K.P., Appellant-Respondent v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Petitioner (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] K.P. appeals following his adjudication as a juvenile delinquent for acts that, if committed by an adult, would be Level 5 felony theft ¹ and Class C misdemeanor minor consuming alcohol.² He presents two issues for our review, which we consolidate and restate as whether the trial court abused its discretion when it placed him in the Department of Correction (“DOC”). We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On November 1, 2024, Warrick County Sheriff's Deputy Barry Griffin initiated a traffic stop on a vehicle traveling twenty miles per hour over the speed limit. An adult was driving the vehicle, and K.P. was one of three juvenile passengers. Deputy Griffin smelled raw marijuana emanating from the car and asked its occupants to exit the vehicle.

[3] While searching K.P. and the other occupants of the vehicle, Deputy Griffin detected the odor of alcohol, though the detainees all denied having drank alcohol. When Deputy Griffin searched the car, he found open alcohol containers and two handguns with loaded magazines. At the police station, K.P. admitted he had consumed three shots of alcohol and smoked marijuana before getting into the car. K.P. subsequently admitted the .380 pistol in his possession belonged to his maternal grandmother. K.P. denied knowing about the stolen .22 tan pistol in the vehicle. K.P. was taken to the Youth Care Center.

[4] On November 7, 2024, the State alleged K.P. was a juvenile delinquent for acts that, if committed by an adult, would be Level 5 felony theft and Class C misdemeanor minor consuming alcohol. On December 16, 2024, the trial court held a dispositional hearing during which K.P. admitted the allegations against him. Moving to K.P.’s placement, the trial court heard argument from the parties, received a victim's impact statement from Seales, and reviewed the predispositional report. In making its decision to place K.P. in the DOC, the trial court stated:

[Trial Court]: Um, I mean the Pre-Dispositional Report is not that all encouraging because it indicates to me you don't really think you have a problem, you don't ․ indicate that your [sic] um taking steps to stop it and what's really concerning um is the fact that you don't have a lengthy criminal background or delinquency background but now you ․ all of a sudden escalated to guns. And that's not good.

KP: Yes, sir.

[Trial Court]: So, uh, I am gonna have you taken to the Department of Correction. Okay? Um as [DCS Attorney] indicated [that] doesn't mean you stay there for a long period of time. You you [sic] benefit from what their [sic] offering you you [sic] can get out sooner.

(Tr. Vol. II at 24.) The trial court placed K.P. at the DOC “until a risk assessment can be completed and they deem him safe for release.” (App. Vol. II at 59.)³

[5] On December 30, 2024, the trial court entered its dispositional order placing K.P. in the DOC. The trial court did not make specific findings regarding its reasons for placing K.P. in the DOC. Instead it stated:

The juvenile has a prior history of delinquent behavior and has been previously adjudicated a delinquent.

The Court finds that reasonable efforts were made by the Probation Department to prevent or eliminate the need for removal of the child. The statements of reasonable efforts as set forth in the pleadings, reports and documents of the Probation Department and/or all other service providers filed herein are incorporated by reference.

The Court finds that placement is the least restrictive option to ensure family autonomy and provide the safety of the family and community.

(Id. at 44.)

[6] On February 13, 2025, K.P. filed his notice of appeal. He argued the trial court's order did not comply with Indiana Code section 31-37-18-9(a).⁴ On May 23, 2025, we issued an order directing the trial court to enter an amended order that satisfied the requirements of Indiana Code section 31-37-18-9(a) and allowed the parties to thereafter rebrief their arguments. On June 6, 2025, the trial court entered its amended order with findings pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-37-18-9(a). In the amended order, as in the original order, the trial court placed K.P. in the DOC.

