Eric Scott Standiford, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] In 2018, Eric Standiford was charged with Level 6 felony sexual battery. After numerous delays, Standiford filed a motion to discharge pursuant to Indiana Criminal Rule 4(C). The trial court denied Standiford's motion to discharge and his subsequent motion to correct error. Standiford now appeals. Finding Standiford failed to timely object to preserve his 4(C) claim, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] The State charged Standiford with Level 6 felony sexual battery on December 18, 2018, in Clark County. The trial court issued an arrest warrant on December 19, but it was never served. Standiford voluntarily appeared at his initial hearing on December 21, at which the trial court recalled the arrest warrant and scheduled a pretrial conference for February 14, 2019.

[3] At Standiford's requests, status conferences were scheduled and held in April, July and September 2019. It is unclear from the record whether the State was present for the September hearing,¹ and no indication exists as to which party requested another status conference for November 25. Standiford later requested two continuances, and the November conference was rescheduled to May 12, 2020.

[4] On March 13, 2020, the Indiana Supreme Court approved the Clark County Courts’ petition for emergency administrative relief, tolling all speedy trial time limits in criminal cases through April 10, 2020, due to the COVID-19 coronavirus pandemic. In the Matter of the Petition of the Clark Circuit Courts for Admin. Rule 17 Emergency Relief, No. 20S-CB-00111 (Mar. 13, 2020). Days later, the Supreme Court issued an order tolling time limits for speedy trials statewide. In re Admin. Rule 17 Emergency Relief for Ind. Trial Cts. Relating to 2019 Novel Coronavirus (COVID-19), No. 20S-SB-123 (Ind. Mar. 23, 2020). The tolling period was ultimately extended through August 14, 2020. In the Matter of Admin. Rule 17 Emergency Relief for Indiana Trial Courts Relating to the 2019 Novel Coronavirus (COVID-19), 144 N.E.3d 198 (Ind. May 13, 2020) (extending tolling period through August 14, 2020).

[5] Pursuant to the Supreme Court's orders, the trial court continued the May pretrial conference to August 6, 2020. It is unclear from the record whether the parties held the August conference, but the trial court scheduled another pretrial conference for November 16, and a trial date for December 17.² Then, on November 16, the trial court continued the conference to March 19, 2021, and the jury trial to April 8, 2021. Two days later, the trial court entered an order in which it found an emergency continued in Clark County due to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. And the Indiana Supreme Court issued another emergency order suspending jury trials and tolling Criminal Rule 4(C) time periods until March 1, 2021. In re Admin. Rule 17 Emergency Relief for Ind. Trial Cts. Relating to the 2019 Novel Coronavirus (COVID-19), No. 20S-CB-123 (Ind. Dec. 14, 2020).

[6] On Standiford's motions, the court rescheduled the trial to August 26, 2021, and then to December 9, 2021. The State also requested a continuance in October, and the court rescheduled the trial for March 24, 2022. Standiford requested a continuance on March 4, 2022, and the trial was rescheduled for November 17, 2022. Due to court congestion, the court rescheduled the trial for June 22, 2023. On June 7, 2023, Standiford again moved for a continuance. The trial court reset the trial for July 27, 2023.

[7] The parties appeared for trial on July 27, 2023. Before the jury was empaneled, the State moved to amend its charging information. Over Standiford's objection that the State's motion prejudiced him and would change his theory of defense, the court granted the State's motion. Standiford requested a continuance, which the court granted and charged to the State. Standiford did not object to the new trial date on grounds that the State would exceed the one-year period under Criminal Rule 4(C). The court scheduled the trial for September 28, 2023.

[8] Thereafter, Standiford moved to continue the September 28 trial date, and the court reset it for March 28, 2024. On March 19, 2024, Standiford filed a motion for discharge under Criminal Rule 4(C) and moved to continue the trial. The court reset the trial to June 27, 2024, and held a hearing on Standiford's motion for discharge on June 17, 2024. At the hearing, the trial court denied Standiford's motion after finding Standiford waived his claim by failing to timely object to the court setting a trial date outside the one-year period.

[9] The court later issued written findings of fact and conclusions of law detailing its calculations. Specifically, the court found only 355 days attributed to the State as of July 27, 2023. The court determined the one-year period began on December 21, 2018—the date of the initial hearing. It then attributed the following time periods to the State:

• December 22, 2018, to February 14, 2019 (55 days)3

• September 17, 2019, to November 25, 2019 (70 days)

• August 15, 2020, to December 17, 2020 (125 days)

• December 10, 2021, to March 24, 2022 (105 days)

The trial court attributed all other periods to Standiford, the COVID-19 emergency, and court congestion. Notably, the trial court found the time from March 23, 2020, to August 14, 2020, was tolled pursuant to the Indiana Supreme Court orders.

