IN RE: T.T. (Child in Need of Services) (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] J.T. (“Father”) appeals the trial court's determination that his minor child, T.T. (“Child”), is a child in need of services (“CHINS”). We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Child was born to C.S. (“Mother”) in August 2019. Father petitioned to establish paternity in June 2023 under cause number 48C02-2306-JP-176 (“Cause No. JP-176”). In August 2023, Mother and Father stipulated that Father was Child's natural and legal father, and the paternity court established a visitation schedule for Father to visit with Child.

[3] On June 18, 2024, the Department of Child Services (“DCS”) filed a CHINS petition pursuant to Ind. Code § 31-34-1-1 based on allegations that a search of Mother's residence revealed “$34,000 in a diaper bag” that was “used to purchase and deal in narcotics.” Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 10. The petition alleged that law enforcement also found “1800 grams of marijuana, 2200 grams of hallucinogenic drugs, evidence of firearms, [and] scales and plastic baggies used in the distribution of narcotics.” Id. at 10-11. The petition further alleged that the home had bugs and was cluttered with trash and that Child reported “not feeling safe with [F]ather due to physical discipline.” Id. at 11. Child was not removed from the home at that time.

[4] The court held a combined initial and detention hearing on June 20, 2024. Mother appeared, waived court appointed counsel, and stated her intent to hire private counsel. Father appeared and requested appointed counsel. Both Mother and Father denied the allegations in the petition. The court found that Child had been removed from the home and was placed in foster care. The court noted that the CHINS allegations were against Mother. When asked if it had considered Father as an appropriate placement option for Child, DCS reported that it had concerns placing Child with Father due to allegations in the petition that Child did not feel safe with Father and because Father had recently been denied visitation with Child on a petition for custody modification under another cause number and there was “not a lot of information about why.” Transcript Volume II at 21. The court ordered that Father would have third-party supervised visitation and set a factfinding hearing for August 12, 2024.

[5] On August 9, 2024, Mother and DCS filed a mediated agreement wherein Mother agreed to participate in services and admitted that Child was a CHINS. The court took the agreement under advisement pending the outcome of Father's factfinding hearing.¹

[6] The court commenced a factfinding hearing on August 12, 2024. Father appeared with appointed counsel. At the outset of the hearing, Father spoke on his own behalf and requested a continuance because he had “filed a subpoena” and had “two other ones that” he also wanted to file. Id. at 30-31. Father stated that he was “looking to talk to consult with an attorney” and apologized to the court for not being “all the way ready” to proceed with the factfinding. Id. at 31. Father's appointed counsel stated that Father “had indicated to [her] that he was going to move for [her] to be withdrawn,” but since he had not yet done so, she “would forward his position to continue the case.” Id. Father's counsel indicated that she believed “that he issued those subpoenas in the JP case instead of the JC case” because he was not “necessarily acclimated uh to you know the practice of law” and that she believed he had shown “good cause ․ for the continuance ․ if that's what he desires.” Id. The trial court briefly recessed to “go check on a couple of things” and then came back and noted that Father had indeed filed a motion “under his JP cause number,” and then explained to Father that “if the court does grant your continuance” the factfinding “is not going to be until September 23rd.” Id. at 34. Father insisted he wanted a continuance, that he intended to “hire a lawyer,” and the court advised, “Okay, I would make sure that you do that if you want to make sure your legal court [sic] gets filed correctly.” Id. at 35. The court noted, “I can't give you legal advice” and then stated, “in order to preserve due process I'll give you the benefit of the doubt and grant you a continuance[.]” Id. at 36.

[7] Before going off the record, counsel for DCS requested, “judicial notice under this hearing. Father's eyes have been glazed over. He's delayed in his speech and he's slurring his speech, and we'd ask that he [be] ordered to be drug screened today. Someone from DCS is bringing up an oral screen so he won't even have to go anywhere.” Id. Father stated, “I refuse.” Id. The court indicated that it “hadn't noticed that” but informed Father, “You are under court order at this time to take a drug screen. If you refuse, that's your choice but the Court will take that into consideration. Do you understand that?” Id. at 37. Father responded, “Yeah, but I refuse.” Consequently, no drug screen occurred. At the conclusion of the hearing, Father's appointed counsel inquired, “Uh Judge just a point of clarification, am I being removed from the case?” Id. at 38. After confirming with Father that he wanted her removed, the court ordered that counsel was removed from the case. The court reiterated to Father that his factfinding hearing was set for “September 23rd at one o'clock.” Id. at 39.

