Angela Cummings, Appellant-Plaintiff v. Kelly Pfledderer, Appellee-Defendant (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Following a motor vehicle collision, Angela Cummings filed a complaint for negligence against Kelly Pfledderer. After a jury trial, the jury found in favor of Cummings and found that she had suffered $10,000 in damages. However, the jury attributed 49% of the fault to her, so it awarded her $5,100. She now appeals. We affirm.

Issues

[2] Cummings raises two issues for our review:

1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted the deposition testimonies of two of Pfledderer's expert witnesses at trial.

2. Whether the court abused its discretion when it did not give one of Cummings’ proffered jury instructions.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On December 19, 2019, Cummings and Pfledderer were involved in a motor vehicle collision during which Pfledderer struck Cummings’ vehicle while reversing his. Following the accident, Cummings experienced “excruciating pain” and, later that evening, drove herself to the emergency room. Tr. Vol. 2 at 229. Cummings was diagnosed with a “cracked rib[.]” Id. at 142. Cummings underwent physical therapy. Thereafter, in September 2020, Cummings went to the emergency room due to “pains in [her] chest and in [her] back.” Id. at 146. Doctors discovered that Cummings had “an intramural hematoma” in her aorta. Tr. Vol. 3 at 62.

[4] On November 22, 2021, Cummings filed a complaint against Pfledderer and asserted that Pfledderer had operated his vehicle in a “careless and negligent” manner and that she had sustained injuries as “a direct and proximate result of” Pfledderer's actions. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 7. Pfledderer filed his answer, affirmative defenses, and a request for a jury trial.

[5] Thereafter, Pfledderer filed his disclosure of expert witnesses and identified Dr. Ripple Doshi and Dr. Joseph Calandra, among others, as experts he anticipated would testify at trial. Pfledderer's disclosure stated as follows:

Dr. Doshi provided a records review of cardiac and other records pertaining to Plaintiff, Angela Cummings, including the records following the accident of December 19, 2019, which is the subject of this litigation.

It is anticipated Dr. Doshi will testify based on his knowledge, training, background, and expertise, with respect to his review of Ms. Cummings’ medical records, his findings, the nature and extent of Ms. Cummings’ claimed injuries from the motor vehicle accident or otherwise, the nature and extent of Ms. Cummings’ treatment, her continued complaints of pain, the claimed need for additional treatment, her diagnosis and prognosis, her preexisting conditions, and the likelihood/causation of the claimed injuries to the subject motor vehicle accident.

* * *

Dr. Calandra will testify based on his knowledge, training, background, and expertise, of his radiological review of the objective testings of Ms. Cummings’ pre-and post-accident, his opinions and findings as to the objective testings, Ms. Cummings’ diagnosis and prognosis, her pre-existing conditions, and the likelihood/causation of the claimed injuries to the subject motor vehicle accident.

Id. at 16-17. Pfledderer also stated that neither expert had prepared a report but that copies of their curriculum vitae had been previously provided.

[6] Cummings filed her first set of interrogatories and asked that Pfledderer provide information as “to each expert or person with specialized knowledge,” including the subject matter on which the expert will testify, the substance of the facts of their expected testimony, the substance of their opinions relative to the investigation, and a statement of all opinions expressed and the basis and reasons for those opinions. Id. at 41. In response, Pfledderer stated: “See Defendant's Expert Disclosures.” Id. at 42. Thereafter, the parties learned that Drs. Doshi and Calandra would not be available to testify at the jury trial, so depositions were scheduled.

[7] On April 4, 2024, Cummings filed a motion to strike Dr. Doshi and Dr. Calandra. Cummings asserted that no “information has been provided regarding the substance of the facts and opinions which these physicians are expected to testify or a summary of the grounds for each physician's opinions.” Id. at 24. Cummings asserted that she had “no idea what, if any, conclusions Drs. Doshi and Calandra are going to testify to and no way of preparing for their depositions.” Id. at 25. Thus, she maintained that “[n]o meaningful expert disclosures have ever been provided in the present case revealing the grounds and reasons for any conclusion reached here by” the experts and requested that their anticipated testimony be struck. Id. at 28 (emphasis in original). The parties took the depositions of both experts on May 6, with the intention of using the deposition testimony at trial in lieu of live testimony. Both experts testified that Cumming's intramural hematoma was not caused by the car accident.

[8] The court held a hearing on Cummings’ motion on September 11. During the hearing, the court noted that Cummings had “known about these issues since May” when she “took the depositions and found the information out from” the doctors. Supp. Tr. at 23. The court then found that the “defect has been cured” because Cummings had “found out ․ 4 months ago” what the doctors “were going to say.” Id. at 32. Accordingly, the court denied Cummings’ motion to strike.

