Marvin C. Rodgers, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Marvin C. Rodgers appeals the denial of his motion to suppress. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History 1

[2] At approximately 5:45 p.m. on July 20, 2023, Paoli Police Officer Zachary Cook drove past a white car and white Chevrolet Silverado parked along the side of the road, with one of the vehicles facing north and the other facing south, and he did not see anyone in either of the vehicles. He noticed the vehicles “were most of the way off the road” but that “traffic would have to go around them.” Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 104. Officer Cook “knew that that property was all no trespassing,” which was “posted all the way down through there,” and he “went down and turned around [and] was just gonna run the plate but as [he] drove past them, [he] noticed two heads popped up in the truck.” Id. at 103-104, 108. He saw Rodgers in the driver's seat and a woman in the passenger seat. Officer Cook asked Rodgers and the woman “if everything was alright,” exited his vehicle, spoke with them, noted “they appeared to be a little shaky,” and thought “it was suspicious the way they were parked, the way they were acting, and they were hiding or appeared to be hidden when ․ they first s[aw] [him] coming.” Id. at 107. He “didn't know if they were trespassing.” Id. Rodgers and the woman indicated that “[t]hey were just meeting each other there cause no one would know they were there.” Id. at 105. Officer Cook contacted dispatch. “[A]pproximately one to maybe three or four minutes” later, Paoli Police Officer Curtis Garrison arrived at the scene. Id. at 85.

[3] When he arrived, Officer Garrison observed a pickup truck and Rodgers standing behind the truck. As Officer Garrison approached the rear of the vehicle, Rodgers “was moving his shirt left and right, up and down, [ ] he had his hands near his waistline, shifting around, moving around.” Id. at 86. Officer Garrison asked Rodgers “what he was doing back there,” and Rodgers said “[n]othing.”² Id. Officer Garrison believed that Rodgers was armed and dangerous and conducted a “pat down or a frisk” of Rodgers. Id. at 87. Rodgers “did pull away” and “was resisting the pat down to an extent.” Id. at 114. Officer Garrison felt an object which he believed to be a glass smoking device. Officer Garrison placed Rodgers in handcuffs, retrieved the smoking device from Rodgers, read his Miranda rights to him, placed him in the backseat of his police vehicle, and transported him to the jail. After Rodgers was processed, Officer Garrison returned to his police vehicle, searched the backseat, and found a bag of methamphetamine which “had been pushed between the seats.” Id. at 93. Officer Garrison had cleaned and inspected the backseat “[d]uring the last arrest,” and the vehicle “was under [his] control between the last arrest and this arrest.” Id. at 94.

[4] The State charged Rodgers with possession of methamphetamine as a level 6 felony. Rodgers filed a motion to suppress citing the Fourth Amendment. The State and Rodgers filed an “Agreed Entry” providing that the parties agreed to “submit the matter to the Court for consideration and decision based upon the depositions and written submissions of the parties.” Id. at 71. The court issued an order denying Rodgers's motion to suppress, finding that “no illegal or unauthorized search or seizure was committed by law enforcement.” Id. at 126. Upon Rodgers's request, the trial court certified its interlocutory order for appeal, and this Court accepted jurisdiction.

Discussion

[5] Rodgers asserts that Officer Garrison's detention of him, the frisk, and the search of his pocket violated the Fourth Amendment. Rodgers argues that, “for both Officer Cook and Officer Garrison, [his] nervousness formed the core of their suspicion” but that “nervousness is of limited significance when determining reasonable suspicion.” Appellant's Brief at 15 (citing Pinner v. State, 74 N.E.3d 226, 233 (Ind. 2017)). He argues that Officer Garrison's “only basis for the frisk was [his] nervousness, his lifting his shirt, and his reaching around his waistband,” his nervousness was to be expected, and “it is no crime to fiddle with one's shirt or reach around one's waistband.” Id. at 16. Rodgers also argues, “[a]ssuming for the sake of argument that [Officer] Garrison had reasonable suspicion and reasonable fear, he exceeded the scope of his authority when he searched [his] pocket and retrieved the glass smoking device because its nature as contraband was not immediately apparent.” Id. at 17.

[6] We review a trial court's denial of a motion to suppress in a manner similar to review of other sufficiency issues. Sanders v. State, 989 N.E.2d 332, 334 (Ind. 2013), reh'g denied. There must be substantial evidence of probative value in the record to support the ruling of the trial court. Id. We do not reweigh the evidence, and we consider conflicting evidence most favorably to the trial court's ruling. Id. We review de novo the determination of reasonable suspicion for a warrantless search. Id.

[7] In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968), the United States Supreme Court explained that police officers may employ investigative techniques short of arrest on less than probable cause without violating Fourth Amendment interests. Wilson v. State, 745 N.E.2d 789, 792 (Ind. 2001). The principal issue is whether the police action in question was reasonable under all the circumstances. Id. “To determine whether an investigative stop was reasonable ‘our inquiry is a dual one—whether the officer's action was justified at its inception, and whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.’ ” Id. (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20, 88 S. Ct. at 1879).