Discussion and Decision

[7] K.P. challenges his placement in the DOC. “The juvenile court system is founded on the notion of parens patriae, which allows the juvenile court to step into the shoes of the parents.” R.G. v. State, 212 N.E.3d 720, 722 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023). “The parens patriae doctrine gives juvenile courts power to further the best interests of the child, ‘which implies a broad discretion unknown in the adult criminal court system.’ ” Id. (quoting In re K.G., 808 N.E.2d 631, 635 (Ind. 2004)). We review a juvenile court's decision for an abuse of discretion. K.S. v. State, 114 N.E.3d 849, 854 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied. A decision is an abuse of discretion if it “is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the [trial] court or against the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn” from those facts and circumstances. Id.

[8] “A juvenile court has wide latitude and great flexibility in dealing with juveniles; however, its goal is to rehabilitate rather than to punish.” C.T.S. v. State, 781 N.E.2d 1193, 1203 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied. In addition, our legislature has also delineated several factors for trial courts to consider in making such decisions:

If consistent with the safety of the community and the best interest of the child, the juvenile court shall enter a dispositional decree that:

(1) is:

(A) in the least restrictive (most family like) and most appropriate setting available; and

(B) close to the parents’ home, consistent with the best interest and special needs of the child;

(2) least interferes with family autonomy;

(3) is least disruptive of family life;

(4) imposes the least restraint on the freedom of the child and the child's parent, guardian, or custodian; and

(5) provides a reasonable opportunity for participation by the child's parent, guardian, or custodian.

Ind. Code § 31-37-18-6.

[9] In its amended order, the trial court found:

At the time of this offense [K.P.] was living with his maternal grandmother, Carolyn S[e]ales. He was living there for several reasons, but was still seeing his mother, Miranda Luna, regularly. Miranda also has a 3-year-old boy in her home and reported that in the past she had come home to [K.P.] smoking marijuana in the home and that he would not listen to or respect her rules․ Miranda reported having concerns for [K.P.] and wanting to spend time with him and bond, but that recently they have had issues doing so. Miranda reported how much she loves her son and wants the best for him, but has also had concerns recently with who he chose to be friends with and him not wanting to do school. At this time, it is unknown if there is contact with [K.P.]’s biological father.

[K.P.] reported to probation that he wanted to party and that he has had trouble at the place they were going before. That is why he had a weapon on him at the time. He was asked if he had issues there before why would he still go and he reported he wanted to party. [K.P.] admitted that he had taken the weapon from his grandparents’ home.

The night of the incident [K.P.] had admitted to doing 3 shots of alcohol and smoking marijuana. [K.P.] has been very open in the past about his marijuana use and it was frequent.

A majority of [K.P.]’s friends have had interaction[s] with law enforcement and have been or are currently expelled from school. [K.P.] has had suspected gang involvement, but it has never been confirmed. [K.P.] was with two other juveniles and one adult at the time of his arrest.

[K.P.] has never showed any remorse for smoking marijuana and after the incident showed no remorse for carrying a weapon. [K.P.] was asked if he felt like treatment would help him and he reported he does not do well around “weird” people and that would make him worse. [K.P.] reported that he did not need treatment or therapy, but wanted to do house arrest. Probation told [K.P.] that he needed treatment and he reported he would not go.

[K.P.] has completed community services but continued to smoke during the services. [K.P.] was asked about going to residential placement for mental health and rehab services and refused the option. He said he did not need mental health [treatment] and made derogatory statements about the people who are placed in residential placements. Due to his history and recent statements, it does not appear that [K.P.] has a wish to change his mindset, marijuana habit, or friend group.

[K.P.] does not have any plans on changing [sic] who he associates with. [K.P.] also has an extensive history of marijuana use that even with counseling could not be changed.

[K.P.] was previously offered and he accepted therapy services in the community, which [K.P.] participated in, but continued to smoke marijuana and made no changes in his mindset or behaviors. Miranda was offered services in the community, but she has fears for her younger child and she has not been able to control [K.P.]’s behaviors. She believes if left in the home it would put everyone at risk and she also believes a secure treatment facility is what [K.P.] needs to address his mental health, substance abuse, and previous trauma's [sic].

