James L. Singleton, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] James Singleton was charged with three counts of child molesting and waived his right to a jury trial in writing on these charges; he was found guilty as charged. Singleton now appeals and presents one issue for our review: Whether his jury trial waiver was valid.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In February 2024, the State charged Singleton with two counts of child molesting as Level 1 felonies and one count of child molesting as a Level 4 felony. The matter was set for trial. At a pretrial hearing on August 9, the State informed the trial court that the parties had discussed Singleton “potential[ly]” waiving his right to a jury trial. Supp. Tr. Vol. II at 7. The trial court told the parties that “if [it] receive[d] a waiver of jury trial,” the trial court would “address that.” Id. Addressing Singleton directly, the trial court added, “[I]f anything about that changes, we'll have you back to have further hearing on the issue.” Id.

[4] On August 27, Singleton filed a Notice of Waiver of Jury Trial (the “Waiver”) that provided as follows:

Comes now State of Indiana, by Deputy Prosecuting Attorney Anna Samland and Defendant James L. Singleton, in person and by counsel Mark S. Lenyo, and hereby waives trial by jury in this cause and consents to bench trial to the court in this matter.

Appellant's App. Vol. II at 36. Singleton, Singleton's counsel (“Defense Counsel”), and the deputy prosecutor all signed the Waiver.

[5] On September 5 and 6, the trial court held pretrial hearings. At the September 5 hearing, the following colloquy occurred between the trial court, Defense Counsel, and Singleton:

THE COURT: All right. [Defense Counsel], we had set this for hearing. Couple things: I had seen that you had filed the Waiver of Notice of Jury Trial, and I wanted to just make sure we were confirming that. I think you had maybe raised a potential issue, which prompted the setting of this hearing as well. So I'll let you speak as to that.

[Defense Counsel]: Right. Thank you. I was asked by one of the family members that Mr. Singleton wanted to see me. I went over to see him yesterday. He came into the interview room and said since you will not do what I want you to do, I hereby terminate your services, and then he left. So that's where we're at.

* * *

THE COURT: ․ We have a trial set for September 9th. I was not inclined to continue that trial. And so we can have you back here -- hang on.

․ I'm concerned about you seeking to represent yourself with a trial pending on Monday. This was the trial that was up and set to go. [Defense Counsel], I guess I'll ask you: In light of that, were you ready to proceed to trial on Monday?

[Defense Counsel]: Yes, I was․ I don't believe there's any conflict or any reason for appointment of new counsel. So if Mr. Singleton desires to represent himself, that's an issue we'll have to work through.

* * *

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Singleton, I'm going to reset this hearing to tomorrow. We'll have you brought over to court, and we'll have further discussion about how we're going to move forward with the trial on Monday.

[Singleton]: Okay. Thank you.

Am. Tr. Vol. II at 3–4. Singleton ultimately kept Defense Counsel as his attorney.

[6] At the September 6 hearing, the trial court again acknowledged the Waiver, noting that “[t]here had been a waiver of jury trial filed just back on August 27th with [Singleton's] signature, [Defense Counsel's] signature, and the deputy prosecutor's signature.” Am. Tr. Vol. II at 6. The matter was not discussed further. However, the following colloquy occurred:

THE COURT: ․ Yesterday there was some discussion about you not wanting to continue with [Defense Counsel] as your lawyer․

And as we talked about, Mr. Singleton, there was not going to be appointment of new public defender. And so the question was how are we proceeding for this bench trial on September 9th? You had made some comments about representing yourself, which is why we wanted to have the hearing today to talk further about all of that. So I guess I'll ask both of you what's the intent for Monday's trial.

[Defense Counsel]: I asked Mr. Singleton, and I really didn't get an answer.

THE COURT: Mr. Singleton.

[Singleton]: I would like to keep him as my counsel. However, there are two things that I asked to be done that he would not do for my defense.

* * *

THE COURT: ․ So as I understand it then, we're proceeding Monday with [Defense Counsel] representing you, correct?

[Singleton]: Yes.

THE COURT: [Defense Counsel], are we okay to go on Monday with the bench trial?

[Defense Counsel]: Yes.

THE COURT: So we'll be back Monday at 1:00 and ready to proceed with trial at that point.

Id. at 6–7 (emphases added).

