WOODS v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Dominick Woods appeals his convictions for Class A misdemeanor battery against a public safety official and the jury's verdict finding him guilty of Class B misdemeanor disorderly conduct, arguing the evidence was insufficient to support either charge. We affirm but remand for correction of the sentencing order and related chronological case summary entry related to the merger of the disorderly conduct offense and improper “Judgment” entry.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department (IMPD) Officer Patrick Tieken reported to the Metro Nightclub on Massachusetts Avenue in the early morning hours following reports that a large crowd was forming outside the club as it closed.¹ By the time Officer Tieken arrived in full uniform and a marked cruiser, other officers were already conducting crowd control. Officer Tieken and two other officers wore active body cameras during their interactions with the crowd. The officers issued several verbal commands for the patrons to leave the area. Many refused and expressed hostility to the officers. See generally State's Exhibits 1-3.

[3] Officer Tieken's body camera footage shows that he encountered Woods from the side and said, “[h]ey, you guys need to go” as he touched Woods's arm. See State's Ex. 3 at 3:08-3:10. Woods yanked his arm away from Officer Tieken and “squared up” to face the officer. Transcript at 120; see State's Ex. 3 at 3:08-3:11. Both men talked over each other using profanities. Woods asked Officer Tieken if he was “ready for this sh**,” and the officer asked Woods if he wanted to go to jail and told him he should start walking away from the area if he did not want to be arrested. Tr. at 118; State's Ex. 3 at 3:11-3:20. As Woods turned away, Officer Tieken touched either his arm or shoulder while telling him to “walk.” See State's Ex. 3 at 3:22-3:25. At that point, Woods's elbow moved backward toward the officer, separation was created between the two, and another officer approached Woods and arrested him. See id. at 3:22-3:35.

[4] The State charged Woods with Count I: Battery Against a Public Safety Official, a Level 6 felony;² and Count II: Disorderly Conduct, a Class B misdemeanor.³ At Woods's jury trial, Officer Tieken testified that when he initially approached Woods and told him to leave, Woods “slap[ped] [his] hand away.” Tr. at 118. He also stated that as he repeated instructions to Woods to leave the area, Woods gave him “kind of an elbow-shoulder to the chest, and ma[de] [him] take a step back, and that's when [the officers] ma[de] the arrest.” Id. Woods testified and denied slapping, striking, or elbowing Officer Tieken. The jury found Woods guilty on both counts.

[5] At the sentencing hearing, the trial court indicated its intent to merge the disorderly conduct with the battery conviction due to double jeopardy concerns. It also entered the battery conviction as a Class A misdemeanor and sentenced Woods to 365 days in jail with six days credit for time served and the remaining time suspended with 180 days probation. Despite the trial court's oral order at sentencing, its chronological case summary (CCS) “Judgment” entry indicated the battery conviction was a “[p]lea by agreement” and noted the disorderly conduct “[c]onviction” was “[m]erged.” Appellant's Appendix Vol. 2 at 15. The court's written sentencing order did not refer to the disorderly conduct finding of guilt or conviction but again indicated that the disposition of the battery conviction was “[p]lea by [a]greement.” See id. at 17-18.

Discussion and Decision

[6] Woods challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury's verdicts finding him guilty on both counts. Sufficiency claims “trigger a deferential standard of review in which we ‘neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility, instead reserving those matters to the province of the jury.’ ” Hancz-Barron v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1237, 1244 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Brantley v. State, 91 N.E.3d 566, 570 (Ind. 2018), reh'g denied, cert. denied). When conducting our review, “we consider only the evidence that supports the jury's determination, not evidence that might undermine it.” Id. We affirm if the probative evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom could have allowed a reasonable jury to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. McHenry v State, 820 N.E.2d 124, 126 (Ind. 2005).

