SUMMERS BOOK v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Amanda Summers-Book,¹ while intoxicated, led law enforcement on a car chase before she crashed into another vehicle and police found a firearm, ammunition, smoking devices, and illegal drugs in her car. She was charged with eleven counts related to that incident. A few weeks later, she was charged with three new counts related to possessing and dealing illegal drugs while incarcerated in Whitley County Jail. A year later, Book pled guilty to four charges in the first cause and all three charges in the second cause. The trial court sentenced her to a total of sixteen years in the first cause and eight years in the second, to be served consecutively for an aggregate sentence of twenty-four years. She appeals, asserting that the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered both causes to be served consecutively. Finding otherwise, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On September 21, 2023, Book led an Indiana State Trooper on a car chase through Whitley County while she was intoxicated, reaching speeds up to 95 miles per hour. The police successfully deployed stop sticks, slowing Book down until she crashed into a parked car. In a search of her vehicle, police found a firearm, ammunition, smoking devices, and illegal drugs. Book was arrested, taken to the Whitley County Jail, and charged under Cause Number 92C01-2309-F4-1040 (F4-1040), the most relevant charges being: Count I, Unlawful Possession of Firearm by a Serious Violent Felon, a Level 4 felony;² Count II, Resisting Law Enforcement, a Level 6 felony;³ Count IV, Operating a Vehicle While Intoxicated, a Class A misdemeanor;⁴ and Count VII, Possession of Paraphernalia, a Class C misdemeanor.⁵

[3] On October 6, 2023, while incarcerated in the Whitley County Jail, the jail staff received a report that individuals in Book's cell were in possession of drugs. After searching the cell and the inmates, methamphetamine was found on Book's person. She admitted to staff that she brought the drugs into the facility inside her body and had shared them with two other inmates, one of whom shared Book's drugs multiple times. Book was charged on October 12, 2023, in Cause Number 92C01-2310-F4-1126 (F4-1126) with three counts: Count I, Dealing in Methamphetamine, a Level 4 felony;⁶ Count II, Possession of Methamphetamine, a Level 5 felony;⁷ and Count III, Trafficking with an Inmate, a Level 5 felony.⁸

[4] While Book initially intended to go to trial, a year later she agreed to plead guilty to the four charges discussed above in F4-1040 with the habitual offender enhancement attached to Count I.⁹ She also agreed to plead guilty to all the charges in F4-1126. On October 11, 2024, the trial court held a change of plea hearing and accepted Book's guilty pleas in both causes. On November 25, 2024, the trial court sentenced Book on both causes. She was sentenced in F4-1040 as follows:

Count I – Unlawful Possession of Firearm by Serious Violent Felon, Level 4 felony: Sentenced to the Indiana Department of Correction (DOC) for a period of eight years enhanced by eight years for the Habitual Felony Offender Enhancement. See Appellant's Amended App. Vol. 2 at 153-54.

Count II – Resisting Law Enforcement by Vehicle, Level 6 felony: Sentenced to the DOC for a period of two and a half years, all to serve, concurrent to Count I. See id. at 154.

Count IV – Operating While Intoxicated, Class A misdemeanor: Sentenced to the DOC for a period of one year, all to serve, concurrent to Counts I and II. See id.

Count VII – Possession of Paraphernalia, Class C Misdemeanor: Sentenced to the DOC for a period of sixty days, all to serve, concurrent to Counts I, II, and IV. See id.

[5] She was sentenced in F4-1126 as follows:

Count I – Dealing in Methamphetamine, Level 4 felony: Sentenced to the DOC for a period of eight years, with four years to serve and balance suspended and on probation supervision, consecutive to F4-1040. See Appellant's Amended App. Vol. 3 at 29.

Count III – Trafficking with an Inmate, Level 5 felony: Sentenced to the DOC for a period of four years, all to serve, concurrent to Count I.10 See id. at 30.

[6] Book appeals, arguing that it was improper for the trial court to order that the sentence for Count I in F4-1126 be served consecutively to her sentence in F4-1040.

