Anissa Cooperwood, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Anissa Cooperwood challenges her convictions of burglary, as a Level 3 felony;¹ theft, as a Class A misdemeanor;² and criminal mischief, as a Class B misdemeanor.³ The only issue she raises on appeal is whether the State provided sufficient evidence to support those convictions.

[2] We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Vincent Hinton had been in an on-and-off relationship with Veronica Limon since 2014. In 2020, Hinton moved into a house that Limon had rented. Hinton was not on the lease, but he paid half the rent, and Limon gave him a key to the house. Hinton kept his belongings, such as clothing and a love seat, in the guest bedroom of the house. Hinton also made payments on Limon's truck, which she allowed him to use.

[4] At one point, Hinton ended the relationship with Limon. During the week prior to October 14, 2020, Hinton and Limon were “in the process of [Hinton] moving out [of the house] because [they] were ending the relationship.” Tr. v. 2 at 145. “That whole week, [Hinton had been] coming in and out of the house.” Id. at 144. Limon had informed Hinton that, “if he want[ed] to end the relationship,” he had to “come get his items” out of the house and either put the truck in his name or leave the keys to the truck with her. Id. at 185.

[5] On October 14, 2020, Hinton asked his friends Kameron Rice and Cooperwood to assist him in retrieving his belongings from Limon's house. Because Hinton would be leaving Limon's truck and key to the truck with Limon at her house, he needed Rice's and Cooperwood's vehicles to transport himself and his belongings. At approximately midnight, Hinton, Rice, and Cooperwood arrived at Limon's house. Cooperwood waited in her vehicle while Hinton and Rice went into the house. Hinton had his key to the back door of the house with him.

[6] At approximately 12:15 a.m., Hinton went into Limon's bedroom and awoke her to tell her that he was “leaving.” Id. at 144. Limon responded, “Okay. If you're leaving, can you do it quietly?” Id. at 146. She also instructed Hinton to leave the keys to her truck in the house. Hinton and Limon then began to argue. Hinton grabbed Limon's iPhone from her bed, put it in his pocket, and refused to return it to her. Limon followed Hinton around as he packed his belongings and repeatedly attempted to retrieve her phone from Hinton's pocket. Each time she did so, Hinton pushed her down, once causing her to fall into a bedroom doorknob and break it. At that point, Rice entered the bedroom and, “to stop [Limon] from retrieving [her] phone [from Hinton], [Rice] grabbed [Limon] from behind like a bear hug.” Id. at 151. Hinton then grabbed Limon by her neck and punched her in her jaw.

[7] Hinton and Rice walked out to the car with some of Hinton's belongings. At that point, Limon locked the front and back doors of the house. Hinton and Cooperwood went to the back sliding glass door. Hinton tried to open the door while Cooperwood spoke to Limon through the door. Cooperwood asked Limon to “let [Hinton] get his stuff and leave,” and Limon replied that “no one was stopping him,․ [she] just wanted [her] phone.” Id. at 152-53. Limon then heard Rice yell from inside the house that he was “getting in,” and Limon ran to the guest bedroom—which was not visible from the back door— to find Rice halfway inside the bedroom window. Id. at 154. Rice completed entry through the window, ran to the front door, and unlocked and opened it. Hinton and Cooperwood then entered the house through the front door.

[8] When Hinton and Cooperwood entered the house, Limon told Cooperwood, “[Y]ou do not have permission to be here. You are trespassing. You can wait for [Hinton] outside.” Id. at 158. Cooperwood then “took off her wig, and ․ said she had fought big b****s before.” Id. at 159. Rice once again held Limon in a “bear hug” as Cooperwood approached Limon and “hit [her] on the side of [her] head twice,” causing Limon pain. Id. Cooperwood, Hinton, and Rice then “focused on removing more of [Hinton's] things from the home, grabbed more bags, packed more bags” and then “walked outside.” Id. at 160. At that point, Limon locked the guest bedroom window and the front and back doors. Limon also placed a “wooden stick” in the sliding back door track. Id. at 163.