[7] Here, however, Woods argues that we need not defer to the jury's assessment of the evidence because the body camera footage “is clear enough to show indisputably that Woods never made contact with [Officer Tieken].”⁴ Appellant's Amended Brief at 10. Where video evidence is at issue, our Indiana Supreme Court has built a “narrow failsafe” into our standard of review and determined that when the “video evidence indisputably contradicts the trial court's findings, relying on such evidence and reversing the trial court's findings do not constitute reweighing.” Love v. State, 73 N.E.3d 693, 699 (Ind. 2017). Elaborating on this exception, the Supreme Court stated,

in order that the video evidence indisputably contradict the trial court's findings, it must be such that no reasonable person could view the video and conclude otherwise. When determining whether the video evidence is undisputable, a court should assess the video quality including whether the video is grainy or otherwise obscured, the lighting, the angle, the audio and whether the video is a complete depiction of the events at issue, among other things. In cases where the video evidence is somehow not clear or complete or is subject to different interpretations, we defer to the trial court's interpretation.

Id. at 699-700.

[8] In Love, the Supreme Court noted that the video at issue was “dark,” it was “hard to see much,” and the video did not completely depict the relevant events. Id. at 700. The Supreme Court found that the video did not indisputably contradict the trial court's findings. Id. at 700. Similar reasoning applies here. The nighttime incident was dimly lit by streetlights, and Woods acknowledges that Officer Tieken's body camera footage is somewhat blurry.⁵ See Appellant's Am. Br. at 10. While the blurriness is moderate, and we agree with Officer Tieken that “you can still hear and see mainly everything[,]” the video evidence is not a “complete depiction of the events at issue” and does not “indisputably contradict” the jury's findings. Tr. at 117; Love, 73 N.E.3d at 699.

[9] Arguing the body camera footage indisputably shows he did not make physical contact with the Officer Tieken, Woods initially disputes the officer's testimony that Woods “slap[ped] [his] hand away” at the beginning of the altercation. Tr. at 118. But the video evidence shows that Woods yanked his arm away from the officer and does not positively confirm whether Woods slapped or batted the officer's hand away in the process. Woods then “square[d] up to” Officer Tieken and exchanged heated comments with the officer before turning away from him. Id. at 120. Just after Woods turned and Officer Tieken touched his arm, Woods's elbow flashed backward toward the officer, the two separated, and a nearby officer immediately arrested Woods. The precise movement of Woods's elbow or shoulder was not completely visible on the body camera footage, and the foregoing facts give rise to the reasonable inference that Woods did in fact strike Officer Tieken with an elbow or shoulder to the chest. A reasonable person could view the video and agree with the jury's findings that Woods made physical contact with the officer. Thus, we defer to the jury's factual determination regarding the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses. Love, 73 N.E.3d at 700.

[10] Woods does not question the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the other essential elements of the offenses for which he was found guilty. However, we briefly address the totality of the evidence supporting the offenses. To show that Woods committed battery against a public safety official, the State had to prove that he knowingly or intentionally touched Officer Tieken in a rude, insolent, or angry manner while the officer was engaged in his official duties. See Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(c)(1), (e)(2). With respect to the disorderly conduct charge, the State needed to prove that Woods recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally engaged in fighting or tumultuous conduct. See I.C. § 35-45-1-3(a)(1). Under the disorderly conduct statute, “fighting” includes physical altercations only.⁶ Mi.D. v. State, 57 N.E.3d 809, 814 (Ind. 2016) (finding “intentional, point-blank spitting” on another constituted sufficient evidence of fighting). “Tumultuous conduct” means “conduct that results in, or is likely to result in, serious bodily injury to a person or substantial damage to property.” I.C. § 35-45-1-1; see Bailey v. State, 907 N.E.2d 1003, 1006-07 (Ind. 2009) (finding sufficient evidence that serious bodily injury was likely to result when the defendant threw down his drink and coat, stepped toward the Dean of Students with clenched fists at his sides, and let out a series of obscenities).

[11] Without reweighing the evidence or judging witness credibility, we conclude that the trial testimony and body camera footage amounted to sufficient evidence upon which the jury could find Woods guilty of battery against a public safety official and disorderly conduct. Given his heated interaction with Officer Tieken culminating in an elbow or shoulder to the officer's chest, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude Woods battered Officer Tieken. Furthermore, in the context of a large crowd of patrons growing increasingly hostile outside Metro Nightclub as the bar was closing—many of whom failed to disperse and were argumentative with officers—we conclude there was sufficient evidence to show Woods's verbal and physical escalation with Officer Tieken constituted disorderly conduct by fighting or tumultuous conduct.