Discussion and Decision

[7] “[S]entencing decisions rest within the sound discretion of the trial court and are reviewed on appeal only for an abuse of discretion.” Zavala v. State, 138 N.E.3d 291, 298 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (quoting Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007) clarified on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (2007)) trans. denied. However, it is the legislature's responsibility to codify criminal penalties, and thus “a trial court's sentencing discretion must not exceed the limits prescribed by statute.” Fix v. State, 186 N.E.3d 1134, 1143 (Ind. 2022). We find an abuse of discretion only when the trial court's decision is “clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom.” K.S. v. State, 849 N.E.2d 538, 544 (Ind. 2006) (quoting In re L.J.M., 473 N.E.2d 637, 640 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985)). We will not reweigh evidence or judge witness credibility in our review. Zavala, 138 N.E.3d at 299.

[8] Book argues that these two causes constitute a single “episode of criminal conduct” under Indiana Code section 35-50-1-2 and thus, the trial court's finding that the dealing in methamphetamine charge in F4-1126 was a “wholly new and separate crime” from those in F4-1040 was an “improper” basis for consecutive sentencing. Transcript at 39; see Appellant's Br. at 8. At the time of Book's sentencing, Indiana Code section 35-50-1-2 provided, in relevant part:¹¹

(b) As used in this section, “episode of criminal conduct” means offenses or a connected series of offenses that are closely related in time, place, and circumstance.

(c) Except as provided in subsection (e) or (f) the court shall determine whether terms of imprisonment shall be served concurrently or consecutively․ However, except for crimes of violence, the total of the consecutive terms of imprisonment, exclusive of terms of imprisonment under IC 35-50-2-8 and IC 35-50-2-10 (before its repeal) to which the defendant is sentenced for felony convictions arising out of an episode of criminal conduct shall not exceed the period described in subsection (d).

* * *

[(d)](3) If the most serious crime for which the defendant is sentenced is a Level 4 felony, the total of the consecutive terms of imprisonment may not exceed fifteen (15) years.

Ind. Code § 35-50-1-2(b), (c), (d)(3).

[9] Critically, and detrimental to Book's contention, “Indiana Code [s]ection 35-50-1-2 does not ‘prohibit consecutive sentences’ for offenses that constitute a single episode of criminal conduct; rather, the statute merely ‘limit[s] the length of the aggregate term[.]’ ” Waldon v. State, 259 N.E.3d 318, 324 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (quoting Reed v. State, 856 N.E.2d 1189, 1199 (Ind. 2006)). In other words, it simply places a cap on the aggregate sentence. Thus, even if the two causes (or their relevant counts) at issue here constituted a single episode of criminal conduct, the trial court was not prohibited from entering consecutive sentences.¹²

[10] To the extent Book contends that her aggregate term of imprisonment violates the sentencing limits under the statute, we note that crimes of violence (as defined under the statute) and terms of imprisonment under the habitual offender statute in Indiana Code section 35-50-2-8 are exempt from the cap. Our Supreme Court has interpreted the statute “to exempt from the sentencing limitation (1) consecutive sentencing among crimes of violence, and (2) consecutive sentencing between a crime of violence and those that are not crimes of violence.” Fix, 186 N.E.3d at 1143.

[11] Here, Book's sentence for dealing in F4-1126 runs consecutively to the sentence in F4-1040, for an aggregate sentence of twenty-four years. Book's sixteen-year sentence under F4-1040 is comprised of the eight-year sentence for unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon, with an additional eight years for the habitual offender enhancement. Unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon is a crime of violence under Indiana Code section 35-50-1-2(a)(20). Thus, it is exempt from the statute's sentencing limitations. The term of imprisonment for the habitual offender enhancement is also excluded under the statute. See I.C. § 35-50-1-2(c). The remaining counts in F4-1040 run concurrently to the unlawful possession charge. The eight-year sentence under F4-1126 is for dealing in methamphetamine, which is not a crime of violence under the statute, and the remaining counts in F4-1126 run concurrently to the dealing conviction. Thus, because Book's consecutive sentencing is between a crime of violence—unlawful possession of firearm by a serious violent felon—and one that is not a crime of violence—dealing in methamphetamine—it is exempt from the sentencing limitations regardless of whether the offenses constituted a single episode of criminal conduct. Therefore, even if F4-1040 and F4-1126 did constitute a single episode of criminal conduct, the trial court was permitted to enter consecutive sentences.¹³

