Dustin M. Nevil, Appellant-Respondent v. Laurie B. Nevil, Appellee-Petitioner (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Despite having a premarital agreement, Laurie (“Wife”) and Dustin (“Husband”) Nevil have spent years litigating the division of certain marital property. In this appeal, Husband raises two issues for our review:

1. Whether the trial court erred in determining an ambiguity existed in the premarital agreement regarding property to be included in the marital estate; and

2. Whether the trial court erred by awarding Wife the parties’ jointly owned interest in certain real estate.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On June 13, 2013, Wife and Husband entered into a premarital agreement (the “Agreement”); five days later, they married. Prior to executing the Agreement and marrying Wife, Husband had purchased the real estate commonly known as 6914 W Mill Road, Evansville, Indiana (the “Marital Residence”), and it was listed as his individual property in the Agreement. In March 2019, Husband quitclaimed the Marital Residence to himself and Wife “as joint tenants with full rights of survivorship and not as teannts [sic] in common.” Ex. Vol. IV at 12.¹ Also during the marriage, the parties purchased and rented out nine properties in Evansville (the “Rental Properties”), and they jointly purchased an interest in two properties in Kentucky (the “Kentucky Properties”) for personal use.

[4] On November 23, 2021, Wife filed a petition for dissolution of marriage. On October 4 and 6, 2023, the trial court held a contested final hearing on the division of property. Wife presented evidence that Husband intended to financially harm her through the divorce, as demonstrated in text messages he sent to several different people:

• “I love her to death this is gonna get messy and I'm gonna have to do things that will hurt her to protect myself,” Ex. Vol. VI at 52 (errors in original);

• Wife “got her car taken early this morning” and Husband was going to “sell[ ] it tomorrow,” Wife “done pissed me off,” “I'll sell everything then buy more,” and “Before I get served I need to move everything out of” one of the Kentucky Properties, id. at 53 (errors in original);

• “I'm going to break her in attorney fees I'll drag this out and lose everything I have more f[*]ck you money than she has I'll blow it I don't care about money,” “I will burn this sh[*]t down,” and “The funny thing is I can rebuild she can't,” id. at 54 (errors in original);

• “No one will go against her hired a super lawyer in Indy,” and “I'm gonna try to get it moved there cost her money,” id. at 55 (errors in original); and

• “I might depends on how much money I blow on this divorce and my midlife crisis,” and “I will she starting to feel the financial burden and I hadn't even got started,” id. at 56 (errors in original).

Wife also presented evidence that Husband failed to maintain and pay taxes on the Rental Properties after she filed for divorce, resulting in numerous ordinance violations, tenants leaving, and tax sales being set for seven of the nine properties.

[5] The trial court issued three orders after the final hearing. First, on October 6, the trial court ordered the parties’ marriage dissolved, and in a separate order, it required the parties to sell the Rental Properties. Then on December 14, the trial court issued its order dividing the rest of the parties’ marital estate (the “Division Order”). In the Division Order, the trial court concluded the Agreement was ambiguous as to the division of the Marital Residence and awarded Wife half the equity therein once it was sold. The trial court also concluded that Husband had dissipated marital assets by failing to pay taxes on and maintain the Rental Properties, so the trial court awarded Wife the parties’ joint interest in the Kentucky Properties to offset that dissipation. This appeal ensued.²

Discussion and Decision

1. The Trial Court Did Not Err by Determining the Agreement is Ambiguous Regarding the Property to Be Included in the Marital Estate

[6] Husband contends the trial court erred by awarding Wife half the equity of the Marital Residence because the Agreement unambiguously states that the Marital Residence is his sole property upon divorce. In other words, Husband asks us to interpret the Agreement. Because the Agreement is a premarital agreement, we apply the same standard principles of contract interpretation as we would for other types of contracts. Harrill v. Harrill, 258 N.E.3d 1008, 1014 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (quoting Thompson v. Wolfram, 162 N.E.3d 498, 503 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), reh'g denied). And the same standard of review applies—contract interpretation is a question of law that we review de novo. Thomas v. Valpo Motors, Inc., 258 N.E.3d 236, 239 (Ind. 2025) (citing Land v. IU Credit Union, 218 N.E.3d 1282, 1286 (Ind. 2023)).