[10] The court also found the subsequent sixty-three-day delay from July 28, 2023, to September 28, 2023, was attributed to the State. However, the court held Standiford waived his 4(C) claim on July 27, 2023, when he failed to timely object to the court setting a new trial date outside the one-year period. Standiford filed a motion to correct error on July 25, 2024; the trial court denied that motion on September 4, 2024. Standiford now brings this interlocutory appeal on the denial of his motion to correct error.

Discussion and Decision

[11] “When evaluating a Criminal Rule 4 motion for discharge, ‘in cases where the issue is a question of law applied to undisputed facts, the standard of review—like for all questions of law—is de novo.’ ” State v. Larkin, 100 N.E.3d 700, 703 (Ind. 2018) (quoting Austin v. State, 997 N.E.2d 1027, 1039 (Ind. 2013)). “When the trial court makes factual findings (of congestion or emergency to justify a deadline extension), appellate courts show ‘reasonable deference’ to those findings and reverse only for ‘clear error.’ ” Bradley v. State, 248 N.E.3d 563, 567 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Austin, 997 N.E.2d at 1040).

[12] “The State bears the burden of bringing the defendant to trial within one year.” Larkin, 100 N.E.3d at 703 (Ind. 2018) (citation omitted). Rule 4(C) enforces this burden and “provides a defendant may not be held to answer a criminal charge for greater than one year, unless the delay is caused by the defendant, emergency, or court congestion.” Id. at 703-04. “Furthermore, a ‘defendant has no obligation to remind the trial court of the State's duty, nor is he required to take any affirmative action to see that he is brought to trial within the statutory time period.’ ” Hoback v. State, 225 N.E.3d 208, 212 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (quoting State v. Black, 947 N.E.2d 503, 507 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011)), trans. denied. However, “a defendant generally waives rights under Rule 4(C) by failing to offer a timely objection to trial dates set outside the one-year limitation, unless the setting of that date occurs after the one-year period has expired.” Battering v. State, 150 N.E.3d 597, 601 (Ind. 2020) (citing Pelley v. State, 901 N.E.2d 494, 498 (Ind. 2009)). “The purpose of this rule is to assure criminal defendants of early trials, not to provide them with a technical means of avoiding trial.” Johnson v. State, 708 N.E.2d 912, 915 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied.

[13] Standiford asserts the last day the State had to try him under the one-year period was July 27, 2023. To support this argument, Standiford attributes the following time periods to the State:

• December 18, 2018, to February 13, 2019 (57 days)

• September 17, 2019, to November 25, 2019 (70 days)

• August 6, 2020, to December 17, 2020 (133 days)

• December 10, 2021, to March 24, 2022 (104 days)

• July 27, 2023 (1 day).

In other words, Standiford contends the trial court should have contributed two additional time periods to the State—December 18 to December 21, 2018, and August 6 to August 14, 2020. Standiford disputes the trial court's conclusions that (1) the one-year period began to run on the day of the initial hearing, December 21, 2018; (2) the period from August 6 to August 14, 2020, was tolled due to the ongoing COVID-19 emergency; and (3) Standiford waived his 4(C) argument by failing to object to any trial date set ten days after July 27, 2023. Ultimately, this case turns on whether the 4(C) period had elapsed by July 27, 2023, alleviating Standiford of his duty to timely object to the trial court resetting the trial date. See Battering, 150 N.E.3d at 601.⁴

I. December 18 to December 21, 2018

[14] We first address Standiford's assertion that the one-year period began the day the charge was filed against him—December 18, 2018. Indiana Criminal Rule 4(C) provides that the one-year period begins to run at either “the date the criminal charge against [a] defendant is filed, or from the date of the arrest on such charge, whichever is later[.]” Crim. R. 4(C) (2021).⁵ In Johnson v. State, our court recognized a limited exception to this rule: when an accused is charged with a misdemeanor and is subject to a summons in lieu of an arrest warrant, the one-year period runs from the date the accused is to appear in court, i.e., the date the accused's liberty is restrained. 708 N.E.2d at 915.

[15] Citing Johnson, the trial court found “no arrest warrant was issued” and concluded the one-year period began at the “first point where [Standiford's] liberty interests could be restrained[,]” the initial hearing on December 21, 2018. App. Vol. III p. 106. Standiford argues the Johnson exception is inapplicable to his case, since he was charged with a felony and an arrest warrant was issued on December 19, 2018, but was never served. We agree with Standiford and see no reason why the limited exception outlined in Johnson would be applicable to this case. Applying the plain language of Criminal Rule 4(C), the start of the one-year period began when the State filed charges against Standiford on December 18, 2018. Accordingly, fifty-nine days are attributable to the State for December 18, 2018, to February 14, 2019.

