DEAN v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Anfernee Dean appeals his convictions for felony murder and Level 2 felony attempted robbery as well as his resulting sentence. Dean raises four issues for our review, which we restate as follows:

1. Whether Dean's two convictions are contrary to Indiana double-jeopardy law.

2. Whether Dean's challenge to the admission of certain evidence is proper.

3. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support Dean's conviction for felony murder.

4. Whether Dean's sixty-five-year sentence for felony murder is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and his character.

[2] We affirm Dean's conviction and sentence for felony murder and reverse his conviction and sentence for Level 2 felony robbery.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In the fall of 2022, Dean often spent time with Diego Thornton and Lonnel Tinker at the “Corner Store” on the corner of Anthony Street and Pontiac Street in Fort Wayne. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 165. There, Dean met Johnny Yates, and the two shared phone numbers. Yates lived in Fort Wayne with his girlfriend, Amber Koester.

[4] In November, Dean and Yates exchanged text messages and began discussing firearms. On November 28, the two began discussing a trade of firearms and marijuana between Yates and Tinker, and Dean “set up the transaction.” Id. at 168. Yates wanted to do the transaction at the Corner Store, but Dean was “unwilling” to do it there and insisted that Yates meet Dean and his associates at a nearby vacant house instead. Id. at 171.

[5] That evening, Koester drove Yates to the address Dean had specified to conduct the trade. Tinker and Thornton were there, and Yates invited them to sit in the back seat of the car to discuss the trade, which they did. As they were conversing, Dean appeared at the passenger's side window next to Yates. Dean and Yates acknowledged each other, but then Tinker and Thornton both pulled out firearms. Tinker held his firearm in Yates's abdomen and Thornton held his firearm at Koester's head. Moments later, Koester heard multiple gunshots, and Dean, Tinker, and Thornton all fled the scene. Koester observed that Yates was dead in the front passenger seat. A later autopsy revealed that Yates had been shot eight times.

[6] Koester identified Dean to investigating officers, but the day after the murder Dean had left Indiana for Chicago. On December 6, the State charged Dean with felony murder and Level 2 felony attempted robbery, and the court issued an arrest warrant. Eight days later, Texas law enforcement officers apprehended Dean, and he was returned to Indiana.

[7] At Dean's ensuing jury trial, Koester testified to the November 28 incident, and the State introduced into evidence the text exchanges between Dean and Yates. The trial court also admitted, over Dean's objections, certain videos and data that had been extracted from Tinker's cell phone. Those videos showed Tinker and Dean together on various occasions between January 2020 and November 2022. In some of those videos, Tinker was in possession of firearms. In one video, Dean was also in possession of a firearm. The trial court admitted that evidence on the ground that Tinker was not going to testify ¹ and the evidence was probative to show the “nature and scope of the relationship” between Dean and Tinker. Id. at 237. The State also introduced into evidence a note Dean had written to Tinker in jail that told Tinker to “answer no questions,” to blame Thornton, and to “shut up.” Ex. Vol. 1, p. 198.

[8] The jury found Dean guilty of felony murder and Level 2 felony attempted robbery. The trial court entered judgment of conviction on both counts and sentenced Dean to consecutive terms of sixty-five years for felony murder and thirty years for attempted robbery.

[9] This appeal ensued.

1. Dean's two convictions violate his double-jeopardy rights.

[10] On appeal, Dean first asserts that he cannot be convicted of both felony murder and Level 2 felony attempted robbery because the attempted robbery was included in the felony murder. The State concedes this point, and we agree that Dean's two convictions are contrary to law. See Ind. Code § 35-38-1-6 (2022). Accordingly, we reverse his conviction for Level 2 felony attempted robbery and his thirty-year sentence for that conviction.

2. Dean's challenge to the admissibility of the videos from Tinker's phone is not proper.

[11] We next address Dean's challenge to the trial court's admission of videos from Tinker's phone, which show Tinker and Dean in possession of firearms. We review the trial court's ruling on the admission of evidence for an abuse of that discretion. Jones v. State, 982 N.E.2d 417, 421 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. “We reverse only where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances.” Id.