[7] Premarital agreements “are favored by law,” and we liberally construe them to “realize the parties’ intentions.” Harrill, 258 N.E.3d at 1014 (quoting Thompson, 162 N.E.3d at 504). Furthermore, when we interpret a contract,

we ascertain the intent of the parties at the time the contract was made, as disclosed by the language used to express the parties’ rights and duties. We look at the contract as a whole ․ and we accept an interpretation of the contract that harmonizes all its provisions. A contract's clear and unambiguous language is given its ordinary meaning. A contract should be construed so as to not render any words, phrases, or terms ineffective or meaningless.

Ryan v. TCI Architects/Eng'rs/Cont'rs, Inc., 72 N.E.3d 908, 914 (Ind. 2017) (internal citations omitted). “A contract is not ambiguous simply because the parties disagree about the proper interpretation of its terms. Instead, for an ambiguity to exist, the contract must be subject to more than one reasonable interpretation.” Wohlt v. Wohlt, 245 N.E.3d 611, 616 (Ind. 2024) (internal citations omitted).

[8] Here, the parties disagree over whether Paragraphs 6 and 12 can be read together harmoniously as written, or whether those paragraphs contradict one another such that an ambiguity exists. Both paragraphs concern joint property; however, to fully understand those two paragraphs, we must first examine the Agreement's explanation of “individual property” in Paragraph 2:

2. INDIVIDUAL PROPERTY. The term ‘individual property’ as used herein shall mean those assets set forth in Schedules A and B attached hereto and made a part hereof. The term “individual property” shall also mean any assets acquired with the proceeds of any assets set forth in Schedules A and B (but only to the extent that the proceeds are utilized to acquire such assets) whether or not those proceeds are invested in like kind property. “Individual property” shall also mean any gift or inheritance received by either party after the date of the marriage of the parties. All appreciation in individual property occurring after the marriage shall accrue solely to such party owning same and shall not be considered as property acquired during marriage. Neither party shall acquire any interest in the Individual Property of the other unless such interest is expressly transferred by written agreement signed by the party owning same.

Ex. Vol. VI at 99 (emphasis added). Schedule B is a list of Husband's individual property, which includes the Marital Residence.

[9] In contrast to “individual property,” Paragraph 6 explains “joint property” as follows:

6. JOINT PROPERTY. The term “Joint Property” shall mean any and all property which either or both of the parties elect to place in their joint names with rights of survivorship, and not as tenants in common, whether through joint tenancy with rights of survivorship or tenancy by the entireties. Joint Property may be created before or after the marriage of the parties hereto. The parties intend and agree that Joint Property shall also include all property acquired by either party after their marriage so long as such property is placed in the joint names of the parties with rights of survivorship, and not as tenants in common, whether through joint tenancy or tenancy by the entireties. Nevertheless, all individual property of either party at the execution hereof which is later converted into joint property or property held as tenants by the entireties shall not be treated as individual property upon divorce, but as joint property at death, as further provided for in paragraphs 11 and 12 following.

Ex. Vol. VI at 100 (emphasis added).

[10] Paragraph 12 concerns the division of property in the event the parties terminate their marriage in any way except for the death of the other party. In particular, Paragraph 12(E) provides as follows:

12. PROPERTY DIVISION IN DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE, SEPARATION, ANNULMENT OR ANY OTHER TERMINATION OF MARRIAGE OTHER THAN THE DEATH OF A PARTY. In the event of a Decree of Dissolution of Marriage, Order of Separation, an annulment or termination of the marriage between the parties for any reason other than the death of a party, without regard as to the moving party, the property of the parties shall be divided as follows:

* * *

(E) Individually Held Property Later Converted to Joint Property. Such property shall pass to the survivor at the death of either party; however, such property shall revert to the party who held title to such Individual Property prior to converting the same to Joint Property, including all appreciation thereof and subject to all depreciation thereof.

Ex. Vol. VI at 102 (emphasis added).

[11] Reading Paragraphs 2, 6, and 12(E) together reveals that Paragraphs 6 and 12(E) contradict one another. Pursuant to Paragraph 12(E), individual property, along with any appreciation or depreciation thereof, that was converted to joint property during the marriage “revert[s]” to the party who originally held title thereto. Ex. Vol. VI at 102. Additionally, the appreciation and depreciation associated with the converted property also reverts to the original titleholder. According to Paragraph 2, a hallmark of individual property is that all appreciation accrues solely to the owning party. Because Paragraph 12(E) provides that the appreciation and depreciation of converted property reverts to the original titleholder, Paragraph 12(E) treats converted property as individual property upon divorce.

