MCCANDLESS v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Jeremy McCandless was charged with molesting his niece, C.W., when she was between five and nine years old. During the proceedings, he sent a letter to the trial court proclaiming his innocence and blaming the molestations on another man. Ultimately, he pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement. At his change of plea hearing, McCandless admitted that he had committed child molesting, he was entering into the plea agreement knowingly and voluntarily, and he made no further proclamations of innocence. However, during his presentence investigation (PSI) interview, McCandless again proclaimed his innocence. Later, he indicated he wanted to withdraw his guilty plea, but the trial court denied his request and sentenced McCandless to twenty years in the Indiana Department of Correction (DOC). McCandless appeals, raising one issue, which we restate as whether the trial court abused its discretion by failing to allow McCandless to withdraw his guilty plea in light of his proclamations of innocence. Finding no error, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On October 2, 2023, a Pike County Sheriff's Office deputy received a report of possible child molestation from the Indiana Department of Child Services (DCS). An employee of the Southwestern Indiana Child Advocacy Center Coalition (Child Advocacy Center) interviewed C.W. who reported being molested by her uncle, later identified as McCandless.

[3] In her interview, C.W. stated that when she was between five and nine years old, she spent time with her aunt and McCandless while her mother worked. During these times, McCandless groped and touched her. C.W. recalled an incident when McCandless inappropriately touched her while she lay next to her sleeping aunt and she “climbed up by her aunt for safety.” Appellant's Appendix Vol. 2 at 23. She stated that McCandless made her take baths with him and “touch[ed] her [vaginal] areas[,]” and “put his hands in there[.]” Id. at 24. She relayed that normally he sat behind her in the bathtub, but she “faced him three or four times.” Id. One time, C.W.’s aunt walked in on this happening but “ignored it.” Id. at 26. C.W. remembered the bath incidents happening “up to 5 or 6 times.” Id. at 25.

[4] She also recalled a specific occasion where she “looked him in the eyes and [McCandless] made [her] put [his penis] in her mouth.” Id. at 26. McCandless told her not to tell anyone about his conduct because “it was their secret and their time.” Id. When C.W. was nine years old, DCS “got involved” and the abuse ended. Id. at 27.

[5] As amended, the State charged McCandless with Count I: Child Molesting,¹ a Level 1 felony; Count II: Child Molesting (fondling),² a Class C felony; and Count III: Child Molesting (fondling), a Level 4 felony.³ On August 26, 2024, McCandless sent a letter to the trial court proclaiming his innocence. He claimed he was never around C.W. and she was molested by another man, R.C. See Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 69-71. Three days later, defense counsel told the trial court that McCandless rejected the State's plea offer and the case was set for trial.

[6] Approximately one month later, McCandless changed his position and pled guilty to Level 1 felony child molesting pursuant to a plea agreement that called for a minimum sentence of twenty years in prison and dismissed the remaining counts with prejudice. At the change of plea hearing, McCandless told the trial court that he read and signed the plea agreement, discussed it with his attorney, knowingly and voluntarily entered into it, understood that he was waiving his right to a jury trial, and admitted that he knowingly submitted to oral sex with a juvenile under fourteen years old with intent to satisfy his sexual desires. When the trial court asked McCandless if he had anything to add or tell the trial court about the crime, McCandless responded “[n]o.” Tr. at 22. The trial court accepted McCandless's guilty plea.

[7] Before sentencing, a probation officer interviewed McCandless for a PSI report. During the interview, McCandless once again proclaimed his innocence and told the probation officer that R.C. committed the offense. He also admitted to the probation officer that he had failed a polygraph examination. The probation officer noted these claims in the PSI.

[8] Shortly before the sentencing hearing, McCandless told his attorney that he wanted to withdraw his guilty plea. The trial court continued the sentencing hearing to allow McCandless time to file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. In his December 4 motion, McCandless claimed he was “adamant about his innocence” and only pled guilty because he was “afraid of losing at trial.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 150. The motion further stated,

[c]ombined with the failed polygraph and the Defendant's statement that he feared losing at trial, [defense counsel] reasonably believed the Defendant was voluntarily admitting guilt. That said, there is no way to know what is in the heart and mind of an individual with absolute certainty. The Defendant's statement in the presentence report combined [with] his expressed desire to withdraw his plea and go to trial; contrasted with his factual basis during the plea hearing leads to the impression that Mr. McCandless was hoping to cut his losses by accepting the minimum sentence rather than take the matter before a jury. He subsequently regretted his decision and voiced his desire to try this matter to a jury even with the stipulated polygraph failure because he is sure of his innocence.