[9] The court held a three-day jury trial beginning on November 12. During the trial, Cummings had her medical records admitted as evidence. Among those records was a report made at the emergency room following the motor vehicle crash. In that report, a physician noted that Cummings had been involved in a motor vehicle accident where the other driver “backed into her drive[r] side door going about 15 mph.” Ex. Vol. 1 at 35. Cummings also presented as evidence the deposition of Dr. Mark Gerdish, a cardiologist who had treated Cummings. Dr. Gerdish testified that the “timing” of Cummings’ hematoma “appeared to be related to that motor vehicle event.” Tr. Vol. 3 at 62. He further testified that the injury made her more “vulnerable” in the future “to changes in the aorta in that area.” Id. at 64. On cross-examination, Dr. Gerdish testified that Cummings had “suffered a high[-]velocity trauma in a motor vehicle accident” and that he had either been told or assumed that the motor vehicle accident had occurred at a high velocity. Id. at 99. And he testified that Cummings’ history of hypertension, diabetes, and smoking “[c]ould” have contributed to her hematoma. Id. at 108.

[10] In his defense, Pfledderer presented the deposition testimonies of Drs. Doshi and Calandra to the jury over Cummings’ objection. Dr. Calandra testified that, based on his review of Cummings’ x-ray, she had not sustained a rib fracture. He also testified that, in order to sustain an intramural hematoma, a person would have to be involved in a motor vehicle accident going “at least 30 miles per hour[.]” Id. at 139. Dr. Doshi testified that, based on “the description of the accident in terms of the speed and the amount of damage to the vehicle,” he did not agree with the opinion that the motor vehicle accident had caused her hematoma. Id. at 213. He further testified that her history of high blood pressure, diabetes, and smoking could be “contributing factor[s] to the underlying cause.” Id. He also testified that it would be “unlikely” for a crash at fifteen miles per hour to cause the hematoma. Id. at 216. And he testified that her hematoma was not “relate[d]” to the motor vehicle accident. Id. at 223.

[11] At the conclusion of the trial, Cummings proposed the following jury instruction: “Defendant is not excused from liability just because Plaintiff had a physical condition at the time of the collision that made her more likely to be injured.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 152. The court declined to give the instruction.

[12] The jury found in favor of Cummings and determined that she had sustained $10,000 in damages. But the jury assigned Cummings 49% of the fault. Accordingly, the court entered a judgment in favor of Cummings and awarded her $5,100. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

Issue One: Admission of Evidence

[13] Cummings first contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted certain evidence. The decision to admit or exclude evidence lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, and we will not disturb the trial court's decision absent a showing of an abuse of that discretion. Oaks v. Chamberlain, 76 N.E.3d 941, 946 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. denied. An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's decision is against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court or if the court has misinterpreted the law. Id. We will not reverse the trial court's admission of evidence absent a showing of prejudice. Gary Comm. Sch. Corp. v. Boyd, 890 N.E.2d 794, 798 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).

[14] Cummings specifically contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted the deposition testimonies of Drs. Doshi and Calandra because Pfledderer had failed to comply with the requirements of Trial Rule 26(B). That rule provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

(4) Trial Preparation: Experts.

Discovery of facts known and opinions held by experts, otherwise discoverable under the provisions of subdivision (B)(1) of this rule and acquired or developed in anticipation of litigation or for trial, may be obtained as follows:

(a)(i) A party may through interrogatories require any other party to identify each person whom the other party expects to call as an expert witness at trial, to state the subject matter on which the expert is expected to testify, and to state the substance of the facts and opinions to which the expert is expected to testify and a summary of the grounds for each opinion.

Ind. Trial Rule 26(B)(4). Cummings maintains that Pfledderer's disclosure “provide[d] nothing in the way of any real information concerning the specific conclusions reached by Drs. Doshi and Calandra.” Appellant's Br. at 17.

[15] Cummings further contends that Pfledderer violated Indiana Trial Rule 26(E) when he failed to supplement his discovery responses. That rule provides that a party “is under a duty seasonably to supplement his response with respect to any question directly addressed to” the identity of each person expected to be called as an expert witness, the subject-matter on which he is expected to testify, and the substance of his testimony. T.R. 26(E)(1). Cummings maintains that Pfledderer's response was simply to “see Expert Disclosures,” which was a “direct violation” of that rule. Appellant's Br. at 21 (alteration omitted).