[9] Hinton returned to the back door and attempted to force it open. Hinton got the sliding door open a “crack,” which caused the door to pop out of its track. Id. Hinton's efforts at forced entry also caused damage to the curtain rod above the back door. Limon ran to her downstairs neighbor's house and used his phone to call the police. Rice left the scene in his own vehicle, and Cooperwood and Hinton soon followed in Cooperwood's vehicle. Limon subsequently found her phone in a neighbor's trash can.

[10] The State charged Cooperwood with robbery resulting in bodily injury, as a Level 3 felony;⁴ criminal confinement, as a Level 5 felony;⁵ residential entry, as a Level 6 felony;⁶ battery, as a Level 6 felony;⁷ theft, as a Class A misdemeanor; criminal mischief, as a Class B misdemeanor; and burglary, as a Level 3 felony. At Cooperwood's subsequent jury trial, Limon, Hinton, and Cooperwood testified, and the jury instructions included an instruction on accomplice liability. The jury found Cooperwood not guilty of robbery and battery but guilty of all other charges. Due to double jeopardy concerns, the trial court entered judgment of conviction only for the burglary, criminal confinement, theft, and criminal mischief verdicts, and sentenced Cooperwood accordingly. Cooperwood now appeals the burglary, theft, and criminal mischief convictions.

Discussion and Decision

[11] Cooperwood challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support her convictions of theft, criminal mischief, and burglary. When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence needed to support a criminal conviction,

we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses. We only consider the evidence supporting the judgment and any reasonable inferences that can be drawn from such evidence. A conviction will be affirmed if there is substantial evidence of probative value supporting each element of the offense such that a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. It is the job of the fact-finder to determine whether the evidence in a particular case sufficiently proves each element of an offense, and we consider conflicting evidence most favorably to the [fact-finder's] ruling.

Willis v. State, 27 N.E.3d 1065, 1066-67 (Ind. 2015) (citation modified).

Theft

[12] To support Cooperwood's conviction of theft, as a Class A misdemeanor, the State was required to prove that (1) Cooperwood, as an accomplice or principal, (2) knowingly or intentionally (3) exerted unauthorized control (4) over property of another person (5) with intent to deprive the other person of any part of its value. Ind. Code § 35-43-4-2(a). Cooperwood was charged with theft based on Hinton's unauthorized taking of Limon's iPhone. That is, there was no evidence produced at trial that Cooperwood herself stole Limon's iPhone; rather, the theory of Cooperwood's liability was that she was Hinton's accomplice.

[13] Indiana Code Section 35-41-2-4 provides:

A person who knowingly or intentionally aids, induces, or causes another person to commit an offense commits that offense, even if the other person:

(1) has not been prosecuted for the offense;

(2) has not been convicted of the offense; or

(3) has been acquitted of the offense.

This statute does not establish accomplice liability as a separate crime, but merely as a separate basis of liability for the crime charged. E.g., Taylor v. State, 840 N.E.2d 324, 333 (Ind. 2006). A defendant may be charged as the principal but convicted as an accomplice. Id.

[14] In determining whether there is sufficient evidence to support an accomplice relationship, we consider: (1) presence at the scene of the crime;⁸ (2) companionship with another at the scene of the crime; (3) failure to oppose commission of the crime; and (4) course of conduct before, during, and after occurrence of the crime. E.g., Shields v. State, 248 N.E.3d 1246, 1274 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024), trans. denied. It is not necessary that the evidence show the alleged accomplice personally participated in the commission of each element of the offense. Castillo v. State, 974 N.E.2d 458, 466 (Ind. 2012). Rather, “[a] jury may infer complicity and participation in a crime” from a consideration of the above four factors. Hauk v. State, 729 N.E.2d 994, 998 (Ind. 2000). However, “[i]n order to sustain a conviction as an accomplice, there must be evidence of the defendant's affirmative conduct, either in the form of acts or words, from which an inference of common design or purpose to effect the commission of a crime may be reasonably drawn.” Boyd v. State, 766 N.E.2d 396, 399 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002).

