IN RE: K.B. (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] M.S. (“Mother”) appeals the adjudication of her children, K.B., Jr. and S.S., (collectively “Children”) as Children in Need of Services (“CHINS”), and K.B. (“Father”) appeals the adjudication of his child, K.B., Jr., as a CHINS. Each party presents multiple issues, which we consolidate and restate.

Mother presents the following issues:

1. Whether the trial court erred when it adjudicated Children as CHINS because:

1.1. the evidence does not support the trial court's findings concerning Mother's participation in services and her care of S.S.; and

1.2. the trial court's findings do not support its conclusion that the coercive intervention of the trial court was needed; and

2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when, in its dispositional report, it required Mother to participate in certain services.

Father presents the following restated issues:

1. Whether Father received adequate notice that the allegation of domestic violence could include acts of violence by Mother;

2. Whether the trial court erred when it adjudicated K.B., Jr. as a CHINS; and

3. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when, in its dispositional order, it required Father to complete certain services.

Affirmed.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] S.S. was born to Mother on September 26, 2009.¹ K.B., Jr. was born to Mother and Father on December 10, 2020. Prior to Department of Child Services (“DCS”) intervention, Mother and Father lived with K.B., Jr. in paternal grandfather's house and S.S. lived with her maternal great-grandmother, Sheila Spears (“Spears”).

[3] On January 1, 2024, while at Spears's house, Father and Mother argued. S.S., who was in another room, heard them yelling at each other and then she heard “a big thud” like “something slammed into the wall[.]” (Tr. Vol. II at 126.) She then heard Mother “yell stop while she was crying.” (Id.) Shortly thereafter, Father left the house.

[4] On February 20, 2024, Mother, Father, and Spears engaged in a verbal altercation after Spears asked Mother and Father to leave her house because they had purchased a vehicle in her name without her permission. Spears left the house and went to S.S.’s school. She and S.S. spoke with the school counselor about what transpired at Spears's house earlier in the day, as well as the incident on January 1, 2024. The school counselor called DCS.

[5] When Spears returned to her house she discovered “holes in the wall, TVs busted” and a “game system had been smashed on the floor.” (Id. at 51.) Father told Spears that he would “burn this trailer down” with Spears inside. (Id. at 52.) S.S. took pictures of the damage. Spears reported the damage to the police, but the State did not file charges based on the incident.

[6] A few days later, Mother and Father returned to Spears's house to retrieve Father's tools. When Mother and Father left, Father told Spears, “watch your back, fat b*tch. I'm gonna get you.” (Id. at 53.) Based on Father's comment and the February 20, 2024, incident, Spears obtained a protective order against Father.

[7] DCS began its investigation on February 21, 2024, to investigate allegations of domestic violence, substance abuse, and neglect. Family Case Manager (“FCM”) Brittany Brashear (“FCM Brashear”) spoke to Mother and Father at their residence. In its preliminary inquiry report, DCS alleged that Father became upset when asked to speak with Mother alone to discuss the domestic violence allegations. Father denied being a perpetrator, and Mother denied being a victim of domestic violence.

[8] Mother and Father admitted they used marijuana. The results of subsequent drug testing revealed Mother tested positive for THC and Father tested positive for benzoylecgonine, THC, and cocaine.

[9] On or about March 4, 2024, DCS filed a petition alleging Children were CHINS based on domestic violence and illegal substance use in the home. The Court allowed K.B., Jr. and S.S. to remain in Mother and Father's custody. However, Mother would not allow S.S. to live with her, Father, and K.B., Jr. because Mother did not “feel comfortable with [S.S.] being in the same home” because of S.S.’s “false allegations” against Father. (Tr. Vol. II at 17-18.) S.S. lived with a neighbor, a friend, and then eventually returned to Spears's house. Mother, Father, and K.B., Jr. continued living with paternal grandfather.

[10] During the time that the CHINS petition was pending, DCS recommended Mother complete a “substance use assessment, parenting time with [S.S.], family pres[ervation services], ․ [and a] psychological evaluation.” (Id. at 157.) DCS also recommended Mother complete an domestic violence assessment for victims. DCS recommended Father complete a domestic violence assessment for batterers and engage in family preservation services. Mother and Father participated in some of the required random drug screens, with Mother admitting she missed “more than your average person[.]” (Id. at 14.)

