FREEMAN v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] DeCarlos Javon Freeman appeals his convictions for invasion of privacy and resisting law enforcement as class A misdemeanors and claims the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In April 2024, Terri Gushwa lived at a residence in South Bend, and Freeman was staying in her basement. On April 8, 2024, Gushwa filed a petition for a protective order against Freeman. That same day, the court issued an Ex Parte Order for Protection pursuant to Ind. Code § 34-26-5-9 prohibiting Freeman from harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting, or directly or indirectly communicating with Gushwa. The court also ordered Freeman to stay away from Gushwa's residence.

[3] On April 9, 2024, a copy of the protective order was delivered to Gushwa's house while Gushwa was “on the back porch” when “the police came.” Transcript Volume II at 6. At that time, only Gushwa and Freeman were at her house. Freeman confronted Gushwa about the protective order, and Gushwa observed copies of the protective order at the bar in plain view in the basement which was Freeman's living area.

[4] On April 10, 2024, Gushwa arrived home from work at 2:15 a.m., and Freeman was parked in front of her house. Gushwa entered her house and went to bed. Later that day, Freeman knocked on Gushwa's door. At 8:00 a.m., Gushwa peeked out her back window and observed Freeman on her back porch. Gushwa told Freeman she was going to call the police if he did not leave. Freeman left but returned less than five minutes later to her back porch and was drinking a beer. Gushwa called the police.

[5] South Bend Police Officer Dalton Stroupe was dispatched to Gushwa's residence in response to a call regarding an unwanted person identified as “a male black wearing a black sweatshirt.” Id. at 16. When Officer Stroupe arrived at the scene, he observed Freeman in Gushwa's back yard. Officer Stroupe approached the house, and observed Freeman “walk out the back entrance.” Id. at 17. Officer Stroupe entered his police car and drove around the corner to approach Freeman.

[6] Between one and two minutes later, Officer Stroupe attempted to speak with Freeman. Officer Stroupe, who was driving a marked police vehicle and wearing a police vest with a body camera, exited his vehicle, and approached Freeman who was walking in a parking lot. Officer Stroupe said, “Come on, man” and “Come here.” State's Exhibit 2 at 0:45-0:49. Freeman continued walking away. Officer Stroupe said, “Stop running, man.” Id. at 0:48-0:50. Freeman began running in a wooded area. Officer Stroupe pursued Freeman and yelled, “Hey! Freeze! Police!” Id. at 1:02-1:05. Freeman did not stop, and Officer Stroupe apprehended Freeman. Later that day, Officer Stroupe went to Gushwa's residence and observed a copy of the protective order in the back yard.

[7] On April 11, 2024, the State charged Freeman with invasion of privacy and resisting law enforcement as class A misdemeanors. On September 12, 2024, the court held a bench trial. The State presented the testimony of Gushwa and Officer Stroupe. The court also admitted the protective order and related documents as State's Exhibit 1 and the recording from Officer Stroupe's body camera as State's Exhibit 2. A document in State's Exhibit 1 indicated the “Service History” for the protective order, identified Freeman as the person served, indicated he was served at 8:59 a.m. on April 9, 2024, at Gushwa's address, and listed the method of service as “Personal.” Exhibits Volume III at 7.

[8] After the State rested, Freeman testified that he went to Gushwa's residence on April 10, 2024, to obtain work clothes, Gushwa called him and told him to “come back,” and “as soon as [he] pulled up the police was there.” Transcript Volume II at 25. He denied confronting Gushwa about the protective order and stated that he never saw the protective order. He testified that he “did see the officer.” Id. at 28. When asked if he heard the officer tell him to stop, Freeman answered:

No. I mean, I blacked out. I was just nervous and afraid. I had – like I said, I had to start a job that day. And I'm like – and wasn't nobody around. It was just me and him. I think he – I don't know if he grabbed his pistol or whatever. I just got afraid and ran. I've been beat by the police before.

Id.

[9] The court found Freeman guilty as charged. It sentenced him to consecutive sentences of sixty days for each count.

Discussion

[10] Freeman argues that the State did not prove that he was properly served with or had actual notice of the protective order prior to him visiting Gushwa's residence to retrieve his work clothes. He asserts that there was no evidence that the protective order was mailed to him as required by Ind. Trial Rule 4.1(B), and, even if a copy was promptly mailed, he would not have received it by 8:00 a.m. on April 10.¹ With respect to his conviction for resisting law enforcement, Freeman argues that he testified that he did not hear any order to stop and that Officer Stroupe's testimony does not demonstrate any type of force or resistance.