Conclusion

[12] Because Book has failed to prove that the trial court abused its discretion in entering a consecutive sentence, we affirm.

Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   In her brief, Book's attorney refers to her only by the last name “Book” rather than “Summers-Book.” We do the same here.

2.   Ind. Code § 35-47-4-5(c).

3.   I.C. § 35-44.1-3-1(a)(3), (c)(1).

4.   I.C. § 9-30-5-2(a), (b).

5.   I.C. § 35-48-4-8.3(b)(1).

6.   I.C. § 35-48-4-1.1(a)(1), (c)(1).

7.   I.C. § 35-48-4-6.1(a), (b)(2).

8.   I.C.§ 35-44.1-3-5(b)(1).

9.   In F4-1040, the State filed a notice of intent to seek habitual offender status on September 22, 2023 and an amended notice of intent to seek habitual offender status on November 27, 2023. See Appellant's Amended App. Vol. 2 at 56, 68.

10.   The trial court did not convict Book of Count II in F4-1126 due to double jeopardy concerns.

11.   The statute was amended in the 2025 Indiana General Assembly Legislative Session. We rely on the version in effect at the time Book was sentenced in November 2024.

12.   Momentarily setting aside the immateriality of whether the two causes constitute a single episode of criminal conduct, we find that they do not. Whether offenses constitute a single episode of criminal conduct requires a factual analysis. Waldon, 259 N.E.3d at 324. We must determine whether the offenses “are closely related in time, place, and circumstance.” I.C. § 35-50-1-2(b). We consider the following factors: (1) the time span over which the offenses occurred and the time between them; (2) whether the offenses occurred at separate locations; (3) whether the offenses can be explained without reference to one another; and (4) whether the offenses are united by a common purpose or scheme. Waldon, 259 N.E.3d at 326.Book's crimes in F4-1126, dealing of methamphetamine and trafficking to inmates, occurred weeks later than the crimes in F4-1040 and in an entirely different location—F4-1040 occurred in a car; F4-1126 occurred inside the Whitley County Jail. There is no evidence that the two causes were united by a common purpose or criminal scheme. In fact, Book testified at sentencing that when she brought the drugs into the facility, “it wasn't [her] initial intention to bring it to somebody.” Tr. at 20. The only connection is the fact that Book brought the methamphetamine she dealt to other inmates into the facility upon her arrest for F4-1040. We do not find such a fact to be sufficient to make these two causes “closely related in time, place and circumstance,” nor does it make us unable to explain one crime without reference to the other. I.C. § 35-50-1-2(b). Thus, we conclude that the trial court's finding that F4-1126 was a “wholly separate and new crime” from F4-1040 was not “improper as a matter of law” as Book contends. Tr. at 39; Appellant's Br. at 10.

13.   To the extent Book argues the trial court had no valid basis for entering a consecutive sentence, such an argument fails. In determining whether sentences shall be served concurrently or consecutively, the trial court may consider aggravating and mitigating factors. I.C. § 35-50-1-2(c). “A trial court may order consecutive sentences based on one valid aggravating factor.” Kayser v. State, 131 N.E.3d 717, 723 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). Here, the trial court found Book's criminal history, substance abuse history, and history of violating probation to be aggravating factors in F4-1126, all of which are supported by the record and justify consecutive sentencing in this case. See Appellant's Amended App. Vol. 3 at 29.

DeBoer, Judge.

Altice, C.J., and Pyle, J., concur.