JACKSON v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] John Jackson appeals his conviction for Level 5 felony failure to register as a sex offender. He argues that the trial court abused its discretion by not sua sponte holding a hearing as to his competency to stand trial before submitting the case to the jury. But only a few months earlier, two court-appointed psychologists had evaluated Jackson and reported to the court that he had the ability to understand the proceedings and assist in the preparation of a defense. Because nothing occurred after those evaluations to raise a reasonable doubt as to Jackson's abilities, the court did not abuse its discretion by not sua sponte holding a competency hearing. We affirm Jackson's conviction.

[2] Jackson also appeals the trial court's finding that he was in contempt of court for refusing to submit to fingerprinting by the State during trial. Because the record shows that Jackson willfully disobeyed the court's direct order that he submit to fingerprinting, we affirm the contempt finding as well.

Facts

[3] In August 2011, Jackson was convicted of Class D felony sexual battery. As a result, Indiana Code § 11-8-8-19(a) required him to register as a sex offender for 10 years. But in April 2013 and again in June 2022, Jackson was convicted of failure to register as a sex offender, a Level 6 and a Level 5 felony, respectively. As a result of these convictions, and due to tolling during Jackson's periods of incarceration, his sex offender registration period was extended to April 5, 2036.¹

[4] In January 2023, Jackson was hand-delivered a letter from the Marion County Sheriff's Department that generally explained the extension of his sex offender registration period and advising of the new April 2036 end date. Jackson was unhappy about the extension and refused to sign the letter to acknowledge its receipt. But he continued to register as required while he appealed the extension through the Indiana Department of Correction (DOC).

[5] In a letter dated May 1, 2023, DOC denied Jackson's appeal and generally explained the extension of his sexual offender registration period. Jackson, however, was not satisfied. Later that month, he again appealed the extension, this time by filing a motion in his 2011 sexual battery case. The State responded to Jackson's motion on June 9, 2023, with a filing that generally explained the extension and incorporated by reference the letters from the Marion County Sheriff's Department and DOC. But the State's filing mistakenly asserted that Jackson's sex offender registration period had been extended to April 5, 2023, not 2036. And when the trial court later denied Jackson's motion, its order stated: “[Jackson] is required to register as explained in ․ the State's response.” Exhs., p. 84.

[6] Jackson last registered as a sex offender on June 7, 2023. When he did not register as required a week later, the State again charged him with Level 5 felony failure to register. Jackson requested a speedy trial, but his trial date was continued several times due to defense motions and court congestion. All the while, Jackson was adamant that he was no longer required to register as a sex offender—a position he repeatedly asserted to both his defense counsel and the trial court. Initially, Jackson argued that his registration period had only been extended to April 5, 2023, citing the State's mistaken assertion of that date in its June 2023 filing. But Jackson soon began arguing generally and erroneously that his registration period had never been lawfully extended at all.

[7] Jackson's first trial setting was in September 2023. But at the scheduled final pretrial conference, Jackson's defense counsel advised the trial court that he would need more time to prepare. Defense counsel therefore requested and was granted a continuance of trial. This angered Jackson, who went on a profane rant about his right to a speedy trial before being removed from the courtroom.

[8] At a pre-trial conference in April 2024, Jackson informed the trial court that he and his defense counsel were “not seeing eye to eye.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 44. His defense counsel then moved to have Jackson's competency to stand trial evaluated. The trial court responded, “I have to say he's never presented to me as incompetent. He's just angry.” Id. at 46. But defense counsel explained that the issue was Jackson's insistence that his sex offender registration period had not been lawfully extended—“[he] can't get off that point.” Id. The court added, “I don't have enough in front of me to say that I think he is incompetent.” Id. at 47. However, the court granted Jackson's motion for a competency evaluation and appointed two psychologists for the task: Kevin D. Hurley, Psy.D., and Courtney G. Deloney, PhD. The court also set the case for trial in July 2025.

[9] At the scheduled final pre-trial conference in June 2024, Jackson's defense counsel advised the trial court that they were still awaiting Dr. Hurley's and Dr. Deloney's reports as to Jackson's competency to stand trial. Defense counsel therefore requested another continuance of trial. As before, this again angered Jackson. He again went on a profane rant about his right to a speedy trial before being removed from the courtroom. The trial court then granted a continuance.

