point, you will have to pay that back. Are you okay with that?

J.C.: Yeah.

Id. at 96.

[8] The juvenile court awarded wardship of J.C. to the DOC. In doing so, the court noted, “[w]e have attempted every possible placement whether it be at home with monitoring and services and then residential out of home placements, had issues and then returning home and cannot ․ maintain a safe pattern of behavior here.” Id. at 97. The court later entered a written dispositional order that contained no findings about dual status. The court also ordered restitution in the amount of $241.00. J.C. now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

I. Due Process

[9] J.C. first argues the juvenile court violated her due process rights by issuing a modified dispositional order (1) without a modification report and (2) without a finding as to whether she is a dual status child.¹ The due process clause is applicable to juvenile proceedings. See Harris v. State, 165 N.E.3d 91, 98 (Ind. 2021) (“Children in the juvenile justice system have many of the same due process rights guaranteed to adults accused of crimes, plus a few extra protections.”). “The standard for determining what due process requires in a particular juvenile proceeding is fundamental fairness.” J.B. v. State, 205 N.E.3d 244, 250 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “These principles include the right to have a competency determination, the right to notice of the charges, the right to counsel, the privilege against self-incrimination, and the right to confront witnesses, and, in the case of a modification, the right to an evidentiary hearing.” K.S. v. State, 114 N.E.3d 849, 853 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied. The failure to properly follow statutory requirements can lead to a violation of a person's procedural due process rights. See A.P. v. Porter Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 734 N.E.2d 1107, 1112-13 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), trans. denied.

A. Modification Report

[10] J.C. first argues the juvenile court violated her due process rights by modifying her placement without the required modification report. “When modification of a dispositional decree is requested, the probation department must complete a modification report governed by the requirements for a predispositional report[.]” K.S., 114 N.E.3d at 853 (citing Ind. Code § 31-37-22-4). It is undisputed that no modification report was produced in this case.

[11] The State argues J.C. has waived this argument by not objecting to the juvenile court's proceeding to disposition without a report. Here, the court asked both parties if they “wish[ed] to proceed with disposition today.” Tr. Vol. II p. 86. J.C. did not object, despite the fact that no modification report had been produced. “Where a party fails to alert a trial court to a due process argument, that argument is waived for appeal.” M.H. v. State, 199 N.E.3d 1240, 1245 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022). As such, we agree that J.C. has waived this claim.

[12] Furthermore, the absence of the report did not deny J.C. fundamental fairness. Notably, J.C. does not assert she was denied any of the fundamental principles, and indeed the record reflects she had ample notice of the allegations, was provided counsel, and attended a hearing at which she had the opportunity to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses.

[13] Nonetheless, J.C. argues the report would have contained “information essential” to the court's decision on disposition. Appellant's Br. 17. We agree that the purpose of these reports is to provide information to the juvenile court to assist “in entering the dispositional order[.]” Matter of W.H., 254 N.E.3d 549, 558 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (discussing predispositional reports in the context of child in need of services (CHINS) proceedings). But the record here shows the juvenile court had ample information from which to make its decision, even absent this report. PO Johnson spoke to the court at length regarding J.C.’s history, including the various placements J.C. had through years of involvement with the system, her frequent noncompliance, and that there was no alternative placement. Mother specifically testified that she agreed with PO Johnson's recommendation. While we do not condone the court and probation's failure to ensure a modification report was produced in accordance with the statutes, we cannot say this instance rises to the level of a due process violation in these circumstances.

B. Dual Status

[14] J.C. also argues the court violated her due process rights by modifying her disposition without conducting a dual status inquiry. When a child enters the juvenile justice system, the court and responding agencies must determine whether she is a dual status child and proceed accordingly. See Ind. Code § 31-34-7-1 (requiring dual status determination in preliminary inquiry of a CHINS allegation); Ind. Code § 31-37-8-1 (requiring same in preliminary inquiry of a delinquency allegation).