[7] On September 9, the trial court held Singleton's bench trial. Before the bench trial commenced, the trial court addressed the parties as follows: “We're set to proceed with [a] bench trial. Are both sides ready to proceed?” Am. Tr. Vol. II at 8. Singleton did not object to the case being tried by the trial court. Singleton was found guilty as charged. The trial court sentenced Singleton to 30 years of incarceration. This appeal ensued.¹

Discussion and Decision

Singleton's Jury Trial Waiver Was Valid

[8] On appeal, Singleton challenges the validity of his jury trial waiver. Whether a defendant validly waived the right to a jury trial is a question of law we review de novo. Horton v. State, 51 N.E.3d 1154, 1157 (Ind. 2016) (citing Hall v. State, 36 N.E.3d 459, 466 (Ind. 2015), reh'g denied). Our Supreme Court has explained the right to a jury trial as follows:

In broad view, federal and Indiana constitutional jury trial rights guarantee the same general protection—a criminal defendant must receive a jury trial, unless he waives it. Waiver of the Sixth Amendment jury trial right must be “express and intelligent,” Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 312, 50 S. Ct. 253, 74 L. Ed. 854 (1930), and waiver of the Indiana constitutional jury trial right must be “knowing, voluntary[,] and intelligent,” Perkins v. State, 541 N.E.2d 927, 928 (Ind. 1989).

Horton, 51 N.E.3d at 1158.

[9] Generally, the defendant bears the burden of establishing that his waiver was invalid. Nunez v. State, 43 N.E.3d 680, 683 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied. It is fundamental error to deny a defendant his right to a jury trial unless there is evidence of the defendant's knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of the right. Johnson v. State, 6 N.E.3d 491, 496 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). “A voluntary waiver occurs if the conduct constituting the waiver is the product of a free will; a knowing waiver is the product of an informed will; [and] an intelligent waiver is the product of a will that has the capacity to understand[.]” Id. (internal quotation omitted). Additionally, waiver of a jury trial must be personally expressed by the defendant, and such desire must be apparent from the record. Id. Personal waiver of the right to a jury trial may be either in writing or in open court. Horton, 51 N.E.3d at 1159.

[10] As an initial matter, we note that the State argues Singleton waived his appellate challenge to the validity of his jury trial waiver “because [he] made no objection when the trial court represented several times that the parties were proceeding to bench trial based on Singleton's signed request to do so.” Appellee's Br. at 11. To resolve this matter, we look to our Supreme Court's decision in Perkins v. State, 541 N.E.2d 927 (Ind. 1989). In Perkins, our Supreme Court addressed whether a defendant's submission to a bench trial with counsel by his side—by itself—is sufficient to waive the right to a jury trial. Id. at 928. Resolving the matter, the Perkins Court noted the following:

[A] successful waiver of jury trial cannot be made by the accused without the assent of the government and the judge. Good v. State (1977), 267 Ind. 29, 366 N.E.2d 1169. It is the duty of courts to assume in a criminal case that the defendant will want a trial by jury and require any waiver of jury trial to be a knowing and voluntary choice of the defendant himself, personally expressed by him viva voce or in writing, and memorialized on the court's record. Doughty v. State (1984), Ind., 470 N.E.2d 69. A knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver of the right cannot be inferred from a record of trial court events which does not evidence such personal choice. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1969). Submission to a bench trial with counsel at one's side cannot be deemed a waiver. Good, 366 N.E.2d 1169.

Perkins, 541 N.E.2d at 928 (emphasis added). In Johnson v. State, a panel of this court determined that “Perkins does not prevent us from interpreting submission to a bench trial as one piece of evidence, among others, supporting a waiver.” 6 N.E.3d 491, 497 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).

[11] Applying the reasoning in Perkins and Johnson to the case before us, we conclude that Singleton's failure to object to the bench trial—and his subsequent submission to the bench trial—alone cannot be deemed a waiver of his appellate challenge to the validity of his jury trial waiver. See Perkins, 541 N.E.2d at 928. It is just one factor supporting a valid waiver. See Johnson, 6 N.E.3d at 497.

[12] Based on the foregoing, Singleton has not waived his challenge to the validity of his jury trial waiver. We therefore proceed to the merits of Singleton's challenge to the validity of his jury trial waiver.