[11] On June 21, 2024, and July 30, 2024, the trial court held fact-finding hearings on the CHINS petitions. During the hearing, FCM Georgina Adekaka (“FCM Adekaka”) testified Father was often “verbally aggressive” toward her. (Id. at 162.) She reported that, although Father completed the domestic violence assessment, he refused to participate in any related services. FCM Adekaka told the trial court that Mother was engaging in services “to an extent[.]” (Id. at 163.) She explained Mother was participating and doing well in family preservation services but she had just started substance abuse treatment. She noted Mother was “not fully engaging” in parenting time or drug screening. (Id.)

[12] S.S. “testified that although she has not observed Mother or Father doing drugs, she has heard both of them refer to drugs with nicknames like ‘Coca Cola, Lycra, White Girl,’ and so on.” (Id. at 173.) S.S. said Mother and Father would go into another room and Mother would emerge “giggly and wide eyed” and Father was “a little bit more irritated than usual.” (Id. at 173.) S.S. reported that one time after she believed Father had used drugs, K.B., Jr. started crying and Father told him to “be quiet or [Father] would give him a reason to cry” and put K.B., Jr. “in a time out for an hour.” (Tr. Vol. II at 130.) Finally, S.S. testified that she was concerned about Mother's mental health because Mother changed her moods very fast.

[13] On November 16, 2024, Mother tested positive for benzoylecgonine, cocaine and THC. On December 2, 2024, the Court ordered the removal of K.B., Jr. from Mother and Father's care.² On December 18, 2024, the trial court issued an order adjudicating Children as CHINS based on illegal drug use by Mother and Father and domestic violence in the home.

[14] The trial court held its dispositional hearing on January 13, 2025, and on January 17, 2025, issued its dispositional order. As part of that order, Father was required to participate in “homebased therapy, homebased case management, a domestic violence assessment, a substance abuse assessment, random drug screens, a parenting assessment, a psychological evaluation, anger management, and Fathers Engagement.” (Father's App. Vol. II at 30.)³ The trial court ordered Mother to engage in “homebased therapy, homebased case management, a domestic violence assessment, random drug screens, a substance abuse assessment, a parenting assessment, and a psychological evaluation[.]” (Id.)

Discussion and Decision

[15] Mother and Father appeal the adjudication of K.B., Jr. and S.S. as CHINS. Because a CHINS proceeding is a civil action, DCS “must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a child is a CHINS as defined by the juvenile code.” In re N.E., 919 N.E.2d 102. 105 (Ind. 2010). DCS alleged Children were CHINS pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-34-1-1, which states:

A child is a child in need of services if before the child becomes eighteen (18) years of age:

(1) the child's physical or mental condition is seriously impaired or seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or neglect of the child's parent, guardian, or custodian to supply the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education, or supervision:

(A) when the parent, guardian, or custodian is financially able to do so; or

(B) due to the failure, refusal, or inability of the parent, guardian, or custodian to seek financial or other reasonable means to do so; and

(2) the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that:

(A) the child is not receiving; and

(B) is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the court.

A CHINS adjudication focuses on the needs and condition of the child. Matter of N.E., 228 N.E.3d 457, 476 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024). “The purpose of a CHINS adjudication is not to punish the parents, but to protect the child.” Matter of W.H., 254 N.E.3d 549, 554 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024).

Mother's Arguments

1. CHINS Adjudication

1.1. Challenged Findings

[16] Mother argues a number of the trial court's findings are not supported by the evidence. When, as here, a trial court enters findings of fact and conclusions of law in a CHINS decision, we apply a two-tiered standard of review. In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d 1283, 1287 (Ind. 2014). We consider first whether the evidence supports the findings and then whether the findings support the judgment. In re Des. B., 2 N.E.3d 828, 836 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). We may not set aside the findings or judgment unless they are clearly erroneous. Id. “Findings are clearly erroneous when the record contains no facts to support them either directly or by inference.” Quillen v. Quillen, 671 N.E.2d 98, 102 (Ind. 1996). “A judgment is clearly erroneous if it relies on an incorrect legal standard.” In re Des. B., 2 N.E.3d at 836. “We give due regard to the trial court's ability to assess the credibility of witnesses.”. Id. “We do not reweigh the evidence; rather we consider the evidence most favorable to the judgment with all reasonable inferences drawn in favor of the judgment.” Id. We defer substantially to findings of fact but not to conclusions of law. Id. “We accept unchallenged findings as true.” Henderson v. Henderson, 139 N.E.3d 227, 232 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019).