[12] By contrast, Paragraph 6 explains that property that was individual at the time the Agreement was executed but converted to joint property during the marriage “shall not be treated as individual property upon divorce.” Ex. Vol. VI at 100 (emphasis added). That is, such property is treated as joint property upon divorce. Paragraph 12(E)’s treatment of individual property that was converted to joint property directly contradicts Paragraph 6's instruction that property that was individual when the parties executed the Agreement and was converted to joint property is not to be treated as individual property upon divorce.

[13] Typically, we would determine whether Paragraph 6 or Paragraph 12 is the more specific and therefore controlling term. See Castleton Corner Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. Conroad Assocs., L.P., 159 N.E.3d 604, 611 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (citing G.G.B.W. v. S.W., 80 N.E.3d 264, 270 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017)). However, it is not entirely clear which of the two is more specific. We therefore conclude that the Agreement is ambiguous concerning how individual property that was converted to joint property during the marriage should be treated upon divorce.

[14] A court may look to facts to resolve an ambiguity, inconsistency, or uncertainty in a contract's terms. Wohlt, 245 N.E.3d at 616 (citing First Fed. Sav. Bank of Ind. v. Key Mkts., Inc., 559 N.E.2d 600, 604 (Ind. 1990)). The factfinder “must determine the facts required to construe the contract” by looking “outside the contract's four corners to parol (or extrinsic) evidence.” Wohlt, 245 N.E.3d at 616 (citing Key Mkts., 559 N.E.2d at 604). The ambiguity is generally construed against the contract's drafter. Thomas, 258 N.E.3d at 242 (citing Constr. Grp., LLC v. Superior Concrete Constructors, Inc., 802 N.E.2d 901, 910 (Ind. 2004)).

[15] Here, the trial court entered findings and conclusions, so we review for clear error. See Roetter v. Roetter, 182 N.E.3d 221, 225 (Ind. 2022) (citing Dunson v. Dunson, 769 N.E.2d 1120, 1123 (Ind. 2002)). “A decision is clearly erroneous if the record facts do not support the findings or if [the trial court] applies the wrong legal standard to properly found facts.” In re R.L., 144 N.E.3d 686, 689 (Ind. 2020) (quoting In re D.J., 68 N.E.3d 574, 577–78 (Ind. 2017)). We will not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility, and we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that support the court's decision. In re Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 45 (Ind. 2019) (citing In re K.E., 39 N.E.3d 641, 646 (Ind. 2015)); Campbell v. Campbell, 250 N.E.3d 459, 474 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (citing Smith v. Smith, 136 N.E.3d 275, 281 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019)), trans. not sought.

[16] The trial court credited Wife's evidence that the parties’ intent when drafting the Agreement was for converted property to be split equally between them in the event of divorce. To the extent Husband argues on appeal that the trial court should not have admitted certain evidence, he has waived that claim by failing to identify the evidence he now attempts to challenge, as required by Indiana Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(d). Regarding Husband's other arguments, they are all requests for us to reweigh the evidence and reassess witness credibility, which we cannot do, see Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 45 (citing K.E., 39 N.E.3d at 646); Campbell, 250 N.E.3d at 474 (citing Smith, 136 N.E.3d at 281). For example, Husband contends that the trial court should not have accepted Wife's evidence that “the ambiguity arose due to a scrivener's error,” Appellant's Br. at 32, but the trial court expressly found, “To the extent paragraph 12(E) of the Agreement contradicts the other paragraphs, this Court finds Wife's testimony credible that was solely due to a scrivener error, not the intent of the parties,” Appellant's App. Vol. II at 31. Regardless of how the trial court characterized the error that led to the contradiction in the Agreement, the fact remains that the trial court found the parties intended that converted property would be subject to equal division upon divorce.