[12] Dean argues on appeal that the videos should have been excluded as inadmissible prior bad acts and that the firearms in the videos were not relevant to the instant offenses and, thus, the videos had no probative value. See Appellant's Br. at 19-20. But the trial court did not admit the videos under Indiana Evidence Rule 404(b), which generally prohibits evidence of other acts when that evidence is being used to show that the defendant subsequently acted in accordance with that character. Instead, the court admitted the video evidence to show the nature and scope of the relationship between Tinker, who did not testify, and Dean. That was information of probative value to the jury, and, absent an argument on appeal that specifically addresses the reason the trial court gave for admitting the video evidence, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in that decision.

3. The State presented sufficient evidence to support Dean's felony murder conviction.

[13] Dean next contends that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support his conviction for felony murder. For challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, we consider only the probative evidence and the reasonable inferences therefrom that support the judgment of the trier of fact. Hall v. State, 177 N.E.3d 1183, 1191 (Ind. 2021). We will neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility. Id. We will affirm a conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

[14] Indiana Code section 35-42-1-1(2) provides that a person who kills another human being while attempting to commit robbery commits murder. According to Dean, the State failed to meet its burden under that statute because there was no evidence that he was armed at the scene of the shooting and he had only just arrived there when the shooting happened.

[15] But Dean's argument is not consistent with our standard of review. The record most favorable to the jury's verdict makes clear that Dean arranged the gun transaction between Tinker and Yates; that Dean insisted the transaction happen at a vacant residential address rather than at the Corner Store; that Tinker and Thornton did not act against Yates until Dean arrived on the scene; that Dean then fled the scene, and, the next day, left Indiana for Chicago and then eventually Texas; and that, while in jail with Tinker, he attempted to influence Tinker's possible witness testimony.

[16] A reasonable juror could conclude from the evidence that Dean committed felony murder, and we affirm his conviction.

4. Dean's sixty-five-year sentence for felony murder is not inappropriate.

[17] Dean's final argument on appeal is that his sixty-five-year sentence for his felony murder conviction is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and his character.² Under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), we may modify a sentence that we find is “inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Making this determination “turns on our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given case.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1224 (Ind. 2008).

[18] However, sentence modification under Rule 7(B) is reserved for “a rare and exceptional case.” Livingston v. State, 113 N.E.3d 611, 612 (Ind. 2018) (per curiam). Thus, when conducting this review, we will defer to the sentence imposed by the trial court unless the defendant demonstrates compelling evidence that portrays the nature of the offenses and his character in a positive light, such as showing a lack of brutality in the offenses or showing substantial virtuous character traits. Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015).

[19] Murder carries a sentencing range of forty-five to sixty-five years, with an advisory term of fifty-five years. I.C. § 35-50-2-3. Again, the court ordered Dean to serve the maximum term of sixty-five years.

[20] We cannot say that Dean's sentence is inappropriate. Regarding the nature of the offense, he lured Yates to a vacant residential location with the intent to rob him. Dean was the main facilitator of the transaction, and it was only upon his arrival at the scene that the situation became both hostile and fatal. And, regarding his character, Dean has seven prior misdemeanor convictions, a prior felony conviction that included the use of a weapon, and prior revocations of both a suspended sentence and probation. Finally, Dean presents no compelling evidence on appeal to demonstrate any positive aspects of the offense or his character.

[21] Accordingly, we affirm Dean's sixty-five-year sentence for felony murder.

Conclusion

[22] For all of these reasons, we affirm Dean's conviction and sentence for felony murder and reverse his conviction and sentence for Level 2 felony attempted robbery.

[23] Affirmed in part and reversed in part.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Thornton committed suicide after Yates's death and before Dean's trial.

2.   Dean's argument in his brief includes his sentence for the Level 2 felony conviction. However, as we have vacated that conviction and sentence, we limit our review of his sentence to his sentence for his felony murder conviction.

Mathias, Judge.

May, J., and Bradford, J., concur.