[17] Mother first challenges Findings 23 and 24, which state:

23) Despite the Order of March 4, 2024, requiring Mother and Father to engage with [Family Preservation Services] for a domestic violence assessment, neither Mother nor Father had participated in the domestic violence assessment.

24) Mother cited a “scheduling mash up” for not completing the domestic violence assessment despite the three-month gap between being ordered to complete the domestic violence assessment and the Fact-Finding Hearing.

(App. Vol. II at 170-1.) Mother argues there was evidence that she completed the domestic violence assessment prior to the hearing. However, on direct examination, Mother testified she had not completed the domestic violence assessment because she was “still waiting on [DCS].” (Tr. Vol. II at 16.) Additionally, FCM Adekaka testified Mother had not completed the domestic violence assessment. Because there was testimony that Mother had not completed the domestic violence assessment, her argument to the contrary is an invitation for us to reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do. See In re Des. B., 2 N.E.3d at 836 (appellate court cannot reweigh evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses). Therefore, we conclude the evidence supports the trial court's findings.

[18] Mother next challenges Finding 31, which states: “The Court noted that Mother seemed defensive and uncooperative with regard to participation in services despite admitting that services such as parenting class had a positive impact on her parenting skills.” (App. Vol. II at 171.) Mother contends the evidence does not support this finding because, while she did not “believe domestic violence services and parenting education services were necessary, Mother was participating in services.” (Mother's Br. at 22.) In support of her argument, Mother asserts that she was employed, had appropriate housing arrangements for herself and Children, had stopped using marijuana, and was engaged in several recommended services.

[19] The trial court found Mother was employed. However, she admitted she did not have stable housing and that her future plans to provide housing for S.S. were not known because Mother refused to let S.S. live with her. Martin and FCM Adekaka testified Mother was engaged in some services but had not completed assessments for others. Additionally, Mother testified regarding her participation in random drug screens, “I have not been consistent, no, but that comes with being a parent[.]” (Tr. Vol. II at 14.) Mother acknowledged she missed at least five random drug screens and that she had “probably missed more than your average person[.]” (Id.) “The trial court sits ‘in the best position to weigh any conflicting evidence and assess the credibility of witnesses.’ ” Wilfong v. Cessna Corp., 838 N.E.2d 403, 407 (Ind. 2005) (quoting Hensler v. Brooks, 684 N.E.2d 1180, 1184 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997)). Thus, we cannot reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses, which is what Mother is asking us to do. See In re Des. B., 2 N.E.3d at 836 (appellate court cannot reweigh evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses). We conclude the evidence supports the trial court's findings that Mother had been non-compliant with certain services and seemed defensive and uncooperative about completing them.

[20] Finally, Mother challenges Findings 48, 72, and 73, which state:

48) Mother's and Father's testimony consistently blamed [S.S.] for their deficiencies as parents, refusing to provide [S.S.] with basic care and supervision, [and] effectively abandoning [S.S.].

* * * * *

72) [S.S.] testified that she has not lived with Mother or Father for many months because she was told by Mother that “there wasn't enough room” for her to live with them despite [S.S.’s] repeated requests to move in with Mother and Father.

73) [S.S.] also testified that she has received no assistance of any kind from Mother or Father.

(App. Vol. II at 172, 174.) Mother asserts the evidence does not support these findings because S.S. “did not see Mother as a mother figure to her” because Mother “gave birth to S.S. when she was about the same age as S.S. [now] and Sheila Spears took over the parenting responsibilities for S.S.” (Mother's Br. at 24.) She also contends S.S. did not want to live with her and so Mother found alternate housing plans for S.S. She states that, when S.S. lived with neighbors, Mother “offered to provide food but she was not required to provide it” (id. at 25) and when S.S. lived with friends, Mother provided her with food. However, Mother's arguments are invitations for us to reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do. See In re Des. B., 2 N.E.3d at 836 (appellate court cannot reweigh evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses).