[10] By the next pre-trial conference, in mid-August 2024, Dr. Hurley and Dr. Deloney had filed their competency evaluation reports. As the following excerpt from Dr. Hurley's report shows, he concluded that Jackson was competent to stand trial:

Opinion Regarding Competency to Stand Trial

Based on all the available records in this case and my recent interview with the defendant, it is the opinion of this psychologist that the defendant is competent to stand trial. According to the defendant's jail records he has a history of depression and schizophrenia. He was noted to present a[s] loud, angry, and tangential in early May 2024, when he reported suicidality and informed staff that they had to take him to suicide watch housing. The defendant then proceeded to refuse to speak with mental health staff while on suicide watch. He was seen for a psychiatric evaluation on 6/25/2024 where he was noted to have previously reported suicidality for secondary gain (i.e. reported suicidality for the purpose of obtaining a desired change in housing). The defendant refused to speak with the psychiatric provider on this date and was not prescribed any medication.

At my recent interview with the defendant on 7/15/2024, the defendant presented with a negative, contrarian, and uncooperative attitude. He appeared to be capable, but unwilling to answer questions in a [straight]-forward manner. Instead, the defendant chose to use the interview as an opportunity to air grievances. The defendant did not exhibit any evidence of overt or definitive psychiatric symptoms. He did not appear to be responding to internal stimuli, was not distracted, and did not make any statements that appeared to be delusional in nature. When the defendant chose to respond to my questions, his answers were organized and logical. He did not exhibit any evidence of thought disorganization. Overall, the defendant did not appear to be experiencing acute symptoms of a severe mental illness at this interview. Instead, the defendant's presentation was most consistent with that of an individual with Antisocial Personality Disorder. This hypothesis is strongly supported by the defendant's extensive criminal history which includes multiple prior misdemeanor and felony convictions, his history of multiple prison sentences, and his history of sexual and physical violence.

At this time, the defendant does not appear to be experiencing acute symptoms of a mental illness, disease or defect which would interfere with his basic competency to stand trial. He is capable of working with his attorney and rationally considering his legal options, if he chooses to do so. In accordance with Indiana Code 35-36-3, it is the opinion of this psychologist that the defendant has the present ability to rationally understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him and has the ability to rationally assist in his defense at this time. He is competent to proceed/stand trial from a forensic psychological perspective.

App. Vol. II, p. 108-09 (emphasis in original).

[11] Dr. Deloney also concluded that Jackson was competent to stand trial, as the following excerpt from her competency evaluation report shows:

CURRENT CLINICAL FUNCTIONING/BEHAVIORAL OBSERVATIONS: [At our] June 4th meeting, Mr. Jackson was wearing the required jail-issued clothing. He looked a bit younger than his stated age. He passed the brief Mental Status Exam. Specifically, he correctly stated his name, age, and date of birth, indicating orientation to person. He also correctly made reference to himself. He correctly stated his location as Adult Detention Center in Indianapolis, Indiana, indicating orientation to place. He correctly stated the month as June and the year as 2024, indicating orientation to time. He was oriented to situation and understood that he was being interviewed related to his criminal charge.

Mr. Jackson was cooperative but somewhat hostile during the interview. His eye contact was poor. Instead of facing me, he sat with his body perpendicular from mine. He was hostile in speaking about his criminal charge, verbally dismissing it as if it does not exist. In fact, several times, he said, “It never happened,” perhaps referring to the original offense. (We spoke only about his charge of Failure to Register. I was not informed about his other charges until a later date.) Mr. Jackson appears to be of average intelligence. There was no evidence of psychosis or severe mental illness.

***

Returning to the discussion above, I see two reasons for Mr. Jackson's unwillingness to discuss this charge. First, because the charge is a sex offense, he wishes for it to remain private ․ A second and equally likely reason could be self-deception. He genuinely does not believe that he committed the offense that he was originally convicted of. He would deny that his record shows any tendency towards violence or sexual lewdness. His self-deception is not psychosis but an ego defense; in his case, part of his Antisocial Personality Disorder and Paraphilic Disorders.

***

COMPETENCE TO PROCEED: Mr. Jackson's competence to proceed was evaluated according to Indiana Code 35-36-3. The code asserts that the defendant must be able to understand the legal proceedings and assist in the preparation of their defense. Information to this effect was collected from Mr. Jackson via a question set adapted from McGarry's Competency Functions (1973).

Mr. Jackson passed a brief Mental Status Exam and there were no signs of psychosis. He gave logical responses to each of the competency questions. Mr. Jackson is competent to stand trial. He has minimum knowledge of criminal proceedings and can aid in his own defense.