[8] On September 23, 2024, the court held the continued factfinding hearing. Father failed to appear and no counsel appeared on his behalf. Mother appeared with counsel. The court noted on the record that Father was “made aware in open court of the hearing date today.” Id. at 43. Counsel for DCS also presented evidence that DCS attempted to serve Father with notice of the hearing.² The court found that “service has been perfected. [Father] was well aware that today was the hearing date ․ we will proceed with the fact-finding without him.” Id. at 44. DCS presented the testimony of Father's third-party visit supervisor, Steve Daniels, Family Case Manager Shannon Vannetta (“FCM Vannetta”), Family Case Manager Teresa Sloan (“FCM Sloan”), and A.P, Child's maternal grandmother.³

[9] Daniels submitted his visitation report which was admitted into evidence. Daniels testified that Father refused to sign any of the intake paperwork regarding visit rules and expectations stating that “he would not follow rules because he didn't need to.” Id. at 47. Daniels further noted that several of Father's supervised visits with Child ended early. One visit ended early because Father “brought unapproved people to the visit.” Id. at 45.

[10] FCM Vannetta testified that Father has “not complied at all” with the ongoing DCS assessment regarding Child despite multiple DCS supervisors attempting to work with him. Id. at 50. She testified that she was also involved with a CHINS case involving another child of Father with a different mother and that Father's controlling behavior had led to that mother losing unsupervised visitation with all of her children. FCM Vannetta stated that she was concerned that Father's control included emotional abuse and domestic violence.

[11] FCM Sloan confirmed that Father was “refusing to participate in any services ․ with the exception of visitation which ․ is not going very well.” Id. at 53. She testified that Father reminds her that he is a “S[overeign] Citizen and that he doesn't have to go by the same rules and laws that we do ․ and that [she] is not doing [her] job because [she has] to respect his um S[overeign] Citizen status[.]” Id. FCM Sloan testified that she believed Child “still needs to be doing therapy and supervised visits” with Father because Child is still “trying to process the whole relationship with [Father], the fear of the visits.” Id. at 54. She stated that she was “concerned with the visits” due to Father's “behavior.” Id. FCM Sloan further testified that Father had refused to take an ordered drug screen but that she had seen a copy of an alleged screen that he sent to another case manager but “it wasn't a test that [she was] used to looking at or reading” so she was not able to confirm that “it was accurate or that it was tested by a lab as it was required.” Id. at 54. At the conclusion of FCM Sloan's testimony, counsel for DCS moved to admit the records from Cause No. JP-176, and the trial court admitted the records.

[12] A.P. testified that Child was currently placed in her home. She stated that she had “concerns for [her] safety” and the safety of her family due to Father's hostile behavior. Id. at 56. She testified that she had seen a “difference” in Child after his visits with Father that caused her to have “multiple concerns.” Id. at 56-57. She noted that after visits with Father, Child had “peed on himself three times,” was “biting his nails ․ biting straws,” “acting nervous,” and asking her if it was “okay to be scared because he doesn't want to go see his dad.” Id. at 57. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court adjudicated Child a CHINS as to Father and ordered Father's supervised visitation suspended “until [Father] appears before the court.” Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 6.

[13] On October 9, 2024, Father petitioned the court to reappoint his prior appointed counsel as his public defender. He also asked for “a new judge ․ and most importantly a new case worker.” Id. at 20. The trial court granted Father's request to reappoint his counsel, but denied his other requests.

[14] The court commenced a dispositional hearing on October 23, 2024, but granted Father's request for a continuance due to his reappointed counsel not being present. The court held the continued dispositional hearing on December 2, 2024. Both Mother and Father appeared with counsel. The court entered its dispositional order on December 5, 2024, ordering Father to participate in various reunification services.

Discussion

[15] Father first asserts that the trial court violated his due process rights during the CHINS proceedings. Specifically, Father asserts that he was deprived of his right to be represented by an attorney “at a critical juncture of the case,” and that this violation “remained unrectified until” after the factfinding hearing had already proceeded in his absence. Appellant's Brief at 15, 19 (emphasis and capitalization omitted). He also asserts that the court violated his due process rights when it ordered him to submit to a drug screen, which he refused, at the original factfinding hearing on August 12, 2024. He argues that the court had “no authority to require a drug screen or to rely upon refusal to screen as a CHINS basis.” Id. at 19.