[16] However, even if we assume for the sake of argument that Pfledderer failed to comply with Trial Rule 26, Cummings has failed to demonstrate that she was harmed by that failure. Her main contention on appeal is that, had she known the substance of the doctors’ testimonies prior to the depositions, she would have been more prepared. But Cummings does not make any argument to explain how she would have prepared differently or what questions she would have asked. Indeed, she does not make any argument to explain anything she would have changed about the depositions.

[17] And despite Cummings’ lack of notice about the doctors’ testimonies, she was nonetheless able to thoroughly cross-examine them. She challenged them about their opinions regarding the cause of her hematoma, and she questioned them regarding their qualifications to render those opinions. For instance, Cummings questioned Dr. Calandra about his opinion that an intramural hematoma can only be caused by an accident of at least thirty miles per hour, and she was able to elicit testimony that the source of his information was a class in medical school in 1978, which testimony she was then able to use to challenge his credibility before the jury. Similarly, Cummings was able to elicit testimony from Dr. Doshi that he was not a biomechanical expert, that he did not treat patients with intramural hematomas caused by trauma, and that he did not perform any calculations to determine the force of the impact Cummings had sustained. And Cummings was again able to use that testimony to challenge his credibility before the jury.

[18] Because Cummings has not explained what she would have done differently and because she was able to thoroughly cross-examine Drs. Doshi and Calandra, she has not met her burden on appeal to show that she was harmed by the court's admission of the doctors’ testimonies, which she obtained six months prior to the trial date. We therefore do not find reversible error on this issue.

Issue Two: Jury Instructions

[19] Cummings next contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it declined to give her proffered jury instruction. As this Court has stated:

“In reviewing challenges to jury instructions, we afford great deference to the trial court.” R.T. v. State, 848 N.E.2d 326, 331 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). In reviewing a trial court's decision to give or refuse a tendered instruction, this Court considers “whether the instruction (1) correctly states the law, (2) is supported by the evidence in the record, and (3) is covered in substance by other instructions.” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Wright, 774 N.E.2d 891, 893 (Ind. 2002).

Ramey v. Ping, 190 N.E.3d 392, 402 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), trans. denied.

[20] Cummings requested that the court instruct the jury that “Defendant is not excused from liability just because Plaintiff had a physical condition at the time of the collision that made her more likely to be injured.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 152. Cummings contends that her proposed instruction was a correct statement of the law “as it is based on Pattern Instruction No. 925,” and because it was supported by the evidence in the record, as there was testimony that she “was more susceptible to” the intramural hematoma given her history. Appellant's Br. at 26. And she contends that the failure to give the instruction was “not harmless” because it “is clear that the jury did not assess damages for the [hematoma] as the verdict was only for $10,000”¹ and that, had the jury been given her proffered instruction, “then the verdict would have been different and damages would have been assessed” for the hematoma. Id. at 27.

[21] However, we agree with Pfledderer that, even if Cummings’ proposed instruction was an accurate statement of the law and supported by the evidence, the substance of her instruction was covered by other instructions.² Again, the substance of the instruction Cummings sought was that Pfledderer could still be found liable for having caused Cummings’ injury even though she had preexisting conditions that made her more susceptible to that injury.

[22] While the court did not give Cummings’ proffered instruction, the court instructed the jury that a “person's conduct is legally responsible for causing an injury if the injury would not have occurred without the conduct and was a natural probable and foreseeable result of the conduct.” Tr. Vol. 4 at 46. The trial court further instructed the jury that Cummings was required to prove by the greater weight of the evidence that “Pfledderer's act was a responsible cause of Angela Cummings's claimed injuries and Angela Cummings suffered damages as a result of the injuries.” Id. at 48. And the court instructed the jury that, if it found that Pfledderer was liable to Cummings, it “may consider the amount or the nature and extent of the injuries and defect of injuries on Angela Cummings's ability to function as a whole person.” Id. at 50.

[23] Stated differently, the court instructed the jury that Cummings had to prove that Pfledderer's negligence caused her injury and that her injury would not have happened but for the accident. And there is nothing in the instructions that excused Pfledderer's liability based on a preexisting condition. Thus, the substance of Cummings’ instruction—that Pfledderer was liable if the accident caused her injuries—was covered by other instructions. The trial court therefore did not abuse its discretion when it declined to give Cummings’ proffered instruction.

Conclusion

[24] Cummings has not shown reversible error regarding the admission of the doctors’ depositions at trial. And the court did not abuse its discretion when it declined to give Cummings’ proffered jury instruction. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

[25] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Cummings asked the jury to award her $1,290,000.00.

2.   In her principal brief, Cummings makes no argument to show that her proffered instruction is not covered by other instructions. She makes this argument for the first time in her reply brief.

Bailey, Judge.

Judges Brown and Weissmann concur. Brown, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.