JACKSON v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Jason Jackson appeals his conviction of possession of methamphetamine, contending the State's evidence was insufficient. Concluding the State presented sufficient evidence, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In May 2023, Officers Matthew Pate and Christian Navaro of the Lafayette Police Department were dispatched on a call about a man reportedly passed out behind the wheel of his car. When the officers arrived, they found Jackson in the driver's seat of a car parked in the middle of the street, blocking traffic. When Officer Navaro spoke with Jackson he noticed that Jackson's speech was slurred, and his pupils were pinpointed. The officer conducted three field sobriety tests on Jackson, and Jackson failed all three.

[3] Meanwhile, Officer Pate, who was standing outside the car, observed a glass pipe under the radio console inside the car. The officer then searched the car and found another glass pipe wedged between the passenger seat and the center console as well as two plastic bags that contained a clear crystallized substance that was later determined to be methamphetamine.

[4] The State charged Jackson with possession of methamphetamine, a Level 6 felony and possession of paraphernalia, a Class C misdemeanor. At Jackson's bench trial, the State introduced a report from the BMV showing that Jackson is the registered owner of the vehicle in which he and the methamphetamine were found. The court determined Jackson was guilty of the felony and sentenced him to 545 days, with 180 days suspended to probation. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[5] When we review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of the witnesses. Sandleben v. State, 29 N.E.3d 126, 131 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied. Instead, we consider only the evidence most favorable to the judgment and any reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. Id. If there is substantial evidence of probative value from which a reasonable factfinder could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the judgment will not be disturbed. Labarr v. State, 36 N.E.3d 501, 502 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).

[6] To convict Jackson of possession of methamphetamine as a Level 6 felony, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Jackson, without a valid prescription or order of a practitioner acting in the course of the practitioner's professional practice, knowingly or intentionally possessed methamphetamine. See Ind. Code § 35-48-4-6.1(a) (2014). Jackson challenges the evidence of possession, specifically constructive possession.

[7] “Possession can be actual or constructive.” Pigott v. State, 219 N.E.3d 808, 812 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023). “Actual possession occurs when the person has direct physical control over the item.” Id. Here, the officers found the methamphetamine in Jackson's car, not in his actual possession. Thus, we must consider whether he constructively possessed the methamphetamine.

[8] First we observe that this Court has previously held that “[c]onstructive possession of items found in an automobile may be imputed to the driver of the vehicle.” State v. Emry, 753 N.E.2d 19, 21-22 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). Moreover, particularly compelling in this case is that Jackson was not only the driver of the vehicle but also its owner and sole occupant. Accordingly, constructive possession of the methamphetamine can be attributed to Jackson.

[9] That said, we briefly discuss the two elements of constructive possession. Constructive possession requires both the intent and the capability to maintain dominion and control over the item. Woodward v. State, 187 N.E.3d 311, 319 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (quoting Parks v. State, 113 N.E.3d 269, 273 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018)). To establish the intent element, the State must demonstrate the defendant's knowledge of the presence of the contraband. Wilson v. State, 966 N.E.2d 1259, 1265 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. Such knowledge may be inferred from the defendant's exclusive dominion and control over the premises containing the contraband. Id. Because Jackson was the owner, driver, and sole occupant of the vehicle, he had exclusive possession and control of it. See Whitney v. State, 726 N.E.2d 823, 826 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (determining that trial court could reasonably conclude defendant was in exclusive possession of vehicle where he was driver and sole occupant when stopped by police). It follows then that the factfinder could reasonably infer that Jackson had knowledge of the presence of the methamphetamine and thus, the intent to maintain dominion and control over it.

[10] To prove the capability component, the State must demonstrate that the defendant was able to reduce the contraband to his personal possession. Wilson, 966 N.E.2d at 1266. Where the defendant has exclusive possession of the premises on which contraband is found, an inference is permitted that he was capable of controlling it. Young v. State, 244 N.E.3d 950, 963 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (quoting Griffin v. State, 945 N.E.2d 781, 784 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011)), trans. denied. As Jackson was the registered owner, driver, and sole occupant of the vehicle, he had exclusive possession of the premises in which the drugs were found; therefore, the factfinder could reasonably infer that he had the capability to maintain dominion and control over the drugs.

Conclusion

[11] Based on the foregoing, we conclude the State presented sufficient evidence to establish that Jackson constructively possessed the methamphetamine found in his vehicle.

[12] Affirmed.

Baker, Senior Judge.

Kenworthy, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.