[9] Id. at 151. McCandless signed an affidavit in which he claimed he was innocent but pled guilty “out of self-preservation” rather than risk a guilty verdict and a potential fifty-year sentence. Id. at 154. He also acknowledged he could be charged with perjury for signing the affidavit. On December 10, the trial court denied McCandless's motion to withdraw his guilty plea and sentenced him to twenty years in the DOC. McCandless appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[10] McCandless argues that the trial court abused its discretion by not allowing him to withdraw his guilty plea even though he professed his innocence after his change of plea. He claims that the trial court was required to do so to correct a manifest injustice. We disagree.

After entry of a guilty plea but before sentencing, a trial court may allow a defendant to withdraw the plea “for any fair and just reason unless the state has been substantially prejudiced by reliance upon the defendant's plea.” Ind. Code § 35-35-1-4(b). But a trial court is required to grant such a motion to “correct a manifest injustice.” Id. A trial court's ruling on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea before sentencing is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Smallwood v. State, 773 N.E.2d 259, 264 (Ind. 2002). Such rulings come before an appellate court with a presumption in their favor. See Johnson v. State, 734 N.E.2d 242, 245 (Ind. 2000). “Rulings on motions to withdraw guilty pleas are presumptively valid, and parties appealing an adverse decision must prove the court has abused its discretion.” Asher v. State, 128 N.E.3d 526, 530 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (citing Davis v. State, 770 N.E.2d 319, 326 (Ind. 2002), reh'g denied). Thus, a defendant attempting to overturn a trial court's decision on this issue “faces a high hurdle.” Gross v. State, 22 N.E.3d 863, 868 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied. Rulings based on conflicting evidence will not be disturbed. See Johnson v. State, 734 N.E.2d 242, 245 (Ind. 2000). Nor will we disturb such a ruling where the State would be substantially prejudiced. See Smallwood, 773 N.E.2d at 264.

[11] McCandless wrote a letter to the court proclaiming his innocence in the weeks leading up to his guilty plea. While McCandless argues this should have put the trial court “on notice to conduct more than a cursory inquiry” at the change of plea hearing, he directs us to no precedent mandating a trial court to conduct its proceedings differently based on such claims of innocence. Appellant's Br. at 14. He does not cite to, nor can we find, any precedent standing for the proposition that denying the withdrawal of a guilty plea despite a pre-plea proclamation of innocence constitutes manifest injustice. See Jeffries v. State, 966 N.E.2d 773, 778 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (“Instances of manifest injustice may include any of the following, none of which are present here: a defendant is denied the effective assistance of counsel, the plea was not entered or ratified by the defendant, the plea was not knowingly and voluntarily made, the prosecutor failed to abide by the terms of the plea agreement, or the plea and judgment of conviction are void or voidable.”), trans. denied.

[12] McCandless believes his case is different because he sent a letter to the trial court several weeks before his change of plea, affirmatively proclaiming his innocence. But at the change of plea hearing, McCandless told the trial court that he: read and signed the plea agreement containing a written waiver of rights; conferred with defense counsel; agreed to waive his rights to a trial and to compel witnesses to testify in his defense; denied any promises or threats were made to coerce his plea; affirmed he wished to plead guilty to Level 1 felony child molesting with a sentencing range of twenty to fifty years; and agreed to be bound by the plea agreement if it was accepted by the trial court. See Tr. at 20-22. The State set the factual basis and McCandless agreed that being over twenty-one years old, he knowingly and with intent to satisfy his sexual desires, submitted to oral sex with C.W., a juvenile under fourteen years old. Then the trial court asked defense counsel if he had any questions for McCandless about the factual basis, and he replied he did not. McCandless also declined the court's offer to allow him to provide additional information about the crime.