[21] S.S. testified that Mother offered food when S.S. was living with neighbors, but she did not accept it and that Mother “bought [her] food like 2 times” when she lived with friends. (Tr. Vol. II at 148.) S.S. also stated that she asked Mother if she could live with her, including “sort of” begging Mother to do so, and Mother told her “there wasn't enough room.” (Id.) Mother also testified she did not want S.S. to live with her “[b]ecause of some false allegations that have been said and accusations that shouldn't have been said and just the lies and stuff that I know about” (id. at 17), and because S.S. “doesn't listen to [her.]” (Id. at 25.) Mother stated, “I just don't feel comfortable with her being in the same home as me.” (Id.) Based thereon, we conclude the evidence supported the trial court's findings.

1.2. Conclusions

[22] The trial court made numerous findings to support its conclusion that Children were CHINS. These unchallenged findings, as are relevant here, are:

20) S.S. currently resides with Sheila Spears, grandmother to Mother.

21) Mother denied that Father has ever physically battered her.

22) Mother also denied that Father ever physically battered [Children].

* * * * *

25) Mother testified that she has participated in the substance abuse assessment but is unaware of any specific recommendations.

26) According to Mother, [S.S.] does not live with Mother or Father because of “false allegations” and “the lies and stuff.”

27) Mother testified that she does not “feel comfortable with [S.S.] being in the same home as me[.]”

28) Mother testified that her experiences with parenting classes with [Family Preservation Services] were positive.

29) Mother's testimony denying that domestic violence had not [sic] occurred lacked credibility. The Court noted that Mother seemed to be taking nonverbal cues from Father during her testimony.

30) Mother's testimony regarding substance abuse also lacked credibility.

* * * * *

33) Father testified about his relationship with [K.B., Jr.] testifying that he spends time fishing and playing with toy racetracks.

34) Father denied using any corporal punishment with [K.B., Jr.].

* * * * *

37) Father also testified about an incident that occurred on February 20, 2024, involving Sheila Spears in which Father had disagreement with Sheila Spears about a repossessed vehicle owned by Father.

38) Father denied damaging anything in Sheila Spears[’s] home and indicated that Sheila Spears asked him to leave the residence.

39) The disagreement occurred while Mother and [K.B., Jr.] were still residing in Sheila Spear[s]’s home.

40) Father testified that police were called to the home and escorted him out.

41) Aside from marijuana use, Father denies use of cocaine.

42) Father admits that he has missed ‘five to seven out of probably 20 to 25’ [Random Drug Screen] tests.

43) Father testified to have [sic] positive interaction with FPS parenting classes.

44) Father has participated in one [Child Family Team Meeting] session and described feeling “overwhelmed,” which manifested in his behavior as being “out of line.”

45) Father's testimony denying domestic violence had occurred lacked credibility. The Court noted that Father was dismissive of his angry and violent tendencies.

46) Father's testimony regarding substance abuse also lacked credibility.

47) The Court noted that Father seemed defensive and uncooperative with regard to participating in services despite admitting that services such as parenting class had a positive impact on his ability to maintain relationship with [K.B., Jr.].

* * * * *

51) Sheila Spears testified about an incident that occurred on February 20, 2024, involving Father.

52) The incident occurred at the home of Sheila Spears.

53) The incident involved an argument about a repossessed car owned by Father, which Sheila Spears had requested to be towed.

54) During the incident, Sheila Spears left her home and returned hours later to find damage to her furniture and walls.

55) Sheila Spears detailed other incidences of anger and violence between her and Father resulting in her procuring a civil protection order against Father.

* * * * *

57) Sheila Spears provides for [S.S.] financially, ensures that she is prepared for school, as well as fed and clothed.

58) Sheila Spears expressed fear of retribution for testifying against Father.

59) Sheila Spears expressed fear for [S.S.] based on observations of Father's behavior towards [S.S.].

60) DCS called [S.S.] as the fourth witness.

61) [S.S.] detailed what she observed on February 20, 2024, the incident prompting DCS intervention.

62) Specifically, [S.S.] observed shattered furniture and holes in the wall of Sheila Spear[s]’s home.

63) During testimony by [S.S.], DCS admitted exhibits showing extensive damage to Sheila Spear[s]’s home and furniture.