[11] When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we must consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict. Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007). We do not assess witness credibility or reweigh the evidence. Id. We consider conflicting evidence most favorably to the trial court's ruling. Id. We affirm the conviction unless no reasonable factfinder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. It is not necessary that the evidence overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. Id. at 147. The evidence is sufficient if an inference may reasonably be drawn from it to support the verdict. Id.

[12] “Indiana appellate courts reviewing the sufficiency of evidence must apply the same deferential standard of review to video evidence as to other evidence, unless the video evidence indisputably contradicts the trial court's findings.” Love v. State, 73 N.E.3d 693, 695 (Ind. 2017). “A video indisputably contradicts the trial court's findings when no reasonable person can view the video and come to a different conclusion.” Id. “When determining whether the video evidence is undisputable, a court should assess the video quality including whether the video is grainy or otherwise obscured, the lighting, the angle, the audio and whether the video is a complete depiction of the events at issue, among other things.” Id. “In cases where the video evidence is somehow not clear or complete or is subject to different interpretations, we defer to the trial court's interpretation.” Id. at 699-700.

[13] As for his conviction for invasion of privacy as a class A misdemeanor, Ind. Code § 35-46-1-15.1 provides that “[a] person who knowingly or intentionally violates ․ an ex parte protective order issued under IC 34-26-5 ․ commits invasion of privacy, a Class A misdemeanor.” “A person engages in conduct ‘intentionally’ if, when he engages in the conduct, it is his conscious objective to do so.” Ind. Code § 35-41-2-2(a). “A person engages in conduct ‘knowingly’ if, when he engages in the conduct, he is aware of a high probability that he is doing so.” Ind. Code § 35-41-2-2(b).

[14] The record reveals that Gushwa testified that Freeman knew about the protective order because “[w]hen the police knocked on the door he confronted me about it.” Transcript Volume II at 7. When asked if Freeman saw “a copy of” the protective order, she answered, “I didn't see him, but he pulled both copies off and took them in the house and put them in the basement.” Id. She acknowledged that she did not see him take the copies off the door but stated that no one else was in the house at that time. She also testified that she saw the copies at the bar in plain view in the basement which was Freeman's living area. Officer Stroupe initially observed Freeman in Gushwa's back yard and later observed a copy of the protective order in the back yard when he returned after his encounter with Freeman. We conclude that the State presented evidence of probative value from which a reasonable trier of fact could have found that Freeman knowingly violated the protective order, and his arguments amount to an invitation to reweigh the evidence.

[15] With respect to his conviction for resisting law enforcement as a class A misdemeanor, Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-1 provides that “[a] person who knowingly or intentionally ․ flees from a law enforcement officer after the officer has, by visible or audible means, including operation of the law enforcement officer's siren or emergency lights, identified himself or herself and ordered the person to stop ․ commits resisting law enforcement, a Class A misdemeanor.”

[16] The record reveals that Officer Stroupe, who was driving a marked police vehicle and wearing a police vest with a body camera, approached Freeman who was walking in a parking lot. Officer Stroupe said, “Come on, man” and “Come here.” State's Exhibit 2 at 0:45-0:49. Freeman continued walking away. Officer Stroupe said, “Stop running, man.” Id. at 0:48-0:50. Freeman began running in a wooded area. Officer Stroupe pursued Freeman and yelled, “Hey! Freeze! Police!” Id. at 1:02-1:05. Freeman did not stop, and Officer Stroupe apprehended Freeman. Based upon the record, we conclude that evidence of probative value exists from which the court could determine that Freeman committed resisting law enforcement as a class A misdemeanor.

[17] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Freeman's convictions.

[18] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Trial Rule 4.1 provides:(A) In General. Service may be made upon an individual, or an individual acting in a representative capacity, by:(1) sending a copy of the summons and complaint by registered or certified mail or other public means by which a written acknowledgment of receipt may be requested and obtained to his residence, place of business or employment with return receipt requested and returned showing receipt of the letter; or(2) delivering a copy of the summons and complaint to him personally; or(3) leaving a copy of the summons and complaint at his dwelling house or usual place of abode; or(4) serving his agent as provided by rule, statute or valid agreement.(B) Copy Service to Be Followed With Mail. Whenever service is made under Clause (3) or (4) of subdivision (A), the person making the service also shall send by first class mail, a copy of the summons and the complaint to the last known address of the person being served, and this fact shall be shown upon the return.

Brown, Judge.

Bailey, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.