II. August 6 to August 14, 2020

[16] Standiford argues the trial court erred in considering August 6 to August 14, 2020, tolled by the emergency resulting from the ongoing pandemic. In its order entering findings of fact and conclusions of law, the trial court found:

On August 6, 2020, no Entry was filed by either party related to the Status Conference. The Court then scheduled a Final Pretrial Conference for November 16, 2020 and the first Jury Trial setting herein on December 17, 2020. Due to the lack of record, the delay from August 7, 2020 to Jury Trial date of December 17, 2020 is charged against the State. However, pursuant to Indiana Supreme Court Order, the tolling period for C.R. 4 purposes was tolled from March 23, 2020 until August 14, 2020. Therefore, the delay is calculated from August 15, 2020 to December 17, 2020 for a period of 125 days.

Id. at 107 (emphasis removed).

[17] While Standiford acknowledges the Supreme Court's orders granted trial courts authority to toll Criminal Rule 4(C), Standiford argues the trial court needed to invoke this authority. He argues the trial court failed to invoke this authority and elected to advance the case on August 6 by setting dates for another conference and jury trial. However, the State argues the effect of the Supreme Court's order was to toll the operation of Criminal Rule 4 through August 14, 2020. We agree with the State.

[18] The Supreme Court initially approved the Clark County Courts’ petition for emergency administrative relief, tolling all speedy trial time limits through April 10, 2020. In the Matter of the Petition of the Clark Circuit Courts for Admin. Rule 17 Emergency Relief, No. 20S-CB-00111 (Mar. 13, 2020). In its subsequent orders, our Supreme Court authorized continued tolling through August 14, 2020. In the Matter of Admin. Rule 17 Emergency Relief for Indiana Trial Courts Relating to the 2019 Novel Coronavirus (COVID-19), 141 N.E.3d 1243 (Ind. April 3, 2020) (extending tolling period through May 4, 2020); In the matter of Admin. Rule 17 Emergency Relief for Indiana Trial Courts Relating to the 2019 Novel Coronavirus (COVID-19), 142 N.E.3d 912 (Ind. April 24, 2020) (extending tolling period through May 17, 2020); In the Matter of Admin. Rule 17 Emergency Relief for Indiana Trial Courts Relating to the 2019 Novel Coronavirus (COVID-19), 144 N.E.3d 198 (Ind. May 13, 2020) (extending tolling period through August 14, 2020). The trial court did not err when it ruled the one-year period was tolled in Standiford's case until August 14, 2020. See Blake v. State, 176 N.E.3d 989, 995 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (holding a trial court did not err in finding an emergency existed due to COVID-19 and concluding the Criminal Rule 4 period was tolled). Accordingly, only 125 days are attributable to the State for August 14 to December 17, 2020.

III. July 27, 2023

[19] Finally, Standiford argues he was not required to object on July 27, 2023, because, according to his proffered calculations, it was the last day the State had to try Standiford. We are not persuaded by Standiford's argument. As discussed above, the trial court should have calculated the one-year period as beginning on December 18, 2018, but it correctly concluded the one-year period was tolled from March 23 through August 14, 2020. Thus, Standiford's duty to timely object had not expired on July 27, 2023. See Battering, 150 N.E.3d at 601.

[20] Standiford also argues he was not required to object because he opposed the State's motion to amend the charging information. While “the aim of providing a speedy trial should never risk an unfair or incomplete trial[,]” we see no reason why Standiford could not timely object while simultaneously opposing the State's late motion to amend. Austin, 997 N.E.2d at 1041. The trial court did not err when it denied Standiford's motion for discharge and concluded Standiford failed to timely object when the court continued the trial beyond the one-year period. We affirm.

[21] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The written entry for the status conference indicates the State did not appear, but counsel for the State appears to have signed the entry and the Chronological Case Summary (CCS) indicates the State did appear.

2.   No written entry was filed by either party related to the August 6, 2020, conference.

3.   Despite finding the one-year period began to run on December 21, 2018, the court uses December 22 as the beginning of the first time period.

4.   In his reply brief, Standiford argues the trial court erred by granting the State's motion to amend the charging information on July 27, 2023. However, the trial court denied Standiford's request to certify the denial of his motion to discharge and motion to dismiss the amended information. We only have jurisdiction over the Criminal Rule 4(C) issue. See Ind. Appellate Rule 14(B).

5.   Indiana Criminal Rule 4 was revised effective January 2024. The substance of the rule remains the same.

Scheele, Judge.

Judges May and Weissmann concur. May, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.