64) Testimony by [S.S.] continued on day two of the Fact-Finding Hearing.

65) [S.S.] testified about an incident on January l, 2024, in which she overheard an argument between Mother and Father followed by “something that slammed into the wall.”

66) When asked to describe the sound, [S.S.] described it as “big thud. Like a person hitting the wall.”

67) [S.S.] also testified that although she has not observed Mother or Father doing drugs, she has heard both of them refer to drugs with nicknames like “Coca Cola ․ White Girl,” and so on.

68) [S.S.] also observed that Mother and Father would go into a room for a couple of hours and that upon emerging from the room, both Mother's and Father's behaviors were significantly changed.

69) When asked how their behaviors changed, [S.S.] testified that “she'd (Mother) would be very giggly and wide eyed,” and that Father would “be a little bit more irritated than usual.”

70) [S.S.] also testified to observing significant emotional swings by Mother and that Mother told her that she (Mother) had received mental health treatment at Valley [sic] Vista.

71) [S.S.] has indicated that the services ordered by this Court in its order of March 4, 2024, have positively impacted her.

* * * * *

74) DCS called Georgina Adekaka, family case manager for DCS[,] as the fifth witness.

75) Georgina Adekaka indicated that Mother and Father admitted to marijuana use.

76) During her testimony, Georgina Adekaka testified that Father was ordered to participate in batterers intervention programs, but that Father had not started it as of the date of the Fact-Finding Hearing.

77) Georgina Adekaka also testified that when confronted about this, Father “becomes verbally aggressive” and that he yells at Ms. Adekaka.

78) Georgina Adekaka indicated that she has made several visits to the home and did not observe domestic violence or substance abuse by Mother or Father; however, she also testified that Father is rarely present when she visits.

79) DCS called Elizabeth Martin, home-based case manager with Firefly Family Preservation, as the sixth witness.

80) Ms. Martin testified that in addition to safety checks, she provides parenting education classes for the family.

81) Ms. Martin indicated that she has not observed any indications of physical violence to [K.B., Jr.].

82) Mother and Father do actively participate in parenting education classes with Ms. Martin.

83) Ms. Martin indicated that assessments of both Mother and Father resulted in recommendations for substance abuse counseling services virtually for Mother, but in person for Father; however, in person has been difficult due to Father's work schedule.

84) Ms. Martin testified that she does not have safety concerns in the home but was concerned that services should continue.

85) Ms. Martin did testify, however, that “at a bare minimum for substance use and domestic violence counseling services to be completed to ensure safety․ [.]”

86) Ms. Martin testified that as the family preservation case manager, her professional opinion was that the recommended services be continued.

(App. Vol. II at 170-5.)

[23] Mother contends the trial court's findings do not support Conclusion 11 because DCS did not present evidence that Children needed any care, treatment, or rehabilitation that they were not getting and would not get without the coercive intervention of the trial court. Conclusion 11 states:

11) The coercive intervention of the court is necessary because Mother and Father have minimized the domestic violence that has occurred, have failed to understand the harmful effects of exposing [Children] to domestic violence, and are unwilling or unable to understand the negative effects of substance abuse on their abilities to parent.

(Id. at 176.) Additionally, Mother asserts “[t]here is no indication Mother refused or was unwilling to engage in services.” (Mother's Br. at 25.)

[24] However, according to the trial court's findings, Mother and Father had not completed substance abuse or domestic violence treatment, refused to acknowledge domestic violence occurred in the home, and missed several random drug screens. Additionally, Mother tested positive for THC and cocaine on November 16, 2024, in the time between the fact-finding hearing and the trial court's order adjudicating Children as CHINS. We therefore hold the trial court's findings support its conclusion that the coercive intervention of the court was necessary to ensure the family received the services needed for reunification. See, e.g., K.B. v. Indiana Dept. of Child Servs., 24 N.E.3d 997, 1006 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (coercive intervention of trial court necessary based, in part, on parents’ failure to address domestic violence and substance abuse problems).