(App. Vol. II at 76-7.)

[10] K.P. contends the trial court abused its discretion when it placed him in the DOC because there existed less restrictive placements, specifically house arrest. As noted above in the trial court's findings, while K.P.’s juvenile adjudication history may be short, the reasons for those adjudications have escalated from drug possession to theft of a gun. K.P. was on probation at the time of the incident supporting this juvenile delinquency adjudication.⁵ In addition, K.P. declined to participate in residential placement or any mental health treatment or therapy. He refused to stop consuming marijuana and insisted on continuing to associate with people who also had delinquent records and trouble in school. K.P.’s mother testified that she was concerned about his behavior and that she had trouble getting him to follow the rules. Based thereon, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion ⁶ when it placed K.P. in DOC. See, e.g., J.S. v. State, 110 N.E.3d 1173, 1178 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (trial court did not abuse its discretion when it placed J.S. in DOC based on several juvenile adjudications, violation of home detention, and failed attempts at in-home placement), trans. denied.

Conclusion

[11] We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it placed K.P. in the DOC. Accordingly, we affirm.

[12] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-43-4-2(a).

2.   Ind. Code § 7.1-5-7-7(a)(2).

3.   Our citations to the appendix refer to the Amended Appendix.

4.   Indiana Code section 31-37-18-9(a) states, in relevant part:(a) The juvenile court shall accompany the court's dispositional decree with written findings and conclusions upon the record concerning approval, modification, or rejection of the dispositional recommendations submitted in the predispositional report, including the following specific findings:(1) The needs of the child for care, treatment, rehabilitation, or placement.(2) The need for participation by the parent, guardian, or custodian in the plan of care for the child.(3) Efforts made, if the child is removed from the child's parent, guardian, or custodian, to:(A) prevent the child's removal from; or(B) reunite the child with;the child's parent, guardian, or custodian.(4) Family services that were offered and provided to:(A) the child; or(B) the child's parent, guardian, or custodian.(5) The court's reasons for the disposition.

5.   K.P. was on probation for a 2023 adjudication as a delinquent for committing an act that, if committed by an adult, would be Class B misdemeanor possession of marijuana. Ind. Code § 35-48-4-11(a)(1).

6.   K.P. also challenges the following trial court's finding: “Miranda reported that [K.P.] shares a room with his little brother and that she found bullets and a gun magazine in their shared room. Miranda reported that she approached [K.P.] about this and he acted like it was no big deal.” (App. Vol. II at 76.) K.P. argues there is no evidence to support this statement, either in the transcript or the predispositional report. He is correct. Therefore, the finding is clearly erroneous. See, e.g., Bonnell v. Cotner, 50 N.E.3d 361, 364 (Ind. 2016) (“Findings of fact are erroneous if there is no factual support for them in the record whatsoever, either directly or by inference.”) (citing Johnson v. Wysocki, 990 N.E.2d 456, 460 (Ind. 2013)).However, the fact that a finding is erroneous does not require reversal if that finding is superfluous. See Lasater v. Lasater, 809 N.E.2d 380, 397 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (“To the extent that the judgment is based on erroneous findings, those findings are superfluous and are not fatal to the judgment if the remaining valid findings and conclusions support the judgment.”). As noted in our analysis, the trial court's findings examined K.P.’s delinquency adjudications, his home life, prior attempts at rehabilitation, and his interaction with his community – and those findings supported the trial court's decision to place K.P. in the DOC. Therefore, the trial court's erroneous finding about K.P.’s living situation at Miranda's house is superfluous and is not a reason for reversal. See, e.g., AmRhein v. Eden, 779 N.E.2d 1197, 1206 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (“findings are superfluous and are not fatal to the judgment if the remaining valid findings and conclusions support the judgment”).

May, Judge.

Judges Mathias and Bradford concur. Mathias, J., and Bradford, J., concur.