Christopher Dion Boyd, Jr., Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Christopher Boyd appeals his conviction for murder, a felony. Boyd argues that the trial court erred by denying his request to supplement his argument against the admission of video evidence outside the presence of the jury. Additionally, Boyd argues that the State failed to lay a sufficient foundation for the admission of the video evidence pursuant to the silent witness theory and, thus, the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the video. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm.

Issues

[2] Boyd raises one issue, which we expand and restate as the following two:

I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying Boyd's request to supplement his argument against the admission of video evidence outside the presence of the jury after the trial court gave Boyd a previous opportunity to do so.

II. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the video evidence because the State failed to lay a sufficient foundation pursuant to the silent witness theory.

Facts

[3] On December 31, 2023, Boyd and his girlfriend, Nakia Baker, were celebrating New Year's Eve at a bar in Evansville. Kara Givens, a woman with whom Boyd had a relationship in the past, was also at the bar, as was Given's boyfriend, Jerry Hale.

[4] After the bar closed, Boyd and Nakia drove to Uncle Norman's, an event center in Evansville owned by George Madison. Nakia's mother, Brianna, met them there. Boyd was wearing a white hoodie and a black mask that covered his face up to his eyes.

[5] Sometime later, Hale and Givens also arrived at the event center. At approximately 5:00 a.m., Hale got into an altercation with Givens and was escorted outside. Boyd was initially standing several feet away from Hale near the wall but, as Hale was being escorted outside, Boyd began moving hurriedly toward the exit and left the event center moments before Hale reached the door.

[6] Hale exited the event center, Boyd walked up behind Hale, and Boyd shot Hale directly in the back of the head. Several people, including Madison and Brianna, witnessed the shooting. Boyd ran away.

[7] Emergency responders arrived, and Hale was pronounced dead at the scene. Witnesses identified Boyd as the shooter. During the ensuing investigation, Larry Burns, who lived directly across the street from the event center, informed the officers that he had security cameras placed around his house and that the video might aid in the investigation. The officers reviewed the footage, which captured a direct view of the shooting.

[8] On January 2, 2024, the State charged Boyd with murder, a felony. The State sought a sentencing enhancement based on Boyd's use of a firearm during the commission of the offense. The trial court held a jury trial in December 2024, at which Madison and Briana testified regarding the shooting.

[9] The State prepared the security footage from Burns’ residence as State's Exhibit 17. Burns testified that he had security cameras placed “all the way around” his house, including cameras pointed “directly” at the event center. Id. at 84. Burns was the “sole owner and [person] in control of” the security system,” which was “activated by movement”; was “accurate to time”; left a timestamp; and was “working properly” on the day of the shooting. Id. at 85-86. Burns shared the security system video with Evansville Police Department Detective Aaron McCormick from Burns’ cellphone, which was Burns’ only way to “access” the security system recordings. Id. at 86. Burns testified that he was unable to “change or alter” the recordings, and, after viewing the video, he testified that the original footage had not been “altered or changed[.]” Id. at 85.

[10] Detective McCormick offered additional testimony regarding the video. Detective McCormick testified that Burns’ security system stores recordings on “a Cloud,” where the recording cannot be edited. Id. at 93. Burns showed Detective McCormick the video on Burns’ cellphone, and the video contained a timestamp; however, the timestamp does not appear on Exhibit 17. After Burns shared the video with Detective McCormick, Detective McCormick “downloaded” it to Burns’ “phone storage” and emailed it to the police department. Id. at 93. Detective McCormick further testified that the system was a Google product, which was contrary to Burns’ testimony that the system was not a Google product.

[11] After the State elicited Burns’ and Detective McCormick's testimony—but before the State moved to admit Exhibit 17 into evidence—Boyd argued that the exhibit should not be admitted. The trial court excused the jury to hear argument.

[12] Boyd argued that the State had not laid an adequate foundation under the silent witness theory for Exhibit 17 because: (1) Burns incorrectly testified that the security system was not a Google product; (2) Exhibit 17 did not contain a timestamp; and (3) the State edited Exhibit 17 to produce an additional exhibit, State's Exhibit 19, which was the same as Exhibit 17 but “cropp[ed]” so that the shooting appeared “bigger on the screen.”  ¹ Id. at 107.

[13] The trial court stated,

[T]he Court is satisfied [the State has] laid [a] proper foundation that it's reliable, that it hasn't been doctored or in any way been manipulated or changed so 17 is going to come in when [the State] move[s], [the Defense will] object and we'll incorporate all of this argument.

Id. at 118. The trial court then returned the jury to the courtroom.