2. Dispositional Order

[25] Mother argues the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered her to complete certain services because those services were either unnecessary or duplicative of services she had already completed. While the juvenile court has broad discretion to determine the services parents are to ordered to complete, “the requirements must relate to some behavior or circumstances that was revealed by the evidence.” A.C. v. Marion Cnty. Dep't of Child Servs., 905 N.E.2d 456, 464 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). “[F]orcing unnecessary requirements upon parents whose children have been adjudicated as CHINS could set them up for failure with the end result being not only a failure to achieve the goal of reunification, but potentially, the termination of parental rights.” Id. Indiana Code section 31-34-20-3(a) provides:

If the juvenile court determines that a parent, guardian, or custodian should participate in a program of care, treatment, or rehabilitation for the child, the court may order the parent, guardian, or custodian to do the following:

(1) Obtain assistance in fulfilling the obligations as a parent, guardian, or custodian.

(2) Provide specified care, treatment, or supervision for the child.

(3) Work with a person providing care, treatment, or rehabilitation for the child.

(4) Participate in a program operated by or through the department of correction.

[26] In its dispositional order, the trial court required Mother to engage in several services, including, as is relevant here, participating in home-based case management and completing parenting, substance abuse, and domestic violence assessments. Mother contends home-based case management was not necessary because she was “employed full time, and she was looking for permanent housing solutions on her own.” (Mother's Br. at 28.) In addition, Mother asserts her completion of parenting, substance abuse, and domestic violence assessments is duplicative of the services she had already completed prior to the CHINS adjudication.

[27] To support her argument, Mother relies on A.C., 905 N.E.2d at 465. In A.C., the trial court's dispositional order required the mother to participate in a drug and alcohol assessment, random drug testing, and substance abuse treatment. Id. at 464. The order also required the mother to establish paternity of the child. Id. However, there was no evidence that mother had a substance abuse issue and she had already established paternity of the child. Id. Based thereon, we concluded those services were unnecessary and reversed and remanded the matter for vacation of the irrelevant portions of the dispositional decree. Id. at 465.

[28] A.C. is distinguishable, however, because here there is evidence that the challenged services are necessary for Mother's reunification with Children. While it was true Mother was employed, she admitted she did not have permanent housing. In addition, Martin, who provided the home-based case management services, testified those services included, in addition to assistance obtaining and maintaining employment and housing, “safety checks ․ parenting education ․ [and an] assessment of needs at the very beginning of the case [to see] what services could continue from that point on.” (Tr. Vol. II at 187.) Further, as we noted above, there was evidence that Mother had not completed the domestic violence assessment. Further, FCM Adekaka testified Mother “had recently just started the ․ substance abuse assessment” one week prior to the Fact-Finding hearing, and thus it was not completed. (Id. at 158.) It is not clear whether Mother had completed the parenting assessment, but neither Mother nor the service providers indicated that she had. Based thereon, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered Mother to participate in home-based case management and complete parenting, substance abuse, and domestic violence assessments because there existed evidence to support their necessity. See, e.g., Matter of R.G., 130 N.E.3d 1171, 1180 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (sufficient evidence presented to support the order to participate in services tailored to address the reason for child's removal), trans. denied.

Father's Arguments

1. Due Process

[29] Father argues the State violated his right to due process because the allegations in the CHINS petition did not match the evidence presented at trial, such that he had no opportunity to defend against the unpled allegations.

“Due process requires notice, an opportunity to be heard, and an opportunity to confront witnesses.” In re M.L.K., 751 N.E.2d 293, 295-96 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). Before an action affecting a party's interest in life, liberty, or property protected by the Due Process Clause proceeds, the State, at a minimum, must provide notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections. Id. at 296 (citing Yoder v. Elkhart County Auditor, 632 N.E.2d 369, 372 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994)). “[P]rocedural irregularities in a CHINS proceedings [sic] may be of such import that they deprive a parent of procedural due process with respect to the termination of his or her parental rights.” A.P. v. Porter County Office of Family & Children, 734 N.E.2d 1107, 1112-13 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), reh'g denied, trans. denied.

Castro v. State Off. of Fam. & Child., 842 N.E.2d 367, 375 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied. “[W]hen parents do not receive notice of the specific allegations against them, they do not know what evidence to present on their behalf, which evidence or witnesses to obtain by compulsory process, or which questions to ask during cross-examination[.]” Maybaum v. Putnam Cnty. Ofc. of Fam. & Child., 723 N.E.2d 951, 956 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). A party has the right to receive adequate notice when the court considers issues that were not included in the original pleadings. This principle becomes particularly important when the new issue is not clearly and obviously established by the evidence presented to the court. Elkhart Cnty. Farm Bureau Coop. Ass'n, Inc. v. Hochstetler, 418 N.E.2d 280, 283 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981).