[15] A “dual status child” is one who, among other things:

• is alleged to be or is presently adjudicated to be a CHINS and is alleged to be or is presently adjudicated to be a delinquent child, Ind. Code § 31-41-1-2(1);

• is presently named in an informal adjustment under the CHINS statute and who is adjudicated a delinquent child, Ind. Code § 31-41-1-2(2); or

• who has been previously adjudicated a CHINS or was a participant in an informal adjustment under the CHINS statute and was under a wardship that has been terminated or a program of informal adjustment that has been terminated before the current delinquency petition, Ind. Code § 31-41-1-2(4).

K.S., 114 N.E.3d at 852. If the child is found to be a dual status child, the child may be assessed by a dual status assessment team who evaluate the child's best interests and need for services and then provide written recommendations to the court on how to proceed. Ind. Code §§ 31-41-1-4; 31-41-2-6. A dual status inquiry is to be conducted when an intake officer makes the preliminary inquiry, I.C. § 31-37-8-1; when a juvenile court finds a child is a delinquent child, Ind. Code § 31-37-13-2; and when a probation officer prepares a predisposition or modification report. Ind. Code §§ 31-37-17-6.1, 31-37-22-4. Here, it is undisputed that no dual status inquiry occurred when the court issued its modification order.

[16] The State again first argues J.C. has waived this claim by failing to raise it to the trial court. As noted above, “[w]here a party fails to alert a trial court to a due process argument, that argument is waived for appeal.” M.H., 199 N.E.3d at 1245. And we have previously found a juvenile waived this exact argument for failure to raise it below. See A.B. v. State, No. 24A-JV-2062, at *3 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (mem.). However, we have also declined to find waiver in these circumstances because the juvenile “could not have known the juvenile court would not make the required finding until the modified dispositional order was entered” and thus it is “unclear when ․ [the child] should have objected to the juvenile court's failure[.]” K.S., 114 N.E.3d at 853.

[17] In any event, here J.C.’s due process rights were not violated by the lack of dual status inquiry. This Court addressed a similar situation in K.S., 114 N.E.3d at 852-54. There, the juvenile court modified K.S.’s disposition without making a finding as to whether he was a dual status child. However, the preliminary inquiry submitted by K.S.’s probation officer stated he was not a dual status child, and no subsequent information in the record suggested this had changed prior to the modification hearing. As such, we determined while there was a procedural defect in not making this finding, it did not

rise to the level of a constitutional violation because K.S. was given notice of the charges against him alleged to warrant modification of his placement, had counsel, and was afforded an evidentiary hearing at which no evidence was adduced that would clearly support a finding that he was a dual status child.

Id. at 854.

[18] The same can be said here. The juvenile court erred in issuing a modification order that did not contain a finding as to whether J.C. is a dual status child. However, the preliminary report indicated she is not. And she was given notice of the alleged charges, had counsel, and was afforded a modification hearing at which there was no evidence contradicting the preliminary inquiry's findings. As with K.S., the instant error did not rise to the level of a due process violation.

II. Restitution

[19] J.C. next challenges the trial court's order requiring her to pay restitution. However, J.C. not only failed to object to the restitution, she actively agreed to it. At the hearing, J.C. was informed that $241.00 in restitution was being requested, and her counsel directly asked if she was “okay with being ordered” to repay that amount “at some point[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 96. J.C. responded in the affirmative.

[20] As such, J.C. waived error by not objecting to the restitution order and invited error by affirmatively agreeing to the order which she now argues is erroneous. Because J.C. invited error, and invited error is not reversible error, she has waived review of this claim. See C.H. v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1086, 1097 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (declining to address juvenile's claim of restitution error where he “did not object” to the order and “affirmatively agreed to pay the requested restitution.”).

[21] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   J.C. challenges these errors not only as it relates to the October 2024 modified dispositional order, but also as to the original dispositional order in June 2023 and subsequent orders in October 2023 and August 2024. We agree with the State that any challenge to these previous orders is untimely. See K.S. v. State, 849 N.E.2d 538, 542 (Ind. 2006) (holding juvenile's “claim of procedural error is untimely” where “the alleged error occur[ed] in the original delinquency proceedings” but juvenile did not appeal until he violated probation and was committed to DOC). We limit our analysis to the October 2024 order.

Scheele, Judge.

May, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.