[16] Regarding his claim that the trial court violated his due process rights by allegedly depriving him of his right to counsel, Father has waived this claim because he did not raise this argument before the trial court. Father and his reappointed public defender appeared at the dispositional hearing. At that point, Father had the opportunity to raise this due process claim before the trial court but he failed to do so. See In re N.G., 51 N.E.3d 1167, 1173 (Ind. 2016) (declining to consider mother's claimed violation of due process rights and noting “a party on appeal may waive a constitutional claim, including a claimed violation of due process rights, by raising it for the first time on appeal”); Matter of G.M., 71 N.E.3d 898, 904-905 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (issue not first presented to the trial court is waived for appellate consideration).

[17] Regarding his claim that the court violated his due process rights when it ordered him to submit to a drug screen, which he refused, during the August 12, 2024, hearing, we similarly find waiver. Father was present with counsel at the August 12th hearing during which the drug screen was ordered, as well as at the subsequent dispositional hearing. At neither hearing did Father raise a due process claim regarding the ordered drug screen. The issue is waived.

[18] We next address Father's assertion that the trial court clearly erred in adjudicating Child a CHINS. In reviewing a trial court's determination that a child is in need of services, we do not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses and consider only the evidence which supports the court's decision and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d 1283, 1286-1287 (Ind. 2014), reh'g denied. The trial court here entered very limited findings. As no statute expressly requires formal findings in a CHINS factfinding order and because neither party requested them under Ind. Trial Rule 52(A), we apply the two-tiered standard of whether the evidence supports the findings, and whether the findings support the judgment to any issue covered by the findings, and we review any remaining issues under the general judgment standard pursuant to which a judgment “will be affirmed if it can be sustained on any legal theory supported by the evidence.” Id. at 1287 (citation omitted). We will reverse a CHINS determination only if clearly erroneous. In re D.J., 68 N.E.3d 574, 578 (Ind. 2017). A decision is clearly erroneous if the record facts do not support the findings or if it applies the wrong legal standard to properly found facts. Id.

[19] Ind. Code § 31-34-1-1 provides:

A child is a child in need of services if before the child becomes eighteen (18) years of age:

(1) the child's physical or mental condition is seriously impaired or seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or neglect of the child's parent, guardian, or custodian to supply the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education, or supervision:

(A) when the parent, guardian, or custodian is financially able to do so; or

(B) due to the failure, refusal, or inability of the parent, guardian, or custodian to seek financial or other reasonable means to do so; and

(2) the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that:

(A) the child is not receiving; and

(B) is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the court.

The statute does not require a court to wait until a tragedy occurs to intervene. In re A.H., 913 N.E.2d 303, 306 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). Rather, a child is a CHINS when the child is endangered by parental action or inaction. Id.

[20] Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the court's CHINS adjudication, there was ample evidence presented that Child's mental condition was seriously impaired or endangered due to issues in his relationship with Father and that Child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that is unlikely to be provided or accepted by Father without the coercive intervention of the court.⁴ FCM Sloan and other witnesses testified regarding Father's numerous troubling behaviors and lack of compliance with the ongoing DCS assessment, and A.P. testified regarding Child's fragile mental health and deterioration surrounding visits with Father. FCM Sloan testified that she believed Child was benefiting from therapy and that Child still needed help processing his relationship with Father and his fear of visiting Father. In light of the evidence set forth above and in the record, we cannot say that the trial court's CHINS adjudication is clearly erroneous.

[21] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

[22] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Following the dispositional hearing held on December 2, 2024, the court accepted Mother's agreement.

2.   Counsel for DCS stated that Father “took photos of the process server” and “made posts on Facebook talking about [DCS] trying to serve him.” Transcript Volume II at 43. The court noted on the record that Exhibits 5 and 6, which were admitted into evidence, “shows what appears to be ․ video screen shots from [Father's] house where the ․ process server and someone from the Department also were present at his house trying to serve him.” Id. at 44.

3.   The record indicates that Child was placed in A.P.’s care on July 2, 2024.

4.   As noted by DCS, many of Father's arguments focus on evidence presented at the dispositional hearing, which he characterizes as “a second impermissible round of fact-finding,” and he makes some suggestion that the CHINS adjudication was based on evidence presented at “a contested dispositional hearing” where “[p]arents have fewer protections[.]” Appellant's Brief at 24, 31. Indeed, he asserts that a “contested dispositional hearing does not cure the lack of fact-finding hearing when the facts warrant such a hearing.” Id. at 24 (citation omitted). Father's arguments are misplaced. The trial court held a factfinding hearing, albeit in Father's absence despite proven notice thereof, during which evidence was presented and after which the court issued its order adjudicating Child a CHINS.

Brown, Judge.

Bailey, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.