[17] Husband also asserts that “it is undisputed that Wife was the drafter of the Premarital Agreement, which the trial court notes in finding number three.” Appellant's Br. at 32 (citing Appellant's App. Vol. II at 30). This misconstrues the trial court's order. Finding 3 in the trial court's order states, “The parties used a form to structure the Agreement with Wife acting as the typist.” Appellant's App. Vol. II at 30. “Wife acting as the typist” does not lead to the conclusion that Wife drafted the Agreement. Indeed, Wife testified that the Agreement was a template provided by Husband's attorney, she typed in the parties’ names and filled out Exhibits A and B, and she did not “recall making any substantive changes” to the Agreement. Tr. Vol. II at 84–85. Based on the foregoing, the trial court did not err by determining that the Marital Residence was joint property subject to equal division and by awarding Wife half the equity in the Marital Residence.

2. The Trial Court Did Not Clearly Err by Awarding Wife the Parties’ Joint Interest in the Kentucky Properties

[18] Husband next contends that the trial court erred by awarding Wife the parties’ joint interest in the Kentucky Properties because doing so violated the Agreement. In making this argument, Husband asserts that “the trial court was required to divide the Kentucky properties pursuant to the provisions provided in the ‘valid and binding’ Premarital Agreement.” Appellant's Br. at 37, 38 (citing Pardieck v. Pardieck, 676 N.E.2d 359, 364 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997)). But Husband fails to identify the provision in the Agreement the trial court should have followed or otherwise identify any provision in the Agreement the trial court's decision allegedly violated.³

[19] Wife argues the Agreement is silent on how to divide property that was acquired by the parties jointly during their marriage. Paragraph 3 of the Agreement addresses property the parties acquired during their marriage:

3. PROPERTY ACQUIRED DURING MARRIAGE. Each party's Property Acquired During Marriage shall include any asset acquired by a party in his or her separate name during marriage or in his or her name with others but not with name of the other party, including, but not limited to; assets acquired by a party with income earned by that party during marriage. The parties intend and agree that Property Acquired During Marriage shall also include all property acquired by either party after their marriage that is traceable to Property Acquired During Marriage, including, but not limited to, income from proceeds from the sale of, appreciation in. and other property purchased with the income from, proceeds from the sale of, or appreciation in Property Acquired During Marriage or asset derived therefrom, unless the same has become Joint Property. Neither party shall acquire any interest in the Property Acquired During Marriage of the other unless such interest is expressly transferred by written agreement signed by the party owning same.

Ex. Vol. VI at 99.

[20] Paragraph 12(D) also addresses property the parties acquired during their marriage:

12. PROPERTY DIVISION IN DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE, SEPARATION, ANNULMENT OR ANY OTHER TERMINATION OF MARRIAGE OTHER THAN THE DEATH OF A PARTY. In the event of a Decree of Dissolution of Marriage, Order of Separation, an annulment or termination of the marriage between the parties for any reason other than the death of a party, without regard as to the moving party, the property of the parties shall be divided as follows:

* * *

(D) Property Acquired During Marriage. Each party hereby Waives all right, title and interest in the Property Acquired During Marriage of the other as set out in paragraph 3 above.

Ex. Vol. VI at 102.

[21] Paragraph 3 applies to property acquired individually by the parties during the marriage, and it is inapplicable to property acquired jointly by the parties during the marriage. Paragraph 6 applies to property acquired jointly by the parties during the marriage as well as property acquired individually by the parties and converted to joint property thereafter. The parties acquired their interest in the Kentucky Properties jointly during their marriage. As such Paragraph 3, and thereby Paragraph 12(D), are inapplicable to the parties’ joint interest in the Kentucky Properties. And the parties do not argue that any other provision of the Agreement applies thereto. Because the Agreement does not control the division of the parties’ joint interest in the Kentucky Properties and because the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions thereon, we review the trial court's decision as to the Kentucky Properties and dissipation for clear error, see Roetter, 182 N.E.3d at 225 (citing Dunson, 769 N.E.2d at 1123), which is set forth in detail above, see supra ¶ 15.

[22] “The division of marital property in Indiana involves a two-step process.” Roetter, 182 N.E.3d at 226. First, the trial court identifies the property to include in the marital estate. Id. at 226–27 (citing O'Connell v. O'Connell, 889 N.E.2d 1, 10 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008)). Second, the trial court distributes that property in a “just and reasonable” manner. Id. at 227 (quoting O'Connell, 889 N.E.2d at 10–11). Neither Husband nor Wife argue that the parties’ interest in the Kentucky Properties should not have been included in the marital estate. Instead, their dispute centers on whether it was just and reasonable for the trial court to award Wife the parties’ joint interest in the Kentucky Properties due to Husband's dissipation of the marital estate.