Id. at 115-17 (emphasis in original).

[12] Based on these reports, Jackson's defense counsel advised the trial court that Jackson was not requesting a competency hearing. Specifically, the following exchange occurred at the pre-trial conference in mid-August 2024:

THE COURT: ․ We do have both competency evaluations back from the doctors. I assume the Defense is not requesting a hearing; is that correct?

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Correct.

THE COURT: The State is not requesting a hearing?

[PROSECUTOR]: That's correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: So we need to get these matters back on the trial calendar․

Tr. Vol. II, p. 59. With the parties’ agreement, the trial court went on to set Jackson's case for trial in September 2024.

[13] All parties appeared in court on the September 2024 trial date and advised that they were prepared to proceed with Jackson's trial. The court, however, stated that it needed to continue trial due to court congestion. This set Jackson off. As the court discussed scheduling with the parties’ counsel, Jackson again went on a profane rant about his right to a speedy trial. Jackson was eventually removed from the courtroom, and his trial was reset for October 2024.

[14] Before trial, the State offered Jackson a plea agreement by which he would plead guilty to Level 5 felony failure to register in exchange for a sentence of time served. Jackson rejected the offer, reiterating his position that he was no longer required to register as a sex offender and expressing that a conviction in this case would put him “back on the registry.” Tr. Vol. III, pp. 5-6. Both Jackson's defense counsel and the trial court explained to Jackson that, even if he was acquitted of failure to register in this case, he would still be required to register until 2036 due to his prior convictions. Jackson nonetheless rejected the plea agreement, stating: “I'm not going to go back down there [to register], I'm done. It's hindering me and my children․ And I'm sick of it.” Id. at 7.

[15] Jackson's case proceeded to a bifurcated jury trial in late October 2024. During the first phase of trial, the State argued that Jackson committed Level 6 felony failure to register as a sex offender by failing to register as required in June 2023. Jackson, in turn, raised a mistake-of-fact defense based on the State's mistaken assertion in its June 2023 filing that Jackson's sex offender registration period had only been extended to April 5, 2023. The jury, however, found Jackson guilty of Level 6 felony failure to register.

[16] During the second phase of trial, the State sought to enhance Jackson's conviction to a Level 5 felony based on his prior convictions for failure to register as a sex offender. The trial court had previously granted a motion by the State to have Jackson fingerprinted at trial so an expert could match his current fingerprints to those in the records of his prior convictions. But Jackson had refused to comply with the order. The court therefore called Jackson before the bench, advised him of the court's order, and under threat of contempt, directed him to submit to fingerprinting. Jackson again refused, and the court found him in contempt.

[17] Proceeding without the fingerprints, the State demonstrated Jackson's prior convictions in other ways. The jury ultimately found Jackson guilty of Level 5 felony failure to register as a sex offender, and the trial court entered judgment of conviction on that enhanced offense. The court later sentenced Jackson to four years in DOC for his conviction and ordered him to spend 30 days in the Marion County Jail for his contempt of court.

Discussion and Decision

[18] Jackson appeals his conviction for failure to register as a sex offender, arguing that the trial court erred by not sua sponte holding a hearing on his competency to stand trial. Jackson also appeals the trial court's finding that he was in contempt for refusing to submit to fingerprinting during trial. We review both issues under an abuse of discretion standard. Finnegan v. State, 240 N.E.3d 1265, 1269 (Ind. 2024) (contempt), reh'g denied; Cotton v. State, 753 N.E.2d 589, 591 (Ind. 2001) (competency). “An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's decision is against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court.” Jacobs v. State, 22 N.E.3d 1286, 1288 (Ind. 2015).

I. Competency to Stand Trial

[19] Jackson first argues that the trial court abused its discretion by not sua sponte holding a hearing on his competency to stand trial. Indiana Code § 35-36-3-1(a) provides:

If at any time before the final submission of any criminal case to the court or the jury trying the case, the court has reasonable grounds for believing that the defendant lacks the ability to understand the proceedings and assist in the preparation of a defense, the court shall immediately fix a time for a hearing to determine whether the defendant has that ability.

As this statute indicates, the right to a competency hearing is not “absolute.” Wheeler v. State, 749 N.E.2d 1111, 1113 (Ind. 2001). A hearing is only required “if the evidence before the court raises a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's competency”—that is, their ability to understand the proceedings and assist in the preparation of a defense. Id.