[12] While we affirm his battery conviction and conclude sufficient evidence supports the jury's guilty verdict on disorderly conduct, we remand this matter for the trial court to clarify its sentencing order and related CCS entry. Here, the trial court's written sentencing order serves as the judgment of conviction.⁷ See Woodcox v. State, 30 N.E.3d 748, 751 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (finding a written sentencing order included “the necessary information to qualify as the judgment of conviction”). The sentencing order reflects that Woods was only sentenced for the battery conviction, which appears clearly in line with the trial court's intent. However, while the sentencing order omits any reference to a conviction or guilty verdict related to the disorderly conduct offense, the CCS “Judgment” entry lists disorderly conduct and states “[c]onviction [m]erged” without referencing vacatur. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 15. “If a trial court does not formally enter a judgment of conviction on a jury verdict of guilty, then there is no requirement that the trial court vacate the ‘conviction,’ and merger is appropriate” to remedy double jeopardy concerns. Kovats v. State, 982 N.E.2d 409, 414 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). But “if the trial court does enter judgment of conviction on a jury's guilty verdict, then simply merging the offenses is insufficient and vacation of the offense is required.” Id. at 414-15. The inconsistencies between the trial court's sentencing order and CCS entry create confusion as to whether the court meant to enter judgment of conviction on the disorderly conduct verdict and how it intended to resolve its double jeopardy concerns. We remand for the court to clarify its sentencing order and related CCS entry in this regard. The court should also address its incorrect references to the disposition of Count I as a “[p]lea by [a]greement[.]” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 15, 17.

Conclusion

[13] We affirm Woods's conviction for battery against a public safety official and conclude sufficient evidence supports the jury's guilty verdict on the disorderly conduct charge. However, we remand for clarification and correction of the sentencing order and related CCS entry in a manner consistent with this opinion.

[14] Affirmed in part, remanded in part.

FOOTNOTES

1.   At trial, Officer Tieken testified that the IMPD has “no tolerance [for] fighting and disorderly conduct” and it “proactively tr[ies] to stop [large] crowds from ever happening to protect everyone[,]” particularly around the time when bars are closing in downtown Indianapolis. Transcript at 109-110. He also testified that in the weeks before the incident the IMPD had placed additional officers near the Metro Nightclub “because of the rise in violence ․ there.” Id. at 110.

2.   Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(c)(1), (e)(2).

3.   Ind. Code § 35-45-1-3(a)(1).

4.   Woods asserts that both the battery and disorderly conduct offenses “require that Woods touched Officer Tieken.” Appellant's Am. Br. at 10. However, the State charged and argued that Woods committed disorderly conduct by fighting or tumultuous conduct, the latter of which does not necessarily require a touching. See I.C. § 35-45-1-1 (“As used in this chapter: ‘Tumultuous conduct’ means conduct that results in, or is likely to result in, serious bodily injury to a person or substantial damage to property.”).

5.   At trial, the officer explained that the video was blurry because his body camera had been mounted slightly out of place.

6.   In its closing argument, the State clarified: “So the fighting that the State is arguing that he engaged in wasn't with the other patrons of the bar. It was with Officer Tieken.” Tr. at 174.

7.   Pursuant to Indiana Code section 35-38-3-2(b), the judgment must include:(1) the crime for which the convicted person is adjudged guilty and the classification of the criminal offense;(2) the period, if any, for which the person is rendered incapable of holding any office of trust or profit;(3) the amount of the fines or costs (including fees) assessed, if any, whether or not the convicted person is indigent, and the method by which the fines or costs (including fees) are to be satisfied;(4) the amount of credit time earned for time spent in confinement before sentencing, including time on pretrial home detention; and(5) the amount to be credited toward payment of the fines or costs (including fees) for time spent in confinement before sentencing.

DeBoer, Judge.

Altice, C.J., and Pyle, J., concur.