[30] Father contends the CHINS petition did not indicate Mother may have been the perpetrator of the domestic violence in the home, and thus he was not prepared to present evidence regarding that issue. In his argument, Father relies upon Maybaum, 723 N.E.2d 951. There, DCS alleged the child was a CHINS because the child was a victim of child molestation and the father was the perpetrator of that abuse. Id. at 953. However, at the fact-finding hearing, DCS presented evidence that the child was a victim of child molestation by the father and others. Id. Based thereon, the trial court concluded not that the father abused the child but that he failed to protect the child from sexual abuse by others. Id. The parents argued that the deviation between the allegation in the CHINS petition and the evidence DCS presented denied them the opportunity to respond to allegations outside those set forth in the CHINS petition. Id. We agreed and held the parents

were entitled to notice that they were required to defend against a claim that they had failed to protect the child. And they were entitled to specifics concerning the acts and circumstances which they assertedly failed to protect against. Then if they had a defense, they might be prepared to present it.

Id. at 956.

[31] Here, in its CHINS petition, DCS alleged:

a. [Mother] and [Father] have failed to provide [Children] with a safe, stable, and appropriate living environment free from domestic violence and substance abuse.

* * * * *

c. [S.S.] also reported arguing and fighting in the home between [Mother and Father] that [Children] have witnessed ․

d. [S.S.] stated [Father] is very abusive to [Mother], throws her around and calls her names, and has punched holes in walls and damaged items in the home.

* * * * *

i. Despite [S.S.’s] disclosures, [Mother and Father] have denied domestic violence in their relationship and have not taken necessary action to address the above-mentioned issues.

(App. Vol. II at 37.) During the fact-finding hearing, Father had the opportunity to present evidence to refute the existence of domestic violence in the home and be cross-examined on the issue. S.S. testified she was not in the room when Mother and Father argued on January 1, 2024. She told the trial court she heard Mother “yell stop while she was crying” and then she heard “a big thud[.]” (Tr. Vol. II at 126.)

[32] We find Maybaum inapposite. Unlike Maybaum, in which the petition indicated only the father had abused the child, the CHINS petition herein indicated there was domestic violence. While one allegation specifically indicated Father had “throw[n] around” Mother, it also stated that Children had witnessed “arguments and yelling ․ between” parents. (App. Vol. II at 37.) At the fact-finding hearing, S.S.’s testimony regarding the January 1, 2024, incident in which she heard a “big thud” did not indicate what or who hit the wall. (Tr. Vol. II at 126.) In its order adjudicating Children as CHINS, the trial court concluded Children were CHINS based in part on “acts of domestic violence in and around the home and the Court notes that domestic violence has a severe impact on children exposed to domestic violence.” (App. Vol. II at 175.) Therefore, because the allegations in the CHINS petition were general, Father had notice that DCS intended to present evidence that Mother and/or Father engaged in domestic violence against one another, and Father had an opportunity to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses regarding alleged domestic violence in the home. Based thereon, we hold Father's due process rights were not violated. See, e.g., Gordon v. Gordon, 733 N.E.2d 468, 471 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (respondent put on notice of petitioner's sexual harassment allegations against him even though some of the allegations did not include specific acts and time frames); and see Castro, 842 N.E.2d at 375 (no due process violation when party had an opportunity to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses).

2. CHINS Adjudication

[33] Father argues the trial court erred when it adjudicated K.B., Jr. as a CHINS. He first asserts there was no evidence of domestic violence in the home or of drug use in Children's presence. However, Father does not challenge specific findings, and thus we accept the relevant findings as true. See Henderson, 139 N.E.3d at 232 (“We accept unchallenged findings as true”).

[34] Father also contends the trial court's findings do not support its conclusion that K.B., Jr.’s physical or mental well-being was seriously impaired or seriously endangered by Father's acts or failure to act because there was no evidence “of any impact on [Children] from [K.B., Jr.’s] extended timeout or Mother's mental health issues[.]” (Father's Br. at 17.) However, the trial court did not conclude Children were CHINS based on either of those factors. Accordingly, we need not address this argument.