[15] “To be considered an accomplice, a participant in a criminal offense must knowingly or intentionally associate himself with the criminal venture, participate in it, and try to make it succeed.” Angulo v. State, 191 N.E.3d 958, 971 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (citation modified), trans. denied. To prove the intent element of accomplice liability, there must be some evidence that the alleged accomplice “was aware of a high probability that her behavior was aiding, inducing, or causing” the felony or theft. Johnson v. State, 605 N.E.2d 762, 764 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993), trans. denied. “An accomplice can be held criminally liable for everything done by his confederates which was a probable and natural consequence of their common plan.” Vasquez v. State, 762 N.E.2d 92, 95 (Ind. 2001) (citation modified).

[16] Here, there was no evidence that Cooperwood was present in the house when Hinton stole Limon's phone; rather, Limon's own testimony established that Cooperwood had not entered the house at that time. And, since Cooperwood was not present when Hinton stole Limon's phone, there was no way Cooperwood could have opposed that crime. Moreover, there was no evidence that Cooperwood knew Hinton stole or intended to steal Limon's phone. The evidence showed only that Cooperwood sat in her vehicle as Hinton entered the house to retrieve his belongings. There was no evidence from which it could be reasonably inferred that Hinton's act of stealing from Limon was “a probable and natural consequence” of his actions of retrieving his belongings from a house in which he had lived, to which he still had a key, and from which Limon—by her own admission—had instructed Hinton to remove his belongings.⁹ Vasquez, 762 N.E.2d at 95. In other words, there was no evidence that Cooperwood was “aware of a high probability” that driving Hinton to Limon's home—in which Hinton had lived and out of which he was moving—was aiding him in committing theft. Johnson, 605 N.E.2d at 764. In short, there was insufficient evidence to support Cooperwood's conviction of theft.

Criminal Mischief

[17] To support Cooperwood's conviction of criminal mischief, as a Class B misdemeanor, the State was required to prove that (1) Cooperwood, as an accomplice or principal, (2) recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally (3) damaged or defaced (4) property of another (5) without the other person's consent. I.C. § 35-43-1-2(a). Cooperwood was charged with criminal mischief based on the damage Hinton did to the bedroom door when he pushed Limon into it and the damage he did to the back sliding door when he attempted to force it open. Again, as there was no evidence produced at trial that Cooperwood herself damaged any property, the theory of her liability was that she was Hinton's accomplice.

[18] However, there was no evidence that Cooperwood was present during any of the property damage or that she had any knowledge of it. Limon's own testimony was that Cooperwood had not yet entered the house at the time Hinton pushed Limon into a doorknob, causing damage. In addition, Limon's testimony established that Cooperwood was not present when Hinton attempted to force the sliding glass door open, causing damage. As Cooperwood was not present, she could not have opposed Hinton's commission of those crimes. Nor was property damage a “probable and natural consequence” of Hinton retrieving his belongings from a house in which he had lived, to which he still had a key, and from which Limon had instructed Hinton to remove his belongings. Vasquez, 762 N.E.2d at 95. Again, there was no evidence that Cooperwood was “aware of a high probability” that driving Hinton to or from Limon's home—for which he had a key—was aiding him in committing the crime of property damage. Johnson, 605 N.E.2d at 764. There was insufficient evidence to support Cooperwood's conviction of criminal mischief.