[23] “Indiana Code section 31-15-7-5 (the Division-of-Property Statute) calls for a presumptive equal division between the parties.” Roetter, 182 N.E.3d at 227. But a party “may rebut this presumption with ‘relevant evidence’ showing ‘that an equal division would not be just and reasonable.’ ” Id. Such relevant evidence may include evidence concerning the factors set forth in the Division-of-Property Statute. Ind. Code § 31-15-7-5. While trial courts must consider all relevant factors set forth in the Division-of-Property Statute, they need not explicitly address every factor in writing so long as they consider all assets and liabilities with sufficient findings to justify unequal division. Roetter, 182 N.E.3d at 227. Here, Husband challenges only the trial court's findings and conclusion concerning dissipation.

[24] “Dissipation generally involves the use or diminution of the marital estate for a purpose unrelated to the marriage and does not include the use of marital property to meet routine financial obligations.” Johnson v. Johnson, 181 N.E.3d 364, 376 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (quoting Balicki v. Balicki, 837 N.E.2d 532, 540 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied). Dissipation requires actual waste or misuse of marital assets, id. (quoting Balicki, 837 N.E.2d at 540), and it “includes the frivolous and unjustified spending of marital assets,” id. at 376–77 (quoting Grathwohl v. Garrity, 871 N.E.2d 297, 303 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007)).

[25] We use a four-factor test to determine whether dissipation has occurred: (1) “Whether the expenditure benefited the marriage or was made for a purpose entirely unrelated to the marriage”; (2) “The timing of the transaction”; (3) “Whether the expenditure was excessive or de minimis”; and (4) “Whether the dissipating party intended to hide, deplete, or divert the marital asset.” Johnson, 181 N.E.3d at 377 (quoting Kondamuri v. Kondamuri, 852 N.E.2d 939, 952 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006)). Importantly, transactions that “occur during the breakdown of the marriage, just prior to filing a petition or during the pendency of an action, may require heightened scrutiny.” Id. (quoting In re Marriage of Coyle, 671 N.E.2d 938, 943 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996)).

[26] The trial court awarded the parties’ joint interest in the Kentucky Properties to Wife to offset Husband's dissipation of marital property—namely regarding their Rental Properties—during the pendency of the divorce:

23. There was evidence presented that Husband failed to notify Wife of tax delinquencies regarding the rental properties and allowed multiple properties to be sold at tax sale. Despite Husband's failure to disclose the tax issues, Wife was notified of the tax sale by the bank holding the mortgage on one property.

24. Wife was able to save two properties from tax sale by withdrawing $6,000 from her savings.

25. Wife shall be entitled to reimbursement for the $6,000 paid by her towards taxes for the rental properties․

* * *

27. During the provisional period, Husband had almost exclusive control and access of the Rental Properties. Husband testified that due to the dissolution filed by Wife, he stopped maintenance on the rental properties. Husband also used proceeds of the rental properties to pay for his individual expenses and to reimburse himself. Husband's expenses included: paying himself, paying for his personal jet skis, takeout food and paying for property taxes and expenses for his individual property.

28. Husband failed to maintain the properties, resulting in penalties from the city of Evansville and repeated litigation. Husband's failure to pay taxes on the rental properties – despite using the rental proceeds for his own gain – resulted in all but two properties being sold at tax sale.

29. This devaluation is attributable to Husband's intentional dissipation of the rental properties and associated rental income. However, based on the evidence presented, it is difficult for the Court to determine an exact dollar amount attributable to Husband's actions. To offset the dissipation, Wife shall be the owner of any and all interest in the Kentucky properties held by Husband as explained below.

* * *

31․ Wife shall be the sole and exclusive owner of any interest held by Husband in both Kentucky properties, free and clear of any claim by Husband․ This shall offset dissipation involving the rental properties caused by Husband.

Appellant's App. Vol. II at 32–33.