[13] Singleton argues that the Waiver filed with the trial court, was “extremely brief” and “falls woefully short of an adequate record that Singleton knew the extent of what a jury trial right was, that he intelligently gave up that right, and most importantly[,] that he voluntarily did so.” Appellant's Br. at 8. Singleton points to Defense Counsel's statement that he “didn't get an answer” from Singleton on proceeding with the upcoming trial in claiming that “nothing in the record [ ] supports Singleton had any conversations with his attorney regarding the seriousness of waiving his right to jury trial ․” Appellant's Br. at 8 (quoting Am. Tr. Vol. II at 6). We are unpersuaded by this argument. While Singleton does not argue to the contrary, we note that Singleton personally signed the Waiver which demonstrates that his waiver was personal. See Horton, 51 N.E.3d at 1159.

[14] Regarding Singleton's argument that his waiver was not made knowingly, Singleton acknowledges that an in-court colloquy is not required to waive the right to a jury trial. Nevertheless, he argues that the lack of evidence supporting conversations with his attorney and lack of any colloquy fails to support his waiver was knowing. “For waiver to be knowing, a defendant must be advised of their rights either on the record or in writing.” Carmouche v. State, 188 N.E.3d 482, 485 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (citing Duncan v. State, 975 N.E.2d 838, 844 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012)). Here, Defense Counsel also signed the Waiver, implying that Singleton “acted upon advice and information of legal counsel.” Poore v. State, 681 N.E.2d 204, 207 (Ind. 1997). It is well-settled, as Singleton acknowledges that “there is no requirement that a trial court orally advise a defendant of his right to a jury trial and the consequences of waiving that right.” Coleman v. State, 694 N.E.2d 269, 278 (Ind. 1998) (citing Hutchins v. State, 493 N.E.2d 444, 445 (Ind. 1986)). “A written waiver executed by the defendant is adequate.” Id. Thus, Singleton's argument that he did not make a knowing waiver fails.

[15] We are unpersuaded by Singleton's argument that the Waiver falls “woefully short” in establishing he voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial. Appellant's Br. at 8. At the pretrial hearing on September 5, 2024, the trial court acknowledged that Singleton had filed the Waiver. At the pretrial hearing held the next day, the trial court noted that the Waiver had been filed and signed by Singleton, Defense Counsel, and the deputy prosecutor. The trial court asked the parties, “[H]ow are we proceeding for this bench trial[?]” Am. Tr. Vol. II at 6 (emphasis added). And when the court asked Singleton if he was proceeding to trial with Defense Counsel representing him, Singleton answered in the affirmative. At the start of Singleton's bench trial, the trial court inquired whether the parties were ready to proceed with a “bench trial,” and Singleton did not object to the case being tried by the trial court. Id. at 8. “[S]ubmission to a bench trial [is] one piece of evidence, among others, supporting a waiver.” Johnson, 6 N.E.3d at 497. Under these circumstances, we conclude that Singleton's waiver was made voluntarily.

[16] Likewise, Singleton's argument that his waiver was not made intelligently fails. As stated above, Singleton's attorney also signed the Waiver. “[A] defendant's understanding [of waiver of a jury trial] may be inferred when he and his attorney both sign a written waiver of the jury trial right and file it in open court. The evidence tends to show that [the defendant] could read and that he thus had the ability to understand the short waiver form he signed.” Poore, 681 N.E.2d at 207. Here, Singleton's presentence investigation report reveals that he completed the 11th grade, could read and write, served in the military, and was employed as a truck driver for 30 years.

[17] On this record, we cannot say that Singleton did not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waive his right to a jury trial. Accordingly, Singleton's jury trial waiver was valid. We therefore affirm his conviction and sentence.

[18] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Singleton fails to support with citations to the record numerous statements of fact in his Statement of the Facts, as required by Indiana Appellate Rule 46(A)(6)(a). Singleton also fails to support with citations to authority numerous statements of law in his Argument, as required by Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a). We remind counsel that the purpose of our appellate rules—especially Appellate Rule 46 governing the content of briefs—“is to aid and expedite review and to relieve the appellate court of the burden of searching the record and briefing the case.” Miller v. Patel, 212 N.E.3d 639, 657 (Ind. 2023) (emphasis added) (quoting Dridi v. Cole Kline LLC, 172 N.E.3d 361, 364 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021)). Nevertheless, Singleton's noncompliance with Appellate Rule 46 does not substantially impede our review of his claim, so we choose to address the merits thereof. See Pierce v. State, 29 N.E.3d 1258, 1267 (Ind. 2015).

Felix, Judge.

Judges Vaidik and Tavitas concur. Vaidik, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.