Burglary

[19] To support Cooperwood's conviction of burglary resulting in bodily injury, a Level 3 felony, the State was required to prove that (1) Cooperwood, as an accomplice or principal, (2) broke (3) and entered (4) the building or structure of another person (5) with intent to commit a felony or theft in it (6) resulting in bodily injury to any person other than a defendant. I.C. § 35-43-2-1(2). “A ‘breaking’ is proved by showing that even the slightest force was used to gain unauthorized entry.” Wilburn v. State, 177 N.E.3d 805, 814 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (quoting State v. Hancock, 65 N.E.3d 585, 591 (Ind. 2016)). Thus, even opening an unlocked door or pushing a door that is slightly ajar constitutes a “breaking” if the entry was unauthorized. Id.

[20] Here, the State presented evidence that Cooperwood became aware that Rice had entered Limon's house through a window without authorization and that he then unlocked the front door so that Cooperwood and Hinton could enter. The evidence established that Cooperwood then walked through the front door when she knew that her entry was not authorized by Limon. That was sufficient evidence to show that Cooperwood broke and entered Limon's house. See, e.g., Henley v. State, 522 N.E.2d 376, 379 (Ind. 1988) (finding evidence that the defendant had opened the unlocked door to the victim's house and entered the house without her permission was sufficient to support the breaking and entering element of a burglary charge.)

[21] Moreover, the State provided evidence that Cooperwood broke into Limon's house with the intent to aid in the commission of the felony of criminal confinement, which was one of the felony charges against Cooperwood.¹⁰ “Intent to commit a felony in a burglary case may be inferred from the circumstantial evidence of the nature of the crime.” Gentry v. State, 835 N.E.2d 569, 573 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). “The evidence of intent ‘need not be insurmountable, but only provide a solid basis to support a reasonable inference that the defendant intended to commit the underlying felony charged.’ ” Barthalow v. State, 119 N.E.3d 204, 210 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (quoting Gilliam v. State, 508 N.E.2d 1270, 1271 (Ind. 1987)). While the formation of such an intent after breaking and entering is insufficient to support a burglary conviction, see, e.g., Collins v. State, 252 N.E.3d 971, 977 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025), the intent to commit a felony at the time of breaking and entering can be inferred from the conduct of a defendant once she is inside the premises, see Mull v. State, 770 N.E.2d 308, 313 (Ind. 2002).

[22] A person who knowingly or intentionally confines another person without the other person's consent commits the felony of criminal confinement. I.C. § 35-42-3-3(a). Limon testified that, immediately after Cooperwood entered the house, Rice held Limon in a “bear hug[ ]” without her consent. Tr. v. 2 at 159. That was evidence that Rice criminally confined Limon. Limon further testified that Cooperwood was present when Rice criminally confined Limon and, far from opposing Rice's crime, Cooperwood actually struck Limon twice while she was confined, causing bodily injury.¹¹ Thus, there was evidence that Cooperwood was present at the crime, did not oppose the crime, and conducted herself in a manner from which a fact-finder could reasonably infer that she intended Rice's criminal confinement of Limon. See, e.g., Shields, 248 N.E.3d at 1274 (discussing factors to be considered in determining whether there is an accomplice relationship).

[23] Moreover, the need to intentionally confine a person without their consent—i.e., criminally confine someone—is a “probable and natural consequence” of forcibly breaking into that person's home without authorization. Vasquez, 762 N.E.2d at 95. That is, a fact finder could reasonably infer that Cooperwood was “aware of a high probability” that Limon would resist in some manner the forcible, unauthorized entry into her home, leading one of the intruders to criminally confine her. Johnson, 605 N.E.2d at 764.

[24] There was sufficient evidence from which the jury could reasonably infer that Cooperwood broke and entered Limon's home with the intent to aid Rice in committing the felony of criminal confinement.

Conclusion

[25] There was insufficient evidence to support Cooperwood's convictions of theft and criminal mischief. However, there was sufficient evidence to support her conviction of burglary.

[26] Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

[27] I concur with the majority's conclusion that there was sufficient evidence to support Cooperwood's conviction for burglary. However, I must disagree with the conclusion that there was insufficient evidence to support her convictions for theft and criminal mischief.