[27] Husband argues that Findings 23, 27, and 29 are clearly erroneous. Because Husband does not challenge the remainder of the trial court's findings, we take them as true. See R.M. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 203 N.E.3d 559, 564 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (citing Madlem v. Arko, 592 N.E.2d 686, 687 (Ind. 1992)), trans. not sought. First, Husband's challenges to Finding 23 are merely requests for us to reweigh the evidence and reassess witness credibility, which we cannot do, see Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 45 (citing K.E., 39 N.E.3d at 646); Campbell, 250 N.E.3d at 474 (citing Smith, 136 N.E.3d at 281). For example, Husband argues that “Wife had equal access to the information regarding the [R]ental [P]roperties and failed to take any action herself to ensure that the status of the [R]ental [P]roperties were clear of any tax delinquency.” Appellant's Br. at 39 (citing Tr. Vol. III at 15–16). While this may be true, Husband's contention overlooks the fact that the tax delinquency and tax sale notices were sent to the Marital Residence—of which he had exclusive control at all relevant times—and he failed to inform Wife of the notices.

[28] Second, Husband challenges Finding 27 on multiple fronts. But again, Husband's arguments are all invitations for us to reweigh the evidence and reassess witness credibility, which we cannot do, see Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 45 (citing K.E., 39 N.E.3d at 646); Campbell, 250 N.E.3d at 474 (citing Smith, 136 N.E.3d at 281). For instance, Husband claims that Wife could have but did not use insurance proceeds from a fire at one of the Rental Properties to make repairs to the Rental Properties. Appellant's Br. at 41. Husband's argument ignores the fact that (a) he was the one who initially cashed the full amount of the insurance check the parties received for that fire, (b) he spent half the funds within one month and on things other than the rentals, and (c) he refused to turn over the other half of the funds to Wife for nearly six months.

[29] Finally, Husband challenges Finding 29, alleging the trial court's failure to assign a dollars-and-cents value to his dissipation necessarily means that he did not actually waste or misuse marital assets. Husband's argument ignores the fact that the trial court found the Kentucky Properties are worth “approximately $27,250.” Appellant's App. Vol. II at 33. Husband also cannot now benefit from his own wrongdoing by claiming that the trial court had to determine an exact value of his dissipation before the trial court could find that he had, in fact, dissipated marital assets. The trial court clearly concluded that Husband's decision to neglect the Rental Properties constituted waste or misuse thereof such that Husband committed dissipation. The trial court's decision to award Wife the parties’ interest in the Kentucky Properties as an equalization payment for Husband's dissipation is not clearly erroneous. See Layne v. Layne, 77 N.E.3d 1254, 1263–64 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. denied.

Conclusion

[30] In sum, the trial court did not err by determining the Agreement was ambiguous regarding division of the Marital Residence, nor did it err by awarding Wife the parties’ joint interest in the Kentucky Properties as an equalization payment for Husband's dissipation of marital assets. We therefore affirm the trial court on all issues raised.

[31] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   All citations to the Transcript are to the Transcript filed in Case 24A-DC-79, one of Husband's first two attempts to appeal the trial court's dissolution decree in this case, see infra n.2.

2.   Husband has appealed this case twice before. The first appeal—Case 24A-DC-79—was dismissed without prejudice and remanded for further proceedings on Wife's then-pending Motion for Rule to Show Cause and for Sanctions, which stemmed from Husband recording mechanics’ liens on five of the Rental Properties after October 6, 2023; those liens “effectively thwarted the sale of the property and circumvented the agreed order and the final decree of dissolution in this matter,” Appellant's App. Vol. II at 38. The second appeal—Case 24A-DC-680—was also dismissed without prejudice and remanded for further proceedings on Wife's then-pending motions related to Husband's continued refusal to comply with the trial court's orders; this court also awarded Wife appellate attorneys’ fees.

3.   In his reply brief, Husband argues for the first time that “the trial court erred when it failed to comply with its own determinations on Jointly Held Property,” Appellant's Reply Br. at 19 (citing Appellant's App. Vol. II at 30), namely that “Jointly Held Property must be divided equally between the parties,” id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Appellant's App. Vol. II at 30). Husband has waived this argument by raising it for the first time in his reply brief. See Lockerbie Glove Co. Town Home Owner's Ass'n, Inc. v. Indianapolis Historic Pres. Comm'n, 194 N.E.3d 1175, 1184 n.7 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (quoting Kirchgessner v. Kirchgessner, 103 N.E.3d 676, 682 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018)).

Felix, Judge.

Judges Vaidik and Tavitas concur. Vaidik, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.