[14] When the State later moved to admit Exhibit 17, Boyd objected and requested to again address the trial court “outside the presence of the jury.” Id. at 134. The following exchange took place:

COURT: The objection is overruled, I'm incorporating all of the previous argument, do you want to add anything else?

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I do outside the presence of the jury.

COURT: Just make the argument now.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Judge, you can't talk about in front of the jury what we do outside their presence and that's what the State has done, that's not allowed, and we don't talk about legal principles in front of these people, there's a reason we do it outside the presence of the jury so that they don't think we're trying to hide something, the rules of evidence govern what we do and its impermissible to make legal arguments in front of these people.

COURT: State's 17 is admitted over the objection of the defense.

Id. Exhibit 17 was then played for the jury.

[15] Boyd testified and claimed that he shot Hale in self-defense. According to Boyd, Hale threatened to shoot Boyd and Nakia at the event center and had threatened to shoot Boyd on previous occasions based on Boyd's previous relationship with Givens. Boyd testified that he was carrying a firearm because he felt “uncomfortable” after these interactions with Hale. Tr. Vol. III p. 9. Boyd claimed that, after leaving the event center, he hid behind a truck and heard Hale ask someone nearby where Boyd had gone. Boyd then shot Hale because Boyd felt “scared,” and “it was either me or him.” Id. at 226. Boyd fled after the shooting because he feared others would shoot at him, and he later “got rid of” the gun. Id. at 8.

[16] The jury found Boyd guilty of murder, and Boyd subsequently pleaded guilty to the firearm enhancement. Boyd was sentenced to sixty years for murder, plus five years for the firearm enhancement, for a total sentence of sixty-five years executed in the Department of Correction. Boyd now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

I. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Boyd's request to supplement his argument against the admission of the security system video outside the presence of the jury.

[17] We first address Boyd's argument that the trial court erred by refusing to permit Boyd to supplement his argument against the admission of the security system video outside the jury's presence when the video was offered into evidence. According to Boyd, “it is not proper to litigate the admissibility of evidence in front of the jury.” Appellant's Br. p. 14.

[18] The decision regarding whether to remove the jury during argument regarding the admissibility of the video was committed to the trial court's discretion. See Hardin v. State, 956 N.E.2d 160, 162 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (“Control and management of the jury are matters generally committed to the trial court's discretion.”) (citing Warren v. State, 757 N.E.2d 995, 1001 (Ind. 2001)).

[19] Here, the trial court gave Boyd an opportunity to argue against the admissibility of the video outside the jury's presence, and this argument spanned approximately ten pages of the trial transcript. When the State moved to admit the video, Boyd again requested to make argument outside of the jury's presence. Boyd on appeal does not identify any new argument he wished to make outside the jury's presence after the State moved to admit the video. When the trial court stated, “make the argument now,” Tr. Vol. II p. 134, Boyd's counsel could have requested a sidebar but instead argued the propriety of arguing his objection to the evidence in the jury's presence. Moreover, at the time the State sought to admit the video, the jury was already familiar with the existence of it through Burns’ testimony, and Madison had testified regarding the shooting depicted therein. We fail to see the harm regarding the jury's exposure to argument concerning the video at this point in the trial. The trial court did not abuse its discretion.

II. The State laid a sufficient foundation for the admission of the security system video as silent witness evidence.

[20] Boyd argues that the trial court erred by admitting the security system video because the State failed to lay a sufficient foundation pursuant to the silent witness theory. He argues that Burns incorrectly testified that the security system was not a Google product, that the video does not contain a timestamp, and that Detective McCormick incorrectly testified that recordings could not be edited while in the Cloud.

[21] We review challenges to the admission of evidence for an abuse of the trial court's discretion. Combs v. State, 168 N.E.3d 985, 990 (Ind. 2021). We will reverse only where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances and the error affects a party's substantial rights. Clark v. State, 994 N.E.2d 252, 259-60 (Ind. 2013). “The effect of an error on a party's substantial rights turns on the probable impact of the impermissible evidence upon the jury in light of all the other evidence at trial.” Gonzales v. State, 929 N.E.2d 699, 702 (Ind. 2010); see Ind. Trial Rule 61; Ind. Appellate Rule 66(A).

[22] The silent witness theory concerns the admission of machine-generated evidence—typically photographs and video recordings—as substantive rather than demonstrative evidence. Knapp v. State, 9 N.E.3d 1274, 1282 (Ind. 2014). Such “[e]vidence offered for substantive purposes acts as a ‘silent witness[ ] as to what activity is being depicted’ whereas evidence offered for demonstrative purposes is merely an ‘aid[ ] that assist[s] in a human witness's testimony.’ ”² Kirby v. State, 217 N.E.3d 575, 583 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (quoting Knapp, 9 N.E.3d at 1282), trans. denied.