[28] As acknowledged by the majority, it is not necessary that the evidence show the alleged accomplice personally participated in the commission of each element of the offense. Castillo, 974 N.E.2d at 466. During closing arguments, both parties argued that it was up to the jury to decide whether Cooperwood should be held responsible for her role in the charged crimes. The State argued that the evidence presented demonstrated that Cooperwood was involved in “an ambush that night” and that she was “material to the ambush.” Transcript Volume III at 116. The State further noted that the evidence indicated that Cooperwood and Hinton “planned this out,” as they left their young kids at home, met up with Rice, and went to Limon's house “in the middle of the night.” Id. at 122-123. The State argued, “we're not saying that Ms. Cooperwood personally did everything. We're saying that she's the accomplice here. We're saying that this was a group scheme.” Id. at 124.

[29] The jury heard evidence that Cooperwood was present at the crime scene, showed companionship with Hinton and Rice, failed to oppose the commission of the appealed offenses, and even encouraged them. Moreover, the jury heard evidence of her course of conduct before, during, and after the occurrence of the offenses. Indeed, Cooperwood could have stayed in her car after driving Hinton to Limon's house, but she instead decided to exit her car and actively participate in the crimes against Limon before then lending aid to her confederates as a getaway driver. I believe that the jury carefully weighed the evidence on all charged counts, acquitted Cooperwood on two counts, but determined that she indeed bore responsibility for the appealed counts of burglary, theft, and criminal mischief. This was the jury's prerogative, and it is not our place to reweigh the evidence or reassess witness credibility on appeal. Cf. Griffin v. State, 16 N.E.3d 997, 1004 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (holding that State presented sufficient evidence to support robbery conviction under accomplice theory because jury could reasonably conclude based on the evidence that defendant not only failed to oppose the robberies but was, in fact, an active participant in them); Woods v. State, 963 N.E.2d 632, 636 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (holding that State presented sufficient evidence for the jury to find defendant guilty of robbery as an accomplice; she waited in her car down the street from the crime scene and served as getaway driver when the robber returned).

[30] As I believe that the majority has inappropriately reweighed the evidence and reassessed witness credibility as to Cooperwood's convictions for theft and criminal mischief, I respectfully dissent from the decision to reverse those convictions, and I would affirm the convictions and the judgment of the trial court in all respects.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-43-2-1(2).

2.   I.C. § 35-43-4-2(a).

3.   I.C. § 35-43-1-2(a).

4.   I.C. § 35-42-5-1(a)(1).

5.   I.C. § 35-42-3-3(a), (b)(1)(C).

6.   I.C. § 35-43-2-1.5.

7.   I.C. § 35-42-2-1(c)(1), (e)(1).

8.   “Mere presence at the scene of a crime is insufficient to make one an accomplice,” but we consider presence at the scene in conjunction with the other factors. Griffin v. State, 16 N.E.3d 997, 1004 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).

9.   We note that neither Limon nor any other witness testified that Hinton did not have Limon's consent for his initial entry into the home on the night in question.

10.   Cooperwood has not challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support her conviction of criminal confinement.

11.   The jury found Cooperwood not guilty of battery, but it found her guilty of criminal confinement. We note thatjury verdicts in criminal cases are not subject to appellate review on grounds that they are inconsistent, contradictory, or irreconcilable. Beattie v. State, 924 N.E.2d 643, 649 (Ind. 2010). The evaluation of whether a conviction is supported by the evidence is independent from—and irrelevant to—the assessment of whether verdicts are contradictory and irreconcilable. Id. at 648.Myers v. State, 221 N.E.3d 694, 698 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), trans. denied.

Bailey, Judge.

Judge Weissmann concurs. Judge Brown concurs in part and dissents in part with separate opinion. Weissmann, J., concurs. Brown, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with separate opinion.