[20] Jackson claims the trial court had reasonable grounds to believe he lacked competency before the court submitted his case to the jury in late October 2024. He emphasizes that, by that time, the court was aware of Jackson's prior schizophrenia diagnosis and expressions of suicidal ideations while in jail. Jackson had also been removed from the courtroom three times for profane rants about his right to a speedy trial. Additionally, he had repeatedly asserted to the court that he was no longer required to register as a sex offender. And he had rejected the State's proposed plea agreement after expressing his concern that a conviction in this case would put him back on the registry.

[21] Jackson's claims ignore that his competency to stand trial had been raised and resolved only 21/212 months earlier. By mid-August 2024, both Dr. Hurley and Dr. Deloney had evaluated Jackson's competency, concluded he was competent to stand trial, and reported their conclusions to the court. Our Supreme Court has consistently held that a competency hearing is not required under such circumstances. See, e.g., Wheeler v. State, 749 N.E.2d 1111, 1113 (Ind. 2001); Woods v. State, 547 N.E.2d 772, 788 (Ind. 1989); Montague v. State, 360 N.E.2d 181, 186 (Ind. 1977). Moreover, Jackson's defense counsel affirmatively told the court that Jackson was not requesting a hearing after receiving Dr. Hurley's and Dr. Deloney's competence evaluation reports.²

[22] As Jackson correctly observes, “[m]ental competency is not a static condition and is to be determined ‘at the time of trial.’ ” Edwards v. State, 902 N.E.2d 821, 827 (Ind. 2009). But “when the circumstances do not indicate that a trial court should sua sponte order a competency hearing, the defendant has the burden of establishing that reasonable grounds for such a hearing exist.” Campbell v. State, 732 N.E.2d 197, 202 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (citing Brown v. State, 485 N.E.2d 108, 110 (Ind. 1985)). All but one of the facts and circumstances that Jackson claims raised a reasonable doubt as to his competency in October 2024 were before the court 21/212 months earlier when Jackson's competency was resolved.

[23] Jackson first points to the trial court's awareness of his prior schizophrenia diagnosis and expressions of suicidal ideations while in jail. But the trial court learned of that mental health history through Dr. Hurley's competency evaluation report, which was filed by mid-August 2024. The report noted Jackson's schizophrenia diagnosis; however, Dr. Hurley concluded therein that Jackson's “presentation was most consistent with that of an individual with Antisocial Personality Disorder.” App. Vol. II, p. 109. The report also indicated that Jackson's expressions of suicidal ideations while in jail were for “secondary gain,” such as “for the purpose of obtaining a desired change in housing.” Id.

[24] Next, Jackson points to his profane courtroom rants about his right to a speedy trial and his repeated assertions to the court that he was no longer required to register as a sex offender. But two of Jackson's three courtroom rants occurred before mid-August 2024, and the one that occurred after was not unique. Jackson also remained consistent in generally asserting that his sex offender registration period had never been lawfully extended. And Jackson's alternative claim that his registration period had only been extended to April 5, 2023, ultimately formed the basis of the mistake-of-fact defense Jackson's counsel argued at trial.

[25] Although Jackson's rants were disruptive and his assertions partially erroneous, these acts demonstrated his ability to understand the proceedings and assist in the preparation of a defense. In fact, when Jackson's defense counsel moved for a competency evaluation in April 2024, the trial court stated: “[Jackson has] never presented to me as incompetent. He's just angry.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 46. A trial court's “observations of a defendant in court can be an adequate basis for finding that a competency hearing is not necessary.” Cotton v. State, 753 N.E.2d 589, 591 (Ind. 2001). And here, the trial court's observation that Jackson was angry but not incompetent was ultimately consistent with Dr. Hurley's and Dr. Deloney's observations that Jackson was “negative,” “contrarian,” and “hostile” but competent to stand trial. App. Vol. II, p. 109, 115.

[26] The only new development in the 21/212 months before trial was Jackson's rejection of the State's proposed plea agreement after expressing his concern that a conviction in this case would put him “back on the registry.” Tr. Vol. III, pp. 5-6. But before Jackson rejected the plea agreement, his defense counsel and the trial court both explained to him his ongoing registration requirement. To this, Jackson rebuffed: “I'm not going to go back down there [to register], I'm done. It's hindering me and my children․ And I'm sick of it.” Id. 7. In the context of Jackson's prior pattern of behavior, the trial court's observation of his demeanor, and Dr. Hurley's and Dr. Deloney's competency evaluation reports, Jackson's rejection of the plea agreement can reasonably be characterized as an act of volition, not incompetence.