3. Dispositional Order

[35] Father argues the trial court abused its discretion when, in its dispositional order, it required him to complete substance abuse, domestic violence, and psychological assessments and follow all recommendations and to complete home-based services. Specifically, he asserts the trial court could not require him to: (1) complete a substance abuse assessment because DCS did not recommend he do so in its predispositional report; (2) complete domestic violence and psychological assessments because there was no evidence that they were necessary; and (3) participate in home-based casework, home-based therapy, parenting assessment, and anger management because those services were duplicative of other services such as the requirement that he submit to random drug screens and complete Father's Engagement. We address each argument below.

[36] First, Father asserts the trial court could not order him to complete a substance abuse assessment because DCS did not include that recommendation in its predispositional report. In his brief, Father contends Indiana Code section 31-34-19-6.1(c) requires the trial court to continue the dispositional hearing if it “does not accept the recommendations provided in DCS's predispositional report and wants DCS to consider other dispositional options.” (Father's Br. at 21.) However, DCS recommended Father complete a substance abuse assessment as evidenced by its selection of the option on its predispositional report. (See App. Vol. II at 186.) Therefore, the trial court accepted DCS's recommendation that Father complete a substance abuse assessment, and Father's argument fails.

[37] Next Father contends the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered him to complete a domestic violence assessment because there was no evidence that he needed that service. However, as noted in the facts, Mother and Father engaged in at least one incident that resulted in something or someone hitting a wall. Further, as noted in the previous analysis section, Father does not challenge the findings that he engaged in domestic violence and thus we accept them as true. Based thereon, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered Father to complete a domestic violence assessment. See, e.g., Matter of R.G., 130 N.E.3d at 1180 (sufficient evidence presented to support the order to participate in services tailored to address the reason for child's removal).

[38] Similarly, Father argues the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered him to complete a psychological assessment because “no one testified the anger Father exhibited was due to psychological issues.” (Father's Br. at 23.) The trial court's requirement that a parent participate in a service “must relate to some behavior or circumstance[ ] that was revealed by the evidence.” A.C., 905 N.E.2d at 464. We see no reason why it would not be appropriate to require Father to complete a psychological assessment in light of the evidence that he damaged Spears's home after a disagreement with her, displayed anger when interacting with FCM Adekaka, and engaged in physical violence against Mother. Based thereon, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered Father to complete a psychological assessment. See, e.g., Matter of R.G., 130 N.E.3d at 1180 (sufficient evidence presented to support the order to participate in services tailored to address the reason for child's removal).

[39] Finally, Father contends the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered him to complete a parenting assessment and participate in home-based casework, home-based therapy, and anger management because those services were duplicative of other services such as random drug screens and Father's Engagement. He claims the “Fathers Engagement program's curriculum addresses issues such as anger management, parenting education, and domestic violence[.]” (Father's Br. at 24.) There is nothing in the record, nor does Father provide authority, to support the contention that Father's Engagement and home-based casework addressed the same issues. Based thereon, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered Father to complete a parenting assessment and participate in home-based casework, home-based therapy, and anger management. See, e.g., Matter of R.G., 130 N.E.3d at 1180 (sufficient evidence presented to support the order to participate in services tailored to address the reason for child's removal).

Conclusion

[40] We hold DCS presented sufficient evidence to support the findings that Mother challenges. Further, the challenged and unchallenged findings support the trial court's conclusion that the coercive intervention of the trial court was necessary. Finally, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered Mother to participate in the services ordered.

[41] We hold Father's due process rights were not violated because he was given notice that DCS alleged domestic violence between him and Mother, with no indication of the specific perpetrator in all domestic violence incidents. Additionally, the trial court did not err when it adjudicated K.B., Jr. as a CHINS. Finally, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered Father to participate in the challenged services.

[42] Accordingly, we affirm the adjudication of S.S. and K.B., Jr. as CHINS.

[43] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   S.S.’s father is unknown.

2.   The record is unclear about where DCS placed K.B., Jr. outside the home.

3.   Unless otherwise indicated, our citations to the appendix are to Father's appendix.

May, Judge.

Judges Mathias and Bradford concur. Mathias, J., and Bradford, J., concur.