[8] To conduct a pat down, an “officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed; the issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger.” Id. (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 27, 88 S. Ct. at 1883). “To determine whether an officer acted reasonably, we consider the specific, reasonable inferences that the officer, in light of his experience, can draw from the facts.” Johnson v. State, 157 N.E.3d 1199, 1205 (Ind. 2020) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 27, 88 S. Ct. at 1883), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 2681 (2021). “In addition, a police officer ‘justified in believing that the individual whose suspicious behavior he is investigating at close range is armed and presently dangerous to the officer or to others,’ is entitled to conduct a limited patdown search of the suspect's outer clothing to search for a weapon.” Jackson v. State, 669 N.E.2d 744, 747 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 24, 88 S. Ct. at 1881). The Fourth Amendment allows privacy interests protected by the Fourth Amendment to be balanced against the interests of officer safety. Wilson, 745 N.E.2d at 792 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 23-27, 88 S. Ct. at 1881-1883).

[9] The record reveals that Officer Cook observed two vehicles which “were most of the way off the road” but that “traffic would have to go around them” along property for which there were no trespassing signs posted. Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 104. He “noticed two heads pop[ ] up in the truck.” Id. He also observed that Rodgers and the woman in the truck “appeared to be a little shaky.” Id. at 107. Officer Cook testified “it was suspicious the way they were parked, the way they were acting, and they were hiding or appeared to be hidden when ․ they first seen me coming” and “I didn't know if they were trespassing.” Id. Officer Cook contacted dispatch, and Officer Garrison responded within minutes. Officer Garrison testified, “[w]hen I approached the truck, Mr. Rodgers was on the opposite side of the truck, so he was closest to the tree line” and “as I approached the rear of the vehicle, [ ] he was moving his shirt left and right, up and down, [ ] he had his hands near his waistline, shifting around, moving around so I asked him what he was doing back there?” Id. at 86. When asked, “[w]hat did he say,” Officer Garrison replied “[n]othing.” Id. When asked, “based upon Mr. Rodgers you say moving his shirt left to right, up and down and hands near his waistline, you believed that he was armed and dangerous,” Officer Garrison replied, “I did sir. Yes,” and when asked “can you explain why you thought he was armed and dangerous based on his movements,” he answered, “His nervous behavior. His reaching around his waistline. Him hiding on the other side of the vehicle. Those were all elements that made me believe that he may be armed and dangerous.” Id. at 87.

[10] Officer Garrison observed more than mere nervousness—he observed the location of the vehicles along the road and the position of Rodgers relative to the vehicles and the officers, and he saw Rodgers “shifting his shirt,” “reaching around his waist area,” and “moving around.” Id. at 85-86. We conclude that a reasonably prudent person in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was potentially in danger, and we cannot say that Officer Garrison's detention or pat down of Rodgers violated the Fourth Amendment. See Johnson v. State, 38 N.E.3d 658, 663 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (reasonably prudent person would be warranted in the belief their safety was potentially in danger where defendant did not remove his hand from his pocket) (citing Williams v. State, 754 N.E.2d 584, 588 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (defendant avoided eye contact with the officer, was more nervous than usual for a routine traffic stop, and placed his hands in his pocket and waistband area, and defendant's behavior warranted officer's reasonable fear for his safety and subsequent pat down search), trans. denied), trans. denied.

[11] As for Rodgers's argument that Officer Garrison exceeded the scope of his authority in conducting the pat down, the Indiana Supreme Court has noted that, “[i]f a police officer lawfully pats down a suspect's outer clothing and feels an object whose contour or mass makes its identity immediately apparent”—even if that item is not a weapon—“there has been no invasion of the suspect's privacy beyond that already authorized by the officer's search for weapons.” Johnson, 157 N.E.3d at 1207 (quoting Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 367, 113 S. Ct. 2130, 2132 (1993)).

[12] Here, Officer Garrison testified that he conducted the pat down of Rodgers and felt an object which he “believed to be a glass smoking device.” Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 88. He indicated the device had “a little glass sphere at one end and a shaft at the other end coming off of the sphere.” Id. Officer Garrison testified “[i]t was immediately apparent to me that it was a pipe.” Id. at 89. When asked, “[j]ust from its outline,” he answered, “[c]orrect.” Id. We find no Fourth Amendment violation on this basis. See Johnson, 157 N.E.3d at 1208) (“Because Agent Wilkinson discerned the lump to be contraband as soon as he felt it without further manipulation, he was justified in seizing the powder-filled baggie from Johnson's pocket. This patdown search did not run afoul of the Fourth Amendment ․”) (citation and quotation marks omitted); Durstock v. State, 113 N.E.3d 1272, 1278 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (“The officer testified that he felt a ‘tubular object’ in Durstock's pocket that was ‘consistent with being a syringe.’ The syringe's identity was immediately apparent to the officer based on its shape, and the officer's warrantless seizure of the syringe was justified ․”), trans. denied.

[13] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court.

[14] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

2.   Officer Garrison testified, “[w]hen I approached the truck, [ ] Rodgers was on the opposite side of the truck, so he was closest to the tree line,” “as I approached the rear of the vehicle, [ ] he was moving his shirt left and right, up and down, [ ] he had his hands near his waistline, shifting around, moving around so I asked him what he was doing back there?” Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 86. When asked “[w]hat did he say,” Officer Garrison replied: “Nothing.” Id.

Brown, Judge.

Judges Bailey and Weissmann concur. Bailey, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.