[13] McCandless's post-plea assertion of innocence “does not require the trial court to set aside an otherwise knowing and voluntary guilty plea.” Knight v. State, 202 N.E.3d 475, 480-81 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), trans. denied. Again, McCandless does not dispute that his plea was knowing and voluntary. In the affidavit that accompanied his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, McCandless indicated that it had been his strategic decision to plead guilty rather than face a potential sentence greater than twenty years if he lost at trial. “A plea of guilty entered due to the threat of a higher sentence does not render the plea involuntary.” Watson v. State, 526 N.E.2d 701, 703 (Ind. 1988). McCandless's fear of losing at trial is not a fair or just reason to permit withdrawal of a guilty plea since “these types of pressures are normal ones that face any defendant when considering a plea offer.” Knight, 202 N.E.3d at 481.

[14] McCandless again asserted his innocence during a PSI interview, but a panel of our Court rejected a claim that a guilty plea should be invalidated on this basis. See Mayberry v. State, 542 N.E.2d 1359, 1360-61 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989), trans. denied. Protestations of innocence that “find their way into the record through presentence reports are fraught with the opportunity for too much mischief.” Moredock v. State, 540 N.E.2d 1230, 1231 (Ind. 1989) (holding that a trial court may accept a guilty plea from a defendant who tells a probation officer in the presentence investigation interview that he did not commit the crime), reh'g denied.

[15] We also refute McCandless's argument that his admission of guilt was unreliable.⁴ Substantial evidence exists painting McCandless as the perpetrator of these crimes. In his pre-plea letter to the trial court, McCandless presented the identity of a person he claimed committed these crimes and claimed that person molested C.W. while wearing a mask. Based on the number of incidents, the specificity with which C.W. detailed the molestations, and C.W.’s clear identification of McCandless as her abuser, we find there was adequate evidence presented to support that McCandless was in fact the perpetrator. See Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 25. During her interview with Child Advocacy Center, C.W. did not make any statements about the perpetrator wearing a mask during the attacks, indicate doubt as to the perpetrator's identity, or mention R.C.’s name. Other witnesses also refuted McCandless's claim that he was never around C.W. They told detectives that C.W. was around McCandless for years and they detailed the physical abuse they and C.W. suffered at McCandless's hands. See id. at 28-34.

[16] Finally, we reject McCandless's claim that he consistently maintained his innocence. See Ellis v. State, 67 N.E.3d 643, 650 (Ind. 2017) (citing Carter v. State, 739 N.E.2d 126, 129 (Ind. 2000)) (stating a “trial court may not accept a guilty plea that is accompanied by a denial of guilt[,]” but this only applies “upon the protestation of innocence occurring at the same time the defendant attempts to enter the plea”). McCandless entered his guilty plea without conditions or mention of his innocence. Thus, we conclude that the trial court's denial of McCandless's motion to withdraw his guilty plea was not an abuse of discretion as no manifest injustice occurred.

Conclusion

[17] The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied McCandless's request to withdraw his guilty plea.

[18] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-42-4-3(a)(1).

2.   I.C. § 35-42-4-3(b)

3.   C.W. was ages five through nine between 2013 and 2017. The Indiana General Assembly changed felony statutes effective July 1, 2014 to designate felonies as numbers, rather than by letters. Thus, Count II was charged to account for acts occurring before July 1, 2014 and Count III was charged to account for acts occurring after that date. C.W. recalled one specific act constituting a violation of Indiana Code section 35-42-4-3(a), occurring in October 2015; thus, the State only charged McCandless with the post-2014 statute for Count I. See Appellant's Appendix Vol. 2 at 48-49.

4.   To the extent that McCandless challenges the sufficiency of the factual basis supporting his guilty plea, such challenges are not available on direct appeal. See Stanley v. State, 849 N.E.2d 626, 630 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (holding the appellant's argument that the factual basis supporting his habitual offender admission was insufficient was not properly before our Court on direct appeal). Even if it were, “claims about omissions in the factual basis have been unavailing when the omissions do not seem to demonstrate doubt about actual guilt.” State v. Cooper, 935 N.E.2d 146, 150 (Ind. 2010). Here, the prosecutor read the factual allegations contained in the information and McCandless admitted to the allegations, so we are confident that an adequate factual basis to support the entry of the guilty plea was established. See Ellis v. State, 67 N.E.3d 643, 646-47 (Ind. 2017).

DeBoer, Judge.

Altice, C.J., and Pyle, J., concur.