[27] For these reasons, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in not sua sponte holding a hearing to determine Jackson's competency to stand trial. We therefore affirm his conviction for failure to register as a sex offender.

II. Direct Contempt of Court

[28] Jackson next argues that the trial court abused its discretion by finding him in direct criminal contempt for refusing to submit to fingerprinting during trial. “Contempt of court involves disobedience of a court which undermines the court's authority, justice, and dignity.” Hopping v. State, 637 N.E.2d 1294, 1297 (Ind. 1994). “Direct contempt involves actions occurring near the court, interfering with the business of the court, of which the judge has personal knowledge.” Id. at 1296. And “criminal contempt, as its name implies, is punitive in nature.” Wine v. State, 147 N.E.3d 409, 415 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (internal quotation omitted).“Any act which manifests a disrespect and defiance of a court may constitute direct criminal contempt.” Id. (emphasis in original).

[29] Jackson claims he did not disobey, disrespect, or defy the trial court's authority in refusing to submit to fingerprinting during trial. Instead, he contends he was simply asking for an explanation as to why his fingerprints were needed. The transcript, however, shows that Jackson was provided an explanation but still refused:

THE COURT: State, in your motion to take the fingerprint of the Defendant, you, in fact, outlined the reason why; is that correct?

MS. RAINBOLT: Yes, Judge. I can read that as well as --

THE COURT: Why don't you read that into ․ the record.

MS. RAINBOLT: “The State of Indiana, by its Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, moves the Court for an order requiring that John F. Jackson, Defendant, in the above-entitled cause, present himself for the purpose of taking a sample of fingerprints by a latent fingerprint examiner or expert prior to the presentation of evidence of prior convictions for the purposes of enhancement.”

THE COURT: Do you understand that now?

THE DEFENDANT: No, only because it's not making any sense. Why would I have to take fingerprints for prior?

THE COURT: Because you're accused of failing to register as a sex --

THE DEFENDANT: I'm accused? So what --

THE COURT: Sir, you're interrupting me. I can't finish my answer if you keep interrupting me. And if you do it again --

THE DEFENDANT: Well, can I go back and lay down then?

THE COURT: -- I'm going to hold you in contempt for that.

THE DEFENDANT: Can I go back -- can I go back and -- no disrespect. Can I go back then before we --

THE COURT: No.

THE DEFENDANT: -- I'm being held in contempt and --

THE COURT: You've already been held in contempt because you're refusing to give a fingerprint.

***

THE DEFENDANT: I don't mean no disrespect. I'm just going to be quiet and plead the Fifth.

THE COURT: Okay. So Mr. Morlan can take your print then?

(Counsel and Client confer)

THE COURT: Would you let the deputy take your print?

Mr. Jackson, will you allow the deputy to take your print without force?

Let the record reflect now he's not answering.

Tr. Vol. II, pp. 89-92.

[30] Explanation aside, Jackson was required to comply with the trial court's order even if he thought it was erroneous. See City of Gary v. Major, 822 N.E.2d 165, 170 (Ind. 2005) (“The only remedy from an erroneous order is appeal and disobedience thereto is contempt.”). Because Jackson refused to submit to fingerprinting as ordered by the court, the court did not abuse its discretion by finding him in direct criminal contempt. We therefore affirm the court's contempt finding.

Conclusion

[31] We affirm Jackson's conviction for failure to register as a sex offender, finding the trial court did not abuse its discretion by not sua sponte holding a hearing as to Jackson's competency to stand trial. We also affirm the trial court's finding that Jackson was in contempt of court for willfully disobeying the court's direct order that he submit to fingerprinting.

affirmed

FOOTNOTES

1.   The record does not reveal how April 5, 2036, was calculated as the date Jackson's sex offender registration period ended. But on appeal, Jackson and the State both accept it as the correct date. We follow suit.

2.   We note that the doctrine of invited error bars a party from appealing an error they affirmatively induced at trial. Brunette v. State, 227 N.E.3d 982, 985 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (ruling defendant invited any error in trial court not holding competency hearing when defense counsel affirmatively informed court competency hearing was not necessary), trans. denied.

Weissmann, Judge.

Bailey, J., and Brown, J., concur.