[23] As this Court has held,

[E]vidence Rule 901(a) provides that, “[t]o satisfy the requirement of authenticating or identifying an item of evidence, the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is.” Pursuant to Evidence Rule 901(b)(9), “[i]n order to authenticate videos or photographs using the silent-witness theory, there must be evidence describing the process or system that produced the videos or photographs and showing that the process or system produced an accurate result.” McFall [v. State], 71 N.E.3d [383,] 388 [(Ind. Ct. App. 2017)] (citing Ind. Evid. R. 901(b)(9)).

The silent witness theory requires a proponent of substantive evidence to lay a stronger foundation regarding the evidence's authenticity than if the proponent were offering the evidence merely for demonstrative purposes. See Knapp [ ], 9 N.E.3d [at] 1282 [ ] (explaining that, when a photograph is offered for demonstrative purposes, testimony that the photograph “ ‘accurately depict[s] the scene or occurrence as it appeared at the time in question’ ” is an “adequate foundation” but that when the photograph is offered for substantive purposes, such testimony will often be inadequate on its own because the testifying witness “ ‘was not necessarily there to observe the scene on that day’ ”) (quoting Smith [v. State], 491 N.E.2d [193,] 195-96 [(Ind. 1986)]).

The burden is “ ‘rather strict.’ ” McFall, 71 N.E.3d at 388 (quoting 13 Robert L. Miller, Jr., Indiana Practice, Indiana Evidence § 901.209 (4th ed. 2016)). Our courts have explained:

[T]he proponent must show that the photograph or video was not altered in any significant respect, and the date the photograph or video was taken must be established when relevant. [13 Miller at § 901.209]; see also Wise v. State, 26 N.E.3d 137, 141 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (noting that when automatic cameras are involved, “there should be evidence as to how and when the camera was loaded, how frequently the camera was activated, when the photographs were taken, and the processing and changing of custody of the film after its removal from the camera[ ]” (quotation omitted)), trans. denied.[3] If a foundational requirement is missing, then the surrounding circumstances can be used.

Id.

Though our courts have declined to “ ‘lay down extensive, absolute foundation requirements,’ ” Kindred v. State, 524 N.E.2d 279, 298 (Ind. 1988) (quoting Bergner v. State, 397 N.E.2d 1012, 1017 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979)), ultimately, the proponent must convince the trial court of the silent witness evidence's “competency and authenticity to a relative certainty,” McCallister [v. State], 91 N.E.3d [554,] 562 [(Ind. 2018)]; cf. McFall, 71 N.E.3d at 388 (silent witness theory “requires only that the process or system be described in such a way as to allow the trier of fact to find that it is more likely than not that the system produced an accurate result”). We review the admission of silent witness evidence for an abuse of the trial court's discretion. Id. at 561.

Id. at 584 (footnote omitted).⁴

[24] Here, Burns and Detective McCormick testified that: (1) Exhibit 17 was a video captured by Burns’ home security system on the night of the shooting; (2) Burns was the only person with access to the security system; (3) the system was working properly that night; (4) and the video had not been altered or changed. The security system automatically uploaded recordings, Burns accessed the recording from his cellphone, and Detective McCormick downloaded the recording and emailed it to the police department.

[25] Home security systems such as Burns’ “are widely accessible to the public and are not technically complicated to the average user.” Id. at 588. We are convinced that Burns and Detective McCormick's testimony laid a sufficient foundation for the video's accuracy and chain of custody. See McCallister, 91 N.E.3d at 562 (affirming admission of hotel security recording under silent witness theory when hotel general manager testified that recording was saved to the internet and then transmitted to law enforcement and that recording was accurate); Irwin v. State, 229 N.E.3d 567, 571-72 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (affirming admission of apartment security footage pursuant to silent witness theory when State presented evidence of the location of the system, that landlord was the only person with access to that location, that a law enforcement officer downloaded the footage on the day of the arrest, and that neither the landlord nor the officer altered the footage), trans. denied.

[26] Boyd first argues that the State did not lay a sufficient foundation because Burns testified that his security system was an ADT Nest System and not a “Google Home System,” Tr. Vol. II p. 88, whereas Detective McCormick testified that the Nest system was a Google product. Boyd fails to demonstrate how this affects the foundational requirements to authenticate the video's accuracy or develop a cogent argument with citations. See App. R. 46(A)(8)(a) (providing that the appellant's “argument must contain the contentions of the appellant on the issues presented, supported by cogent reasoning,” and that “[e]ach contention must be supported by citations to the authorities”).

[27] Boyd also points out that Burns and Detective McCormick both testified that the security system video viewed from Burns’ cellphone displayed a timestamp whereas Exhibit 17 does not contain a timestamp. Exhibit 17 depicts Hale being shot in the back in the head in the same manner described by witnesses at trial, and the video was turned over to law enforcement at most only a few hours after the shooting. See Kirby, 217 N.E.3d at 584 (“ ‘[T]he date the photograph or video was taken must be established when relevant.’ ”) (quoting McFall, 71 N.E.3d at 388). Under the facts of this case, we are not persuaded that the absence of a timestamp on Exhibit 17 demonstrates that the exhibit was “altered in any significant respect” or undermines the video's “competency and “authenticity[.]” McFall, 71 N.E.3d at 388; McCallister, 91 N.E.3d at 562; see also Hamilton v. State, 182 N.E.3d 936, 938-41 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (affirming admission of copy of home security recording where witnesses testified that original recording contained an accurate timestamp, although timestamp had been cropped out of copy).

[28] Lastly, Boyd argues that Detective McCormick was unaware of “software that can edit files on the Cloud.” Appellant's Br. p. 11. But nothing suggests such software was used here. See McFall, 71 N.E.3d at 388 (noting that the proponent need only show that it is more likely than not that the system produced an accurate result”). We, therefore, conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the video.

[29] Moreover, any error in the admission of the video was harmless. “The improper admission of evidence is harmless error when the conviction is supported by such substantial independent evidence of guilt as to satisfy the reviewing court that there is no substantial likelihood that the questioned evidence contributed to the conviction.” Pelissier v. State, 122 N.E.3d 983, 988 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied. “The erroneous admission of evidence may also be harmless if that evidence is cumulative of other evidence admitted.” Id.

[30] The depictions in the video were cumulative of other evidence admitted here. Madison testified that he saw Hale get “shot in the back of the head” and then saw Boyd running away. Tr. Vol. II p. 133. Brianna testified that she saw Boyd shoot Hale in the back of the head. Both testified that the shooting took place at the location depicted in the video. Boyd, for his part, did not even contest that he shot Hale. Instead, Boyd argued that he shot Hale in self-defense.⁵ Thus, there is “no substantial likelihood” that the video “contributed to the conviction.” Pelissier, 122 N.E.3d at 988.

Conclusion

[31] The trial court did not abuse its discretion by declining to remove the jury for supplemental argument regarding the admission of the security system video. Further, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the video. Accordingly, we affirm.

[32] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The trial court ultimately excluded Exhibit 19 because it was not produced to Boyd during discovery.

2.   For example, one notable treatise has observed:When properly authenticated, admissibility of photographic evidence may be based on two different theories: (1) one theory is the pictorial testimony theory, which provides photographic evidence is merely illustrative of a witness's testimony, and it only becomes admissible when a sponsoring witness can testify that it is a fair and accurate representation of the subject matter, based on that witness's personal observation, and thus, the evidence is merely illustrative of a witness's testimony, and (2) a second theory is the silent witness theory, which provides the photographic evidence is a silent witness, which speaks for itself, and is substantive evidence of what it portrays independent of a sponsoring witness.29A Am. Jur. 2d Evidence § 956.

3.   We note that the foundation requirements of the silent witness theory evolved from when manual loading of film into a camera was necessary, but technology has changed significantly since that time.

4.   The case at hand is not a typical silent witness theory case because, in addition to being recorded by Burns’ security system, the shooting was observed by testifying witnesses. See Stott v. State, 174 N.E.3d 236, 245 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (noting that “[w]hat matters for foundational purposes is that no testifying witness was [present] to observe the scene the photographs depict”). Because the video was admitted for substantive purposes, however, we conclude that the silent witness theory “provides an adequate framework for the present case.” See Wise, 26 N.E.3d at 142 (holding that, although admission of videos—which were recorded by the victim from the defendant's cellphone using a camcorder—was not an “especially neat fit” for the silent witness theory because the evidence did not concern “automated, unwitnessed video,” court would analyze the evidence under the silent witness theory because “[t]he foundation and confrontation aspects of the theory are largely on all-fours with the nature of the recordings here”).

5.   Boyd does not argue that the State presented insufficient evidence to negate his self-defense claim.

Tavitas, Judge.

Judges Vaidik and Felix concur. Vaidik, J., and Felix, J., concur.